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  1. Empathy and Anastomosis: On the Empathetic Interpretation of Universal Archetypes.Jeffery Childers - manuscript
    This work deconstructs the subjective experience, and identifies the role of empathy in experience as being capable of reconciling the mob mindedness that accompanies ideologies. The essence of the paper is to discuss and elucidate the societal impact of empathetic being, and the correlation with such states of being as an avenue for learning which identifies and interprets reality rather than realizing it. The idea is that by empathetically interpreting our experience and empathetically informing our modes of expression, one becomes (...)
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  2. Against the Diversity Objection to Group Worldview Description.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays the group as homogeneous.
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  3. “Everyone Knows X”: Analytic Philosophy, Medicine, and Lacanian Psychoanalysis.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This is a one page handout presenting different attempts to understand claims of the form "Everyone knows X.".
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  4. Believing is Said of Groups in Many Ways (and so It Should Be Said of Them in None).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...)
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  5. Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief: A DDL Approach.Proietti Carlo - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  6. An Introduction to Collective Intentionality: In Action, Thought, and Society.Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    This is an introduction to collective intentionality. It discusses collection action and intention, collective belief, distributed cognition, collective intentionality and language, conventions and status functions, institutions and social ontology, and collective responsibility.
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  7. Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Justification.Lukas Schwengerer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Jennifer Lackey challenged group acceptance accounts of justification by arguing that these accounts make the possession of evidence arbitrary and hence lead to illegitimate manipulation of the group's evidence. She proposes that the only way out is to rely on the epistemic propriety of the individual group members, which leads to a dilemma for group acceptance views: either they are wrong about justification, or they cease to rely only on group acceptances. I argue that there is a third option based (...)
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  8. Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1153-1173.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
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  9. Can Groups Be Genuine Believers? The Argument From Interpretationism.Marvin Backes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10311-10329.
    In ordinary discourse we often attribute beliefs not just to individuals but also to groups. But can groups really have genuine beliefs? This paper considers but ultimately rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can be genuine believers – the Argument From Interpretationism – and concludes that we have good reasons to be sceptical about the existence of group beliefs. According to the Argument From Interpretationism, roughly speaking, groups qualify as genuine believers because we (...)
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  10. Group Belief: Defending a Minimal Version of Summativism.Domingos Faria - 2021 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (1):82-93.
    Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...)
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  11. Deslimitando a Sosa. Diacronía y Colectividad del Juicio Doxástico.Jesus Navarro & Dani Pino - 2021 - In Modesto Gómez-Alonso & David Perez Chico (eds.), Ernesto Sosa. Conocimiento y Virtud. Zaragoza, España: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. pp. 211-244.
    Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...)
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  12. Can a Wise Society Be Free? Gilbert, Group Knowledge and Democratic Theory.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - Ethics, Politics and Society 3:28-48.
    Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize (...)
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  13. AS SOMBRAS CEGAS DE NARCISO (um estudo psicossocial sobre o imaginário coletivo).Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à Vista.
    No presente trabalho, vamos abordar algumas das questões essenciais sobre o imaginário coletivo e suas relações com a realidade e a verdade. Devemos encarar esse assunto em uma estrutura conceptual, seguida pela análise factual correspondente às realidades comportamentais demonstráveis. Adotaremos não apenas a metodologia, mas principalmente os princípios e proposições da filosofia analítica, que com certeza serão evidentes ao longo do estudo e podem ser identificados pelos recursos descritos por Perez[1] : Rabossi (1975) defende a ideia de que a filosofia (...)
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  14. Apperceptive Patterning: Artefaction, Extensional Beliefs and Cognitive Scaffolding.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History 16 (1):125-178.
    In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This (...)
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  15. Intra-Group Disagreement and Conciliationism.Nathan Sheff - 2020 - In J. Adam Carter & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 90-102.
    Conciliationists about peer disagreement claim that, when epistemic peers (that is, people who are equally intelligent, aware of the same relevant evidence, and so on) disagree, the rational response is for each to lower their confidence in their initial views – perhaps even suspending judgment on the matter entirely. While conciliationism in cases of disagreement among individual peers remains controversial, the case for conciliation in other types of disagreement has been underexplored. This chapter aims to explore this territory, making the (...)
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  16. Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
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  17. Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  18. Staying True with the Help of Others: Doxastic Self-Control Through Interpersonal Commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
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  19. Agential Insensitivity and Socially Supported Ignorance.Lauren Woomer - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):73-91.
    In this paper, I identify a form of epistemic insensitivity that occurs when someone fails to make proper use of the epistemic tools at their disposal in order to bring their beliefs in line with epistemically relevant evidence that is available to them. I call this kind of insensitivity agential insensitivity because it stems from the epistemic behavior of an individual agent. Agential insensitivity can manifest as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or appropriately interpret evidence (...)
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  20. Introduction to the Special Issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of (...)
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  21. The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, Tina Besley & Mats Hyvonen (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: Viral Modernity & Higher Education. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 43-58.
    Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...)
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  22. Reputation and Group Dispositions.Andrés Páez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):469-484.
    In many contexts, such as business, science and law, it is essential to determine whether a company, a product or a person in fact has the reputation attributed to it, regardless of whether that reputation has been rightly earned. In this paper I offer two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the attribution of a reputation to a subject within a social group. The first one concerns the way in which reputational information is spread among the members of the relevant (...)
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  23. Trump, Propaganda, and the Politics of Ressentiment.Cory Wimberly - 2018 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32 (1):179.
    This article frames Trump's politics through a genealogy of propaganda, going back to P.T. Barnum in the 19th century and moving through the crowd psychologist Gustave Le Bon and the public relations counsel Edward Bernays in the 20th. This genealogy shows how propaganda was developed as a tool by eager professionals who would hire themselves to the elite to control the masses. Trump’s propaganda presents a break in that he has not only removed professionals from control over his propaganda, he (...)
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  24. Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Current scientific research almost always requires collaboration among several (if not several hundred) specialized researchers. When scientists co-author a journal article, who deserves credit for discoveries or blame for errors? How should scientific institutions promote fruitful collaborations among scientists? In this book, leading philosophers of science address these critical questions.
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  25. Do Corporations Have Minds of Their Own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.
    Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in (...)
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  26. What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2017 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peters (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.
    This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...)
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  27. Крим як Храмова гора.Ruslana Demchuk - 2016 - NaUKMA Research Papers. History and Theory of Culture 179:10-17.
    «Крим як Храмова гора» – новітній дискурс, артикульований російським президентом Путіним як ідеологічне прикриття анексії Криму 2014 р., що виступає пролонгацією «кримського міфу». Зазначений міф представлений дискурсами «Легендарний Севастополь» у радянський та «Крим наш» у пострадянський періоди. Компенсаторні дискурси започатковано трагічними подіями Кримської війни (1853–1856 рр.) як сублімація посттравматичної ментальності, обумовлена низкою військових та політичних поразок Росії на території Кримського півострова. Експресивні репрезентації образу Севастополя через пісенний інтертекст, передусім, стосуються російської «сакральної географії». Таким чином, тривалий «севастопольський» дискурс структурувався як антиукраїнський, (...)
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  28. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  29. Collective Intentionality.Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - In Lee McIntyre & Alex Rosenberg (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Social Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 214-227.
    In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, status functions, norms, institutions, and shared attitudes more generally. Collective action and shared intention play a foundational role in our understanding of the social. -/- The three central questions in the study of collective intentionality are: -/- (1) What is the ontology of collective intentionality? In particular, are groups per se intentional agents, as opposed to just their individual members? (2) What is the psychology of (...)
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  30. What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
    This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—_inflationary_ views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and _deflationary_ views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an altogether different place for an adequate account of justified group belief. (...)
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  31. Essays in Collective Epistemology Edited by Jennifer Lackey, Ed. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):105-108.
  32. Collective Belief, Kuhn, and the String Theory Community.James Owen Weatherall & Margaret Gilbert - 2016 - In Michael S. Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-217.
    One of us [Gilbert, M.. “Collective Belief and Scientific Change.” Sociality and Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 37-49.] has proposed that ascriptions of beliefs to scientific communities generally involve a common notion of collective belief described by her in numerous places. A given collective belief involves a joint commitment of the parties, who thereby constitute what Gilbert refers to as a plural subject. Assuming that this interpretive hypothesis is correct, and that some of the belief ascriptions in question are (...)
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  33. Developing Community Epistemic Capacities.Ian Werkheiser - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (2):97-101.
  34. Disagreement and Authority: Comparing Ecclesial and Scientific Practices.Louis Caruana - 2015 - In A. J. Carroll, M. Kerkwijk, M. Kirwan & J. Sweeney (eds.), Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 91-102.
    In recent years, disagreement as a philosophical topic has started to attract considerable attention, giving rise to rich debates not only on the logical nature of disagreement but also on specifically political and religious forms of it. Moreover, in some recent documents of the Catholic Church, we see corresponding attempts at understanding religious pluralism, dialogue among religions, and doctrinal tensions that sometimes arise within various parts of the Church itself. In such debates, many assume that the realm of the humanities (...)
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  35. Friends with Benefits! Distributed Cognition Hooks Up Cognitive and Social Conceptions of Science.P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1114-1127.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
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  36. Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases.Uwe Peters - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):1-16.
    The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.
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  37. Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...)
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  38. Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.
  39. Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds.Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):17-31.
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...)
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  40. Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
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  41. When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
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  42. A DDL Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief.Carlo Proietti & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):499-515.
  43. Against Group Cognitive States.Robert D. Rupert - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 97-111.
  44. Plural Self-Awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) (...)
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  45. The Adaptive Function of Distributed Remembering: Contributions to the Formation of Collective Memory. [REVIEW]Martin M. Fagin, Jeremy K. Yamashiro & William C. Hirst - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):91-106.
    Empirical research has increasingly turned its attention to distributed cognition. Acts of remembering are embedded in a social, interactional context; cognitive labor is divided between a rememberer and external sources. The present article examines the benefits and costs associated with distributed, collaborative, conversational remembering. Further, we examine the consequences of joint acts of remembering on subsequent individual acts of remembering. Here, we focus on influences on memory through social contagion and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. Extending beyond a single social interaction, (...)
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  46. Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):1-24.
    According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research, while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incorporate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing, as we witness an increasing level (...)
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  47. Emanuele Bardone: Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition: Cognitive Systems Monographs, Volume 13, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011, ISBN 978-3-642-19632-4, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19633-1.Merja Bauters - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (2):257-264.
    The use of intuition and emotion in reasoning or in building hypothesis has been discussed through varied approaches within many disciplines. Emanuele Bardone provides new insights into these issues, such as the idea of human cognition as a chance-seeking system. This perspective creates a new framework when considering the decision-making and problem solving challenges. One of the key concepts that Bardone discusses at length is affordances, the relation of affordances to abduction and to the eco-cognitive niche. Worth mentioning are also: (...)
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  48. Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality.Gerald Gaus - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group (...)
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  49. Subject, Mode and Content in We-Intentions.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind 2.
  50. Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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