Background: Despite an increase in health research conducted in Africa, there are still inadequate human resources with research ethics training and lack of local long-term training opportunities in research ethics. A research ethics training program named United States-Mali Research Ethics Training Program (US-Mali RETP) was established through a partnership between the George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health (GWSPH), USA and University of Sciences, Techniques & Technologies of Bamako (USTTB), to address the critical need for improved bioethics training, (...) leadership, and policy in Mali. Methods: The aims of the capacity building programme are achieved by leveraging US and Africa-based expertise to strengthen research ethics education and capacity through: (1) intensive faculty development to design ethics training curricula; (2) development of a research ethics specialization within the existing Masters of Public Health program (MPH); and (3) establishing professional development courses through short-term training workshops and webinars to address research and professional needs in ethics. Results: The program will strengthen USTTB’s capacity of research ethics by training at least 15 MPH students over 5 years to prepare the next generation of ethics researchers. During the first two years of the program, a new ethics training curricula was developed, two cohorts of Master’s students were enrolled, and a series of webinars and workshops were conducted with participation of Malian and international researchers. Conclusions: US-Mali RETP will promote a sustainable bioethics enterprise at USTTB, and enable dissemination of research ethics training to increase health research capacity in Mali. (shrink)

The Shadow of God combines history and philosophy in a way that is, unlike Hegel, fundamentally pluralistic. It presents the period of German Idealism as a time when philosophers aimed to bring faith and reason together through the idea of autonomy. At the same time, the tensions endemic in that process led to a transfer of individual hope from an afterlife of reward or punishment to participation in a collective, historical process. This article responds to a series of critical questions: (...) Does the book assimilate consolation and reconciliation? Does it sufficiently distinguish knowledge and justification? Does it open the possibility for a reaffirmation of the individual? Does it underestimate the potential for a secularized Kantian philosophy to bring together equality, justification, and community? Does its interpretation of Kant give a place for his account of historical progress? Is awareness of the way in which theodicy came to be historicized helpful in understanding contemporary democracy and its discontents? (shrink)

The last decade has seen an explosion of research on the gut microbiota—the trillions of microorganisms that colonize the human gut. It is now clear that interindividual diversity in microbiota composition plays an important role in determining susceptibility to a wide variety of diseases. However, identifying the precise changes in microbiota composition that play causal roles has remained a largely unrealized goal. Here, we propose that functional classifications of microbes based on their interactions with and effects on the host—particularly the (...) host immune system—will illuminate the role of the microbiota in shaping human physiology. We outline the benefits of “functional” classification compared to phylogenetic classifications, and review current efforts at functional classification of the microbiota. Finally, we outline a theoretical framework for classifying host-microbiota interactions. Future advances enabling broader functional classifications of the microbiota promise to revolutionize our understanding of the role of gut microbes in health and disease. Functional classifications of the human microbiota reveal previously hidden patterns and will be key to cracking the microbiota composition code. This figure shows a theoretical comparison between phylogenetic classification and functional classification of a host-associated microbial community. (shrink)

It has been argued by Hull and others that a remnant of essentialism impeded taxonomic progress until systematists abandoned attempting to define taxa on the basis of characters necessary and sufficient for group membership. The advent of cladistics suggests instead that it is an essentialistic view of characters, not of taxa, that should be abandoned, and that only a transformational view of characters allows evolutionary novelties to be identified, much less explained. Conventional Darwinian explanations are not tautologous but are difficult (...) to test and scarcely explain evolutionary novelties, probably because of their emphasis on genetic rather than epigenetic (developmental) processes. (shrink)

Generalizing the work of Einstein and Mayer, it is assumed that at each point of space-time there exists an N-dimensional linear vector space with N≥5. This space is decomposed into a four-dimensional tangent space and an (N - 4)-dimensional internal space. On the basis of geometric considerations, one arrives at a number of fields, the field equations being derived from a variational principle. Among the fields obtained there are the electromagnetic field, Yang-Mills gauge fields, and fields that can be interpreted (...) as describing matter. As a simple example, the case N=6 is considered. (shrink)

Cognitive neuroscience has inspired a number of methodological advances to extract the highest signal-to-noise ratio from neuroimaging data. Popular techniques used to summarize behavioral data include sum-scores and item response theory. While these techniques can be useful when applied appropriately, item dimensionality and the quality of information are often left unexplored allowing poor performing items to be included in an itemset. The purpose of this study is to highlight how the application of two-stage approaches introduces parameter bias, differential item functioning (...) can manifest in cognitive neuroscience data and how techniques such as the multiple indicator multiple cause model can identify and remove items with DIF and model these data with greater sensitivity for brain–behavior relationships. This was performed using a simulation and an empirical study. The simulation explores parameter bias across two separate techniques used to summarize behavioral data: sum-scores and IRT and formative relationships with those estimated from a MIMIC model. In an empirical study participants performed an emotional identification task while concurrent electroencephalogram data were acquired across 384 trials. Participants were asked to identify the emotion presented by a static face of a child across four categories: happy, neutral, discomfort, and distress. The primary outcomes of interest were P200 event-related potential amplitude and latency within each emotion category. Instances of DIF related to correct emotion identification were explored with respect to an individual’s neurophysiology; specifically an item’s difficulty and discrimination were explored with respect to an individual’s average P200 amplitude and latency using a MIMIC model. The MIMIC model’s sensitivity was then compared to popular two-stage approaches for cognitive performance summary scores, including sum-scores and an IRT model framework and then regressing these onto the ERP characteristics. Here sensitivity refers to the magnitude and significance of coefficients relating the brain to these behavioral outcomes. The first set of analyses displayed instances of DIF within all four emotions which were then removed from all further models. The next set of analyses compared the two-stage approaches with the MIMIC model. Only the MIMIC model identified any significant brain–behavior relationships. Taken together, these results indicate that item performance can be gleaned from subject-specific biomarkers, and that techniques such as the MIMIC model may be useful tools to derive complex item-level brain–behavior relationships. (shrink)

Generalizing the work of Einstein and Mayer, it is assumed that at each point of space-time there exists a vector-spinor space with Nv vector dimensions and Ns spinor dimensions, where Nv=2k and Ns=2 k, k⩾3. This space is decomposed into a tangent space with4 vector and4 spinor dimensions and an internal space with Nv−4 vector and Ns−4 spinor dimension. A variational principle leads to field equations for geometric quantities which can be identified with physical fields such as the electromagnetic field, (...) Yang-Mills gauge fields, and wave functions of bosons and fermions. (shrink)

The protection of employee rights in the workplace is one of the fundamental ethical questions facing organizations today. Organizations differ in the extent to which they protect the rights of both employees and themselves as employers, yet little research has examined the types of organizations that have rights protection policies. Instead of the classic normative approach to ethical issues, this study took a contextual approach to the management of rights in the workplace through human resource policies. Associations were found between (...) the organizational characteristics of size, industry, unionization, business condition, and the existence of employee and employer rights policies. Additional analyses revealed underlying dimensions in right policies and the relationship of organizational characteristics to these aspects of rights management were examined. The results are discussed in terms of understanding human resource rights management within an organizational context. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Justifying involuntary psychiatric treatment on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity is usually expressed in terms of a person’s ability to make a decision about his or her health and treatment. Typically, this relates to the ability to refuse treatment. Exactly what “capacity” means, however, and how one determines when another individual lacks capacity, or lacks sufficient capacity, in this context is particularly controversial, with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities insisting (...) that involuntary treatment be abandoned altogether and capacity tests avoided.Capacity is a concept that has multiple meanings and applications across different disciplines and... (shrink)

What is ethnicity and how does it inform the way we understand ethical and political issues involving ethnic change and ethnically conscious public policies? Jorge J. E. Gracia put forth what he calls his ‘Familial-Historical View’ of ethnicity in which Hispanic identity is understood in terms of history and family resemblances. He criticizes what he calls the ‘Common-Bundle View’ of ethnicity which understands ethnic belonging in terms of an essence. I defend two negative theses which lead to the outlines of (...) a positive thesis: (1) Gracia’s arguments against the Common-Bundle View are not effective; (2) the Familial-Historical View is inadequate because it downplays the essential role that cultural phenomena play in making Hispanic history ethnically relevant to Hispanic identity. As a way of building on the Common-Bundle View I sketch a reformulation that avoids Gracia’s criticisms and is more politically and ethically effective than his family resemblance view of ethnicity. (shrink)

We take another look at “Just-So” solar neutrino oscillations, characterizing them by the energy Eπ/2 at which the distance-varying angle is π/2, instead of by the usual Δm 2 . The rising spectrum recently observed by SuperKamiokande is consistent with an Eπ/2 ∼6–9 MeV and marginally with 48 MeV. The pp neutrinos must then be reduced to one-half the standard solar model prediction, and 7Be neutrinos must make up a significant part of the SAGE and GALLEX gallium signal. For Eπ/2 (...) close to 9 and 48 MeV, the 7Be neutrinos will also show a large seasonal variation, emphasizing the importance of direct measurements of the 7Be neutrinos. (shrink)

According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 373-374.

Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in the light of (...) two cognate circumstances: the measurement problem in quantum physics, and the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of machines. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are objective; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called complex. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or self-references which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object. (shrink)

Model theory is concerned mainly, although not exclusively, with infinite structures. In recent years, finite structures have risen to greater prominence, both within the context of mainstream model theory, e.g., in work of Lachlan, Cherlin, Hrushovski, and others, and with the advent of finite model theory, which incorporates elements of classical model theory, combinatorics, and complexity theory. The purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of what might be called the model theory of finite structures. Some topics in (...) finite model theory have strong connections to theoretical computer science, especially descriptive complexity theory. In fact, it has been suggested that finite model theory really is, or should be, logic for computer science. These connections with computer science will, however, not be treated here.It is well-known that many classical results of ‘infinite model theory’ fail over the class of finite structures, including the compactness and completeness theorems, as well as many preservation and interpolation theorems. The failure of compactness in the finite, in particular, means that the standard proofs of many theorems are no longer valid in this context. At present, there is no known example of a classical theorem that remains true over finite structures, yet must be proved by substantially different methods. It is generally concluded that first-order logic is ‘badly behaved’ over finite structures.From the perspective of expressive power, first-order logic also behaves badly: it is both too weak and too strong. Too weak because many natural properties, such as the size of a structure being even or a graph being connected, cannot be defined by a single sentence. Too strong, because every class of finite structures with a finite signature can be defined by an infinite set of sentences. Even worse, every finite structure is defined up to isomorphism by a single sentence. In fact, it is perhaps because of this last point more than anything else that model theorists have not been very interested in finite structures. Modern model theory is concerned largely with complete first-order theories, which are completely trivial here. (shrink)

The Gibbs' Paradox is commonly explained by invoking some type of "principle of indistinguishability," which asserts that the interchange of identical particles is not a real physical event, i.e., is operationally meaningless. However, if this principle is to provide a satisfactory resolution of the Paradox, it must be operationally possible to determine whether, in fact, two given systems are identical or not. That is, the assertion that the Gibbs' Paradox is resolvable by an indistinguishability principle actually is an assertion that (...) we can in principle possess a complete set of effective procedures for determining the identity or non-identity of arbitrary physical systems. We show that, in rather general situations, an assertion of this type is not well founded. It is further pointed out that a failure to recognize an incomplete set of "sameness criteria" can lead to serious blunders in physics and in biology. (shrink)

Based on Medicine as a human experience / David E. Reiser, David H. Rosen. c1984.

A dialectical, double-aspect model of general interaction is proposed as a means of visualizing existence. It is constructed from observation of the transformational properties of the Moebius surface, with hyperdimensional extrapolation to the Klein bottle. The interaction of systems is viewed as a process of circumversion (i.e. turning inside-out) whereby systems exchange relations, become mutually negated, then exchange identities. Interaction is discussed in the context of the PCT problem, symmetry, creation-annihilation, and uncertainty.

The rest-frame of the universe determines a universal, or absolute time, that given by a clock at rest in it. The question is raised whether one can have a satisfactory universal time in general relativity if a gravitational field is present, i.e., whether there are coordinates such that the coordinate time is the time given everywhere by a clock at rest and they provide the correct description of our everyday experience. Several attempts are made to find such coordinates, but the (...) results are unsatisfactory. The question is still open, but it may be that there is no significance to such a universal time in general relativity, because to have a clock at rest in a gravitational field requires nongravitational forces. (shrink)

A classical model of an elementary particle is considered in the framework of the bimetric general relativity theory. The particle is regarded as a spherically symmetric object filling its Schwarzschild sphere and made of matter having mass density, pressure, and charge density. The mass is taken to be the Planck mass, and possible values of the charge are taken as zero, ±1/3e, ±2/3e, and ±e, with e the electron charge.

What is ethnicity and how does it inform the way we understand ethical and political issues involving ethnic change and ethnically conscious public policies? Jorge J. E. Gracia put forth what he calls his ‘Familial-Historical View’ of ethnicity in which Hispanic identity is understood in terms of history and family resemblances. He criticizes what he calls the ‘Common-Bundle View’ of ethnicity which understands ethnic belonging in terms of an essence. I defend two negative theses which lead to the outlines of (...) a positive thesis: (1) Gracia’s arguments against the Common-Bundle View are not effective; (2) the Familial-Historical View is inadequate because it downplays the essential role that cultural phenomena play in making Hispanic history ethnically relevant to Hispanic identity. As a way of building on the Common-Bundle View I sketch a reformulation that avoids Gracia’s criticisms and is more politically and ethically effective than his family resemblance view of ethnicity. (shrink)

We examine herein some aspects of the mind/brain problem as they have been approached from a standpoint of mimesis. Such studies are usually prefixed by the adjective “artificial,” as in “artificial intelligence”; “artificial life,” etc. A key assertion of such approaches is embodied in the familiar “Turing Test” ; that two systems which behave “enough” alike are alike. Specifically, that a properly programmed finite-state device (i.e., a Turing machine) which behaves “sufficiently” intelligently is intelligent; or, contrapositively, that any system which (...) behaves intelligently can be replaced by such a device. We place such mimetic approaches into a historical context, and contrast them with paralleI scientific approaches to the same questions. We argue that there is no finite threshold, beyond which “enough” commonality of behavior allows us to conclude an equation of causal underpinnings with finitely-generated syntax typical of algorithmic devices, and hence that assertions like Turing’s Test are false. (shrink)

We prove a 0-1 law for the fragment of second order logic SO over parametric classes of finite structures which allow only one unary atomic type. This completes the investigation of 0-1 laws for fragments of second order logic defined in terms of first order quantifier prefixes over, e.g., simple graphs and tournaments. We also prove a low oscillation law, and establish the 0-1 law for Σ14 without any restriction on the number of unary types.

This is the sequel to the previously reviewed first volume of a proposed three volume study of Proust as philosopher. Good as the first volume is, this is even better. It is extremely difficult, unusually subtle, and demands slow and ruminative reading. For the present reviewer, the book falls naturally into two parts, each with its own peak or crescendo. The key to understanding the book is to hear the two crescendos in unison, or better, in harmony. The first crescendo (...) begins at about page 97 and culminates on page 112. A crucial passage: "Le point de création: le point instable et indécis, où la vague se lève, où le dessin, la plume en feront un duvet.... Tout est allégorie et possibilité de métaphore ou de métamorphose: les choses ne sont pas, elles ne savent pas; elles sont quelquefois l'attente, l'impatience. Il faut venir à point et dans le bon moment." And another: "C'est parce que rien n'est marqué dans une complexion définitive, imprimée dans l'espace, que l'art peut approcher, regarder, rectifier. Non pas décrire et reproduire: réinventer". The second crescendo begins with a distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory, with a long culminating passage extending from page 238 to page 265. This may be summarized as follows: I do not produce but await my memories, which come as if from another and construct what I am. Now to combine the two crescendos: I make the world, and the world makes me. The second crescendo is already anticipated in the first, e.g., p. 97: art does not invent but articulates and structures nature. The first crescendo is resumed or echoed in the second : the work of art is the most perfect form of reality. To give another formulation to the harmony of the two crescendos: in order to perceive, one must remember; yet one cannot remember unless one has perceived. Hence perception and memory remake each other. In sum, I am that spectator of the world who makes, and is made by, the world. We cannot really perceive things except via an image of them which we produce and which provides us, not with an objective representation of the perceived things, but with an equilibrium between our desires and emotions on the one hand, and the perceptions on the other. This produced image is presumably the aforementioned perception of a memory. And thus we respond to the uniqueness of our perceptions, via our produced images, by uniting them into a world, each of which is again unique, and yet, which is in each case the same single world in which we all dwell. On this reading, Proust's theme is the equilibrium between seeing and producing, or between theory and practice at the level of the constitution of the world. To oversimplify drastically, Proust teaches the Platonic demiurge but not the Platonic Ideas. As a consequence, one is intermittently reminded of a quasi-Husserlian phenomenology rooted in the primacy of intentionality as enacted in perception. But the mathematicism of Husserl is absent; the intentionality is that of a poet.-Stanley Rosen, Pennsylvania State University. (shrink)

This very interesting and extremely useful study raises the question, by virtue of its title and what it does not do, of what is, or ought to be, meant by the philosophy of mathematics. The author begins his study of Euclid with a brief discussion of Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry. The two main points in this discussion are: "Hilbertian geometry and many other parts of modern mathematics are the study of structure", i.e., of the interpretations of axiom-systems; and intuition of (...) geometrical form becomes irrelevant to the content of mathematics. Greek mathematics, and specifically Euclid, cannot be understood in these terms; hence, Euclid's use of the axiomatic method differs from ours. One may also say that logic, "the theory of structure-preserving inference", becomes central to modern mathematics, as it was not for Euclid. But, the author continues, it does not follow that one cannot exhibit the logical structure employed by Euclid. The bulk of Mueller's book is concerned to do just this, thanks to a formalization of Euclid which attempts to be faithful to his principal concepts, while at the same time employing contemporary logical techniques. (shrink)

This very interesting and extremely useful study raises the question, by virtue of its title and what it does not do, of what is, or ought to be, meant by the philosophy of mathematics. The author begins his study of Euclid with a brief discussion of Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry. The two main points in this discussion are: "Hilbertian geometry and many other parts of modern mathematics are the study of structure", i.e., of the interpretations of axiom-systems; and intuition of (...) geometrical form becomes irrelevant to the content of mathematics. Greek mathematics, and specifically Euclid, cannot be understood in these terms; hence, Euclid's use of the axiomatic method differs from ours. One may also say that logic, "the theory of structure-preserving inference", becomes central to modern mathematics, as it was not for Euclid. But, the author continues, it does not follow that one cannot exhibit the logical structure employed by Euclid. The bulk of Mueller's book is concerned to do just this, thanks to a formalization of Euclid which attempts to be faithful to his principal concepts, while at the same time employing contemporary logical techniques. (shrink)

Two theses figure centrally in work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’) and Uniqueness (‘U’). According to EW, you should give precisely as much weight to the attitude of a disagreeing epistemic peer as you give to your own attitude. U has it that, for any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Although EW has received considerable discussion, the case for U has not (...) been critically evaluated. Endorsing U, we argue, commits one to the highly controversial thesis that whatever fixes your rational attitudes can do so only by fixing what evidence you have. This commitment imposes a relatively demanding requirement on justified belief in U, one that we argue is not satisfied by what is currently the strongest available case for U, due to Roger White [2005]. Our challenge to U makes more trouble for its proponents than do the worries about U expressed by Gideon Rosen [2001] and Thomas Kelly [2010]. Moreover, if Kelly [2010] is correct in thinking that EW “carries with it a commitment to” U—a claim which we accept for reasons similar to Kelly’s but is beyond this paper’s scope (but see Ballantyne and Coffman [forthcoming])—then our challenge to U bears importantly on EW: to the extent that our challenge to U succeeds, EW also suffers. (shrink)