The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge

Episteme 4 (1):10-29 (2007)
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Abstract

According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond

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Gideon Rosen
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
Epistemic relativism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (2):225-240.

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References found in this work

Context and logical form.Jason Stanley - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (4):654-658.

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