Episteme 4 (1):10-29 (2007)

Authors
Gideon Rosen
Princeton University
Abstract
According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond
Keywords epistemology   relativism
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.10
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References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
Context and Logical Form.Jason Stanley - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (4):654-658.

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Citations of this work BETA

Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW]Crispin Wright - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.

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