Hence, there is still controversy over which of the two versions of the deduction deserves priority and whether indeed any distinction between them can be maintained that would go beyond questions of presentation and involve the structure of the proof itself. Schopenhauer and Heidegger held that the first edition alone fully expresses Kant's unique philosophy, while Kant himself, as well as many other Kantians, have only seen a difference in the method of presentation.

Thanks to the editorial work of David Pacini, the lectures appear here with annotations linking them to editions of the masterworks of German philosophy as they ...

This is a collection of four essays on aesthetic, ethical, and political issues by the pre-eminent Kant scholar in Germany today, perhaps best known for rekindling interest in the great classical German tradition from Kant to Fichte.

In this collection comprising four of his most influential essays, Henrich proves himself unique in the conjunction of philosophical acumen, insight, and originality that he brings to Kant interpretation.

Diese folgenden Texte betreffen allesamt die Theorieversuche über Selbstverhältnisse, welche die klassische deutsche Philosophie entwickelt hat. Sie gehen auch allesamt darauf aus, diese Theorieversuche aus ihren Prämissen neu aufzubauen und ihre Begründungen nicht allein von den Argumenten abhängig sein zu lassen, die sich in den Werken der klassischen Philosophie finden.

Auf den ersten Blick scheint Selbstbewusstsein zu dem zu gehören, was sich nahezu von selbst versteht. In anhaltendem Nachdenken stellt sich aber heraus, dass mit ihm der Philosophie eines ihrer schwierigsten und folgenreichsten Probleme aufgegeben ist. Vor über fünfzig Jahren erschien Dieter Henrichs Abhandlung Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht, welche dieses Problem ausarbeitete. Sie zeigte, dass es Fichte war, der als erster das Problem sicher erfasste und zum Leitthema seines Denkens werden liess. Dem unveränderten Abdruck dieses Textes folgt nun -- als um (...) ein Vielfaches umfangreicherer Haupttext -- eine neue Folge von Überlegungen. Sie betreffen Selbstbewusstsein im Zusammenhang einer philosophischen Grundlegung und die Probleme, die Fichtes Systembildung unter dem Leitgedanken seiner ursprünglichen Einsicht in eine Bewegung ohne definitive Lösung versetzten. Henrichs Buch lässt sich als eine Erneuerung von Kants Denkart betrachten - in der Beziehung auf ein Thema, dessen Bedeutung für die Philosophie kaum noch bestritten wird, in einer der Erfahrungsart der Gegenwart gemässen Perspektive und in der Folge von Klärungen, die zu gewinnen sind, wenn man der Dynamik in Fichtes Systembildungen nachdenkt."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the foremost Kant scholars of our time is a welcome and timely addition to the literature. Henrich is a very prolific scholar, and the lack of English translations of most of his works may account in some measure for the fact that there has been surprisingly little sustained engagement with them by Anglo-American scholars, especially those working on Kant’s ethics. It is to be hoped that this volume will help provoke such an engagement.

In a series of studies over the last 30 years, Henrich has shown that Hölderlin played a decisive role in the development of philosophy from Kant to Hegel. This book includes six of Henrich's most important essays on Hölderlin.

Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads (...) into an infinite regress. (shrink)

In his 1960 paper “The concept of moral insight and the Kantian doctrine of the Fact of Reason” (introduced and translated in french by Laura Tavernier), Dieter Henrich argues that Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason—according to which pure reason can not theoretically anticipate or ground the possibility of its practical use—does not betray a lack of systematicity, as post-Kantians reproached it to Kant. After the repeated failures of his own attempts to deduce moral insight from theoretical reason in (...) the “silent decade”, Kant eventually acknowledges that the moral law and our awareness of it cannot be logically derived from a higher principle. The Kantian doctrine of the Fact of Reason thus remains faithful to the phenomenon of moral insight, the paradoxical knowledge of the good, and offers a methodologically adequate answer to the problem that D. Henrich considers to be at the foundation of metaphysics: Kant thinks of a unity of the theoretical and the practical reason that does not imply any derivation of one from the other, nor any subsumption of the two under a unifying principle. (shrink)

Tugendhat erklärt Mystik als Weg aus den Leiden, die Folgen der in der propositionalen Sprachform begründeten Selbstzentrierung des Menschen sind. Seine Erklärungen des Selbstverhältnisses des Menschen werden kritisiert. Die Mystik ist auch nicht primär als Leidensüberwindung zu verstehen, sondern aus Weisen der Konzentration in das Selbstsein, deren Ergebnis für sich erstrebenswert ist. Sie führen zugleich zu einer Distanz gegenüber den Lebensinteressen und zu einem veränderten Bild von der Zugehörigkeit des Menschen zu einem Ganzen, das ihn einbegreift.

Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads (...) into an infinite regress. (shrink)

The International Hegel Association accepts as its members philosophers who have published on Hegel and his historical environment or on philosophical problems that have reference to Hegel’s philosophy. Every second year it announces a colloquium at which approximately fifty specialists can take part. Every sixth year an international congress takes place which is open to the general public. The last international congress on ‘Is Systematic Philosophy Possible?’ met in Stuttgart from May 28th to May 30th, 1975. The next colloquium on (...) ‘Schelling and Hegel in Jena, the ultimate formation of Hegel’s System’ will take place in Nizza in 1977. Members of the association will receive a News-letter and will be able to order the supplementary series to the Hegel-Studien at a reduced rate. The annual membership fee is DM 25, -. Applications for membership can be mailed to the President, Professor Dieter Henrich, Philosophisches Seminar, Universität 69 Heidelberg, Marsiliusplatz 1. (shrink)