Abstract
We examine herein some aspects of the mind/brain problem as they have been approached from a standpoint of mimesis. Such studies are usually prefixed by the adjective “artificial,” as in “artificial intelligence”; “artificial life,” etc. A key assertion of such approaches is embodied in the familiar “Turing Test” ; that two systems which behave “enough” alike are alike. Specifically, that a properly programmed finite-state device (i.e., a Turing machine) which behaves “sufficiently” intelligently is intelligent; or, contrapositively, that any system which behaves intelligently can be replaced by such a device. We place such mimetic approaches into a historical context, and contrast them with paralleI scientific approaches to the same questions. We argue that there is no finite threshold, beyond which “enough” commonality of behavior allows us to conclude an equation of causal underpinnings with finitely-generated syntax typical of algorithmic devices, and hence that assertions like Turing’s Test are false.