Background: Despite an increase in health research conducted in Africa, there are still inadequate human resources with research ethics training and lack of local long-term training opportunities in research ethics. A research ethics training program named United States-Mali Research Ethics Training Program (US-Mali RETP) was established through a partnership between the George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health (GWSPH), USA and University of Sciences, Techniques & Technologies of Bamako (USTTB), to address the critical need for improved bioethics training, (...) leadership, and policy in Mali. Methods: The aims of the capacity building programme are achieved by leveraging US and Africa-based expertise to strengthen research ethics education and capacity through: (1) intensive faculty development to design ethics training curricula; (2) development of a research ethics specialization within the existing Masters of Public Health program (MPH); and (3) establishing professional development courses through short-term training workshops and webinars to address research and professional needs in ethics. Results: The program will strengthen USTTB’s capacity of research ethics by training at least 15 MPH students over 5 years to prepare the next generation of ethics researchers. During the first two years of the program, a new ethics training curricula was developed, two cohorts of Master’s students were enrolled, and a series of webinars and workshops were conducted with participation of Malian and international researchers. Conclusions: US-Mali RETP will promote a sustainable bioethics enterprise at USTTB, and enable dissemination of research ethics training to increase health research capacity in Mali. (shrink)

Some internal and philosophical remarks are made regarding a system of a second order logic of existence axiomatized by the author. Attributes are distinguished in the system according as their possession entails existence or not, The former being called e-Attributes. Some discussion of the special principles assumed for e-Attributes is given as well as of the two notions of identity resulting from such a distinction among attributes. Non-Existing objects are of course indiscernible in terms of e-Attributes. In addition, However, Existing (...) objects indiscernible in terms of e-Attributes are indiscernible in terms of all attributes. (shrink)

Theories of well-being that I call “loving-the-good” claim that one intrinsically benefits if and only if one loves what is objectively good. For these views, well-being comes to be when the correct connection between world and mind obtains. Intuitively, ill-being is the opposite of well-being. I explore the resources of loving-the-good views to explain ill-being, especially whether they can do so and also meet the theoretical virtues of continuity and unity. Continuity is met when ill-being theory mirrors the well-being theory. (...) Unity is met when all instances of a phenomenon are given the same kind of explanation. I argue that, strikingly, the key insight of loving-the-good theories of well-being does not seem plausible for ill-being. A consequence is that loving-the-good theories face significant problems to meet continuity. I examine alternatives for these views to meet unity. I argue that plausible explanations of ill-being do not meet unity either. (shrink)

A first-order formulation of Leśniewski's ontology is formulated and shown to be interpretable within a free first-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantification over proper and common-name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the first-order part of Leśniewski's ontology is decidable.

This is a review of the book Quantum [Un]speakables: From Bell to Quantum Information. Reinhold A. Bertlmann and Anton Zeilinger (editors). xxii + 483 pp. Springer-Verlag, 2002. $89.95.

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

Bohmian mechanics is a theory about point particles moving along trajectories. It has the property that in a world governed by Bohmian mechanics, observers see the same statistics for experimental results as predicted by quantum mechanics. Bohmian mechanics thus provides an explanation of quantum mechanics. Moreover, the Bohmian trajectories are defined in a non-conspiratorial way by a few simple laws.

Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics.

In this paper we explain how the intentional objects of our mental states can be represented by the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We first briefly examine and show how Brentano’s actualist theory of judgment and his notion of an immanent object have a clear and natural representation in our conceptualist logic of names. We then briefly critically examine Meinong’s theory of objects before turning finally to our own representation of intentional objects in terms of the intensional objects of conceptual (...) realism. We conclude by explaining why existence-entailing concepts are so basic to our commonsense framework and how these concepts and their intensions can be used to model Meinong’s ontology. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como principal propósito establecer las categorías conceptuales de la meta-seguridad y la meta-violencia aplicadas al caso del VRAEM en Perú después del fin del Sendero Luminoso. Para cumplir con lo anterior, la pregunta a resolver a lo largo del artículo es ¿por qué la región del VRAEM se configura como un espacio en el que el senderismo ha mutado y representa una amenaza para los operadores de seguridad peruanos? El trabajo integra perspectivas teóricas y empíricas alrededor (...) de la mutación y transformación de la violencia y la seguridad especialmente en la región del Valle de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro. (shrink)

This article offers a detailed analysis of Ilyenkov’s conception of the relationship between the logical and the historical. It posits that Ilyenkov, by overcoming the theoretical impasses of mainstream Soviet Marxism, was the first thinker to recognize the centrality of this relationship in dialectics. Through a brief overview of the official conception of Diamat, I explain that the latter broadly understood the relation of the logical and the historical in a rather superficial way. I then argue that Ilyenkov’s approach to (...) dialectics as the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, combined with his research orientation towards the method of Marx’s Capital and his reevaluation of Hegel’s philosophy led him to a much deeper understanding of the inner unity of the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete and the relation of the logical and the historical. In reconstructing Ilyenkov’s analysis on this matter, I explain how the unfolding of the categories throughout the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is inextricably intertwined with the relation of the logical and the historical. Therefore, the article concludes by arguing that Ilyenkov’s analysis marks a significant advance in the understanding of dialectics in the history of Marxism, and a core aspect of this deeper understanding is his systematic approach to the relationship of the logical and the historical. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism that completely avoids talk of combination. Inspired by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads, I will focus on (...) a relational explanation of how simple subjects could constitute complex experiences, without them having to combine in virtue of their subjectivity. I call this view monadic panpsychism. Additionally, my proposal will not rely on emergence and so it will circumvent problems commonly faced by emergentist accounts. As I will argue, monadic panpsychism is preferable to combinatory and emergentist panpsychism because it faces a significantly less worrisome set of objections. Apart from being unaffected by the seemingly insuperable issue of subject combination, I will demonstrate that monadic panpsychism also has tools to address other kinds of the combination problem. That alone justifies the need for a new formulation of panpsychism, one which faces unique difficulties but also offers unique solutions. (shrink)

Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through a second nominalization (...) of the common names that are part of conceptual realism’s theory of reference (via quantifier phrases), the theory also accounts for both plural reference and predication and mass noun reference and predication. Finally, a separate nexus of predication based on natural kinds and the natural properties and relations nomologically related to those natural kinds, is also an integral part of the framework of conceptual realism. (shrink)

Pure type systems arise as a generalisation of simply typed lambda calculus. The contemporary development of mathematics has renewed the interest in type theories, as they are not just the object of mere historical research, but have an active role in the development of computational science and core mathematics. It is worth exploring some of them in depth, particularly predicative Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory and impredicative Coquand’s calculus of constructions. The logical and philosophical differences and similarities between them will be (...) studied, showing the relationship between these type theories and other fields of logic. (shrink)

A propositional logic with modal operators for logical necessity and possibility is formulated as a formal ontology for logical atomism (with negative facts). It is shown that such modal operators represent purely formal, Internal 'properties' of propositions if and only if the notion of 'all possible worlds' has its standard and not the secondary interpretation which it is usually given (as, E.G., In kripke model-Structures). Allowing arbitrary restrictions on the notion of 'all possible worlds', At least in such a framework (...) as logical atomism, Generates internal 'properties' of propositions with material instead of purely formal content. (shrink)

My new homepage is at jostylr.com . The corresponding e-mail address is [email protected] . On my new homepage there will be information about Bohmian mechanics, my papers, professional information, and personal information. As of 7/30/04, there is not much there, but it should improve.

The notion of a "class as many" was central to Bertrand Russell''s early form of logicism in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics. There is no empty class in this sense, and the singleton of an urelement (or atom in our reconstruction) is identical with that urelement. Also, classes with more than one member are merely pluralities — or what are sometimes called "plural objects" — and cannot as such be themselves members of classes. Russell did not formally develop this notion (...) of a class but used it only informally. In what follows, we give a formal, logical reconstruction of the logic of classes as many as pluralities (or plural objects) within a fragment of the framework of conceptual realism. We also take groups to be classes as many with two or more members and show how groups provide a semantics for plural quantifier phrases. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russellian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Russellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dispositional properties are identified. (...) I maintain that the identity theory serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsychism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that identity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering. (shrink)