Moral Constraints on War offers a principle-by-principle presentation of the transcultural roots of the ethics of war in an age defined by the increasingly international nature of military intervention.

This book argues that theory formation in ethics might be, but does not have to be, grand; local and weaker theories can also be effective. Indeed, theory formation is far more varied than theorists and anti-theorists imagine it to be.

As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.

"This volume is concerned with how we ought to evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend - discussed here as the "problem of contingent future persons." For it seems that those future persons who are brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by them in any conventional sense. This is a relatively novel problem in ethics and as yet there is simply no consensus on how (...) we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. However, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. Intended for professional ethicists, policy researchers, and graduate students, this volume explores the theological implications of the problem and advances the investigation of it both philosophical and in theological terms." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

Just War Theory is becoming increasingly important to nations when they contemplate and participate in war. This book recognizes the timeliness of the topic and so seeks, in concrete historical terms, to deal with the issue of constraining war on the basis of moral principles.

This commentary on Professor Kasher's and General Yadlin's article employs a bit of violence. It transforms and broadens some of the ideas presented in their article. I argue that committing these acts of violence are justified because, if their article is left as written, it is difficult to tell at what point the Kasher/Yadlin (K/Y) theory corresponds with just war theory and at what points it does not. This commentary alters K/Y theory, and alters classical just war theory as well, (...) so as to place the two theories in parallel as much as possible. Once the alterations are complete, it becomes more evident that the two theories share much in common. What also becomes more evident is that the two theories differ in important respects since the one deals with conventional war and the other with unconventional (asymmetric) war. The differences vindicate Kasher's and Yadlin's claim that it is necessary to spend time to re-think just war theory, especially when dealing with terrorism. (shrink)