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Gideon Rosen [70]Gideon A. Rosen [1]
  1. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. qnew York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
  2. Real Definition.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.
  3. (2 other versions)Composition as a fiction.Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr - 2002 - In Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 151--174.
    Region R Question: How many objects — entities, things — are contained in R? Ignore the empty space. Our question might better be put, 'How many material objects does R contain?' Let's stipulate that A, B and C are metaphysical atoms: absolutely simple entities with no parts whatsoever besides themselves. So you don't have to worry about counting a particle's top half and bottom half as different objects. Perhaps they are 'point-particles', with no length, width or breadth. Perhaps they are (...)
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  4. A subject with no object: strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics.John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Gideon A. Rosen.
    Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. This book cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous (...)
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  5. Modal fictionalism.Gideon Rosen - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):327-354.
  6. Skepticism about moral responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
  7. Ground by Law.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):279-301.
  8. Culpability and Ignorance.Gideon Rosen - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61-84.
    When a person acts from ignorance, he is culpable for his action only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts. The paper defends the view that this principle holds, not just for actions done from ordinary factual ignorance, but also for actions done from moral ignorance. The question is raised whether the principle extends to action done from ignorance about what one has most reason to do. It is tentatively proposed that the principle holds in full (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.
  10.  86
    A Subject with no Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.
    This is the first systematic survey of modern nominalistic reconstructions of mathematics, and for this reason alone it should be read by everyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics and, more generally, in questions concerning abstract entities. In the bulk of the book, the authors sketch a common formal framework for nominalistic reconstructions, outline three major strategies such reconstructions can follow, and locate proposals in the literature with respect to these strategies. The discussion is presented with admirable precision and clarity, (...)
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  11. (1 other version)Abstract objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  12. The limits of contingency.Gideon Rosen - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13--39.
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  13. What is a Moral Law?Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    This chapter explores bridge-law non-naturalism: the view that when a particular thing possesses a moral property or stands in a moral relation, this fact is metaphysically grounded in non-normative features of the thing in question together with a general moral law. Any view of this sort faces two challenges, analogous to familiar challenges in the philosophy of science: to specify the form of the explanatory laws, and to say when a fact of that form qualifies as a law. The chapter (...)
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  14. Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics.Gideon Rosen - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 151-169.
     
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  15. (2 other versions)A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics.John Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):124-126.
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  16. What is constructive empiricism?Gideon Rosen - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (2):143 - 178.
    Van Fraassen defines constructive empiricism as the view that science aims to produce empirically adequate theories. But this account has been misunderstood. Constructive empiricism in not, as it seems, a description of the intentional features of scientific practice, nor is it a normative prescription for their revision. It is rather a fiction about the practice of science that van Fraassen displays in the interests of a broader empiricism. The paper concludes with a series of arguments designed to show that constructive (...)
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  17. Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):591-610.
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  18. Objectivity and modern idealism: What is the question?Gideon Rosen - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 277--319.
  19. Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.
    1. Professor Brandom’s paper is addressed to a methodological question: When we set out to account for the intentionality of thought and language, what resources may we exploit? Which notions may we use? Brandom is a famously ambitious theorist. Unlike his colleague, John McDowell, Brandom has long maintained that we should at least aspire to explain intentionality in non-intentional terms. This leaves it open, however, which non-intentional resources are legitimate.
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  20. Modal Fictionalism Fixed.Gideon Rosen - 1995 - Analysis 55 (2):67-73.
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  21. (1 other version)Worldly indeterminacy: A rough guide.Nicholas J. J. Smith & Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):185 – 198.
    This paper defends the idea that there might be vagueness or indeterminacy in the world itself--as opposed to merely in our representations of the world--against the charges of incoherence and unintelligibility. First we consider the idea that the world might contain vague properties and relations ; we show that this idea is already implied by certain well-understood views concerning the semantics of vague predicates (most notably the fuzzy view). Next we consider the idea that the world might contain vague objects (...)
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  22. Blackburn’s E ssays in Quasi-Realism.Gideon Rosen - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
  23. A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds.Gideon Rosen - 1993 - Analysis 53 (2):71 - 81.
    Fictionalism about possible worlds is the view that talk about worlds in the analysis of modality is to be construed as ontologically innocent discourse about the content of a fiction. Versions of the view have been defended by D M Armstrong (in "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility") and by myself (in "Modal Fictionalism', "Mind" 99, July 1990). The present note argues that fictionalist accounts of modality (both Armstrong's version and my own) fail to serve the fictionalists ontological purposes because they (...)
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  24. Who Makes the Rules Around Here?Gideon Rosen - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):163-171.
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  25. The refutation of nominalism (?).Gideon Rosen - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (2):141--86.
  26.  7
    Nominalism Reconsidered.John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    Nominalism is the view that mathematical objects do not exist. This chapter delimits several types of nominalistic projects: revolutionary programs that attempt to change mathematics and hermeneutic programs that attempt to interpret mathematics. Some programs accord with naturalism, and some oppose naturalism. Steven Yablo’s fictionalism is brought into the fold and discussed at some length.
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  27. Noncognitivism and agent-centered norms.Alisabeth Ayars & Gideon Rosen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1019-1038.
    This paper takes up a neglected problem for metaethical noncognitivism: the characterization of the acceptance states for agent-centered normative theories like Rational Egoism. If Egoism is a coherent view, the non-cognitivist needs a coherent acceptance state for it. This can be provided, as Dreier and Gibbard have shown. But those accounts fail when generalized, assigning the same acceptance state to normative theories that are clearly distinct, or assigning no acceptance state to theories that look to be intelligible. The paper makes (...)
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  28. Postscript to ”Things qua Truthmakers': Negative Existentials.David K. Lewis & Gideon Rosen - 2002 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. New York: Routledge. pp. 39-42.
  29. Scanlon’s modal metaphysics.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):856-876.
    In Being Realistic About Reasons T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary (...)
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  30. The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge.Gideon Rosen - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):10-29.
    According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond.
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  31. A study in modal deviance.Gideon Rosen - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 283--307.
  32.  55
    Knowledge and Evidence.Gideon Rosen - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):681.
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  33. (1 other version)Might Kantian contractualism be the supreme principle of morality?Gideon Rosen - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):78-97.
    According to Parfit, the best version of Kantian ethics takes as its central principle Kantian Contractualism: the thesis that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. This paper examines that thesis, identifies a class of annoying counterexamples, and suggests that when Kantian Contractualism is modified in response to these examples, the resulting principle is too complex and ad hoc to serve as the 'supreme principle of morality'.
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  34. Problems in the History of Fictionalism.Gideon Rosen - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 14--64.
     
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  35.  87
    Armstrong on classes as states of affairs.Gideon Rosen - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):613 – 625.
  36. I—Gideon Rosen: Culpability and Duress: A Case Study.Gideon Rosen - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):69-90.
    The paper examines the conditions under which we are responsible for actions performed under duress, focusing on a real case in which a soldier was compelled at gunpoint to participate in the massacre of civilian prisoners. The case stands for a class of cases in which the compelled act is neither clearly justified nor clearly excused on grounds of temporary incapacity, but in which it is nonetheless plausible that the agent is not morally blameworthy. The theoretical challenge is to identify (...)
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  37. On behalf of the moral realist.Gideon Rosen - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):794-802.
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  38. The Reality of Mathematical Objects.Gideon Rosen - 2011 - In John Polkinghorne (ed.), Meaning in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  39.  53
    The Case for Incompatibilism.Gideon Rosen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):699-706.
    Wallace does not provide an explicit account of moral fairness. Rather he gives substance the notion by articulating two concrete principles governing blame which are meant to be—and in some sense clearly are—demands of fairness.
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  40. A Puzzle Postponed.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):198-201.
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  41.  94
    Platonism, semiplatonism and the caesar problem.Gideon Rosen - 2003 - Philosophical Books 44 (3):229-244.
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  42. Textualism, Intentionalism, and the Law of the Contract.Gideon Rosen - 2011 - In Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames (eds.), Philosophical foundations of language in the law. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  43. On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities - Set Theoretic Constructionalism in the Metaphysics of David Lewis.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 382-398.
  44.  17
    Peacocke on Modality.Gideon Rosen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):641-648.
    We know a great deal about what is possible, so modal knowledge must be possible, not just in principle but by ordinary methods. Christopher Peacocke’s leading thought in Chapter 4 of Being Known is that this fact places significant constraints on philosophical treatments of modality. Modal realism is ruled out on the ground that it renders modal truth “radically inaccessible”, and actualism is forced upon us. It goes without saying that any account of the modal facts must eventually dovetail with (...)
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  45.  81
    Yablovian ‘If-Thenism’.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):143-152.
    ABSTRACTThe paper explores Stephen Yablo's suggestion that ‘If-Thenism’ in the philosophy of mathematics is best formulated as the thesis that the real content of a mathematical claim C is the result of subtracting the potentially problematic metaphysical commitments of mathematics from C [Yablo 2017]. Yablo's proposal assumes that some propositions make others true. The present discussion assumes that propositions are coarse-grained sets of possible worlds and asks what Yablo's proposal looks like on that assumption. The conclusion is that the adequacy (...)
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  46. Buildings and grounds: notes on Karen Bennett’s Making Things Up.Gideon Rosen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (7):711-721.
    ABSTRACT Bennett argues that the various building relations are all directed, necessitating and generative. This note provides interpretations of these conditions different from Bennett’s. According to Bennett, the full builders for an entity must necessitate its existence alone or in conjunction with other items that are not builders. I suggest that the full builders must necessitate the built item outright. According to Bennett, building is generative only in the sense that when the xx build y we are thereby “licensed” to (...)
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  47. The shoals of language.Gideon Rosen - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):599-609.
  48. (1 other version)Quine and the Revival of Metaphysics.Gideon Rosen - 2013 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernest LePore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  49. Deferentialism and adjudication.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - In Brian G. Slocum (ed.), The nature of legal interpretation: what jurists can learn about legal interpretation from linguistics and philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     
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  50.  7
    On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 382–398.
    Viewed from a suitable distance, David Lewis's ontological scheme is simplicity itself. Absolutely everything that exists, according to Lewis, is either a spatiotemporal particular, or a set theoretic construction from such particulars, or a mereological aggregate of such items. Set theoretic constructionalism is not an incidental feature of Lewis's system. The master argument of On the Plurality of Worlds is that a pluriverse composed of infinitely many concrete universes constitutes a “paradise for philosophers. Given his other views, his account of (...)
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