The notion of the ‘division of physiological labour’ is today an outdated relic in the history of science. This contrasts with the fate of another notion, which was so frequently paired with the division of physiological labour, which is the concept of ‘morphological differentiation.’ This is one of the elementary modal concepts of ontogenesis. In this paper, we intend to target the problems and causes that gradually led biologists to combine these two notions during the 19th century, (...) and to progressively dissociate them, retaining only the concept of differentiation by the early 20th century. We shall adhere to the following: 1. The primitive economic concept of the division of labour is not a descriptive notion denoting a type of organisation of labour, but an etiological one: the idea of a causal relationship between this type of organization and the improvement of the whole. 2. This concept rapidly interested naturalists such as Henri Milne-Edwards, who were keen to find a rational ground for hierarchizing living forms based on anatomical complexity. 3. The validation of this notion in the realms of biology was subject to at least two conditions which were far from being fully satisfied. This did not prevent, however, the initial success of the concept of the division of physiological labour during the second half of the 19th century. 4. Finally, the gradual disqualification, within the Darwinian theoretical context, of the conception of an intrinsic hierarchical rank of organisms, led to a lack of interest in the concept of the physiological division of labour, at least in its non-Darwinian and non-ecological variant. (shrink)

The notion of the ‘division of physiological labour’ is today an outdated relic in the history of science. This contrasts with the fate of another notion, which was so frequently paired with the division of physiological labour, which is the concept of ‘morphological differentiation.’ This is one of the elementary modal concepts of ontogenesis. In this paper, we intend to target the problems and causes that gradually led biologists to combine these two notions during the 19th century, (...) and to progressively dissociate them, retaining only the concept of differentiation by the early 20th century. We shall adhere to the following: 1. The primitive economic concept of the division of labour is not a descriptive notion denoting a type of organisation of labour, but an etiological one: the idea of a causal relationship between this type of organization and the improvement of the whole. 2. This concept rapidly interested naturalists such as Henri Milne-Edwards, who were keen to find a rational ground for hierarchizing living forms based on anatomical complexity. 3. The validation of this notion in the realms of biology was subject to at least two conditions which were far from being fully satisfied. This did not prevent, however, the initial success of the concept of the division of physiological labour during the second half of the 19th century. 4. Finally, the gradual disqualification, within the Darwinian theoretical context, of the conception of an intrinsic hierarchical rank of organisms, led to a lack of interest in the concept of the physiological division of labour, at least in its non-Darwinian and non-ecological variant (the link between the division of labour within an organism and organic perfection). (shrink)

This paper analyzes classical concepts of division of labour and offers some contemporary theoretical model which includes causes and effects of it. For Smith, the main cause is a tendency of human nature to exchange and the main effect is a progress of the country. For Marx, the fundamental cause is historical development of productive forces and effects are accumulation of capital on the one side but also an alienation of working class on the other. Spencer considers as (...) the main cause specialization of functions in generally, which consequence is integration of society. For Durkheim, causes are social density and volume, and its effect or function is new interconnection in society known as term organic solidarity. Weber derives division of labour from his theory of rational economic actions, and its most important effect is development of occupational structure. (shrink)

This essay takes up an apparently minor idea of Susan Moller Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family—that employers should split the paycheck of wage-earning husbands between employees and their stay-at-home spouses—and suggests that it actually threatens to undermine Okin's entire argument by perpetuating the most central cause of women's inequality by Okin's own account: the sexual division of labor. Recognizing the vital contributions that Okin's seminal work made and the impact that it had on the field of feminist philosophy (...) and political theory, the essay explores the ethical, political, and philosophical problems with this solution to the dire problems of gender inequality and injustice that Okin correctly identifies. The essay suggests that her commitment to liberalism may have resulted in a commitment to an inadequate vision of how to solve the problems of gender inequality, and offers other possibilities that Okin could have pursued instead that sustain her strong commitment to liberalism. (shrink)

The economic shutdown and national lockdown following the outbreak of COVID-19 have increased demand for unpaid work at home, particularly among families with children, and reduced demand for paid work. Concurrently, the share of the workforce that has relocated its workplace to home has also increased. In this article, we examine the consequences of these processes for the allocation of time among paid work, housework, and care work for men and women in Israel. Using data on 2,027 Israeli adults whom (...) we followed since the first week of March, we focus on the effect of the second lockdown in Israel on the gender division of both paid and unpaid work. We find that as demand for housework caused by the lockdown increases, women—especially with children—increase their housework much more than men do, particularly when they work from home. The consequences of work from home and other flexible work arrangements for gender inequality within the family are discussed. (shrink)

Causal complexities involved in biological phenomena often generate ambiguous experimental results that may create epistemic niches for new approaches and interpretations. The exploration for new approaches may foment momentum of larger epistemological shifts, and thereby introduce the possibilities of adopting new technologies. This paper describes British molecular biologist Robin Holliday’s cell aging research from 1963 to the 1980s that transformed from simple hypothesis testing to working on various alternative and integrative approaches designed to deal with complex data. In the 1960s, (...) hoping to use biochemical investigations of cells to settle a debate about whether DNA mutations or protein errors caused aging, Holliday carried out a series of experiments with fruit flies, fungi, and human fibroblast cells. The results seemed to demonstrate that cytoplasmic protein errors caused cell aging. However, other scientists obtained contradictory results and raised issues about potential flaws in Holliday’s experiments. In the 1970s, working as the director of the Genetics Division of the National Institute for Medical Research in Mill Hill, United Kingdom, Holliday relied on available talents of his associates, including computational expertise, to explore alternative hypotheses and approaches. By the early 1980s, they had worked out an epigenetic explanation and had established integrative, evolutionary models of cell aging that incorporated both DNA mutations and protein errors as critical factors. By delineating Holliday’s research path from simply testing hypotheses to integrating multiple factors involved in aging, this paper offers an account of the difficulties in targeting molecular cause in cell aging around the 1970s, whose failures nevertheless opened up an epistemic niche for integration. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate three kinds of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper, valid methods of division, namely, diairesis, parallel division, and chiasmus. I attempt to explain the relationship among the three kinds of division, namely, how they transform from one to another. Starting with Plato’s division of constitution in the Statesman, I illuminate that from ostensible diairesis emerges a parallel division, and the parallel division causes a cross- (...) class='Hi'>division to occur. Thus, the sixfold division of constitution is not a diairesis but rather is a 3 x 2 cross-division. Inheriting the three kinds of division from Plato, Aristotle advances the form by providing a theoretical explanation to the transformation of the three kinds of division. In Topics Z6, Aristotle prescribes two conditions under which a parallel division can originate from or construct ostensible diairesis and how the parallel division further causes a cross-division to occur. (shrink)

La división de las causas en el De principiis naturae 5 de Tomás de Aquino establece de cuántas maneras pueden distinguirse las cuatro clásicas causas aristotélicas. El texto presenta varias dificultades y las principales son la determinación del número de las divisiones y la no necesaria contemporaneidad del ser en potencia de una causa y de su causado. Nuestro objetivo es resolverlas a través de un análisis pormenorizado del texto latino, que resulta en un comentario completo al capítulo, lo cual (...) es un aporte secundario. A través de este análisis resolvemos las dificultades principales. Primero, al descubrir una distinción tácita entre divisiones de causas en cuanto consideradas en sí mismas y en cuanto conocidas y verbalizadas por los seres humanos, el número de las divisiones es finalmente siete (cuatro fundadas en el ser y tres en el modo de conocer). Esta distinción tiene un signo lingüístico en las expresiones ‘item’ y ‘sciendum est quod’. Segundo, la eventual no contemporaneidad entre los estados potenciales de una causa y su causado se puede justificar respetando la predicación singular, al considerar que un arquitecto, una vez construida una casa, está en potencia de reconstruirla, si ésta perdiera las causas internas de su integridad. (shrink)

Aristotle refers to some animal kinds as μέγιστα γένη, or greatest kinds. The goal of this paper is to make clear the nature and significance of these kinds. I argue that Aristotle thinks of greatest kinds as the most general kinds within a specified domain. I then consider the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of animals’ reproductive parts and modes of reproduction in Generation of Animals is organized around divisions related to the cause of each of the features being explained. I (...) conclude that, while classification is an important goal in Aristotle’s biological treatises, it is of little significance that some of the kinds he identifies are referred to as greatest kinds. The important divisions are, for Aristotle, the divisions that best serve his goal of explaining the various features of animals and these divisions sometimes group together and sometimes cut across the commonly recognized, including the greatest, animal kinds. (shrink)

Aristotle’s influence on D’Arcy Thompson was praised by Thompson himself and has been recognized by others in various respects, including the aesthetic and normative dimensions of biology, and the multicausal explanation of living forms. This article focuses on the relatedness of organic forms, one of the core problems addressed by both Aristotle’s History of Animals (HA), and the renowned chapter of Thompson’s On Growth and Form (G&F), “On the Theory of Transformations, or the Comparison of Related Forms.” We contend that, (...) far from being an incidental inspiration stemming from Thompson’s classicist background, his translation of HA played a pivotal role in developing his theory of transformations. Furthermore, we argue that Thompson’s interpretation of the Aristotelian method of comparison challenges the prevailing view of Aristotle as the founder of “typological essentialism,” and is a key episode in the revision of this narrative. Thompson understood that the method Aristotle used in HA to compare animal forms is better comprehended as a “method of transformations,” leading to a morphological arrangement of animal diversity, as opposed to a taxonomical classification. Finally, we examine how this approach to the relatedness of forms lay the foundation for a causal understanding of parts and their interconnections. Although Aristotle and Thompson emphasized distinct types of causes, we contend that they both differ in a fundamental sense from the one introduced by Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which was formulated as a solution to the species problem rather than the form problem. We conclude that Thompson’s interpretation of Aristotle’s approach to form comparison has not only impacted contemporary scholarship on Aristotle’s biology, but revitalized a perspective that has regained significance due to the resurgence of the problem of form in evo-devo. (shrink)

Aristotle refers to some animal kinds as μέγιστα γένη, or greatest kinds. The goal of this paper is to make clear the nature and significance of these kinds. I argue that Aristotle thinks of greatest kinds as the most general kinds within a specified domain. I then consider the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of animals’ reproductive parts and modes of reproduction in Generation of Animals is organized around divisions related to the cause of each of the features being explained. I (...) conclude that, while classification is an important goal in Aristotle’s biological treatises, it is of little significance that some of the kinds he identifies are referred to as greatest kinds. The important divisions are, for Aristotle, the divisions that best serve his goal of explaining the various features of animals and these divisions sometimes group together and sometimes cut across the commonly recognized, including the greatest, animal kinds. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, despite what many commentators have concluded, Plato’s division of three psychological “causes” of criminal behavior at Laws 863b1-e3 (anger, pleasure, and ignorance) is not intended to invoke the tripartite theory of the soul. I suggest that the focus of the division is on an alternative moral psychological picture, one which is better suited to the criminal penology of Book 9. However, I argue, this alternative picture is nonetheless consistent with tripartite theory.

What the causes of aging are and which factors define lifespan are key questions in the understanding of aging. Here, it is argued that cellular life involves (i) inevitable accumulation of damage resulting from imperfectness and heterogeneity of every cellular process, and (ii) dilution of damage when cells divide. While severe damage is cleared by protective systems, milder damage can only be diluted. This is due to the high cost of accuracy, the greater number of damage forms compared to (...) protective systems, and the constraints on cellular life inherited from the prokaryotic world. This strategy also applies to cancer cells, which are particularly dependent on damage dilution. Imposing restriction on cell division necessarily leads to aging. Interventions that extend lifespan act through metabolic reprogramming, thereby changing both damage composition and the rate of damage accumulation. Thus, heterogeneity leading to myriad mild damage forms represents the cause of aging, whereas the processes that affect the damage landscape and damage accumulation are lifespan regulators. (shrink)

Albert the Great was one of the earliest Western scholars to apply the methodology of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics to diverse fields of natural philosophy. Some medievalists, however, question Albert's commitment to Aristotelianism, interpreting his paraphrastic commentaries as an exposition of views he did not hold himself. Further, some modern Aristotle scholars argue that the methodology of the Posterior Analytics has little to do with Aristotle's actual practice in his scientific treatises. Albert, however, argued that this methodology is essential for achieving (...) a true scientia of nature and that Aristotle employed this methodology in his zoological books. In his commentary on the first book of the Parts of Animals , Albert shows how the method of demonstration applies to the study of animals. He elaborates an account of demonstration ex suppositione finis as the sort of reasoning proper to a science of contingent things. He also argues that scientific explanation must be a two-part procedure. Preceding the final step of causal demonstration the data to be explained must be organized in such a way that the causally significant connections between them are discovered. This is achieved through a restricted application of Platonic division. Albert makes a careful study of the conditions for non-accidental division and shows how they result in quia demonstrations which in turn yield propter quid demonstrations of the cause. ;This two-step methodology is evident, Albert argues, in the arrangement of Aristotle's zoological treatises. The books of the Historia animalium are placed first because they contain the preliminary organization of animal differentiae through division. These are followed by books on the parts, generation and motion of animals which make use of the material so organized to demonstrate their causes. Thus, Albert agrees with recent scholars who argue that the Historia animalium is not a treatise on systematics, but a pre-causal study of animal morphology. ;Albert's careful interpretation of Aristotle's zoology in light of the methodological requirements of the Posterior Analytics taken together with his own research on animal differentiae demonstrates his commitment to Aristotelian principles of natural philosophy. (shrink)

Gregory Reichberg’s argument against my reading of the classical just war theorists falsely assumes that if just cause is unilateral, then there is no moral equality of combatants. This assumption is plausible if we assume an individualist framework. However, the classical theorists accepted quasi-Aristotelian, communitarian social ontologies and theories of justice. For them, the political community is ontologically and morally prior to the private individual. The classical just war theorists build their theories within this framework. They argue that just war (...) is only waged by supra-individual political communities for irreducibly social ends. War by private individuals for private ends is always unjust. The ends sought in just war presuppose the justice of a hierarchy of authority over war such that the soldier is obligated to serve in war upon the command of his legitimate authority. In this way, the classical theorists accept a unilateral theory of just cause and a division of authority over war that entails the possibility of the moral equality of combatants. (shrink)

In this article, I will begin by describing recent divisive concepts legislation, which bans teaching about aspects of racism, sexism, and equity, speculating briefly on the motivations behind it and the implications resulting from it. I will then describe how discussing divisive concepts in classrooms may be a helpful way for students to better understand the particular concepts and for students to take a stand on them. While I will briefly argue for the importance of classroom discussion of divisive concepts, (...) my central claim will be that we must do more than merely discuss these concepts. Instead, we should engage in classroom inquiry about them. Inquiry positions students to not be silent regarding divisive concepts, as some legislation may cause, and inquiry positions students to not just talk about divisive concepts, but to solve social problems related to them in our world today. In other words, inquiry enables us to do something about divisive concepts, rather than just learning about them, as some educators currently advocate in calls for discussion. And inquiry is certainly more effective than banning divisive concepts or pushing them to the background, as recent legislation attempts to do. I argue that rather than excluding divisive concepts or the divisions they may provoke from our classrooms, we need educative spaces where we inquire into what divides us, why we are divided, and how we might respond to such division. Within that inquiry, we can better attend to our divisions while also taking up the specific concepts prohibited in recent legislation. (shrink)

I will argue that Aristotle’s fourfold division of four causes naturally arises from a combination of two distinctions (a) between things and changes, and (b) between that which potentially is something and what it potentially is. Within this scheme, what is usually called the “efficient cause” is something that potentially is a certain natural change, and the “final cause” is, at least in a basic sense, what the efficient cause potentially is. I will further argue that the essences (...) of things and changes are not features or attributes of them, but paradigms that set the standards according to which these things and changes may be judged to be natural or typical. The “formal cause” of a natural thing will be shown to be its essence in this sense: it sets the standards of typicality that apply to instances of its kind. The final cause will be shown to set the standard of typicality for natural changes. When we understand Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes in this way, it becomes clear on what basis he could convincingly argue that final causality is operative in the whole of nature. (shrink)

It is now more than six years since the Global Financial Crisis threatened to topple the banking systems of the Western world. Although a complete breakdown in the financial system was ultimately avoided, one consequence of the events of 2008 has been the biggest slump in economic activity since the Great Depression. Australia was, in the main, spared the economic damage that ravaged large parts of Europe, and there has been little discussion in these parts of the causes and (...) social effects of what the authors refer to as the 'Great Recession'. Somewhat surprisingly, on the evidence presented in this book it would seem that the Anglosphere at large is guilty of what the authors call the 'veil of complacency'. The book asserts that in those countries there is little concern for either the financial consequences or the victims of the crisis. Why should this be the case? Perhaps the Great Recession was not as bad as the headlines have suggested. (shrink)

Species concepts for bacteria and other microbes are contentious, because they are often asexual. There is a Problem of Homogeneity: every mutation in an asexual lineage forms a new strain, of which all descendents are clones until a new mutation occurs. We should expect that asexual organisms would form a smear or continuum. What causes the internal homogeneity of asexual lineages, if they are in fact homogeneous? Is there a natural “species concept” for “microbes”? Two main concepts devised for (...) metazoans and metaphytes have been applied to bacteria. One is the Recombination Concept, a revised form of the Biological Species Concept in which the homogenizing mechanism is the sharing of genome fragments, somewhat akin to sexual recombination. The other is the Ecological Species Concept, in which the ecological niche is that which maintains lineages as cohesive. In this paper I will discuss these two concepts, and offer an underlying model that conjoins them, and consider the implications for species concepts in general. In short, my argument is that asexual species are instances of the most primitive and underived notion of species, which I will call “quasispecies”, following Eigen, and that sexual species are merely one derived kind of species. Moreover, I will argue that there is a continuum of recombination from simple viral models in which each strain is a clone, through to obligate recombination of 50% of the parents’ genome, and that consequently there is no sharp division between “microbial” and more familiar species. (shrink)

One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of (...) several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

RESUMO:As relações de conflito entre os grupos sociais constituem um tópico relevante para a filosofia política, e as maneiras distintas como elas são interpretadas dependem de uma visão mais ampla sobre as condições apropriadas a um Estado bem-ordenado. Maquiavel, por exemplo, ao refletir sobre o caso da Roma Antiga, procurou refutar aqueles que condenavam os tumultos entre os nobres e a plebe da cidade, como se eles tivessem provocado apenas males à república. Para o autor, tais tumultos estavam entre as (...) principais causas da liberdade romana, visto que a diferença nos “humores” dos grandes e do povo resultou em embates que deram origem às leis favoráveis à liberdade. Rousseau, por sua vez, descreveu a existência de “associações particulares” dentro da sociedade civil como algo potencialmente nocivo à harmonia da república, pois cada uma delas contém um interesse particular passível de se sobrepor ao bem comum, nas deliberações públicas, prejudicando o prevalecimento da vontade geral. Ainda para o genebrino, a ocorrência de longos debates e de tumultos nas assembleias populares poderia ser um sinal de divisões internas capazes de ocasionar a ruína do Estado. Frente a essas duas maneiras de conceber o papel político dos conflitos sociais, o objetivo deste trabalho é realizar uma análise comparativa das ideias de Maquiavel e de Rousseau. ABSTRACT:The conflictual relations between social groups constitute an important topic for political philosophy, and the different ways in which they are interpreted depend on a broader view of the appropriate conditions for a well-ordered state. Machiavelli, for example, by reflecting on the case of Ancient Rome, sought to refute those who condemned the tumultuous conflicts between the nobles and the plebs of the city as if they had only caused harm to the Republic. For this author, these tumults were among the main causes of Roman freedom, since the difference in the “humours” of the great and the people led to clashes that gave birth to laws favorable to freedom. Rousseau, for his part, described the existence of “private associations” within civil society as something potentially harmful to the harmony of the Republic, because each of them had a self-interest that was able to override the common good in public deliberations and jeopardize the prevalence of the general will. For Rousseau, the occurrence of long debates and tumults in the popular assemblies could also be a sign of internal divisions capable of causing the ruin of the state. In the face of these two ways of conceiving the political role of social conflicts, the goal of this article is to make a comparative analysis of Machiavelli’s and Rousseau’s ideas. (shrink)

It can be said that Westerners have always seen Muslims and Islam as an obstacle to their own existence. They constantly see themselves as superior and try to belittle those who are not like them. The prejudice created by this point of view has prevented them from seeing Islamic civilization. Although many scientists and thinkers have tried to evaluate this accumulation by being influenced by Islamic thought, governments and people have always viewed the issue as such an opposition. This hatred (...) increased even more when Muslims began to conquer the countries of Western (Christian) societies through conquests. The aim of the "Orientalism Research Centers", which was established with the support of the Vienna Church Council, was to make this struggle more systematic by recognizing the Easterners/Muslims instead of understanding them in all their aspects and through the weak sides they could find. Thus, Westerners wanted to place in the Muslim mind The notion they were superior in every field, that Muslims had always been reactionary and that they had to be corrected. In the modern era, the idea that religion is contrary to science and progress and is the source of all conflicts has prevailed in the West. For this reason, it is aimed to create a human and society free from religion and religious.. In the modern era, a secular society experiment was made, people could not be happy. When it comes to the post-modern period, people, whose spiritual and belief aspects were neglected, showed a tendency to turn to religion again with the longing for this. Western governments, politicians and global capitals have resorted to all kinds of remedies to prevent this tendency towards Islam. The construction of Islamophobia has been a concrete proof of this pursuit. The fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 events in the USA and the terrorist attacks in many other western states which is following them, consist of Muslims, has been the pillar of the construction of “Islamophobia” in the West. Capital appetites of global capitals and ancient hostilities have opened the door to direct intervention in Muslim countries with “Islamophobia”. Thanks to Islamophobia, this intervention has been accepted as legitimate in both Western and many Eastern societies. In this study, it is focused on how the “Islamophobia” built into a pragmatic tool is transformed. It has been emphasized that Islamophobia is a legitimate basis for the West to control the energy and oil resources of the Middle East, which has whetted the appetite of the USA. At this point, it has been seen that the West and the USA have achieved their goals to a large extent. However, it was emphasized that in the intervened societies, problems such as poverty, terrorist incidents, ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the masses being forced to migrate could not be solved in the recent past. In this study, an analysis has been made by dealing with a qualitative method, why Westerners behave like this and what they aim with it. (shrink)

Given the current division of modern Orthodox in Ukraine, the study of the history of the church movement of the 1920s, a significant component of which was the activity of the updated clergy, has not only scientific and cognitive but also practical significance, since it helps to clarify the causes and trends of inter-church confrontation in the conditions of existence of several Orthodox churches and to define conceptual approaches to the formation in the state of a single independent (...) Ukrainian Orthodox Church. (shrink)

The rise of appeals to intuitive theories in many areas of cognitive science must cope with a powerful fact. People understand the workings of the world around them in far less detail than they think. This illusion of knowledge depth has been uncovered in a series of recent studies and is caused by several distinctive properties of explanatory understanding not found in other forms of knowledge. Other experimental work has shown that people do have skeletal frameworks of expectations that constrain (...) richer ad hoc theory construction on the fly. These frameworks are supplemented by an ability to evaluate and rely on the division of cognitive labour in one's culture, an ability shown to be present even in young children. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 539-545 [Access article in PDF] Lewis White Beck on Reasons and Causes Paul Guyer Essays by Lewis White Beck: Five Decades as a Philosopher. Edited by Predag Cicovacki. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1998. Pp. xxxii, 244. This volume reissues twelve previously uncollected pieces by the late Lewis White Beck (1913-1997) and also includes a reminiscence by a former colleague, (...) an introduction by the editor, and a bibliography of Beck's work. Beck was of course the most distinguished American Kant scholar of his time, who made enduring contributions to scholarship with his translations of Kant's writings in moral philosophy, originally published in Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (Chicago, 1949); his trenchant articles on the analytic-synthetic distinction from the early 1950s, collected in his Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis, 1965); his unsurpassed A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago, 1960); his monumental Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); his various articles on Kant's treatment of causation, collected in Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven, 1978); and in his independent philosophical work, The Actor and the Spectator (New Haven, 1975). The present volume, edited by a student from Beck's last years at the University of Rochester, where he spent most of his career, includes articles on a variety of subjects published between 1939 and 1984, and it might seem to be little more than an act of piety toward a now departed but still revered teacher. But a core group of these articles are intimately connected with Beck's central scholarly and philosophical concerns and are well worth republication and renewed study.The articles included in the volume are three early pieces on several central issues in the philosophical debates of the time, "The Synoptic Method" (1939), "The Formal Properties of Ethical Wholes" (1941), and "The Principle of Parsimony in Empirical Science" (1943); an early piece on aesthetics, "Judgments [End Page 539] of Meaning in Art" (1944); two pieces on the tensions between causal explanations and rational evaluations of human behavior, "Psychology and the Norms of Knowledge" (1954) and "Conscious and Unconscious Motives" (1966); Beck's 1971 Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, a skeptical discussion of "Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life"; an overview of philosophies of time, "World Enough, and Time" (1979); a piece on styles of philosophical writing called "Philosophy As Literature" (1980); and then three pieces on Kant, published after the second of Beck's two earlier anthologies of his articles on Kant: "Kant on the Uniformity of Nature" (1981), "Five Concepts of Freedom in Kant" (1987), and "What Have We Learned from Kant?" (1984). With the last paper, the editor departs from the strictly chronological order he has previously employed, presumably in order to end the volume on a suitably general and retrospective note.I will focus my comments on the two systematic papers on psychological explanation and rational evaluation as well as on the first two Kant papers, all of which touch upon the issues that were central to Beck in his philosophically most important works, the 1960 Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and the 1975 The Actor and the Spectator, and which point toward what was Beck's leading idea in both his philosophical and interpretative work: it concerns the idea that the causal explanation of human behavior as a subset of natural events and the rational explanation and justification of human actions are two entirely separate perspectives on the same subject-matter that can be rendered compatible only by the thought that each, causal explanation of behavior on the one hand and rational assessment of actions on the other, is only a regulative ideal for our conduct of inquiry and thus that neither represents a metaphysically privileged point of view. This was an approach that Beck claimed to have been foreshadowed in Kant's resolution of the "Antinomy of Teleological Judgment" in his last great critique, the Critique of the Power... (shrink)

Marxism is a materialist theory that centers economic life in its analysis of the human social world. This materialist orientation manifests in explanations that take economic class to play a fundamental causal role in determining the emergence, character, and development of race-and sex-based oppression—indeed, of all forms of identity-based oppression within class societies. To say that labor is mediated by class in a class-based society is to say that, in such societies, the class-based division of that activity which produces (...) and reproduces the human species is the definite form in which labor appears, and that the human life which is the product of that self-making activity bears its stamp. Marxism’s emphasis on economic factors as central in the constitution and development of human life has been seized upon as evidence of its alleged “class reductionism”—its supposed tendency to think of all aspects of human life as direct and simple expressions of a class relation. No such thing follows; quite the opposite, a correct understanding of the relationships among capitalism, racism, and sexism only further highlights how central the struggle against each is to the struggles against any of the others. (shrink)

This paper considers Kant’s conception of force and causality in his early pre-Critical writings, arguing that this conception is best understood by way of contrast with his immediate predecessors, such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Georg Friedrich Meier, Martin Knutzen, and Christian August Crusius, and in terms of the scientific context of natural philosophy at the time. Accordingly, in the True estimation Kant conceives of force in terms of activity rather than in terms of specific effects, such as motion. Kant’s (...) explicit arguments in the Nova dilucidatio for physical influx are directed primarily against the conception of grounds and existence held by Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier, and only secondarily against Leibniz. Finally, Kant’s reconciliation of the infinite divisibility of space and the unity of monads in the Physical monadology is designed to respond to objections that could be raised naturally by Wolff and Baumgarten.Author Keywords: Kant; Pre-Critical; Force, Causality; Wolff; Leibniz. (shrink)

In some works of Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), there is a discourse related to the claim that textual evidence produces uncertainty. This claim was put forward as a theory based on approximately eleven premises although this number varies in some of his works. According to this theory, textual evidences are not convenient for drawing definite conclusions about the meanings indicated by these evidences due to the situations which is caused by (ⅰ) the language itself and (ⅱ) the use of (...) the speaker of the language and (ⅲ) understanding of listener respectively. There is an additional phrase “This claim is not valid absolutely” in some of the works that mention this theory. Even though that is the case, this addition is not enough -at first glance- to solve the problem. If the problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence, which was put forward systematically for the first time by Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as far as is known, is accepted in the borad sense it might cause some critical problems concerning the science of Kalām. The most important one among these problems can be presented in this way: In the science of Kalām, it is claimed that the certain (yakīnī) propositios and certain evidences are used in the issues that Kalām deals with and substantiates. On the other hand, the true narrative (al-khabar al-sādiq) is counted as one of the sources of knowledge in this science. The true narrative has subsections in the form of narratives transmitted from so many groups of people that are almost impossible to agree on a lie. Because all of these have reached us by way of words and narration, the issue of the uncertanity of textual evidence renders these subsections problematic. Consequently, one of the sources of knowledge in the science of Kalām happens to lose its reliability. In the present work, the following problem is analyzed: The problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence in that it causes one fundamental source of knowledge to be eliminated in the science of Kalām. [In the present paper] Two solutions will be offered to solve the problem: (a) Questioning how the issue was discussed after Rāzī and how Rāzī was understood, then showing which understanding is in accordance with Rāzī's statements. For, in order to reach the most accurate conclusion about a problem, how the issue is understood and explained in the historical process has a very important position. To solve a problem regarding a scholar like Rāzī, who left many works that must be examined from a holistic point of view, it is extremely important to consider first-hand his students, close followers and critics. (b) Showing the field and issues in which the textual evidence can be used epistemologically" through "the tripartite division of the issues whose knowledge is sought to be attained, as known only by reason, known only by transplantation, and known by both" in Kalām. Because the division of the issues according to the ways and sources of knowledge will reveal which information sources can be used in what kind of issues and where they will pose a problem when used. Accordingly, the power or consistency of an information source should be examined through issues that are not objectionable in their epistemological use. The aim of this study is to solve the problem in two ways to have been mentioned. (shrink)

In January 2018, the Trump administration established the Conscience and Religious Freedom Division within the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights with the explicit goal of intensifying legal protection of religious and conscience objections in health care. The establishment of OCR’s new division illustrates the significant powers of administrative agencies to mold the substance of law without seeking legislative action. The mere formation of a division dedicated to protecting conscience rights is already having (...) a significant impact; it is causing health care entities, including hospitals, research organizations, and clinics, to change policies and practices to comply with the declared enforcement strategy. Administrative agencies also shape the law in what they decide not to pursue. For example, OCR has suspended enforcement of the Affordable Care Act prohibition against gender‐identity discrimination. (shrink)

Kraut and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics, I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of (...) all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind and good for something can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue contra Gotthelf that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture. (shrink)

After biologist Deborah Gordon made a series of experimental discoveries in the 1980s, she argued that a change in terminology regarding the division of labor among castes of specialists was needed. Gordon’s investigations of the interactive effects of ants in colonies led her to believe that the established approach Edward O. Wilson had pioneered was biased in a way that made some alternative candidate adaptive explanations invisible. Gordon argued that this was because the term “division of labor” implied (...) a division among specialists that was unwarranted, and proposed “task allocation” as a better description that did not bias research against the alternative causes she had discovered. Gordon’s empirical findings and theoretical proposals also vindicate the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology who have been dismissed as political radicals, but her proposals have been widely misunderstood by many contemporary behavioral ecologists. The terminological and methodological confusions rampant in contemporary discourse can be clarified by applying a framework developed by Elisabeth Lloyd involving an analysis of the constraints imposed by different research questions. Applying this framework will show how the methodological problems involving description raised by the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology extended to his analysis of ants, indicating that they were not challenging Wilson’s naturalistic approach to the study of human evolution, but rather his methods. It will also show how confusion over how Gordon’s proposed research questions have been conflated with the possible answers she has argued ought to be investigated. This in turn will clarify contemporary disputes over her proposal to abandon the term “division of labor.”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The False Cause Fallacy Hasty Generalizations Failure to Take Context into Account Suppressing Relevant Evidence The Gambler's Fallacy Affirming the Consequent/Denying the Antecedent The Fallacies of Composition and Division Missing the Forest for the Trees.

At the end of the Sixth Book of the Republic Plato explains the Idea of Good by means of the Figure of the Sun. As the sun is the cause both of the becoming of that which is subject to becoming and of our apprehension of it and of its changes through the eye, so the idea of good is the cause of the being of that which is and also of our knowledge of it. As the sun is beyond (...) γxs22EFνεσις, so the Idea of Good is beyond Being. Glaucon says he does not understand. The simile is further elucidated by means of a line, divided into two parts, of which one stands for the νιητxs22EFν γxs22EFνος τε καxs22EF τxs22EFπος, where the Idea of Good bears rule, the other for the xs22EFρατxs22EFν γxs22EFνος τε καxs22EF τxs22EFπος, over which the sun is lord. The line is to be divided unequally , and subdivided in the same proportions. Thus we get a line consisting of four parts in the ratio 4 : 6 : : 6 : 9. Let us call the four parts A B C D respectively, A being the smallest, D the greatest, B and C necessarily equal. A stands for εxs1F31κxs22EFνες, shadows, images in water and on polished surfaces, and the like: B stands for animals, plants, and the creations of human industry: C for the objects of that enquiry in which the objects denoted by B are treated as images, i.e. mathematical enquiries: D for the objects apprehended by dialectic, the Ideas themselves. The first equation asserted is—The objects of opinion : objects of knowledge : : representation : original . There follows an explanation of the inferiority of mathematical to philosophical reasoning, and an explanation of the statement that the objects denoted by B are used as images or symbols by the enquiry concerned with C; as a result of which Glaucon perceives that the general distinction between C and D is that between the τxs22EFχναι , i.e. those sciences in which the Guardians were to be educated, and Philosophy or Dialectic. Finally a special πxs22EFθημα or affection of the soul is allotted to each of the four divisions of the line, to A εxs1F31κασxs22EFα, to B πxs22EFστις, to C διxs22EFνοια, to D νxs22EFησις, each πxs22EFθημα being clear in the same degree in which the objects it is concerned with are true. (shrink)

In De Anima II.6, Aristotle divides the objects of perception into three kinds: “special perceptibles" (idia aisthêta) such as colours, sounds and flavours, which can be perceived in their own right by only one sense; “common perceptibles" (koina aisthêta) such as shapes, sizes and movements, which can be perceived in their own right by multiple senses; and “incidental perceptibles,” such as the son of Diares, which can be perceived only “incidentally” (kata sumbebêkos). In this paper, I examine this division (...) of perceptibles and consider what it amounts to. First, I argue that Aristotle’s distinction between perceiving something in its own right (kath' hauto) and perceiving it incidentally marks a causal distinction: what is perceived in its own right causes perception as such, whereas what is perceived incidentally coincides with what is perceived in its own right. Second, I argue that for Aristotle special perceptibles, unlike common perceptibles, belong to homogeneous bodies on account of their chemical composition. Finally, I explain the primacy Aristotle assigns to special perceptibles and his claim that perception of them alone is free from error. I conclude with some brief remarks on Aristotle and the primary/secondary quality distinction. (shrink)

_The purpose _of the article is to introduce into scientific circulation works by Ukrainian scholar Taras Zakydalsky on the philosophy of Hryhorii Skovoroda. Taras Zakydalsky is a representative of the Ukrainian diaspora, philosopher, and member of Canadian NTSh (Shevchenko Scientific Society of Canada). _Theoretical basis._ We consider the uniqueness of H. Skovoroda’s philosophy, which stimulates not only intellectually but also spiritually enlightens the reader. The reasons for the complex perception and interpretation of Hryhorii Skovoroda’s philosophy are highlighted. We have verified (...) the main methods of its interpretation given in the works by Dmytro Chyzhevskyi. The influence of philosophical thought of thinkers of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Aristotle, Epicurus, the Church Fathers, and Tertullian has been studied. We have comprehended H. Skovoroda’s interpretation of the Bible as a two-layer existence, the symbolic world that makes the foundation of his philosophy. The peculiarity of the thinker’s division of the heart into "internal" and "external" is analyzed. Hryhorii Skovoroda’s position on the Good and the evil is stated. The Good is identified with God, and the evil – with the real world, the man can choose between the two. Much attention is paid to the understanding of man as a microcosm – rational thinking, and thought is the fundamental cause of human activity, which generates all existence. Hryhorii Skovoroda’s philosophy of metaphysics as the existence of three worlds is highlighted: the first is the macrocosm (the whole surrounding world), the second is the microcosm (the man), and the third is the symbolic world (the Bible). "Monodualism" as a characteristic feature of H. Skovoroda’s work is analyzed. We have highlighted H. Skovoroda’s attitude to the transcendence of God, which is not separated from the world but is present in it directly. The understanding of faith as a forced act of self-love is analyzed because by loving ourselves we love God. The criteria for true and false faith have been clarified. The significance of H. Skovoroda’s aphorism that _what is necessary is useful, and not useful is unnecessary_ is considered. Examples of ethical principles in H. Skovoroda’s philosophy are considered. Peculiarities of the concept HAPPINESS are revealed. This concept is a universal means of existence of the Good, its source is gratitude to God. _Originality_ of the article is in the systematic presentation of the philosophy of the heart by Hryhorii Skovoroda and the analysis of the integrity of the "inner man", the true meaning of life as interpreted by Taras Zakydalsky. _Conclusions_ summarize the "anthropological pragmatism" of the philosopher, whose main idea is to apply practical skills for the benefit of society. (shrink)

This article is about the 500 hundred year commemoration of the Reformation in 2017. However, the question is to be asked: What should we celebrate in 2017? The article reflects on this question against the background of the ongoing division within Western Christianity. It discusses objectives laid out by Wolfgang Huber in 2008 for the Luther Decade. These objectives focus on the relationship between church and society, and particularly Lutheran-themes such as ‘hopelessnesses of life’, ‘afflictions of faith’, ‘God’s hiddenness’ (...) and the ‘theology of the cross’. The article demonstrates that the soteriological focal point of Biblical-Lutheran theology reflects the assertion that it is only God who, through the belief in Christ, awards freedom and dignity to every human. The Church represents the ‘metaphor of a Christian fellowship’, which is a fellowship of equals that provides a socio-political impetus. (shrink)

Today, every Muslim is expected to have a personality that can respond to the demands of religion in life. Because this ability can bring global goodness to humans. However, Muslims today are faced with a variety of causes that cause Muslim personalities to deviate and cases of behavior and this character deviation that needs to be addressed. The criminality that exists in society is certainly contrary to religious values to is commonplace and requires special attention in handling it. This (...) article aims to convey Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī’s idea of reconstructing morals based on faith. Using the descriptive method of analysis, researchers analyzed data in the form of the concept of ‘aqīdah and morals from the perspective of Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī. Apart from that, it also discussed the concept of morals and its division, the process, and the role of morals in humans. So ‘aqīdah becomes the main basis of Muslims in determining their outlook on life in every thought, word, action, and produce commendable morals because these praiseworthy morals are proof of the primacy of human faith. ‘Aqīdah and morals have a close relationship which results in human deeds and actions. All of them will be commendable if there is continuity between nafs, ‘aql, spirit, and qalb in interpreting the human itself and the nature of the world. So, this is where the role of ‘aqīdah as a Muslim worldview in equalizing the goals of nafs, ‘aql, spirit, and qalb to achieve ḥaqīqī happiness, namely the return of humans to their Creator. (shrink)

As José Benardete observes, "the concept of the infinite is found to impinge on almost the whole schedule of ontological questions" (Infinity, viii). This is especially true for the early moderns, for whom questions like the following were still very much in play: Does the world have a beginning? Are there bounds to the spatial extent of the world? How does an imperfect creation flow from an infinitely perfect creator? How does the infinite divisibility of the continuum relate to the (...) structure of the material world? How are human actions related to the (possibly) infinite chain of causes or influences that shape our behaviors? Far from being an esoteric topic, which is best relegated to the outskirts of metaphysics or mathematics, infinity has tendrils reaching into nearly every philosophical domain. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Madness of the Philosophers, Madness of the ClinicJames Phillips (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, insanity, moral, natural, Hegel, KierkegaardDaniel Berthold's "Talking Cures: A Lacanian Reading of Hegel and Kierkegaard on Language and Madness" is an eloquent discussion of speech, silence, and the 'talking cure' in the three figures highlighted in the title. There is much to admire in this paper. The treatment of speech and silence in the thought of Hegel and Kierkegaard, (...) with many well-chosen quotations, offers much for reflection, both with respect to these philosophers and more generally with respect to the human condition. This is a paper that deserves more than one reading. I find nothing to criticize here and intend the following as further discussion of the themes Berthold has brought to us. Taking his cue from Lacan and reading back into the nineteenth-century figures from the perspective of Lacan's emphasis on language and what he (Lacan) terms the Symbolic, Berthold explores the question of madness in Hegel and Kierkegaard. In my remarks, I connect Berthold's analysis with older traditions of madness, distinguishing what I call the madness of the philosophers and the madness of the clinic.With the phrase, madness of the philosophers, I refer to a longstanding philosophic tradition that opposes reason and passion and attributes madness to an excess of the latter. In Berthold's paper, Hegel is the representative of this position, with his description of madness as a regression into the primitive "life of feeling." As Berthold puts it:For Hegel, madness is a "reversion" or "withdrawal" or "sinking back" of the rational consciousness into the primitive world of instincts and drives, or what Hegel calls "the life of feeling" (Gufühlsleben), which he locates in "the soul," where the "mind is still in the grip of nature"... The soul is "the form of the dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing of the spirit through its unconscious individuality" (in seiner besusstlosen Individualität)... The mind becomes "mastered" by the archaic, unconscious drives of the soul: "the natural self... gains mastery over the... rational consciousness."(2009, 301)Taking off from Lacan in his interpretation of Hegel, Berthold associates reason with language—or, in Lacan's terminology—the register of the Symbolic. Hegel's "life of feeling"—or of passion—is inarticulate, primitive, and vulnerable to madness.Berthold analyzes Kierkegaard in these categories. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is driven to silence, subjectivity, and inwardness as the native [End Page 313] ground of faith. On the other hand, he recognizes something maddening in his extreme solitude, and acknowledges his need to write as a form of self-therapy: "If I stop [writing] for a few days, right away I become ill.... So powerful an urge, so ample, so inexhaustible [is my need to write], subsist[ing] day after day for... years." Kierkegaard's compromise is his "indirect communication." By Berthold's account, Kierkegaard's silence does not rate very high for Hegel and Lacan. For Hegel it represents a regression into the primitive "life of feeling." For Lacan, Kierkegaard's silent inner self is "a myth—a 'shapeless vapor,' 'absolutely nothing.'" As we shall see, Kierkegaard's ambivalence toward silence and speech (or writing) does not fit neatly into the equation of silence and madness.What, however, in contrast to this madness of the philosophers, is the madness of the clinic?1 It is madness caused by disease, whether the latter be understood in ancient terminology of humors, or more modern terminology of brain disease. For a quick review of how clinical madness has played off against the madness of the philosophers, we can turn to the philosophers themselves, invoking Plato as our first guide, because he speaks of both kinds of madness. On the one hand, with his tripartite division of the soul, he is one of the inaugurators of the philosophic vision of madness as an overcoming of the rational part of the soul by the appetitive side. On the other hand, he implicitly endorses the Hippocratic, medical view of madness with a statement like this: "A man who commits one of these crimes might be suffering from insanity, or be as good as insane either because... (shrink)

Ultrasociality refers to the social organization of a few species, including humans and some social insects, having a complex division of labor, city-states, and an almost exclusive dependence on agriculture for subsistence. We argue that the driving forces in the evolution of these ultrasocial societies were economic. With the agricultural transition, species could directly produce their own food and this was such a competitive advantage that those species now dominate the planet. Once underway, this transition was propelled by the (...) selection of within-species groups that could best capture the advantages of (1) actively managing the inputs to food production, (2) a more complex division of labor, and (3) increasing returns to larger scale and larger group size. Together these factors reoriented productive life and radically altered the structure of these societies. Once agriculture began, populations expanded as these economic drivers opened up new opportunities for the exploitation of resources and the active management of inputs to food production. With intensified group-level competition, larger populations and intensive resource exploitation became competitive advantages, and the “social conquest of Earth” was underway. Ultrasocial species came to dominate the earth's ecosystems. Ultrasociality also brought a loss of autonomy for individuals within the group. We argue that exploring the common causes and consequences of ultrasociality in humans and the social insects that adopted agriculture can provide fruitful insights into the evolution of complex human society. (shrink)

The gendered division of labor is the major cause of gender inequality with respect to the broad spectrum of resources, occupations, and roles. Although many feminists aspire to an equality of outcome where there are no significant patterns of gender difference across these dimensions, many have also argued that liberal theories of social justice do not have the conceptual tools to justify a direct attack on the gendered division of labor. Indeed, many critics argue that liberalism positively condones (...) it, presuming that it arises from the free choices of individuals, which must be respected. In this paper I will accept the feminist goal of equality of outcome across roles, occupations, income, and wealth, but will argue that liberal theories of justice are consistent with strong measures aimed at promoting such equality. I will show that liberalism has the conceptual resources to justify a concrete policy measure that goes considerably beyond the measures usually championed by feminists. The example I focus on is “daddy quotas,” which refers to the tagging of a significant part of parental leave for the exclusive use of fathers. (shrink)

This article argues that in order to understand the form of modern political freedom envisioned by Rousseau, we have to understand his theory of taste as refined Epicureanism. Rousseau saw the division of labour and corrupt taste as the greatest threats to modern freedom. He identified their cause in the spread of vulgar Epicureanism – the frenzied pursuit of money, vanity and sexual gratification. In its place, he advocated what he called ‘the Epicureanism of reason’, or refined Epicureanism. Materially (...) grounded on an equitable proportion of needs and faculties, this was a hedonist theory of self-command designed to cultivate the temperate enjoyment of sensual pleasure. I argue that Rousseau hoped that a shift from vulgar to refined Epicureanism would secure political freedom in modernity by grounding the politics of the general will in an economics of balanced growth and a reinvigorated appreciation of natural beauty. This perspective provides a new way of both clarifying the role of economic justice and aesthetic judgment in Rousseau's republican state theory, and of assessing the consistency of his moral and political thought. (shrink)

The article researches the historical transformation of the dichotomy of civilization and barbarism, which originally in ancient Greece did not have a pejorative connotation. This dichotomy has become relevant today to justify the classification of states according to their degree of acceptance of “civilization standards,” which are understood as the standards of the European model of development. The main features of the stereotype of the divide between civilization and barbarism, which took shape in the Roman era, have survived to the (...) present. The premise of “civilizational superiority” of European culture is accompanied by a moral depreciation of other civilizations, turning a barbarian into an enemy of civilization with an explicit racist connotation. Civilization itself is seen as a “vaccination” in the process of missionary work. There emerges the concept of “Eastern barbarism,” coupled with the concepts of terra nullis and the innate irrational behavior of the population of these countries, which justify the seizing of territories for a “more rational” resource management. This activity is historically accompanied by colonization and, in the modern world, by forceful forms of “promoting democracy.” According to the logic of the divide between civilization and barbarism, non-Western countries are doomed to imitate and perpetually fall behind, which causes the disunity of society and internal hostility of “second-rate Europeanized” nations. The Western mentoring has transformed from protectorate to the creation of governance structures that are headed by Western-educated local elites and are designed to change the cultural patterns of society. There was a conception that the world is divided into spheres, in the first circle of which there is a progressive civilized European world, followed by a number of countries similar in structure and values to the European model, and then there is a sphere of barbarism and backwardness. In the contemporary version, this theory presumes the division of states into “pre-modern,” modern, and post-modern states. It the conclusion, it is noted that this divide contradicts to the humane essence of culture and civilization process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to explore alternatives to disgust, which is a social problem today, based on Lao-tzu’s thought. Various discussions on how to approach the problem of hate have recently focused on legal aspects. However, in order to get to the root of the problem, we need a philosophical approach that can provide wisdom along with an understanding of the science of disgust. Among the various causes of hate, the process of generating and categorizing prejudice and (...) discriminating against people based on certain criteria is one of the core elements of hate. Lao-tzu’s thought may offer a new way forward in this regard. Lao-tzu did not see the world’s constitution as a simple division of things into this and that, separated from their relationship to each other by a set of criteria. He also warned against trapping objects within specific concepts by talking about the limits of conceptualization. In this article, I will interpret Lao-tzu’s thought from a correlative standpoint and use it to derive an alternative to aversion based on the dimensions of ‘correlation’and ‘conceptualization’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

Whilst Edward Gibbon's Memoirs of My Life comprise a notoriously complex document of autobiographical artifice, there is no reason to question the honesty of its revelation of his attitudes to geography and its relationship to the historian's craft. Writing of his boyhood before going up to Oxford, Gibbon commented that his vague and multifarious reading could not teach me to think, to write, or to act; and the only principle, that darted a ray of light into the indigested chaos, was (...) an early and rational application of the order of time and place. The maps of Cellarius and Wells imprinted in my mind the picture of ancient geography: from Stranchius I imbibed the elements of chronology: the Tables of Helvicus and Anderson, the Annals of Usher [ sic ] and Prideaux, distinguished the connection of events. . . This seems a fairly direct comment on Gibbon's attitude to geography as a historian in that it is confirmed by various of his working documents and commonplace book comments not aimed at posterity and by the practice embodied in his great work that was thus targeted, the Decline and Fall. Taking Gibbon's private documents, the first manuscript we have in his English Essays, for example, is a tabulated chronology from circa 1751 when Gibbon was fourteen years old, which begins with the creation of the world in 6000 BC and runs up to 1590 BC, this being exactly the sort of material which could be commonplaced from the likes of Ussher and Prideaux. Matching this attention to chronology is a concern with geography, and indeed the two are coupled together as in his comment in the Memoirs. Thus in his Index Expurgatoris, Gibbon berates Sallust as “no very correct historian” on the grounds that his chronology is not credible and that “notwithstanding his laboured description of Africa, nothing can be more confused than his Geography without either division of provinces or fixing of towns”. In this regard, Gibbon the author of the Decline and Fall was a “correct” historian, in that he was careful to frame each arena in which historical events were narrated in the light of a prefatory description of the geography of the location under discussion. This is most readily apparent in the second half of the opening chapter of the work, where Gibbon proceeds on what his “Table of Contents” calls a “View of the Provinces of the Roman Empire”, starting in the West with Spain and then proceeding clockwise to reach Africa on the other side of the Pillars of Hercules, a pattern of geographical description directly mirroring ancient practice in Strabo's Geography and Pomponius Mela's De Situ Orbis. But this practice of prefacing a historical account with geographical description repeats itself at various points in the work, as when, approaching the end of his grand narrative, Gibbon reaches the impact of “Mahomet, with sword in one hand and the Koran in the other” on “the causes of the decline and fall of the Eastern empire”. Before discussing the birth of Islam, Gibbon treats his readers to a discussion of the geography of Arabia, beginning with its size and shape before moving on to its soils, climate and physical–geographic subdivisions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 46-58 [Access article in PDF] In Defense of Trimming Eugene Goodheart I In The Education of Henry Adams, Adams disparages a class of English politicians as "trimmers." They are "the political economist, the anti-slavery and doctrinaire class, the followers of Tocqueville, and of John Stuart Mill. As a class, they were timid--and with good reason--and timidity, which is high wisdom in philosophy, sicklies the (...) whole cast of thought in action." 1 Timidity in action, but high wisdom in philosophy. Adams's ambivalent characterization is, relatively speaking, kind to the trimmer, for in the prevailing view he has a reputation for cowardice, lack of integrity, unprincipled behavior. Dante did not know the word, but the "neutrals" (in Sinclair's translation) whom the poet consigns to limbo have been retroactively called trimmers. Virgil regards them as beneath contempt: "Let us not talk of them; but look thou and pass." Sinclair explains why: "These innumerable seekers of safety first, and last, who take no risk either of suffering in a good cause or of scandal in a bad one, are here manifestly, nakedly, that which they were in life, the waste and rubbish of the universe, of no account to the world, unfit for Heaven and barely admitted to Hell. They have no need to die, for they 'never were alive'. They follow still, as they have always done, a meaningless, shifting banner that never stands for anything because it never stands at all, a cause which is no cause but the changing magnet of the day. Their pains are paltry and their tears and blood mere food for worms." 2The dictionary defines trimming as the "modif[ication] of one's attitude in order to stand well with opposite parties; also to accommodate oneself to the mood of the times," and gives 1685 as the date of provenance. By the late nineteenth century trimming becomes opportunism: [End Page 46] "to modify according to expediency." So it was something of a surprise to find a defense of trimming in Macaulay's famous History of England in his eulogy of one of Charles the Second's ministers, Viscount Halifax (Charles Savile). "Halifax," we learn, "was a trimmer on principle. He was also a trimmer by the constitution of his head and his heart." Macaulay sums up Halifax's defense in his essay "The Character of a Trimmer." "Everything good, he said, trims between extremes. The temperate zone trims between the climate in which men are roasted and the climate in which they are frozen. The English Church trims between the Anabaptist madness and the Papist lethargy. The English constitution trims between Turkish despotism and Polish anarchy. Virtue is nothing but a just temper between propensities any one of which, if indulged to excess, becomes vice." Behind trimming lies Aristotle's golden mean.What of the character of the trimmer? Macaulay provides an admirable and admiring portrait of Halifax. "His understanding was keen, sceptical, inexhaustibly fertile in distinctions and objections; his taste refined, his sense of the ludicrous exquisite; his temper placid and forgiving, but fastidious, and by no means prone either to malevolence or to enthusiastic admiration." Charming and agreeable, but where is the integrity or courage, attributes that we associate with character? He had nothing in common with those who fly from extreme to extreme, and regard the party which they have deserted with an animosity far exceeding that of consistent enemies. His place was on the debatable ground between the hostile divisions of the community.... The party to which he at any moment belonged was the party which, at that moment, he liked least, because it was the party of which at that moment he had the nearest view. He was therefore always severe upon his violent associates, and was always in friendly relations with his moderate opponents. Every faction in the day of its insolent and vindictive triumph incurred his censure; and every faction, when vanquished and persecuted, found in him a protector. To his lasting honor it must be mentioned that he attempted to save those victims whose fate... (shrink)

In 1961, Ernst Mayr published a highly influential article on the nature of causation in biology, in which he distinguished between proximate and ultimate causes. Mayr argued that proximate causes (e.g. physiological factors) and ultimate causes (e.g. natural selection) addressed distinct ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and were not competing alternatives. That distinction retains explanatory value today. However, the adoption of Mayr’s heuristic led to the widespread belief that ontogenetic processes are irrelevant to evolutionary questions, a belief that (...) has (1) hindered progress within evolutionary biology, (2) forged divisions between evolutionary biology and adjacent disciplines and (3) obstructed several contemporary debates in biology. Here we expand on our earlier (Laland et al. in Science 334:1512–1516, 2011) argument that Mayr’s dichotomous formulation has now run its useful course, and that evolutionary biology would be better served by a concept of reciprocal causation, in which causation is perceived to cycle through biological systems recursively. We further suggest that a newer evolutionary synthesis is unlikely to emerge without this change in thinking about causation. (shrink)