In popular lay discourse, objections to human biological enhancement technologies are sometimes expressed in terms of the charge that they are unnatural. This paper critiques the literal claim that seems to be presented here, namely that such technologies are in some ordinary sense ’unnatural' and that it follows from this they are immoral. Such a conceptual ’nature argument' is unsound. However, the paper contends that this does not mean that the charge of unnaturalness should be dismissed out of (...) hand. Rather, the charge of unnaturalness made by a non-philosophically trained public can be construed as expressive of a general attitude of conservative concern about enhancement technologies. Viewed in this way, the charge invites philosophers to take seriously the underlying empirical concerns that underpin these widespread lay reactions. (shrink)

Is it ethical or not to enhance the characteristics and capacities of human beings, making use of technological incorporations in their biology? This article presents arguments from both position pros and cons, about technological incorporations in human bodies. The denaturalization of technologically enhanced humans is discussed; A discussion is raised about the impact of these technologies on the population inequality; We present a contrast between whether the research is for treatment or enhancement purposes. Some of the repercussions on a (...) society of humans are analyzed, both hyper connected and technologically enhanced. Some of the future challenges that societies with technologically enhanced humans must face are presented. In conclusion, the development of technologies, within a regulatory and normative framework, to enhancing the characteristics and capacities of human beings is ethical. Because technologically enhanced humans are part of the NBIC convergence, and the NBIC convergence will generate new knowledge that will surely be used to develop clean and safe energy sources, preventive medical treatments that will eliminate diseases such as cancer and HIV, and design strategies to the conservation and decontamination of the planet. (shrink)

In this chapter the author argues that the desire to improve on the human body and eventually to replace it with post‐biological alternatives does not imply that we loathe the flesh in which we are currently embodied. The appeal of post‐biology lies in the opportunities for expanding not only our cognition and sensory richness and for sculpting and refining our emotions but also for deeper self‐understanding. The chapter points out that post‐biological beings are not truly disembodied. All thinking (...) beings rely ultimately on physical processes, even if those processes are distributed across numerous computational devices. Whatever senses are built into the bodies we choose to inhabit, we will also be able to expand our perceptual range enormously by connecting to external sensors. If we can accomplish the transition to post‐biological being, the result will not be mechanization and restriction; it will be greater richness of being and existential freedom. (shrink)

Despite ever‐increasing accumulation of genomic data, the fundamental question of how individual genes are switched on during development, lineage‐specification and differentiation is not fully answered. It is widely accepted that this involves the interaction between at least three fundamental regulatory elements: enhancers, promoters and insulators. Enhancers contain transcription factor binding sites which are bound by transcription factors (TFs) and co‐factors expressed during cell fate decisions and maintain imposed patterns of activation, at least in part, via their epigenetic modification. This information (...) is transferred from enhancers to their cognate promoters often by coming into close physical proximity to form a ‘transcriptional hub’ containing a high concentration of TFs and co‐factors. The mechanisms underlying these stages of transcriptional activation are not fully explained. This review focuses on how enhancers and promoters are activated during differentiation and how multiple enhancers work together to regulate gene expression. We illustrate the currently understood principles of how mammalian enhancers work and how they may be perturbed in enhanceropathies using expression of the α‐globin gene cluster during erythropoiesis, as a model. (shrink)

Two theories on the origins of COVID-19 have been widely circulating in China and the West respectively, one blaming the United States and the other a highest-level biocontainment laboratory in Wuhan, the initial epicentre of the pandemic. Both theories make claims of biological warfare attempts. According to the available scientific evidence, these claims are groundless. However, like the episodes of biological warfare during the mid-twentieth century, the spread of these present-day conspiracy theories reflects a series of longstanding and (...) damaging trends in the international scene which include deep mistrust, animosities, the power of ideologies such as nationalism, and the sacrifice of truth in propaganda campaigns. Also, the threats associated with biological warfare, bioterrorism, and the accidental leakage of deadly viruses from labs are real and growing. Thus, developing a better global governance of biosafety and biosecurity than exists at present is an urgent imperative for the international community in the broader context of a looming Cold War II. For such a governance, an ethical framework is proposed based upon the triple ethical values of transparency, trust, and the common good of humanity. (shrink)

We provide an introduction to network theory, evidence to support a connection between molecular network structure and neuropsychiatric disease, and examples of how network approaches can expand our knowledge of the molecular bases of these diseases. Without systematic methods to derive their biological meanings and inter‐relatedness, the many molecular changes associated with neuropsychiatric disease, including genetic variants, gene expression changes, and protein differences, present an impenetrably complex set of findings. Network approaches can potentially help integrate and reconcile these findings, (...) as well as provide new insights into the molecular architecture of neuropsychiatric diseases. Network approaches to neuropsychiatric disease are still in their infancy, and we discuss what might be done to improve their prospects. (shrink)

We analyzed stable patients’ views regarding synthetic biology in general, the medical application of synthetic biology, and their potential participation in trials of synthetic biology in particular. The aim of the study was to find out whether patients’ views and preferences change after receiving more detailed information about synthetic biology and its clinical applications. The qualitative study was carried out with a purposive sample of 36 stable patients, who suffered from diabetes or gout. Interviews were transcribed verbatim, translated and fully (...) anonymized. Thematic analysis was applied in order to examine stable patients’ attitudes towards synthetic biology, its medical application, and their participation in trials. When patients were asked about synthetic biology in general, most of them were anxious that something uncontrollable could be created. After a concrete example of possible future treatment options, patients started to see synthetic biology in a more positive way. Our study constitutes an important first empirical insight into stable patients’ views on synthetic biology and into the kind of fears triggered by the term “synthetic biology.” Our results show that clear and concrete information can change patients’ initial negative feelings towards synthetic biology. Information should thus be transmitted with great accuracy and transparency in order to reduce irrational fears of patients and to minimize the risk that researchers present facts too positively for the purposes of persuading patients to participate in clinical trials. Potential participants need to be adequately informed in order to be able to autonomously decide whether to participate in human subject research involving synthetic biology. (shrink)

As cognitive neuroscience has advanced, the list of prospective internal, biological enhancements has steadily expanded. Education and training, as well as the use of external information‐processing devices, may be labeled as “conventional” means of cognition enhancement (CE). They are often well established and culturally accepted. By contrast, methods of enhancing cognition through “unconventional” means, such as ones involving deliberately created nootropic drugs, gene therapy, or neural implants, are nearly all to be regarded as experimental at the present time. (...) Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), genetic interventions, brain‐computer interfaces and new senses are highly experimental and unlikely to be important over the next 15 years. Many of the concerns about enhancement are nonspecific to the tools used to achieve it, which means that enhancement–ethic scrutiny should also apply to nonbiological external enhancements. (shrink)

Since before we can remember, humanity aims to overcome its biological limitations; such a goal has certainly played a key role in the advent of technique. However, despite the benefits that technique may bring, the people who make use of it will inevitably be under risk of harm. Even though human technical wisdom consists in attaining the best result without compromising anybody’s safety, misuses are always a possibility in the horizon. Nowadays, technology can be used for more than just (...) improving human capacities, preserving and restoring health or promoting human well-being. It also enables us to overcome human limitations and reach way beyond our "natural design". That being said, what could possibly justify the fear for these new directions of biotechnology? Should medicine and health care change their traditional goals and begin searching for artificial improvements to wellness in human nature? In this paper, I will hereby present and briefly discuss the main topics of the contemporary issue of human enhancement: the therapy-enhancement distinction, the possibility of cognitive enhancements and better physical performances, the fight against senescence, the arguments for and against human eugenics, the search for perfection, the quest of moral enhancement, the problem of public priorities, and some questions on medical ethics. Then, finally, I will want to present some realist perspectives on the subject. (shrink)

The cumulative impact of enhancement technologies may alter the human species in the very long-term future. In this article, I will start showing how radical genetic enhancements may accelerate the conversion into a novel species. I will also clarify the concepts of ‘biological species’, ‘transhuman’ and ‘posthuman’. Then, I will summarize some ethical arguments for creating a transhuman or posthuman species with a substantially higher level of well-being than the human one. In particular, I will present what I (...) shall call the Principle of the Best Interests of Posthumanity, which states that the enhancement of the human and transhuman species must be directed towards the creation of a posthuman existence that is substantially more valuable than its predecessors. I suggest that human extinction may be considered, within that principle, as one of the best interests of posthumanity. Finally, I will develop three objections that make that principle unattractive and that show that pursuing a full-blown programme of posthuman evolution is ethically flawed. (shrink)

The use of certain performance-enhancing drugs (PED) is banned in sport. I discuss critically standard justifications of the ban based on arguments from two widely used criteria: fairness and harms to health. I argue that these arguments on their own are inadequate, and only make sense within a normative understanding of athletic performance and the value of sport. In the discourse over PED, the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” performance has exerted significant impact. I examine whether the distinction makes sense (...) from a moral point of view. I propose an understanding of “natural” athletic performance by combining biological knowledge of training with an interpretation of the normative structure of sport. I conclude that this understanding can serve as moral justification of the PED ban and enable critical and analytically based line drawing between acceptable and nonacceptable performance-enhancing means in sport. (shrink)

The welfarist account of enhancement and disability holds enhanced and disabled states on a spectrum: the former are biological or psychological states that increase the chances of a person leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances, while the latter decrease those chances. Here, I focus on a particular issue raised by this account: what should we count as part of an individual’s relevant set of circumstances when thinking about enhanced and disabled states? Specifically, is social (...) prejudice relevant to an individual’s circumstances in regards to how disabled or enhanced they are? For instance, if an individual is discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour, and this leads to a reduction in their well-being, the welfarist account suggests that their skin colour is a disability. To avoid such a seeming mislabel, Savulescu and Kahane have argued for excluding social prejudice from counting as a relevant circumstance to their welfarist definition of disability. I argue, however, that this exclusion of social prejudice is unsatisfactory and incompatible with the goals of this account. (shrink)

Stimulant drugs, transcranial magnetic stimulation, brain-computer interfaces, and even genetic modifications are all discussed as forms of potential cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancement can be conceived as a benefit-seeking strategy used by healthy individuals to enhance cognitive abilities such as learning, memory, attention, or vigilance. This phenomenon is hotly debated in the public, professional, and scientific literature. Many of the statements favoring cognitive enhancement (e.g., related to greater productivity and autonomy) or opposing it (e.g., related to health-risks and (...) social expectations) rely on claims about human welfare and human flourishing. But with real-world evidence from the social and psychological sciences often missing to support (or invalidate) these claims, the debate about cognitive enhancement is stalled. In this paper, we describe a set of crucial debated questions about psychological and social aspects of cognitive enhancement (e.g., intrinsic motivation, well-being) and explain why they are of fundamental importance to address in the cognitive enhancement debate and in future research. We propose studies targeting social and psychological outcomes associated with cognitive enhancers (e.g., stigmatization, burnout, mental well-being, work motivation). We also voice a call for scientific evidence, inclusive of but not limited to biological health outcomes, to thoroughly assess the impact of enhancement. This evidence is needed to engage in empirically informed policymaking, as well as to promote the mental and physical health of users and non-users of enhancement. (shrink)

Some say moral bioenhancements are urgent and necessary; others say they are misguided or simply will not work. I examine a class of arguments claiming that moral bioenhancements are problematic because they are self-subverting. On this view, trying to make oneself or others more moral, at least through certain means, can itself be immoral, or at least worse than the alternatives. The thought here is that moral enhancements might fail not for biological reasons, but for specifically morally self-referential reasons. (...) I argue that moral bioenhancements, in a restricted set of cases, are self-subverting such that they are impermissible. Further, some moral bioenhancements would result in agents who are less admirable than they might have been through other means. (shrink)

There is recent empirical evidence that personal identity is constituted by one’s moral traits. If true, this poses a problem for those who advocate for moral enhancement, or the manipulation of a person’s moral traits through pharmaceutical or other biological means. Specifically, if moral enhancement manipulates a person’s moral traits, and those moral traits constitute personal identity, then it is possible that moral enhancement could alter a person’s identity. I go a step further and argue that (...) under the right conditions, moral enhancement can constitute murder. I then argue that these conditions are not remote. (shrink)

In discussions of the ethics of human gene therapy, it has become standard to draw a distinction between the use of human gene transfer techniques to treat health problems and their use to enhance or improve normal human traits. Some dispute the normative force of this distinction by arguing that it is undercut by the legitimate medical use of human gene transfer techniques to prevent disease - such as genetic engineering to bolster immune function, improve the efficiency of DNA repair, (...) or add cellular receptors to capture and process cholesterol. If disease prevention is a proper goal of medicine, these critics argue, and the use of gene transfer techniques to enhance human health maintenance capacities will help achieve that goal, then the “treatment/enhancement‘ distinction cannot define the limits of legitimate gene therapy. In this paper, I argue that a line can be drawn between prevention and enhancement for gene therapy (and thus between properly medical and nonmedical uses of gene therapy), but only if one is willing to accept two rather old-fashioned claims: 1) Some health problems are best understood as if they were entities in their own right, reifiable as processes or parts in a biological system, with at least as much ontological objectivity and theoretical significance as the functions that they inhibit. 2) Legitimate preventive genetic health care should be limited to efforts to defend people from attack by these more robust pathological entities, rather than changing their bodies to evade social injustices. (shrink)

This chapter examines the state of the art of physical enhancement, demonstrating how the problem of regulating excellence is becoming more difficult as technology advances. Modifications are grouped into the following categories, building on Ellul's seminal discussions on philosophy and technology: technique, equipment, and biology. Technical enhancements are those that involve knowledge‐based innovations, leading to improved performance. Such examples encompass modifications arising from scientific insights, such as better understanding about the effect of nutrition. An emerging technology is the “Glove,” (...) developed by Heller and Grahn. This innovative cooling device has been utilized by the San Francisco 49ers and it demonstrates the blurred boundary between therapeutic use and enhancement. The “glove” leads us to forms of enhancement that arise from innovations in equipment design, though even this concept has expanded in remarkable ways recently. The chapter also offers insight into some of the major, emerging biotechnological enhancements that affect physical capabilities. (shrink)

We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should (...) be sought and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices. (shrink)

In what follows, I draw on things I have found in Japanese discussions of bioethics in order to clarify some aspects of the ethics of biotechnological enhancement. In doing so it will, I hope, become evident that what we might call a “religious” component is in Japan somewhat differently construed than in the contexts with which we are more likely to be familiar in North America. And in the end an attempt will be made here to show that the (...) materials considered give us all – not just the Japanese – reasons for going forward with biological enhancement technologies only on condition that extreme caution be exercised. The fast-moving, oncoming traffic in this domain ought to be forced, these materials suggest, to come up to a caution-demanding signal – not a green light but one that is unambiguously amber. Caution and perhaps even a full stop appear to be in order. (shrink)

I argue that the existence of sexual dimorphism poses a profound challenge to those philosophers who wish to deny the moral significance of the idea of ‘normal human capacities’ in debates about the ethics of human enhancement. The biological sex of a child will make a much greater difference to their life prospects than many of the genetic variations that the philosophical and bioethical literature has previously been concerned with. It seems, then, that bioethicists should have something to (...) say about the choice between a male and a female embryo. Either, 1) parents have reason to choose boys over girls; (2) parents have reason to choose girls over boys; or, (3) parents have neither reason to choose girls over boys nor reason to choose boys over girls. Embracing either of the first two alternatives has strongly counterintuitive – and arguably morally repugnant – consequences. To motivate the third option we must either make reference to the idea of ‘normal human capacities’ or argue that parents should consider the interests of society when thinking about what sort of children they should bring into the world – an implication that should be extremely controversial in debates about the ‘new eugenics’. I conclude, then, that the idea of ‘normal human capacities’ is properly crucial to reasoning about the ethics of shaping future persons. (shrink)

Many enzymes are inhibited by their own substrates, leading to velocity curves that rise to a maximum and then descend as the substrate concentration increases. Substrate inhibition is often regarded as a biochemical oddity and experimental annoyance. We show, using several case studies, that substrate inhibition often has important biological functions. In each case we discuss, the biological significance is different. Substrate inhibition of tyrosine hydroxylase results in a steady synthesis of dopamine despite large fluctuations in tyrosine due (...) to meals. Substrate inhibition of acetylcholinesterase enhances the neural signal and allows rapid signal termination. Substrate inhibition of phosphofructokinase ensures that resources are not devoted to manufacturing ATP when it is plentiful. In folate metabolism, substrate inhibition maintains reactions rates in the face of substantial folate deprivation. Substrate inhibition of DNA methyltransferase serves to faithfully copy DNA methylation patterns when cells divide while preventing de novo methylation of methyl‐free promoter regions. (shrink)

Enhancing cognition is a complex activity, for the sake of which humanity has developed a rich array of techniques and skills. We can distinguish between three categories: a) cognitive supports and education; b) neural cognitive enhancers: drugs and other ways to improve the functionality of cognitive neural networks; c) technological cognitive enhancers: implants, extended minds and technological supports variously integrated in the neural cognitive networks. Applying a version of the Parity Principle, I argue that there is no morally relevant difference (...) in the three categories. What we want to preserve while using these techniques is not the biological status quo of the mind of persons, but rather personal identities. In this perspective, there can be no general objection to cognitive enhancement. Every technique, even very traditional ones, have their drawbacks, especially when they threaten to reduce the autonomy of agents in moulding their own personal identity. (shrink)

:Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context—germline intervention in reproductive medicine—issues (...) about enhancement and eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such as intelligence, and there are more pressing questions that need attention if clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility. (shrink)

Abstract: -/- We present a teaching activity, whose aim is to enhance students’ understanding of color perception by introducing them to intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. The approach can be used in different disciplines, including biology, philosophy, psychology, physics, or statistics, for different purposes and with college students having various levels of sophistication and scientific training.

abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and (...) biological (including genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement. (shrink)

:There are manifold intriguing issues located within largely unexplored borderlands of bioethics, future studies, and astrobiology. Human enhancement has for quite some time been among the foci of bioethical debates, but the same cannot be said about its global, transgenerational, and even cosmological consequences. In recent years, discussions of posthuman and, in general terms, postbiological civilization have slowly gained a measure of academic respect, in parallel with the renewed interest in the entire field of future studies and the great (...) strides made in understanding of the origin and evolution of life and intelligence in their widest, cosmic context. These developments promise much deeper synergic answers to questions regarding the long-term future of enhancement: how far can it go? Is human enhancement a further step toward building a true postbiological civilization? Should we actively participate and help shape this process? Is the future of humanity “typical” in the same Copernican sense as our location in space and time is typical in the galaxy, and if so, can we derive important insights about the evolutionary pathways of postbiological evolution from astrobiological and Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence studies? These and similar questions could be understood as parts of a possible unifying research program attempting to connect cultural and moral evolution with what we know and understand about their cosmological and biological counterparts. (shrink)

Much recent work on the ethics of new biomedical technologies is committed to hidden, contestable views about the nature of biological reality. This selection of essays by Tim Lewens explores and scrutinises these biological foundations, and includes work on human enhancement, synthetic biology, and justice in healthcare decision-making.

Interpersonal relations play a critical role in both the conception and dynamics of Brazilian citizenship. Under the influence of neoliberalism, patients must build strategies to access high‐quality health care services. This study aimed to analyze the role of interpersonal relations involved in the access to and delivery of health care services in Brazil amid the influence of austerity policies and the role of nurses in enhancing citizenship through nursing care. Thirty‐one patients in a public hospital in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (...) participated in qualitative interviews. A lexical analysis was conducted to analyze the interview data using Alceste® software, version 2012. The results were interpreted in light of both theoretical constructs of the Brazilian citizenship and biological subcitizenship propositions. Two lexical classes revealed contents about strategies used by patients to access high‐quality health care. In the context of budget cuts due to austerity policies, cultural aspects of Brazilian citizenship have influenced access to high‐quality health care services by creating two distinct conditions. Some patients acted as super‐citizens, while others acted as subcitizens. Nurses across the globe must spearhead the struggle for universal and equitable health care access at all levels, without losing sight of wider sociocultural aspects. (shrink)

The range of opportunities people enjoy in life largely depends on social, biological, and genetic factors for which individuals are not responsible. Philosophical debates about equality of opportunities have focussed mainly on addressing social determinants of inequalities. However, the introduction of human bioenhancement should make us reconsider what our commitment to equality entails. We propose a way of improving morally relevant equality that is centred on what we consider a fair distribution of bioenhancements. In the first part, we identify (...) three main positions in the debate on bioenhancement and equality, and we show how each of them fails to meet the demands of a serious commitment to equality. In the second part, we formulate a new proposal that we think better promotes equality of opportunities: people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds should be given access to bioenhancements while people from privileged socio-economic background should be prohibited from using them. We argue that those who are concerned about the inequality implications of bioenhancement should embrace this solution, rather than reject bioenhancement. (shrink)

This paper presents explication on how paleontologists reconstruct the past using fossils when _good_ modern analogues are not available. I call these _pastist_ methods to differentiate them from presentist methods in which such analogues are available. I do so by presenting two fossil cases: the problematica and graphoglyptids. I describe a forgotten heuristic, “analogue chaining,” that involves jumping from fossil anomaly to fossil anomaly using one to make sense of the other in successive fashion, using the relations _between fossils_ to (...) guide reconstruction. I relate this to the philosophy of historical sciences in four ways. First, that methods like analogue chaining have a “linearity” meaning that there are limited ways in which to learn about specimens using analogues. Second, that they are intrinsically difficult to notice, i.e. invisible. Third, that linearity and invisibility put pressure on some accounts of optimism about historical sciences. Fourth, our cases provide novel forms of optimism based on epistemic enhancement: the phenomena that some questions regarding an event are _better_ answered millions of years after its occurrence. (shrink)

Living systems employ several mechanisms and behaviors to achieve robustness and maintain themselves under changing internal and external conditions. Regulation stands out from them as a specific form of higher-order control, exerted over the basic regime responsible for the production and maintenance of the organism, and provides the system with the capacity to act on its own constitutive dynamics. It consists in the capability to selectively shift between different available regimes of self-production and self-maintenance in response to specific signals and (...) perturbations, due to the action of a dedicated subsystem which is operationally distinct from the regulated ones. The role of regulation, however, is not exhausted by its contribution to maintain a living system’s viability. While enhancing robustness, regulatory mechanisms play a fundamental role in the realization of an autonomous biological organization. Specifically, they are at the basis of the remarkable integration of biological systems, insofar as they coordinate and modulate the activity of distinct functional subsystems. Moreover, by implementing complex and hierarchically organized control architectures, they allow for an increase in structural and organizational complexity while minimizing fragility. Finally, they endow living systems, from their most basic unicellular instances, with the capability to control their own internal dynamics to adaptively respond to specific features of their interaction with the environment, thus providing the basis for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition. (shrink)

In a critical intervention into the bioethics debate over human enhancement, philosopher Melinda Hall tackles the claim that the expansion and development of human capacities is a moral obligation. Hall draws on French philosopher Michel Foucault to reveal and challenge the ways disability is central to the conversation. The Bioethics of Enhancement includes a close reading and analysis of the last century of enhancement thinking and contemporary transhumanist thinkers, the strongest promoters of the obligation to pursue (...) class='Hi'>enhancement technology. With specific attention to the work of bioethicists Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu, the book challenges the rhetoric and strategies of enhancement thinking. These include the desire to transcend the body and decide who should live in future generations through emerging technologies such as genetic selection. Hall provides new analyses rethinking both the philosophy of enhancement and disability, arguing that enhancement should be a matter of social and political interventions, not genetic and biological interventions. Hall concludes that human vulnerability and difference should be cherished rather than extinguished. -/- This book will be of interest to academics working in bioethics and disability studies, along with those working in Continental philosophy (especially on Foucault). (shrink)

This paper turns to Hannah Arendt’s brief, poignant remarks about the advent of a biotechnological revolution as a starting point for a renewed reflection on her concept of natality. By expanding on Arendt's significant, but often overlooked, reference to the work of the German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen, it will be argued that that natality is a concept that subverts any rigid opposition between zoe and bios, biological birth and politico-linguistic birth. Consequently, it will be shown that Jürgen Habermas and (...) Michael Sandel are mistaken to appeal to the concept of natality in their arguments against genetic enhancement. (shrink)

The papers collected in this volume examine moral enhancement: the idea that we should morally improve people through the manipulation of their biological constitution. Whether moral enhancement is possible or even desirable is highly controversial. Proponents argue that it is necessary if we are to address various social ills and avert catastrophic climate change. Detractors have raised a variety of concerns, some of a practical nature and others of principle. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, the proposal forces us (...) to ask anew what being moral actually means, in order for the idea of moral enhancement to make sense at all. The present collection both addresses these issues and moves the debate beyond its current parameters, bringing together authors with a wide range of perspectives and areas of expertise. Chapters variously draw on experimental psychology, social philosophy, pragmatism, Kantian and Aristotelian moral philosophy, and the ethics of care, sex, and psychedelics. (shrink)

This article presents a critical analysis of the views of Michael Sandel on human enhancement in his book The Case Against Perfection (2007). Sandel argues that the use of biotechnologies for human enhancement is driven by a will to mastery or hybris, leading to an ‘explosion of responsibility’ and a disappearance of solidarity. I argue that Sandel is using a traditional concept of solidarity which leaves little room for individual differences and which is difficult to reconcile with the (...) modern trend towards individual autonomy and cultural heterogeneity. With reference to the sociology of Giddens, I argue that the ‘explosion of responsibility’ can be considered an expression of the insecurity in modern society and the need for reflexivity in personal and social life. I argue that the need for reflexivity is a driving social and cultural force behind the interest in human enhancement, and that this trend can go together with a commitment to take care of the needs of others. I agree with Sandel that there is a risk that human enhancement may develop into ‘hybris’, particularly when enhancement is driven by scientism and a naturalist reduction of human values to neurological processes. Enhancement based on scientism will threaten solidarity defined by Honneth as an interactive relationship aimed at the mutual recognition of individual identities in relation to a shared value horizon. I will call for a reflective approach in which human enhancement technologies are explored in the context of a ‘system of reference’. Such a reflective approach will help to protect against the hybris of scientism and to maintain solidarity with vulnerable groups. (shrink)

This paper has two distinct but related goals: (1) to identify some of the potential consequences of the Internet for our cognitive abilities and (2) to suggest an approach to evaluate these consequences. I begin by outlining the Google effect, which (allegedly) shows that when we know information is available online, we put less effort into storing that information in the brain. Some argue that this strategy is adaptive because it frees up internal resources which can then be used for (...) other cognitive tasks, whereas others argue that this is maladaptive because it makes us less knowledgeable. I argue that the currently available empirical evidence in cognitive psychology does not support strong conclusions about the negative effects of the Internet on memory. Before we can make value-judgements about the cognitive effects of the Internet, we need more robust and ecologically-valid evidence. Having sketched a more nuanced picture of the Google effect, I then argue that the value of our cognitive abilities is in part intrinsic and in part instrumental, that is, they are both valuable in themselves and determined by the socio-cultural context in which these cognitive abilities are utilised. Focussing on instrumental value, I argue that, in an information society such as ours, having the skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information are (under most circumstances) more valuable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory. This is so, partly because using the Internet as an external memory system has overall benefits for education, navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship. (shrink)

Designer Biology: The Ethics of Intensively Engineering Biological and Ecological Systems consists of thirteen chapters that address the ethical issues raised by technological intervention and design across a broad range of biological and ecological systems. Among the technologies addressed are geoengineering, human enhancement, sex selection, genetic modification, and synthetic biology.

Naturalistic theories of disease appeal to concepts of biological function, and use the notion of dysfunction as the basis of their definitions. Debates in the philosophy of biology demonstrate how attributing functions in organisms and establishing the function-dysfunction distinction is by no means straightforward. This problematization of functional ascription has undermined naturalistic theories and led some authors to abandon the concept of dysfunction, favoring instead definitions based in normative criteria or phenomenological approaches. Although this work has enhanced our understanding (...) of disease and illness, we need not necessarily abandon naturalistic concepts of function and dysfunction in the disease debate. This article attempts to move towards a new naturalistic theory of disease that overcomes the limitations of previous definitions and offers advantages in the clinical setting. Our approach involves a reevaluation of concepts of biological function employed by naturalistic theories. Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of biology, we develop a contextual and evaluative account of function that is better suited to clinical medicine and remains consistent with contemporary naturalism. We also show how an updated naturalistic view shares important affinities with normativist and phenomenological positions, suggesting a possibility for consilience in the disease debate. (shrink)

In this chapter I will discuss some of the arguments presented inUnfit for the Future, where the authors stress the necessity of moral enhancement to prevent a global catastrophe. Persson and Savulescu promote a reductionistic view of moral intuitions suggesting that oxytocin, serotonin, and genetic treatments could save humanity from the perils of contemporary liberalism, weapons of mass destruction, and uncontrolled pollution. I will contend that although we need a moral enhancement it cannot be a brute manipulation of (...) our biology but something where human plasticity is seen as paramount. Following the lesson of Dewey's instrumentalism, I advocate a non-reductionistic, pluralistic view where neuroscientific data may be used to develop a more effective moral pedagogy. In my opinion, this prospect is currently much more feasible (and less risky) than a hypothetical mass psycho-civilisation created using drugs and electrodes. (shrink)

Essay I explores brain machine interface technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers an inquiry into the ethical problems that are likely to emerge. Essay II, co-written with professor Sven-Ove Hansson, presents a novel procedure to engage the public in deliberations on the potential impacts of technology. This procedure, convergence seminar, is a form of scenario-based discussion that (...) is founded on the idea of hypothetical retrospection. The theoretical background and the results of the five seminars are presented. Essay III discusses moral bioenhancement, an instance of human enhancement that alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behavior. Moral bioenhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy is behavioral enhancement. The second strategy, favored by prominent defenders of moral enhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. Essay IV considers the possibility and potential desirability of sensory enhancement. It is proposed that existing sensory modalities in vertebrate animals are proof of concept of what is biologically possible to create in humans. Three considerations on the normative aspects of sensory enhancement are also presented in this essay. Essay V rejects disease prioritarianism, the idea that the healthcare system ought to prioritize the treatment of diseases. Instead, an approach that focuses on what medicine can accomplish is proposed. Essay VI argues that from the idea that species have an intrinsic value and that humanity has a collective responsibility to protect animal species from extinction, the conclusion that we ought to recreate species follows. Essay VII argues that unknown existential risks have not been properly addressed. It proposes a heuristic for doing so, and a concrete strategy. This strategy consists in building refuges that could withstand a large number of catastrophic events. (shrink)

In the debates concerning the ethics of human enhancement through biological or technological modifications, there have been several appeals to the concept of human dignity, both by those favouring such enhancement and by those opposing it. The result is the phenomenon of ‘dignity talk', where opposing sides both appeal to the concept of human dignity to ground their arguments resulting in a moral impasse. This article examines the use of the concept of human dignity in the (...) class='Hi'>enhancement debates and reveals that the problem of dignity talk arises because proponents of various positions tend to ground human dignity in different features of the human individual. These features include species-membership, possession of a particular capacity, a sense of self-worth, and moral behaviour. The article proposes a solution to this problem by appealing to another feature of human beings, namely their being-in-relationship-over-time. Doing so enables us to understand dignity as a concept that affirms the worth of human individuals as complex, multidimensional wholes, rather than as isolated features. Consequently, the concept of human dignity can serve both a descriptive and a normative function in the enhancement debates. At a descriptive level, asking what advocates of a position mean when they refer to human dignity will reveal what aspects of being human they deem to be most valuable. The debate can then focus on these values. The normative function, although it cannot proscribe or prescribe all enhancement, approves only those enhancements that contribute to the flourishing of human individuals as multidimensional wholes. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore digitally fabricated aesthetic enhancements and modifications of the body as well as digitally fabricated fauna habitats. We will address how we utilize speculative works through our bio inspired digitally fabricated designs via two of our most recent projects: {skin} D.E.E.P. and in silico et in situ. Through these two projects we explore cultural implications of the intersection of technology and biologically inspired art/design. Technology has provided an ever increasing amount of data which has facilitated the (...) way data can be used in aesthetic explorations. Technology can redefine the human experience by enhancing our senses, experiences, and forms of expression. In our work {skin} D.E.E.P., we explore these ideas via augmentation through wearables and biomimetic expressions on the skin through digitally fabricated prosthetics. {skin} D.E.E.P. employs temporary biomimetic skin patterns via wearable 3D printed exoskeletons. The first series of this work mimics the patterns and textures of animal skin via ephemeral impressions onto human skin. Taking inspiration from shedding snakeskin, we shed the outer layer by removing the 3D printed prosthesis. The epidermis retains the negative imprint of the prosthetic mimicking the look of serpent skin. The dermis reestablishes the smooth form of the human skin as it heals itself within the hour, erasing the ephemeral imprint, symbolically representing rebirth and renewal. Investigating the ephemeral aesthetic of textured patterns on human skin will not by any means provide a solution to an engineering problem, yet acts as a larger philosophical basis to conduct a discussion about the possibilities of blending bio inspired designs. The manifestation of data into physical form occurs via digital fabrication in our most recent series in silico et in situ: fauna habitats in the age of voxels, where we aim to create a new ecosystem for animals and to potentially augment their habitat. The habitats include pollinator waterers, spider habitats and turtle basking platforms. This project pushes forward with a new piece—the development of a 20-foot avian sculpture that will solely exist to support the habitat of the Chimney Swift species. The Chimney Swift is a near-threatened bird species in the US. in silico et in situ investigates the interplay of art, nature and technology by contextualizing sculptural works and placing these sculptures into nature. The project serves as a breeding ground for a larger dialogue about nature, culture, human intervention, design art and technology. Providing the artwork in the public sphere, barrier free in nature, fosters this discourse. (shrink)

This article explores the overlap between systems biology and predictive neuroscience, placing them in their larger context, the contemporary trend of bioinformatic convergence across the sciences. These two domains overlap with respect to their interest in data accumulation and data integration; their reliance on computational statistical correlation; and their translational goals, that is, producing practical fruits and applications from the interscientific cross-pollination that contemporary data-integrative approaches make possible. The interventions that such translational conversations generate are medical and social in nature, (...) and are aimed at both prevention and treatment. It will be argued that such approaches, socially and medically applied, contain potential for conveying both agency-enhancing and agency-diminishing social messages. The article concludes with a call to balance the overwhelmingly quantitative focus characteristic of predictive neuroscience with more qualitative empirical methodologies. This would represent a double helical approach. (shrink)

As we become more and more enhanced with cyborg technology, significant issues of law and policy are raised. For example, as cyborg devices implanted within the body create a class of people with enhanced motor and computational abilities, how should the law and policy respond when the abilities of such people surpass those of the general population? And what basic human and legal rights should be afforded to people equipped with cyborg technology as they become more machine and less biology? (...) As other issues of importance, if a neuroprosthetic device is accessed by a third party and done to edit one’s memory or to plant a new memory in one’s mind, or even to place an ad for a commercial product in one’s consciousness, should there be a law of cognitive liberty or of “neuro-advertising” that applies? This paper discusses laws and statutes enacted across several jurisdictions which apply to cyborg technologies with a particular emphasis on legal doctrine which relates to neuroprosthetic devices. (shrink)

We argue that ecology in general and biodiversity and ecosystem function research in particular need an understanding of functions which is both ahistorical and evolutionarily grounded. A natural candidate in this context is Bigelow and Pargetter’s evolutionary forward-looking account which, like the causal role account, assigns functions to parts of integrated systems regardless of their past history, but supplements this with an evolutionary dimension that relates functions to their bearers’ ability to thrive and perpetuate themselves. While Bigelow and Pargetter’s account (...) focused on functional organization at the level of organisms, we argue that such an account can be extended to functional organization at the community and ecosystem levels in a way that broadens the scope of the reconciliation between ecosystem ecology and evolutionary biology envisioned by many BEF researchers. By linking an evolutionary forward-looking account of functions to the persistence-based understanding of evolution defended by Bouchard and others, and to the theoretical research on complex adaptive systems, we argue that ecosystems, by forming more or less resilient assemblages, can evolve even while they do not reproduce and form lineages. We thus propose a Persistence Enhancing Propensity account of role functions in ecology to account for this overlap of evolutionary and ecological processes. (shrink)

Transhumanism introduces from its very beginning a paradigm shift about concepts like human nature, progress and human future. An overview of its ideology reveals a strong belief in the idea of human enhancement through technologically means. The theory of technological singularity, which is more or less a radicalisation of the transhumanist discourse, foresees a radical evolutionary change through artificial intelligence. The boundaries between intelligent machines and human beings will be blurred. The consequence is the upcoming of a post-biological (...) and posthuman future when intelligent technology becomes autonomous and constantly self-improving. Considering these predictions, I will investigate here the way in which the idea of human enhancement modifies our understanding of technological innovation. I will argue that such change goes in at least two directions. On the one hand, innovation is seen as something that will inevitably lead towards intelligent machines and human enhancement. On the other hand, there is a direction such as “Singularity University,” where innovation is called to pragmatically solving human challenges. Yet there is a unifying spirit which holds together the two directions and I think it is the same transhumanist idea. (shrink)