This paper seeks to expand our appreciation of the gene editing tool, clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats‐associated protein 9 (CRISPR‐Cas9), its function, its benefits and risks, and the challenges of regulating its use. I frame CRISPR's emergence and its current use in the context of 150 years of formal exploration of heredity and genetics. I describe CRISPR's structure and explain how it functions as a useful engineering tool. The contemporary international and domestic regulatory environment governing human genetic interventions is (...) reviewed and shown to be increasingly ineffective in its ability to restrain, guide, and optimize the emerging use of CRISPR. Several reasons for this lack of consensus are discussed. In conclusion, I suggest a number of public policy recommendations that might allow us to simultaneously embrace our most important moral values and manage the inevitable power CRISPR will come to have in our lives. (shrink)

In their jointly written book, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler defend ’the development and deployment of genetic intervention technologies?.?.?.’, including genetic enhancements, against charges that they exacerbate injustice. The present paper examines some of their arguments. The first section shows that the authors confuse real societies with just societies. The second shows that without this confusion, their arguments reveal the enormous justice-impairing potential of deploying genetic enhancements in such societies (...) as the United States. (shrink)

In their jointly written book, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler defend ‘the development and deployment of genetic intervention technologies...’, including genetic enhancements, against charges that they exacerbate injustice. The present paper examines some of their arguments. The first section shows that the authors confuse real societies with just societies. The second shows that without this confusion, their arguments reveal the enormous justice‐impairing potential of deploying genetic enhancements in such societies (...) as the United States. (shrink)

Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival (...) approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human. (shrink)

The article investigates the validity of two different versions of the slippery slope argument construed in relation to human gene therapy: the empirical and the conceptual argument. The empirical version holds that our accepting somatic cell therapy will eventually cause our accepting eugenic medical goals. The conceptual version holds that we are logically committed to accepting such goals once we have accepted somatic cell therapy. It is argued that neither the empirical nor the conceptual version of the argument can provide (...) a conclusive moral reason for banning somatic cell therapy. According to a third interpretation, referred to as the arbitrary result argument, the many apparent similarities between somatic cell therapy and eugenic-based human genetic engineering drive us to make principled choices concerning what differences and similarities between the two practices should be regarded as morally (ir)relevant. Decisions of this kind are likely to have unpredictable moral consequences. Thus formulated, the slippery slope argument has much plausibility. One objects to somatic cell therapy not so much because of what is at the bottom of the slope on which it lies, but because it is on a slope of which one does not know what is at the bottom. While the arbitrary result argument does not provide a conclusive reason for prohibiting human gene therapy, it reminds of a very important thing: when making bioethical decisions, we should be as specific and as consistent as possible about our basic moral and medical concepts. (shrink)

Two clusters of essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provide a critical gaze through which to explore central moral, phenomenological, ontological, and political concerns regarding human moral agency and personal responsibility. The first cluster challenges common assumptions in bioethics regarding the voluntariness of human actions. The second set turns the debate towards morally responsible choice within the requirements of distributive justice. The force of their collective analysis leaves us with a well-founded basis critically to approach (...) any account of bioethics or health policy that is insufficiently attentive to the central challenges of human freedom and responsible free choice. (shrink)

Biomedical innovations are making possible the enhancement of human capabilities. There are two philosophical stances on the role that medicine should play in this respect. On the one hand, naturalism rejects every medical intervention that goes beyond preventing and treating disease. On the other hand, welfarism advocates enhancements that foster subjective well-being. We will show that both positions have considerable shortcomings. Consequently, we will introduce a third characterization in which therapies and enhancements can be reconciled with the legitimate objectives of (...) medicine inasmuch as they improve the capabilities that enable the freedom to pursue personal well-being. (shrink)

The possibility of genetic enhancement to increase the likelihood of success in sport and life’s prospects raises questions for accounts of sport and theories of justice. These questions obviously include the fairness of such enhancement and its relationship to the goals of sport and demands of justice. Of equal interest, however, is the effect on our understanding of individual effort, merit, and desert of either discovering genetic contributions to components of such effort or recognizing the influence of social factors on (...) the development and exercise of individual effort. This paper analyzes arguments about genetic enhancement with the goal of raising questions about how sport and justice regard unchosen, undeserved inequalities and what is assumed to be their opposite—namely, the exercise and results of individual effort. It is suggested that contemplating enhancement of natural assets previously outside human control may reinforce recognition of responsibility to intervene with regard to social advantages so as to support individual effort and improve individuals’ life prospects. (shrink)

Since a number of years, popular and scientific interest in resilience is rapidly increasing. More recently, also neuroscientific research in resilience and the associated neurobiological findings is gaining more attention. Some of these neuroscientific findings might open up new measures to foster personal resilience, ranging from magnetic stimulation to pharmaceutical interventions and awareness-based techniques. Therefore, bioethics should also take a closer look at resilience and resilience research, which are today philosophically under-theorized. In this paper, we analyze different conceptualizations of resilience (...) and argue that especially one-sided understandings of resilience which dismiss social and cultural contexts of personal resilience do pose social and ethical problems. On a social level such unbalanced views on resilience could hide and thereby stabilize structural social injustices, and on an individual level it might even lead to an aggravation of stress-related mental health problems by overexerting the individual. Furthermore, some forms of fostering resilience could be a latent form of human enhancement and trigger similar criticisms. (shrink)

Scientists, the medical profession, philosophers, social scientists, policy makers, and the public at large have been quick to embrace the accomplishments of genetic science. The enthusiasm for the new biotechnologies is not unrelated to their worthy goal. The belief that the new genetic technologies will help to decrease human suffering by improving the public’s health has been a significant influence in the acceptance of technologies such as genetic testing and screening. But accepting this end should not blind us to the (...) need for an evaluation of whether a particular means is adequate to achieve it. Lack of such evaluation notwithstanding, discussions of the ethical, legal, and social implications have tended to presuppose that the development and implementation of genetic testing will be an appropriate means to reduce human suffering in significant ways. I argue here that such an assumption is mistaken. In part this is the case because human biology is more complex than sometimes it is made to appear in these debates. But, the idea that human suffering resulting from disease can be reduced in significant ways with the use of genetic testing also ignores the social contexts in which these technologies are being developed and implemented. (shrink)

Actually possible and conceivable future uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and germ-line genetic intervention in assisted reproduction seem to offer increasing possibilities of choosing the kind of persons that will be brought to existence. Many are troubled by the idea of these technologies being used for enhancement purposes. How can we make sense of this worry? Why are our thoughts about therapeutic genetic interventions and non-genetic enhancement (for instance education) not accompanied by the same intuitive uneasiness? I argue that (...) the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice, typically invoked to delimit the morally acceptable uses of reproductive technologies, cannot fully answer these questions. Instead, I suggest that an alternative answer might begin with reflections on the notion of interfering with nature. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and Hans Jonas’s moral philosophy, I outline an argument that attempts to capture what might be particularly troubling about the idea of “designing” future persons. At the core of the argument is the suggestion that enhancing selections and modifications on embryos might be bound up with an instrumentalising, non-responsive perspective on the future persons into which they are intended to grow. (shrink)

Human enhancement, in which nanotechnology is expected to play a major role, continues to be a highly contentious ethical debate, with experts on both sides calling it the single most important issue facing science and society in this brave, new century. This paper is a broad introduction to the symposium herein that explores a range of perspectives related to that debate. We will discuss what human enhancement is and its apparent contrast to therapy; and we will begin to tease apart (...) the myriad intertwined issues that arise in the debate: (1) freedom & autonomy, (2) health & safety, (3) fairness & equity, (4) societal disruption, and (5) human dignity. (shrink)

The military is a major driver of technological, world-changing innovations which, like the Internet, often have unpredictable dual uses and widespread civilian impact (?blowback?). Ethical and policy concerns arising from such technologies, therefore, are not limited to military affairs, but can have great implications for society at large as well. This paper will focus on two technology areas making headlines at present: human enhancement technologies and robotics, representing both biological and technological upgrades to the military. The concerns we will raise (...) are about (1) the unintended effects that these technologies could have on society and (2) the possibly self-defeating nature of these military programs in making war itself more, rather than less likely to occur. Given that society also can influence military programs (e.g., through civil protests) it is important for the military to attend to such concerns. (shrink)

In the context of military medical care, Eisenstein and colleagues have introduced the notion ‘left of bang intervention in trauma’, which refers to interventions administered before trauma to reduce morbidity and mortality after injury. This paper responds to Eisenstein and colleagues’ ethical analysis of such interventions, highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing between purely prophylactic and enhancing interventions. This response also addresses legal issues that arise from left of bang interventions under human rights law and the law of armed conflict, in (...) particular the questions as to whether the consent of service members would need to be obtained and whether the adversary would as a consequence be authorised to resort to more injurious weapons. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 21-23.

Current philosophical and legal bioethical reflection on reprogenetics provides little more than a rationalization of the interests of science. There are two reasons for this. First, bioethicists attempt to address ethical issues in a “language of precision” that characterizes science, and this works against analogical and narratological modes of discourse that have traditionally provided guidance for understanding human nature and purpose. Second, the current ethical and legal debate is framed by a public/private distinction that banishes robust norms to the private (...) realm, and leaves a minimalist public discourse of harm avoidance that is insufficient for regulating the science. In this essay, I argue that Mark Hanson's account of anxiety provides a valuable starting point for addressing deficiencies in the current philosophical and legal debate, and it highlights the need for a theological discourse on genetic enhancements. Through an assessment of Joel Shumann's criticism of the public/private distinction, I show how the needed theological discourse should be situated in the context of robust communities, and how such a communitarian inter-ethic is compatible with a variant of liberalism. Finally, I critically assess James Keenan's account of virtue and perfection, in order to outline what a sufficient discourse on reproductive and genetic enhancements requires. (shrink)

Seemingly ever improving medical technology and techniques portend the possibility of prenatally enhancing otherwise healthy, normal children—seamlessly enhancing or adding to a child’s natural abilities and characteristics. Though parents normally engage in enhancing children, i.e., child rearing, these technologies present radically new possibilities. This sort of enhancement, I argue, is morally problematic for the parent: the expectations of the enhancing parent necessarily conflict with attitudes of acceptance that moral parenting requires. Attitudes of acceptance necessitate that parents are open to the (...) essentially-individual choices of the child that will determine the kind of person he or she becomes. However, the intentional act of enhancing contradicts this openness by setting expectations on who the child becomes. Because of this, there is strong moral weight against parents’ prenatally enhancing their children. (shrink)

The genetic modification of children is becoming a more likely possibility given our rapid progress in medical technologies. I argue, from a broadly Kantian point of view, that at least one kind of such modification—modification by a parent for the sake of a child's comparative advantage—is not rationally justified. To argue this, I first characterize a necessary condition on reasons and rational justification: what is a reason for an agent to do an action in one set of circumstances must be (...) a reason for any in those circumstances to do the action. I then show that comparatively advantageous genetic modification violates this principle since a child's “getting ahead” through genetic modification cannot be rationally justified unless other children also could receive the modification, thus rendering the advantage useless. Finally, I consider the major objection to this conclusion: it seems to disallow all cases of a parent's helping a child get ahead, something that parents normally engage in with their children. I argue that typical practices of developing a comparative advantage in a child, as well as practices of societal competition in general, do not conflict because they involve circumstances that mitigate the universal character of reasons. Many ordinary cases of competitive advantage that we think of as unjust, in fact, can be explained by my argument. (shrink)

It is argued here that bioethicists might inadvertently be promoting genetic determinism: the idea that genes alone determine human traits and behaviours. Discussions about genetic testing are used to exemplify how they might be doing so. Quite often bioethicists use clinical cases to support particular moral obligations or rights as if these cases were representative of the kind of information we can acquire about human diseases through genetic testing, when they are not. On other occasions, the clinical cases are presented (...) in simplistic ways that portray genetic testing as yielding information more accurate than it actually is. It is concluded that, because of the problematic implications that the ideology of genetic determinism might have for individuals’ wellbeing and for our public policies, bioethicists should be careful to present these issues in ways that do not promote questionable ideas about the causal role of genes in human diseases and behaviours. (shrink)

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest (...) arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible. (shrink)

Given the technical feasibility, not only scientists but also moral philosophers approve of an intervention in the genetic basis of our intellectual dispositions. Among the features not related to illnesses, intelligence seems to be an especially promising candidate for genetic enhancement, for intelligence is valued in every culture. The paper presents some of the arguments for and against genetic enhancement of intelligence. The author analyses what kind of good increased intelligence is: an instrumental good for the wellbeing of mankind, a (...) positional good for a given society or an individual, or something that is appreciated by the individual subject because of the positive experience the subject has by making use of it. Since such experiences are not bad in themselves the means of genetic enhancement have to be assessed and compared with accepted practices like education. The author comes to the conclusion that there are morally significant differences between genetic enhancement and accepted practices to enhance intelligence. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 19-21.

Scientists, the medical profession, philosophers, social scientists, policy makers, and the public at large have been quick to embrace the accomplishments of genetic science. The enthusiasm for the new biotechnologies is not unrelated to their worthy goal. The belief that the new genetic technologies will help to decrease human suffering by improving the public’s health has been a significant influence in the acceptance of technologies such as genetic testing and screening. But accepting this end should not blind us to the (...) need for an evaluation of whether a particular means is adequate to achieve it. Lack of such evaluation notwithstanding, discussions of the ethical, legal, and social implications have tended to presuppose that the development and implementation of genetic testing will be an appropriate means to reduce human suffering in significant ways. I argue here that such an assumption is mistaken. In part this is the case because human biology is more complex than sometimes it is made to appear in these debates. But, the idea that human suffering resulting from disease can be reduced in significant ways with the use of genetic testing also ignores the social contexts in which these technologies are being developed and implemented. (shrink)

:Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context—germline intervention in reproductive medicine—issues (...) about enhancement and eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such as intelligence, and there are more pressing questions that need attention if clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility. (shrink)

The distinction between germline and somatic gene editing is fundamental to the ethics of human gene editing. Multiple conferences of scientists, ethicists, and policymakers, and multiple professional bodies, have called for moratoria on germline gene editing, and editing of human germline cells is considered to be an ethical “red line” that either never should be crossed, or should only be crossed with great caution and care. However, as research on germline gene editing has progressed, it has become clear that not (...) all germline interventions are alike, and that these differences make a significant moral difference, when it comes to ethical questions about research, regulation, clinical application, and medical justification. In this paper, I argue that, rather than lumping all germline interventions together, we should distinguish between revising, correcting, and transferring genes, and I assess the consequences of this move for the ethics of gene editing. (shrink)

The author examines whether Kantian ethics would condone the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance one’s moods and cognitive abilities. If key assumptions concerning safety and efficacy, non-addictiveness, non-coercion, and accessibility are not met, Kantian ethics would consider mood and cognitive enhancement to be impermissible. But what if these assumptions are granted? The arguments for the permissibility of neuroenhancement are stronger than those against it. After giving a general account of Kantian ethical principles, the author argues that, when these assumptions (...) are granted, Kantian ethics no longer justifies the prohibition of neuroenhancement, and responds to two objections. (shrink)

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is a new method of prenatal diagnosis that is developing from a union of in vitro fertilization technology and molecular biology. Briefly stated, PGD involves the creation of several embryos in vitro from the eggs and sperm of an interested couple. The embryos are permitted to develop to a 6-to-10-cell stage, at which point one of the embryonic cells is removed from each embryo and the cellular DNA is analyzed for chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations. An embryo (...) or several embryos found to be free of genetic abnormalities are subsequently transferred to the woman's uterus for gestation. Embryos found to carry a genetic abnormality are discarded or frozen. Extra normal embryos may be frozen for future transfer or donation to another couple. (shrink)

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is a new method of prenatal diagnosis that is developing from a union of in vitro fertilization technology and molecular biology. Briefly stated, PGD involves the creation of several embryos in vitro from the eggs and sperm of an interested couple. The embryos are permitted to develop to a 6-to-10-cell stage, at which point one of the embryonic cells is removed from each embryo and the cellular DNA is analyzed for chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations. An embryo (...) or several embryos found to be free of genetic abnormalities are subsequently transferred to the woman's uterus for gestation. Embryos found to carry a genetic abnormality are discarded or frozen. Extra normal embryos may be frozen for future transfer or donation to another couple. (shrink)

: Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.

This paper presents the principal findings from a three-year research project funded by the US National Science Foundation on ethics of human enhancement technologies. To help untangle this ongoing debate, we have organized the discussion as a list of questions and answers, starting with background issues and moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity. Each question-and-answer pair is largely self-contained, allowing the reader to skip to those issues of (...) interest without affecting continuity. (shrink)

This paper will define human enhancement and coercion in the context of this discussion; explain separately how Bioconservatives and Transhumanists use the concept of coercion; and demonstrate how coercion is used improperly as a critique of enhancement.

The main objection to genetic enhancement is that it will create a “genetic apartheid,” deepening existing inequalities. This paper offers considerations that can weaken the inequality argument against genetic enhancement. First, I question the dichotomy of treatment versus enhancement since the differences between the two are unclear. Second, I argue that human enhancement is part of human nature and that there is no sound reason to accept it in other domains while rejecting it in genetics. The paper also demonstrates that (...) inequality is present in every dimension of society, that “God-given” genetics is profoundly unequal, and that genetic enhancement can operate as a mechanism by which a new genetic equality can be achieved. However, the paper underlines that genetic equality is not, per se, a value to which we ought to aspire if it leads us to a uniform community of downsized human beings. Genetic equality is only valuable if it enhances humankind in general. (shrink)

Transhumanism at once embodies our most modern thinking and our biggest longstanding problems. Transhumanism aims to enhance human core capacities: health-span, lifespan, and cognition. The thesis answers the following ethical challenges arising from transhumanist aims. First, whether transhumanism can be an ethical endeavour if it relies on authoritarian intervention by governments and governing bodies to change, generate and enforce behaviour, or to influence and enforce the uptake of medical procedures. Second, the thesis answers the challenge that it is unethical deliberately (...) to encourage the uptake of and pursuit of medical transhumanism given the extent of accessibility and distributive issues that remain unresolved in existing medicine. Finally, the thesis addresses a particular mental health crisis that is often predicted for transhuman beings, namely loss of meaning from loss of death and vulnerability, resulting in widespread loss of social cohesion. The thesis argues that the right solution to the first two problems is a libertarian paternalist approach, viz. nudging, and that this approach will also neutralise the risk of widespread and inevitable boredom or alienation that might otherwise result from the widespread introduction of human enhancement if people are nudged to engage more and more reflectively in their enhancement choices. Additionally, lifestyle issues like obesity, heart disease, cancers, and inaccessibility of vaccines and birth control pose unresolved problems for existing general medicine, killing millions every year worldwide. As a result, another serious challenge for enhancement medicine, which I propose would be addressed by the nudge approach, is to justify its place in the professional domain of medicine. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by (...) environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. (shrink)

The defining debate in this new century will be about technology and human enhancement, according to many across the political spectrum.[1] Our ability to use science to enhance our bodies and minds – as opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes – is one of the most personal and therefore passionate issues in an era where emerging technologies seduce us with new and fantastic possibilities for our future. But in the process, we are forced to rethink what it means to (...) be human or, essentially, our own identity. For some, technology holds the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward becoming Frankenstein’s monster. This paper will look at a growing chorus of calls for human enhancement to be embraced and unrestricted. Specifically, we will critically examine recent “pro-enhancement” arguments – articulated in More Than Human by Ramez Naam,[2] as one of the most visible works on the subject today – and conclude that they ultimately need to be strengthened, if they are to be convincing. Our overarching motive here is not so much that we are against human enhancement technologies; that seems to be too premature a conclusion given the state of research and debate, and such technologies may be inevitable anyway. However, we believe that a skeptical eye should be applied to claims that there should be no restrictions on any particular action. Even our most cherished human rights are bounded by reason or societal norms, for whatever they are worth. For instance, our right to free speech still does not allow us to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theater or to slander others. Our right to fall in love and to make love with whom we want does not extend to children. And for all the talk about the virtues of a “free market” or “free trade”, the invisible hand of our economy is still occasionally slapped by anti-trust lawsuits, which would not be an issue if the market were truly free. So even if human enhancement seems to be a reasonable practice and even a right, restrictions may still be required to mitigate undesirable circumstances or unintended consequences – which would be consistent with how functioning societies treat other liberties, values and rights. (shrink)

Human enhancement – our ability to use technology to enhance our bodies and minds, as opposed to its application for therapeutic purposes – is a critical issue facing nanotechnology. It will be involved in some of the near-term applications of nanotechnology, with such research labs as MIT’s Institute for Soldier Technologies working on exoskeletons and other innovations that increase human strength and capabilities. It is also a core issue related to far-term predictions in nanotechnology, such as longevity, nanomedicine, artificial intelligence (...) and other issues. (shrink)