Authors
Hazem Zohny
University of Otago
Abstract
The welfarist account of enhancement and disability holds enhanced and disabled states on a spectrum: the former are biological or psychological states that increase the chances of a person leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances, while the latter decrease those chances. Here, I focus on a particular issue raised by this account: what should we count as part of an individual’s relevant set of circumstances when thinking about enhanced and disabled states? Specifically, is social prejudice relevant to an individual’s circumstances in regards to how disabled or enhanced they are? For instance, if an individual is discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour, and this leads to a reduction in their well-being, the welfarist account suggests that their skin colour is a disability. To avoid such a seeming mislabel, Savulescu and Kahane have argued for excluding social prejudice from counting as a relevant circumstance to their welfarist definition of disability. I argue, however, that this exclusion of social prejudice is unsatisfactory and incompatible with the goals of this account.
Keywords Enhancement  Disability  Applied ethics
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DOI 10.1136/medethics-2015-103229
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References found in this work BETA

Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction.Norman Daniels - 2000 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9 (3):309--322.
Ethical Issues in Human Enhancement.Nick Bostrom & Rebecca Roache - 2007 - In J. Ryberg, T. Petersen & C. Wolf (eds.), New Waves in Applied Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 120--152.
Well-Being and Enhancement.Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg & Guy Kahane - 2001 - In Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu & Ruud Ter Meulen (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities. Blackwell. pp. 3--18.
The Moral Significance of the Therapy-Enhancement Distinction in Human Genetics.David B. Resnik - 2000 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9 (3):365-377.

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Citations of this work BETA

Enhancing Gender.Hazem Zohny, Brian D. Earp & Julian Savulescu - 2022 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (2):225-237.
Disabling Disability Amid Competing Ideologies.Tom Koch - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):575-579.
Moral Enhancement and the Good Life.Hazem Zohny - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):267-274.

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Disability: A Welfarist Approach.Julian Savulescu & Guy Kahane - 2011 - Clinical Ethics 6 (1):45-51.
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