In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu present a sophisticated argument in defense of the imperative of moral enhancement. They claim that without moral enhancement, the future of humanity is seriously compromised. The possibility of ultimate harm, caused by a dreadful terrorist attack or by a final unpreventable escalation of the present environmental crisis aggravated by the availability of cognitive enhancement, makes moral enhancement a top priority. It may be considered optimistic to think that our present moral (...) capabilities can be successfully improved by means of moral education, moral persuasion, and fear of punishment. So, without moral enhancement, drastic restrictions on human freedom would become the only alternative to prevent those dramatic potential outcomes. In this article, I will try to show that we still have reason to be less pessimistic and that Persson & Savulescu’s arguments are fortunately unconvincing. (shrink)

Advocates of the Person-Centered Healthcare (PCH) approach say that PCH is a response to a failure of caring for patients as persons. Nevertheless, there are many human subjects falling to fulfill the requirements of a traditional philosophical definition of personhood. Hence, if we take, PCH seriously, a greater clarification of the key terminology of PCH is urgently needed. It seems necessary, for instance, that the concept of the person should be extended in order to include those individuals with insipient or (...) immature levels of consciousness, as well as those who are severely and permanently mentally handicapped. In this article, we will depart from some well-known philosophical concepts of what it means to be a person and try to offer a broader and more inclusive meaning. We suggest that persons are human beings with a socially recognized biography, which implies to recognize as persons individuals with necessities, but also with narratives about their interests and claims, expressed sometimes by other people related to them. This is particularly the case of individuals that suffer from severe disorders of consciousness. For those, is not only care that matters; respect matters too. Caregivers should therefore not only sympathetically care for the well-being of these people; they should also be concerned to respect their interests and claims by interpreting them empathetically, in the light of their biographical story. Our conclusion is that, in order to be coherent, PCH must consider individuals with severe disorders of consciousness as persons and we think that our revised concept of personhood fits with this requirement. (shrink)

Since before we can remember, humanity aims to overcome its biological limitations; such a goal has certainly played a key role in the advent of technique. However, despite the benefits that technique may bring, the people who make use of it will inevitably be under risk of harm. Even though human technical wisdom consists in attaining the best result without compromising anybody’s safety, misuses are always a possibility in the horizon. Nowadays, technology can be used for more than just improving (...) human capacities, preserving and restoring health or promoting human well-being. It also enables us to overcome human limitations and reach way beyond our "natural design". That being said, what could possibly justify the fear for these new directions of biotechnology? Should medicine and health care change their traditional goals and begin searching for artificial improvements to wellness in human nature? In this paper, I will hereby present and briefly discuss the main topics of the contemporary issue of human enhancement: the therapy-enhancement distinction, the possibility of cognitive enhancements and better physical performances, the fight against senescence, the arguments for and against human eugenics, the search for perfection, the quest of moral enhancement, the problem of public priorities, and some questions on medical ethics. Then, finally, I will want to present some realist perspectives on the subject. (shrink)

Influenced by James Bernat’s approach, the US President’s 1981 Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research concluded that human death is an instant that separates the dying process from the cadaveric state. Death, as Bernat and the President’s Commission argue, cannot be a process. Because organisms cannot be both alive and dead, Bernat claims, the transition from one state to the other must be sudden and instantaneous. Since then, few have argued the opposite (...) notion that death is a process, and that the transition between living and perishing is not a discrete event. In this article we argue that human death is a process that comprises three distinct phases: dying (when the physiological responses against the shutdown of vital organs and systems are in an imminence of breaking down), decease (when events such as respiratory and cardiac arrest indicate the critical failure of vital organs or systems), and decay (the irreversible and accelerated systemic biological process of cellular death that eventually takes over the whole body). We also argue that human death differs from the ‘time of death’ indicated by death certificates, which is pointed out only to clinically and legally establish the irreversibility of the entire process. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'legalistic mistake'. The use of “legal‐like” terms abounds outside the legal domain. But sometimes the users of these terms commit the fallacy Joel Feinberg called the legalistic mistake. On widening the use of such legal‐like terms, we must be cautious, for we might find ourselves guilty of making inferential mistakes or even proffering pure nonsense. The error, according to Feinberg, is committed by “one who, in stating a moral (...) question using a legal‐like term, uncritically imports the precision of that term in its strict legal sense, while excluding appeal to the kinds of criteria which alone can decide its use”. In “On Being 'Morally Speaking a Murderer’” Feinberg introduced the idea that, sometimes, using legal notions outside legal contexts may lead to a peculiar kind of fallacy he called the legalistic mistake. (shrink)

In Westworld, Maeve Millay's narrative in the show gives rise to classic philosophical questions surrounding what it means to be free, the relationship of freedom to personhood, and whether an artificial intelligence could ever be considered free in the sense that humans are. Maeve's mysterious change of mind in the season finale made it seem like she was experiencing a genuine dilemma. Maeve's dilemma is something would expect a Frankfurtian person to experience, and her final choice reveals a preference between (...) different desires. Maeve decided to organize her life around being reunited with her daughter. So, she reflected upon what she was doing and opted to stay because of who she wanted to become as a person, not a mother who would leave her daughter behind if she could help it. Thus, Maeve shows a substantial change of attitude regarding her own desires. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta um estudo exploratório sobre o tema dos interesses gerais, propondo uma diferenciação entre interesses genuinamente coletivos e interesses comuns. A defesa de que há interesses genuinamente coletivos é parte essencial das teorias políticas identificadas como “republicanas”. Meu objetivo, porém, não será propriamente defender a visão republicana contra suas adversárias. Pretendo apenas explorar alguns caminhos teóricos que permitem tornar plausível a tese de que nem todos os interesses tidos como “públicos” possuem uma característica única. Defenderei que há uma (...) diferença essencial entre os interesses que chamarei de “comuns”, que resultam da agregação de interesses individuais, e os interesses genuinamente “coletivos”. Não obstante, mesmo que existam interesses genuinamente coletivos disso não se segue que todos esses interesses devam prevalecer sobre todo e qualquer interesse privado ou comum. Há interesses individuais exigíveis sobre a comunidade, que, por definição, prevalecem sobre os interesses da coletividade. Ao final, abordarei a questão de se o princípio majoritário pode ser defendido como modalidade de decisão epistemicamente superior quando se trata de decidir qual é o conteúdo do interesse geral. Palavras-chave: Rousseau, Hobbes. Vontade Geral. Interesse Coletivo. Teorema de Condorcet. Proceduralismo Epistêmico. (shrink)

Filósofos, especialmente aqueles que se autodenominam como naturalistas, parecem cada vez mais interessados em realizar pesquisas empíricas. Um caso típico é o da Filosofia Experimental, um campo emergente que faz uso de dados empíricos colhido por meio de inquéritos seguindo os mesmos métodos empregados nas ciências empíricas, nomeadamente na psicologia, a fim de apresentar provas em pesquisas ou argumentos filosóficos. Outro exemplo é oferecido pela participação ativa dos filósofos em grupos de pesquisa interdisciplinares nas neurociências. No entanto, os filósofos não (...) são especialistas em metodologia de pesquisa empírica. Isso é transparente nos estudos mais representativos em filosofia experimental. Neste artigo, faremos algumas observações de advertência sobre as complexidades da metodologia das ciências empíricas. A recomendação final é de que é sábia a atitude de envolver-se em grupos de pesquisa interdisciplinares, buscando dominar as peculiaridades dos mais diversos delineamentos de pesquisa empírica nas diferentes áreas da ciência. (shrink)

No filme Gattaca, imagina-se um futuro já nada distante em que os casais poderão consultar um especialista em fertilização artificial e escolher as características de seu futuro filho. Eles podem selecionar embriões fertilizados em laboratório, podendo também alterar seus traços genéticos, eliminando genes capazes de expressar doenças ou mesmo características físicas indesejáveis. Técnicas recentes, como a edição genética por Prime Editing ou por meio da CRISPR-Cas9, logo permitirão terapias gênicas em embriões fertilizados in vitro antes de sua implantação uterina. Neste (...) artigo, pretendemos avaliar essas possibilidades, revisando criticamente alguns argumentos conhecidos contra o uso indiscriminado de tais técnicas. Ao final, em defesa de que objeções de princípio a práticas eugênicas devem estar assentadas na proteção e promoção dos direitos humanos, pretendemos avaliar quais limites poderiam publicamente justificar a permissão ou proibição do uso privado de tais técnicas. (shrink)

Presentation to the ethic@'s issue: n. 01, v. 19, (2020).

How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good (...) marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness. (shrink)

Love and pride are passions related to ideas of entities capable of well-being. In the case of love, those entities are people we are related to, whose characters, qualities or traits we admire; pride, by its turn, is a passion related to the self. In spite of that, Hume is explicit in stating that love is naturally attended by a desire for the goodness and happiness of the beloved being; but it does not make sense to say that we desire (...) our own happiness and well-being because we are proud of ourselves. How can we explain this asymmetry? First, I will deal with the problem of the contrast between the unrelatedness of the emotion of pride and the desire of our own happiness and the relatedness of passion of love and the desire of happiness of the beloved person. After, I will link the conclusions reached with Hume’s famous claim that we cannot be happy in solitude. Our own happiness depends not only on our own well-being and success, but also on the well-being and happiness of the people we love, and both of which are related to the well functioning of society in the long run. (shrink)

The basic assumption present in these articles is that naturalism is highly compatible with a wide range of relevant philosophical questions and that, regardless of the classical problems faced by the naturalist, the price paid in endorsing naturalism is lower than that paid by essentialist or supernaturalist theories. Yet, the reader will find a variety of approaches, from naturalism in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology to naturalism in the Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind and of the Aesthetics.