Transcendental epistemology of physics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9507-z Authors Andrés Rivadulla, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University, 28040 Madrid, Spain Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Transcendental epistemology is an inquiry into conditions of human knowledge which reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. The dependence thesis is the thesis that a proper investigation of such conditions must lean in important respects on the deliverances of science. I argue that Kant is right to object to the dependence thesis, but that the best objections to this thesis lead to the conclusion that the conditions of knowledge which Kant identifies are not, in any interesting (...) sense, a relection of the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. (shrink)

Transcendental epistemology is an inquiry into conditions of human knowledge which reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. The dependence thesis is the thesis that a proper investigation of such conditions must lean in important respects on the deliverances of science. I argue that Kant is right to object to the dependence thesis, but that the best objections to this thesis lead to the conclusion that the conditions of knowledge which Kant identifies are not, in any interesting (...) sense, a relection of the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. (shrink)

A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view (...) by providing for a sharp distinction between how we come to understand and apply epistemic versus non-epistemic concepts, the former through our capacity for a special kind of reflective self-knowledge Kant calls ‘transcendental apperception’. The proposal is a version of restriction strategy: it solves the paradox by restricting the anti-realist’s knowability principle. Restriction strategies have been a common response to the paradox but previous versions face serious difficulties: either they result in a knowability principle too weak to do the work anti-realists want it to, or they succumb to modified forms of the paradox, or they are ad hoc. It is argued that restricting knowability to non-epistemic statements by conceding realism about epistemic statements avoids all versions of the paradox, leaves enough for the anti-realist attack on classical logic, and, with the help of transcendental epistemology, is principled in a way that remains compatible with a thoroughly anti-realist outlook. (shrink)

The paper raises two questions, which seem central to understanding Kant's transcendental epistemology in the first Critique. First, Kant claims that the conditions for the possibility of experience are also conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience (A158/B197). Here the notion of an object is not conceived from the divine standpoint ('the view from nowhere') and is in some sense relativized to experience. But in what sense? Is the notion of an object relativized to one specific (...) kind of experience, human experience? Or is it relativized only to any possible experience? Second, in what sense is Kant's transcendental epistemology a priori? Is it a priori in the strong sense that its starting-point - the notion of experience in the question 'How is experience possible?' - is a priori? Or is it a priori only in the weak sense that, while the notion of experience is obtained empirically, a priori reasoning is required to establish how experience is possible? It has recently been argued (by Patricia Kitcher, Kant's Transcendental Psychology) that (a) the results that Kant wants to establish transcenden-tally about objects are relative to one specific kind of experience, human experience, and (b) Kant's transcendental epistemology is a priori only in the weak sense that the reasoning is a priori, while the starting-point is empirical. These claims are indeed crucial to Kitcher's overall aim of naturalizing Kant's transcendental epistemology. The aim of the paper is to resist both claims. I argue that Kant's notion of an object of experience is the notion of an object of any possible experience, not the notion of an object of one specific kind of experience, human experience. It follows, I argue, that Kant's transcendental epistemology is a priori in the strong sense that its starting-point is a priori. If we deny strong apriority, we fail to account for Kant's move from the nature of experience to the nature of empirical reality: empirical reality as such, not empirical reality as experienced by a particular variety of creatures capable of experience. The upshot is that, for better or worse, Kant's transcendental epistemology cannot be naturalized. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide a (...) satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts. (shrink)

The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope (...) for in the justifi cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endorse Allison’s rejection of the traditional so-called two-world view and, hence, of Guyer and Van Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to the existence of things in themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take Kant’s claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our minds seriously. In the (...) empirical sense, appearances are the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, in the transcendental sense, appearances are nothing but the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent way of knowing the mind-independent reality in itself (epistemological phenomenalism). (shrink)

In this paper, I’ll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant’s philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I’ll proceed as follows. First, I’ll describe the sorts of epistemological (...) questions I’ll be focusing on, and the framework within which I’ll try to address them. Then I’ll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant’s own views. Next, I’ll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of “transcendental argument” allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I’ll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I’ll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. (shrink)

This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and (...) the aforementioned argument for a libertarian conception of free will. In defending each of these arguments, the book both defends and relies upon the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In articulating the latter transcendental argument – for freedom – heavy reliance is made on the earlier, epistemic, work: especially on the deontological conception of rational justification (on epistemic internalism). (shrink)

Much of Ludwik Fleck’s work on the social constitution of knowledge, scientific facts, and objects of inquiry is informed by a specific use of transcendental arguments. This paper analyzes the ways in which Fleck looks for “conditions of possibilities” for the stylization and circulation of cognition. Following a brief discussion of his political agenda regarding science’s “cultural mission,” the paper offers a reconstruction of Fleck’s implicit concept of the transcendental. It is argued that Fleck addresses scientific truth as (...) an ongoing revealing and concealing of possibilities for doing research. By implication, the truth about a scientific fact is at once situated in scientific practices and transcended by a horizon of possibilities. The transcendental takes shape in Fleck’s social epistemology as a result of the reflection upon knowledge production’s “situated transcendence.”. (shrink)

This paper sets out to assess the internal coherence of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realist account of science. Whilst fully supporting his transcendental derivation of a stratified ontology of structures and generative mechanisms from the scientific practice of experimentation, I argue that Bhaskar's adoption of the stance of epistemic relativism results in his inability to defend the generalizability of this ontology. My argument against his epistemic stance turns on the fact that it rests on a false dichotomy between epistemic (...) relativism and epistemic absolutism, and, moreover, that it is quite unnecessary for his efforts to avoid the excesses of epistemological foundationalism. The net result of this stance, in my view, is an inability to sustain the normative force of the concepts of truth and scientific explanation precisely at a time when postmodern authors are denying their privileged status. (shrink)

In order to appreciate the rich implications of the transcendental reduction, one has to distinguish the different contexts where it acquires different meanings. The present paper focuses on a particular epistemological context and clarifies the contribution of the reduction within this context. The contribution consists in the formulation and solution of the problem of exhibiting the evidence supporting the belief in the world’s existence. In a nutshell, world-experience grounds the world-belief and world-experience entails a bedrock of experience legitimizing the (...) positing of others. I argue that this contribution is possibly an enduring achievement of Husserl’s transcendental philosophy against common objections that are raised against it. I show that both the necessity and the viability of the transcendental reduction are a consequence of the general structure of critical examination. Overall, a picture of Husserl’s philosophy emerges that emphasizes embodiment, intersubjectivity, and facticity without giving up the rigor of radical epistemological analysis, aiming at overcoming both naïve pseudo-problems and subtle forms of dogmatism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shake up the consensus view on transcendental arguments (TAs) that the ambitious “world-directed” kind fails and that only moderate, “belief-directed” transcendental arguments have a claim to validity. This consensus is based on Barry Stroud’s famous substitution objection: For any transcendental claim ‘p is an enabling condition for X’ we can readily substitute ‘the belief that p’ for ‘p’. I depart from the observation that the force of Stroud’s objection depends on (...) it being applicable to any world-directed TA whatsoever. This requires a much more substantive justification than is commonly supposed. I rehabilitate world-directed TAs by posing a dialectical dilemma for the Stroudian skeptic: a certain moderate TA is required to uphold the skeptical challenge, but this TA brings with it the commitment to a distinction which restricts the scope of the challenge, namely to ‘empirical’ instead of ‘transcendental’ beliefs about the world. The positive result is a new way of understanding what world-directed transcendental arguments are: a way of showing us which of our beliefs about the world are true because they are, in the sense of Wittgenstein’s meter-measure analogy, constitutive of our very standard for objectivity. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the emergence of the concept of the “historical a priori” at the origin of Foucault’s archeology. I emphasize the methodological function of this concept within Foucault’s archaeology, and I maintain that despite the different thesis it entails as compared to its philosophical sources, it pertains to one of the main issues of phenomenology, that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, and transcendentality. I start from the interest (...) of the young Foucault in existential psychiatry, and I focus on the French philosophical context in which Foucault’s Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence” (1954) was conceived. My aim is to show that the first “phenomenological” phase of Foucault’s work is coherent, from a methodological point of view, with the development of archaeology intended as “historical epistemology.” I conclude by arguing that Foucault’s archaeology is methodologically linked to Canguilhem’s epistemology, in that the latter presents itself as an important attempt at linking together historicity and transcendentality. (shrink)

This chapter aims to establish a philosophical discussion about the epistemological conditions of “observation”, from the cybersemiotic transdisciplinary view of knowing. For this purpose, the discussion will be divided into three parts, each one of them with the intention of outlining a conceptual critique that later allows a pertinent justification of the observation from a transcendental semiotics. This work is based on a problem: it seeks to show that a the cybersemiotic point of view, to consider on a foundationalist (...) stance, fails to overcome the epistemological contradictions involved in the contemporary critique of modern philosophy. Hence, the objective on this work is to propose as an alternative the teleological and nominalist attitude of transcendental semiotics, and also as an epistemological principle that allows overcoming problems of the foundationalist. Then, in a first moment, we will seek to establish a critique of the phenomenology of observation from the pragmatic point of view, developed by N. R. Hanson and Richard Rorty. In this direction, the contradictions involved in the definition of knowledge will be shown from the phenomenological (perception without representation) and phenomenological (states of inner consciousness) positions. In general terms, the epistemological problems found in the foundations of knowledge based on observation will be exposed: specifically, the problem of the empirical basis and perception and the question of the mind as an inner space. Then, in a second moment, a characterization of the "observation" and the "observable fact" will be made from the cybersemiotic point of view. In this sense, these concepts will be described from the peircean semiosis, starting from the theoretical link proposed by Soren Brier. Hence, when considering the observation within the sphere of significance, the approaches will show a non-phenomenological characterization of knowledge and, from there, the overcoming of pragmatic critiques towards phenomenology. The closing will allow circumscribing knowledge from a communicative, semiotic and autopoietic approach. Finally, and as a contribution to the state of the discussion, the present chapter will make a defense of the cybersemiotic phenomenology of observation but considering the pragmatic conditions of knowledge from a transcendental semiotics perspective. In this sense, the transcendental concepts of truth-consensus and fin-ideal will be used to develop a relevant theoretical field that allows a transcendental justification of the communicative-intersubjective nature of knowledge postulated by cybersemiotics. (shrink)

Fichte’s Jena Wissenschaftslehre is often thought to occupy a standpoint from which claims about what there really is, as opposed to claims about how we necessarily represent things to be, are metaphilosophically prohibited or methodologically precluded. This essay argues that for Fichte a transcendental account of the necessary conditions for knowing supports an accordant understanding of the basic nature of being. These are linked by a reconception of the nature of rationality, and thus of rational justification, that Fichte’s (...) class='Hi'>transcendental epistemology secures and which his ontology draws on and develops. In particular, his account of the nature of rationality issues in a distinctive form of nonevidentialism, according to which we possess unimpeachable rational grounds, albeit not narrowly evidential ones, for assent to certain metaphysical claims. (shrink)

This chapter aims to establish a philosophical discussion about the epistemological conditions of “observation”, from the cybersemiotic transdisciplinary view of knowing. For this purpose, the discussion will be divided into three parts, each one of them with the intention of outlining a conceptual critique that later allows a pertinent justification of the observation from a transcendental semiotics. This work is based on a problem: it seeks to show that a the cybersemiotic point of view, to consider on a foundationalist (...) stance, fails to overcome the epistemological contradictions involved in the contemporary critique of modern philosophy. Hence, the objective on this work is to propose as an alternative the teleological and nominalist attitude of transcendental semiotics, and also as an epistemological principle that allows overcoming problems of the foundationalist. Then, in a first moment, we will seek to establish a critique of the phenomenology of observation from the pragmatic point of view, developed by N. R. Hanson and Richard Rorty. In this direction, the contradictions involved in the definition of knowledge will be shown from the phenomenological and phenomenological positions. In general terms, the epistemological problems found in the foundations of knowledge based on observation will be exposed: specifically, the problem of the empirical basis and perception and the question of the mind as an inner space. Then, in a second moment, a characterization of the “observation” and the “observable fact” will be made from the cybersemiotic point of view. In this sense, these concepts will be described from the peircean semiosis, starting from the theoretical link proposed by Søren Brier. Hence, when considering the observation within the sphere of significance, the approaches will show a non-phenomenological characterization of knowledge and, from there, the overcoming of pragmatic critiques towards phenomenology. The closing will allow circumscribing knowledge from a communicative, semiotic and autopoietic approach. Finally, and as a contribution to the state of the discussion, the present chapter will make a defense of the cybersemiotic phenomenology of observation but considering the pragmatic conditions of knowledge from a transcendental semiotics perspective. In this sense, the transcendental concepts of truth-consensus and fin-ideal will be used to develop a relevant theoretical field that allows a transcendental justification of the communicative-intersubjective nature of knowledge postulated by cybersemiotics. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of ontological and epistemological models of the transcendent and transcendental in ancient philosophy, which allows us to understand the genesis and foundations of the main variants of metaphysics in classical thought. In general, constructions of ancient Greek thought are characterized by the understanding of the transcendent as "other" being, the higher sphere of the "cosmos of nature", which has specific spatio-temporal properties, which is outside the immanent world of man. Ontological terms, the (...) Cosmos was subdivided into earthly being, in which a man lives, and being "beyond", inaccessible to a man because of his bodily and vital limitations. In epistemological terms the transcendent was considered incomprehensible for sensory cognition, but accessible for cognition of the speculative, although not in full. The metaphysical model of the transcendental created by antiquity did not provide for the existence of an independent "human cosmos" isolated from the external world. The main task of the transcendental method was to determine the conditions by which it is possible to think of the data of empirical observations. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that Immanuel Kant was one of Karl Barth's most important intellectual influences, but how and to what extent this is the case remains an open question. In Presupposing God, Robert Hand demonstrates a deep consistency between Kant's and Barth's theological epistemologies, with this issue in mind. After arguing for a number of positive emphases in Kant's critical philosophy and religious epistemology in conversation with modern Kant scholarship, Presupposing God demonstrates how these emphases were obscured in (...) Kant's reception in the decades between Kant and Barth, and then explores the intellectual conditions under which Barth first encountered Kant. The argument proceeds to show how Barth wrestled with these varying interpretations and continued to utilize Kant with increased sophistication as his thought developed across the Romans commentaries, Anselm, and the Church Dogmatics. Presupposing God suggests that Kant can be an asset to theology, rather than the liability he is often taken to be, and that Barth is one of the better available examples of this in practice. (shrink)

Comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical systems of classical India and phenomenology of modern West.

Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 633-633.

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has (...) undergone a series of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects. (shrink)

Logic diagrams have seen a resurgence in their application in a range of fields, including logic, biology, media science, computer science and philosophy. Consequently, understanding the history and philosophy of these diagrams has become crucial. As many current diagrammatic systems in logic are based on ideas that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, it is important to consider what motivated the use of logic diagrams in the past and whether these reasons are still valid today. This paper proposes that (...) transcendental philosophy was a key inspiration for the development of logic diagrams and that such diagrams can be employed in transcendental arguments, even after the linguistic turn. (shrink)

Kant's influence on the history of philosophy is vast and protean. The transcendental turn denotes one of its most important forms, defined by the notion that Kant's deepest insight should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical enquiry. To take the transcendental turn is not to endorse any of Kant's specific teachings, but to accept that the Copernican revolution announced in the Preface of (...) the Critique of Pure Reason sets philosophy on a new footing and constitutes the proper starting point of philosophical reflection.In this volume a team of leading philosophers explore the concept of the transcendental as it developed through history, focusing on approaches to the transcendental project by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Bernard Williams. By giving systematic shape to historical material, the volume provides a unique resource for systematic reflection on transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

칸트의 인식론은 마음과 대상과의 관계에서 개념이 생산되는 과정에 대한 통찰을 다룬다. 칸트의 초월적 심리학은 마음이 고유성을 지니면서도 물리적 상태로 환원되지 않고 그 고유성의 근거를 물리적 세계 안에서 마련할 수 있는 독특한 메커니즘을 제공한다. 그 마법의 접착제가 곧 심신의 상호작용이다. 외감과 내감, 통각의 상호 규정의 과정에서 마음이 물질로 환원되지 않고 인과적 질서 안에 있음이 심신 상호작용의 근거가 된다. 우리는 실재를 절대적이고 직접적으로는 파악할 수 없다. 대상은 의식의 형식인 통각이 직관과 개념의 양 표상에 수반되는 사유형식을 통해서만 인식된다. 또한 주어진 감각적 소여에 대한 (...) 사고와 서술이 가능하기 위해서는 도식과 개념이 선재하지 않으면 안 된다. 도식론에서 칸트는 도식적인 방식의 기호표시를 개별 대상에 적용하여 보편개념을 획득하는 사고의 틀을 마련한다. 표상에 도식을 적용함으로써 대상은 비로소 객관적인 의미를 가질 수 있다. 칸트의 개념적 도식은 대상이 언어로 귀착되는 과정을 통찰하는 초월적 언어학이다. 본 논문은 심신 상호작용론을 근거로 칸트의 초월적 심리학과 초월적 언어학을 엮어서 인식론을 의미론적 차원으로 전환하여 재검토하는 기획이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examination of transcendental arguments. This is the philosophical method of arguing that what is doubted or denied by the opponent must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought.The line-up of contributors features leading figures in the field from both sides of the Atlantic; they discuss the nature of transcendental arguments, and consider their role and value. In particular, (...) they consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems. The editor's introduction provides historical context and philosophical orientation for the discussions. This is the first major appraisal of transcendental arguments since the 1970s; they have continued to play a significant role in philosophy, and recent developments in epistemology and metaphysics have raised new questions and challenges for them. Transcendental Arguments will be essential reading for anyone interested in this area of philosophy, and the starting-point for future work. (shrink)

Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl’s basic epistemological principles, such as (...) the “principle of all principles,” seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show (i) that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers of modern physics came to the conclusion that the problem of how objectivity is constituted (rather than merely given) can no longer be avoided, and therefore that a transcendental approach in the spirit of Kant is now philosophically relevant. The usual excuse for skipping this task is that the historical form given by Kant to transcendental epistemology has been challenged by Relativity and Quantum Physics. However, the true challenge is not to force (...) modern physics into a rigidly construed static version of Kant's philosophy, but to provide Kant's method with flexibility and generality. In this book, the top specialists of the field pin down the methodological core of transcendental epistemology that must be used in order to throw light on the foundations of modern physics. First, the basic tools Kant used for his transcendental reading of Newtonian Mechanics are examined, and then early transcendental approaches of Relativistic and Quantum Physics are revisited. Transcendental procedures are also applied to contemporary physics, and this renewed transcendental interpretation is finally compared with structural realism and constructive empiricism. The book will be of interest to scientists, historians and philosophers who are involved in the foundational problems of modern physics. (shrink)

I consider two transcendental arguments for realism in the philosophy of science, which are due to Roy Bhaskar (A realist theory of science, 1975) and Nancy Cartwright (The dappled world, 1999). Bhaskar and Cartwright are both influential figures, however there is little discussion of their use of transcendental arguments in the literature. Here I seek to correct this oversight. I begin by describing the role of the transcendental arguments in question, in the context of the broader philosophical (...) theories in which they are embedded, by Bhaskar and Cartwright respectively. I then consider some specific problems that arise for these particular transcendental arguments, in the context of contemporary philosophy of science. I raise two general problems for transcendental arguments for realism and I finish by spelling out what needs to be done to address the criticisms raised in this paper. (shrink)

There are several ways one can make an appraisal of Husserl’s turn to transcendental phenomenology. One way would be to look at some of the implications of this turn, such as, whether Husserl is thereby prevented from answering certain philosophical questions. Taking this course here, I treat one of the implications that appears when one critically examines the transcendental turn, namely that Husserl’s philosophy is idealistic. This is an implication that many critics of transcendental phenomenology have alleged (...) is philosophically intolerable and requires modification or abandonment of Husserl’s transcendental turn. Important to this task is the distinction between what I shall call “epistemological idealism” and “metaphysical idealism”. As I detail later, epistemological idealism can be characterized as the thesis that consciousness is the sole medium of access to whatever is seen as actually or possibly existing and “metaphysical idealism” can be characterized as including the additional thesis that consciousness creates whatever actually or possibly exists and what exists is dependent on it. It is my contention that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which he labels transcendental idealism, is epistemologically idealistic but metaphysically neutral. Also I contend that metaphysical neutrality is not a deficiency of his philosophy but that such is the necessary conclusion of any philosophy that successfully adheres to the policy of describing, explicating and accepting all objectivities only as they present themselves to the consciousness of them, and in terms of the consciousness of them. (shrink)

The relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of (...) substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The book provides a critical and historical inquiry into Kant's schematism chapter. It focuses on the meanings of the notion of schema before Kant, the precritical meaning of this notion, an analysis of the schematism chapter and its criticisms, and an overview of the legacy of Kant's schematism in philosophy and psychology.

PREFACE Towards the end of his important article 'What is Phenomenology?" Adolf Reinach writes: When we wish to break with all theories and constructions in ...

This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been important to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can (...) know that they know a priori? I defend affirmative answers to both of these questions, and by considering the special kind of modality involved in Kant’s conceptions of possible experience and the essential completability of metaphysics, I argue that his combination of knowability and luminosity principles leads Kant into difficulty. (shrink)

Since Barry Stroud's classic paper in 1968, the general discussion on transcendental arguments tends to focus on examples from theoretical philosophy. It also tends to be pessimistic, or at least extremely reluctant, about the potential of this kind of arguments. Nevertheless, transcendental reasoning continues to play a prominent role in some recent approaches to moral philosophy. Moreover, some authors argue that transcendental arguments may be more promising in moral philosophy than they are in theoretical contexts. Against this (...) background, the current volume focuses on transcendental arguments in practical philosophy. Experts from different countries and branches of philosophy share their views about whether there are actually differences between "theoretical" and "practical" uses of transcendental arguments. They examine and compare different versions of transcendental arguments in moral philosophy, explain their structure, and assess their respective problems and promises. This book offers all those interested in ethics, meta-ethics, or epistemology a more comprehensive understanding of transcendental arguments. It also provides them with new insights into uses of transcendental reasoning in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of moral value or judgments thereof. In this paper, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge about that object. (...) In unpacking each component of this position, I argue that it is both distinct from and more explanatorily attractive than the other approaches to explaining the relationship between emotion and moral thought, including what Kauppinen (2014, forthcoming) calls epistemological sentimentalism and explanatory sentimentalism. I conclude by offering a sketch of what I take to be the most promising strategy for demonstrating the truth of transcendental sentimentalism, suggesting an original form of transcendental argument. If successful, this form of argument would establish transcendental sentimentalism by demonstrating that not having a sentimental response to x disqualifies (in the normative sense) a person from counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge of x. (shrink)

One of Kant’s central central claims in the Critique of Pure Reason is that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. This claim has been regarded as problematic in a number of ways: whether Kant is entitled to assert both that there are things in themselves and that we cannot have knowledge of them, and, more generally, what Kant’s commitment to things in themselves amounts to. A number of commentators deny that Kant is committed to there (...) actually being an aspect of reality which we cannot cognise; they argue that he is committed merely to the idea that we cannot avoid the concept of things as they are in themselves. I will argue in this paper that while transcendental idealism is partly an epistemological position, it is also partly a metaphysical position, and in specific, that Kant is committed to the claim that the things we cognise have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a nature that is independent of us, which we cannot cognise. (shrink)

Although there is increasing interest in philosophy of science in transcendental reasoning, there is hardly any discussion about transcendental arguments. Since this might be related to the dominant understanding of transcendental arguments as a tool to defeat epistemological skepticism, and since the power of transcendental arguments to achieve this goal has convincingly been disputed by Barry Stroud, this contribution proposes, first, a new definition of the transcendental argument which allows its presentation in a simple modus (...) ponens and, second, a pragmatist re-interpretation of this argument form that leaves it to the scientific community to debate, criticize, refine, or reaffirm its core claim: a premise which claims that the truth of a certain assumption is a necessary condition for something that is generally accepted. The proposed “logico-pragmatist interpretation” highlights the role of transcendental arguments as a methodological step to move science forward, just as abduction and inference to the best explanation do. (shrink)

Although there is increasing interest in philosophy of science in transcendental reasoning, there is hardly any discussion about transcendental arguments. Since this might be related to the dominant understanding of transcendental arguments as a tool to defeat epistemological skepticism, and since the power of transcendental arguments to achieve this goal has convincingly been disputed by Barry Stroud, this contribution proposes, first, a new definition of the transcendental argument which allows its presentation in a simple modus (...) ponens and, second, a pragmatist re-interpretation of this argument form that leaves it to the scientific community to debate, criticize, refine, or reaffirm its core claim: a premise which claims that the truth of a certain assumption is a necessary condition for something that is generally accepted. The proposed “logico-pragmatist interpretation” highlights the role of transcendental arguments as a methodological step to move science forward, just as abduction and inference to the best explanation do. (shrink)