Imre Lakatos

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics (...) of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos holds a well-deserved primary place in current philosophy of science. In this essay, Leslie Allan critically examines Lakatos' theory of knowledge in two key areas. The first area of consideration is Lakatos' notion that knowledge is gained through a process of competition between rival scientific research programmes. Allan identifies and discusses four problems with Lakatos' characterization of a research programme. Next, Allan considers Lakatos' proposed test of adequacy for theories of rationality using his methodology of historiographical research programmes. (...) Allan discovers tensions within Lakatos' criteria and suggests ways of strengthening his test. (shrink)

According to falsificationism, a theory is scientific if it can be incompatible with some empirically testable statements. This epistemological approach has been criticized because, in practice, it is impossible to decide when a particular fact should be considered incompatible with a theory. These criticisms, however, neglect the fact that the Popperian sense of falsification is a “logical sense.” Thus, the Popperian criterion of falsifiability only requires that, assuming certain auxiliary hypotheses, the theory in question be logically incompatible with some empirically (...) testable statements. This paper presents a reassessment of these criticisms, justifying that the criterion of falsifiability is unrenounceable insofar as our best theories should aspire to satisfy it. (shrink)

Sometimes themes can be found in common across very different systems in which change occurs. Imre Lakatos developed a theory of change in science, and one involving entities visible at different levels. There are theories defended at a particular time, and there are also research programs, larger units that bundle together a sequence of related theories and within which many scientists may work. Research programs are competing higher-level units within a scientific field. Scientific change involves change within research programs, and (...) change in the ensemble of research programs present at a time, where some will be growing, some shrinking, some progressing, some degenerating. These are also themes in biological evolution. Recent biology has often found itself dealing with the relation between change at a level of "collectives" – such as organisms like us – and change at a lower level – the level of cells, genes, and other evolving parts. This work is continuous with an older discussion, one that arose when biological evolution was no more than a vague speculation, round the beginning of the 19th century. What is the living individual? What is the basic unit of life or living organization? Questions like this were pursued by Goethe, by Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of Charles, and many others. Initially it was plants, especially, that were seen to raise these problems, and then newly described marine animals with strange life cycles. The discussion was influenced by the rise of the cell theory in the early 19th century, but some writers looked for individuals well below the level of the cell. (shrink)

Preuves et Réfutations est écrit comme une série de dialogues socratiques entre un groupe d'étudiants discutant de la démonstration des caractéristiques d'Euler définies pour les polyèdres. Le livre explique de nombreuses idées logiques importantes, mettant l'accent sur l'idée d'heuristique positive. Le livre comprend deux annexes. Dans le premier, Lakatos donne des exemples du processus heuristique de la découverte mathématique en particulier et du processus scientifique en général. Deuxièmement, il oppose les approches déductives et heuristiques et propose des analyses heuristiques des (...) concepts « preuves ». DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20798.31042. (shrink)

Tant qu'un programme de recherche en herbe peut être reconstitué de manière rationnelle en tant que problème progressif, il doit être protégé pendant un certain temps d'un rival puissant existant. Ces considérations, dans leur ensemble, soulignent l’importance de la tolérance méthodologique. Même les fameuses « expériences cruciales » n'auront aucune force pour renverser un programme de recherche. Dans le cadre d'un programme de recherche, des « expériences cruciales mineures » entre versions ultérieures sont assez courantes. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17935.53922.

Research programs allow the development of more complex theories. The terms can be applied to both individual theories and programs. Unlike Kuhn's scientific revolutions, Lakatos assumed that the simultaneous existence of several research programs is the norm. Science is currently facing such an unusual situation: two incompatible theories, but both accepted by the scientific community describe the same reality in two different ways. Research programs may at one time compete with single theories, single theories between them, or research programs between (...) them. We can speak of a "research unit" as a singular theory or a research program. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31863.98729. (shrink)

L'heuristique est un concept central de la philosophie de Lakatos. Selon Lakatos, la méthodologie ne fait plus référence à l'ensemble des règles et stratégies à adopter dans le contexte de la découverte. Seules les heuristiques le font. Mais les principes heuristiques (par opposition aux méthodologiques) ne sont pas objectifs et autonomes, ils sont sujets à changement, de même que les changements dans la science. Les séries de théories scientifiques les plus importantes dans le développement de la science se caractérisent par (...) une certaine continuité qui lie leurs membres et qui découle d'un programme de recherche établi depuis le début, constitué de règles méthodologiques. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22615.62886 . (shrink)

Falsificaționismul dogmatic admite falsificabilitatea tuturor teoriilor științifice fără calificare, dar păstrează un fel de bază empirică infailibilă. Este strict empiricist fără a fi inductivist: neagă faptul că certitudinea bazei empirice poate fi transmisă teoriilor. Astfel, falsificabilitatea dogmatică este cea mai slabă marcă a justificării. Semnul distinctiv al falsificării dogmatice este recunoașterea faptului că toate teoriile sunt la fel de conjecturale. Știința nu poate dovedi nicio teorie, dar le poate respinge. Onestitatea științifică constă astfel în aceea de a specifica un experiment (...) în așa fel încât, dacă rezultatul contrazice teoria, trebuie să renunțăm la teorie. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15335.70561. (shrink)

Euristica este un concept central al filosofiei lui Lakatos. În timp ce euristica în Proofs and Refutations a fost un set de reguli care să ghideze rezolvarea problemelor pentru omul de știință individual, The methodology of scientific research programmes nu oferă niciun sfat euristic oamenilor de știință individuali, dar oferă recomandări pentru comunitatea științifică rațională asupra modului în care ar trebui să acționeze. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31140.63369.

Lakatos a proposé une méthodologie pour étudier l'évolution de la science par le biais de programmes de recherche, une combinaison de la falsifiabilité de Popper, des révolutions scientifiques de Kuhn et de la tolérance méthodologique de Feyerabend. Les programmes de recherche peuvent en même temps concurrencer des théories uniques, des théories uniques entre eux ou des programmes de recherche entre eux. On peut parler d'une « unité de recherche » en tant que théorie singulière ou d'un programme de recherche. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.31636.65925. (shrink)

Le falsificationnisme dogmatique accepte la falsifiabilité de toutes les théories scientifiques sans réserve, mais conserve une base empirique infaillible. Il est strictement empirique sans être inductif : il nie que la certitude de la base empirique puisse être transmise aux théories. Ainsi, le falsificationnisme dogmatique est donc la marque de justification la plus faible. Le signe distinctif de la falsification dogmatique est la reconnaissance du fait que toutes les théories sont également conjecturales. La science ne peut prouver aucune théorie, mais (...) elle peut les rejeter. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26963.32807. (shrink)

Proofs and Refutations este scrisă ca o serie de dialoguri socratice între un grup de elevi care dezbat demonstrația caracteristicilor Euler definite pentru poliedre. În carte sunt explicate multe idei logice importante, accentuându-se pe ideea de euristică pozitivă. Cartea include două anexe. În prima, Lakatos dă exemple ale procesului euristic în descoperirea matematică în special și în cea științifică în general. În al doilea rând, el contrastează abordările deductiviste și euristice și oferă analize euristice ale unor concepte de ”dovezi”. DOI: (...) 10.13140/RG.2.2.31059.53280. (shrink)

Recenzie: Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, volumul I, editată de John Worrall și Gregory Currie, Cambridge University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-521-28031-1, paperback Metodologia programelor de cercetare științifică este o colecție de lucrări publicate de-a lungul timpului, în care Imre Lakatos exprimă o revizuire radicală a criteriului de demarcație al lui Popper între știință și neștiință, conducând la o teorie nouă a raționalității științifice.

Programele de cercetare permit dezvoltarea unor teorii mai complexe. Termenii pot fi aplicați atât la teorii individuale cât și la programe. În cazul în care se aplică teoriilor din cadrul unui program de cercetare, consider că acestea devin la rândul lor programe de cercetare, pe care le putem numi subprograme de cercetare. Spre deosebire de revoluțiile științifice ale lui Kuhn, Lakatos a presupus că existența simultană a mai multor programe de cercetare este norma. Știința se confruntă în prezent cu o (...) astfel de situație inedită: două teorii incompatibile, dar ambele acceptate de comunitatea științifică descriu aceeași realitate în două moduri diferite. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11153.28005. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos a proposé une modification du critère de Popper, qu'il a qualifié de « falsification sophistiquée (méthodologique) ». De ce point de vue, le critère de délimitation ne devrait pas s'appliquer à une hypothèse ou à une théorie isolée, mais plutôt à l'ensemble d'un programme de recherche. La falsification méthodologique sophistiquée change le problème du mode d’évaluation théorique en problème de l’évaluation des séries théoriques. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25555.73761.

Pentru a analiza conceptele de euristica și toleranță metodologică dezvoltate de Lakatos, m-am concentrat pe secțiunea ”Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes”, publicată pentru prima dată ca articol în 1970 și apoi în cartea The methodology of scientific research programmes, Volume I (Lakatos 1978). Am analizat, în acest text, exemplificarea autorului pentru programul de cercetare al emisiei de lumină (în fizica cuantică timpurie) al lui Bohr. O exemplificare detaliată a conceptelor este prezentată de Lakatos în secțiunea ”Newton's effect (...) on scientific standards” din aceeași carte. De asemenea, am făcut dese referiri la cartea Proofs and Refutations (Lakatos 1976) publicată de Lakatos în 1976, în care expune viziunea sa euristică printr-o aplicare directă la evoluția matematicii, și am apelat și la articole ale altor autori pentru analiza celor două concepte în viziunea lui Lakatos. -/- Cuvinte cheie: Imre Lakatos, euristica, toleranța metodologică -/- CUPRINS -/- Abstract 1 Prezentarea generală 1.1 Falsificaţionismul dogmatic (sau naturalist) 1.2 Falsificarea metodologică 1.3 Falsificaţionismul metodologic sofisticat 2 Toleranţa metodologică 3 Euristica 3.1 Euristica negativă: "nucleul dur” al programului 3.2 Euristica pozitivă: "centura de protecţie" a programului 3.3 Bohr: un exemplu de program de cercetare 3.4 Proofs and Refutations 4 Concluzii Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35405.28649. (shrink)

The evolution of gravitational tests from an epistemological perspective framed in the concept of rational reconstruction of Imre Lakatos, based on his methodology of research programmes. Unlike other works on the same subject, the evaluated period is very extensive, starting with Newton's natural philosophy and up to the quantum gravity theories of today. In order to explain in a more rational way the complex evolution of the gravity concept of the last century, I propose a natural extension of the methodology (...) of the research programmes of Lakatos that I then use during the paper. I believe that this approach offers a new perspective on how evolved over time the concept of gravity and the methods of testing each theory of gravity, through observations and experiments. I argue, based on the methodology of the research programmes and the studies of scientists and philosophers, that the current theories of quantum gravity are degenerative, due to the lack of experimental evidence over a long period of time and of self-immunization against the possibility of falsification. Moreover, a methodological current is being developed that assigns a secondary, unimportant role to verification through observations and/or experiments. For this reason, it will not be possible to have a complete theory of quantum gravity in its current form, which to include to the limit the general relativity, since physical theories have always been adjusted, during their evolution, based on observational or experimental tests, and verified by the predictions made. Also, contrary to a widespread opinion and current active programs regarding the unification of all the fundamental forces of physics in a single final theory, based on string theory, I argue that this unification is generally unlikely, and it is not possible anyway for a unification to be developed based on current theories of quantum gravity, including string theory. In addition, I support the views of some scientists and philosophers that currently too much resources are being consumed on the idea of developing quantum gravity theories, and in particular string theory, to include general relativity and to unify gravity with other forces, as long as science does not impose such research programs. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35350.70724 . (shrink)

Dogmatic (naturalist) falsificationism accepts the falsifiability of all scientific theories without qualification but preserves an infallible empirical basis. He is strictly empiric without being inductivist: he denies the fact that certainty of the empirical basis can be conveyed to theories. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest mark of justification. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15196.33927 .

La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, exprimant une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. Le volume I aborde des aspects de la philosophie des sciences et le volume II contient des travaux sur la philosophie des mathématiques. Pour un historien des sciences, la reconstruction proposée par Lakatos est attrayante et explique l’évolution de la science à (...) un niveau jamais atteint auparavant. L'unité d'évaluation de base proposée par Lakatos est le programme de recherche. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22465.92006 . (shrink)

Lakatos a propus o modificare a criteriului lui Popper pe care l-a numit falsificaționism sofisticat (metodologic). Din această perspectivă, criteriul de delimitare ar trebui să se aplice nu unei ipoteze sau unei teorii izolate, ci mai degrabă unui întreg program de cercetare. În lucrările sale timpurii, Lakatos pare să accepte că după un punct de saturație: respingem teoria, pentru ca ulterior să afirme că, dimpotrivă, nu există un astfel de lucru ca punctul de saturație natural pentru un program de cercetare. (...) Standardele sale de evaluare nu stabilesc, practic, nicio limită de timp pentru evaluarea finală a progresivității sau a degenerării empirice a unui program. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12567.21921. (shrink)

According to the scientific "justificationist" method, knowledge consisted of proven sentences. Classical intellectuals (or "rationalists," in the narrow sense of the term) have accepted extremely varied - and powerful "proofs", through revelation, intellectual intuition, experience. These, with the help of logic, have allowed them to prove any kind of scientific statement. Classical empiricists accepted as axioms only a relatively small set of "factual propositions" that expressed "hard facts". The value of their truth has been established by experience and has been (...) the empirical basis of science. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28722.25288. (shrink)

În încercarea de dezvoltare a unei teorii solide a gravitației cuantice, au existat mai multe programe de cercetare, dintre care unele au căzut în timp în desuetitudine datorită puterii euristice mai mari a altor programe. Testul primordial al oricărei teorii cuantice a gravitației este reproducerea succeselor relativității generale. Aceasta implică reconstrucția geometriei locale din observabilele nelocale. În plus, gravitația cuantică ar trebui să prezică probabilistic topologia la scară largă a Universului, care în curând poate fi măsurabilă, și fenomene la scala (...) Planck. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21224.83202. (shrink)

Évaluation: Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, volume I, edité par John Worrall et Gregory Currie, Cambridge University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-521-28031-1, paperback La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, dans laquelle Imre Lakatos exprime une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. -/- Mots-clés: Imre Lakatos, science, méthodologie, programmes de recherche, heuristique -/- (...) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25516.31364 . (shrink)

The methodology of scientific research programmes is a collection of papers published over time expressing a radical review of Popper's demarcation criterion between science and non-science, leading to a new theory of scientific rationality. Volume I address aspects of the philosophy of science, and volume II contains works on the philosophy of mathematics. For a science historian, the reconstruction proposed by Lakatos is attractive and explains the evolution of science to a level that has not been achieved before. The basic (...) evaluation unit proposed by Lakatos is the research programme, and especially the dynamics of these programmes. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31605.01767. (shrink)

La falsification méthodologique est une marque du conventionnalisme. Il y a une importante délimitation entre les théories de la connaissance « passives » et « actives ». « Les passivistes prétendent que la vraie connaissance est l'empreinte de la nature sur un esprit parfaitement inerte : l'activité mentale ne peut qu'engendrer des biais et des distorsions. » L'école passiviste la plus influente est l'empirisme classique. « Les activistes » affirment que nous ne pouvons pas lire le livre de la nature (...) sans activité mentale, sans l'interpréter à la lumière de nos attentes ou de nos théories. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29156.73607. (shrink)

David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature famously fell `deadborn from the press’ because it was too far ahead of its time. Basu’s book is one of a number published in recent years that suggest we are at last ready to put its precepts into action.1 Modern game theory provides a framework that makes Hume’s insights genuinely applicable, and I totaly agree with Basu that this is not only the right way forward, but that it now looksincreasingly likely that this is (...) the road that wil actualy be folowed ± not only in political economy, but across the board in the social sciences. (shrink)

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has undergone a series (...) of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects. -/- Keywords: transcendental philosophy, Kant, programmatics, architectonics, metaphilosophy, ideas of reason, Lakatos, research programmes. (shrink)

This paper explores a particularist element in the theory of method of Imre Lakatos, who appealed to the value-judgements of élite scientists in the appraisal of competing theories of method. The role played by such value-judgements is strongly reminiscent of the epistemological particularism of Roderick Chisholm. Despite the existence of a clear parallel between the particularist approaches of both authors, it is argued that Lakatos’s approach is subject to a weakness that does not affect the approach of Chisholm.

Bilimin ne olduğunun belirlenmesi ve bu bağlamda bilimin sözde bilim ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlara ilişkin sınırının nasıl çizileceği tartışması, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme problemi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın ana konusunu oluşturan bu problem, özellikle yirminci yüzyıldan itibaren, bilim felsefecileri tarafından birçok ölçüt ortaya konularak çözümlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu ölçütler genellikle, bilim ile sözde bilim arasındaki sınırı belirlemek amacıyla, bilimi mantık ve mantıksal önermeler üzerinden değerlendirmektedir. Şu ana kadar Viyana Çevresi, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos gibi filozoflarca ortaya konulan ölçütler, nihai olarak problemi (...) mantıksal açıdan ele almıştır. Sınır çizme sorununun mantıksal açıdan ya da mantıksal ifadeler aracılığıyla ele alınması demek; sorunu içeriği yerine daha çok biçimsel açıdan ele almak anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca, ifade, kuram, araştırma programı gibi bilim öğelerinin bilimsellik durumunu tespit edebilmek amacıyla önerilen ölçütün, tek tek gerekli ve hep birlikte yeterli olan uygun sınır çizme ölçütünü karşılaması anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, gerek ve yeter koşul arayışının, bilimin değişken ve çeşitli yapısını tam olarak yakalayamayacağını ve bilimin belirlenmesinin ve sınırının çizilmesinin bu yöntemle mümkün olmayacağını vurgulamaktadır. Bu konunun mutlaka sosyolojik açıdan da ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bilimin sosyal yapısına, değerler sistemine de bakmamız gerekir. Sonuç olarak, sınır çizme probleminin gerek ve yeter koşulun ortaya koyduğu katı ve ortak özellikler üzerinden sonuçlandırılamayacağı, bunun yerine bilimin “aile benzerliği yaklaşımı” çerçevesinde ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanacaktır. Aile benzerliği yaklaşımının temel oluşturduğu çok boyutlu ölçüt, bu sorunun çözümünde sosyal etkenleri dâhil etmesi, bilimin çeşitliliğini kapsayabilecek ölçüde çoklu ve esnek yapıda olması ile katkıda bulunacaktır. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to generalize a pair of concepts that are widely used in the history of science, in art history and in historical linguistics – the concept of internal and external history – and to replace the often very vague talk of ‘historical narratives’ with this conceptual framework of internal versus external history. I argue that this way of framing the problem allows us to see the possible alternatives more clearly – as a limited number of (...) possible relations between internal and external history. Finally, I argue that while external history is metaphysically prior to internal history, when it comes to historical explanations, we need both. (shrink)

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how (...) Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change. (shrink)

In the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP) there are important features on the problem of prediction, especially regarding novel facts. In his approach, Imre Lakatos proposed three different levels on prediction: aim, process, and assessment. Chapter 5 pays attention to the characterization of prediction in the methodology of research programs. Thus, it takes into account several features: (1) its pragmatic characterization, (2) the logical perspective as a proposition, (3) the epistemological component, (4) its role in the appraisal of research (...) programs, and (5) its place as a value for scientific research. -/- The notion of “novel facts” is highly relevant in his conception, where several aspects are involved: the directions of novel facts, the different kinds of novelty, and the transition from six possible options of “novel facts” to four choices. Thereafter, the prediction of novel facts as the criterion of appraisal is considered. On the one hand, this requires analyzing the theoretical, empirical, and heuristic possibilities of appraisal; and, on the other, whether there is an overemphasis on the role of prediction in methodology of scientific research programs. As a consequence, there is an analysis of Lakatos’ criterion of appraisal in MSRP and economics. (shrink)

I argue that, in analysing the structure and development of moral traditions, MacIntyre relies primarily on Kuhn's model of scientific tradition, rather than on Lakatos' model. I unpack three foci of Kuhn's conception of the sciences, namely: the ‘crisis’ conception of scientific development, what I call the ‘systematic conception’ of scientific paradigms, and the view that successive paradigms are incommensurable. I then show that these three foci are integrated into MacIntyre's account of the development of moral traditions with a surprising (...) degree of faithfulness to Kuhn. And crucially, I argue against the overall cogency of his account, given the disparities I pinpoint between scientific and moral traditions. My overall critique is, however, fundamentally friendly, since nothing I have to say invalidates the very notion of a moral tradition, and all I am calling for are less problematic construals of that notion. (shrink)

This paper considers whether philosophy of mathematics could benefit by the introduction of some sociology. It begins by considering Lakatos's arguments that philosophy of science should be kept free of any sociology. An attempt is made to criticize these arguments, and then a positive argument is given for introducing a sociological dimension into the philosophy of mathematics. This argument is illustrated by considering Brouwer's account of numbers as mental constructions. The paper concludes with a critical discussion of Azzouni's view that (...) mathematics differs fundamentally from other social practices. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of methodological issues within science education research and considers the extent to which this area of scholarship can be understood to (actually and potentially) be scientific. The chapter considers the nature of education and educational research, how methodological issues are discussed in educational research and the range of major methodological strategies commonly used. It is suggested that the way research is discussed, undertaken and reported seems quite different in science education from research in the natural (...) sciences as science education studies are informed by quite diverse paradigmatic commitments. The nature of educational phenomena is such that it is unlikely that science education could adopt the kind of disciplinary matrix that can guide researchers in the natural sciences (by allowing much methodological thinking to be implicit and taken for granted within a field). However, Lakatos’s ‘scientific research programmes’ (SRP) offer a view of research traditions that can encompass social science research. From this perspective, it is possible for progressive SRP to operate in science education. (shrink)

Debates in the philosophy of science typically take place around issues such as realism and theory change. Recently, the debate has been reformulated to bring in the role of experiments in the context of theory change. As regards realism, Ian Hacking’s contribution has been to introduce ‘intervention’ as the basis of realism. He also proposed, following Imre Lakatos, to replace the issue of truth with progress and rationality. In this context we examine the case of the vitalism — reductionism debate (...) in biology inspired by the works of Indian physicist-turned-biologist Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937), in the early twentieth century. Both camps had their characteristic hardcores. Vitalists led by John S. Burdon-Sanderson and Augustus D. Waller accepted religious metaphysics to support their research programme, which ultimately degenerated. Bose worked more with the ideals of science such as Occam’s razor, large-scale systematization of phenomena and novel prediction. I argue that his religious metaphysics, instead of acting as a protective shield, helped him to consolidate his position and allowed further problem shift resulting in a research programme that involved consciousness too. His research programme remains relevant even today. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods of science undergo variation does (...) not entail that epistemic justification varies with the methods employed by scientists. In order to arrive at the relativist conclusion, an epistemological argument is required that justification depends upon operative methods. This raises the question of epistemic normativity. Kuhn himself attempted to deal with this question on a number of occasions, but without success. Following brief discussion of Kuhn on this topic, the paper then turns to the treatment of epistemic normativity in the work of Lakatos, Laudan and Worrall. Lakatos and Laudan proposed that particular episodes from the history of science might be employed to adjudicate between alternative theories of method. Such episodes are selected on the basis of value judgements or pre-analytic intuitions, but such value judgements and intuitions are themselves problematic. Laudan later proposed the normative naturalist view that a rule of method is to be evaluated empirically on the basis of its reliability in conducing to a desired cognitive aim. Against this attempt to naturalize meta-methodology, Worrall argued that the normative force of the appeal to past reliability requires an a priori inductive principle. In my view, the problem of epistemic normativity is solved by combining the particularist focus on specific episodes in the history of science with the naturalistic account of the reliability of method. (shrink)

El artículo pretende analizar la metodología de los programas de investigación de Imre Lakatos a la luz de la ciencia contemporánea. Tomando como base las encuestas realizadas a un grupo de físicos del CERN, se constata que las sugerencias de Lakatos sobre el progreso en la ciencia, esto es, sobre cómo determinar el carácter progresivo o no de un programa de investigación, entran en colisión con la práctica cientí? ca. La conclusión es que el modelo lakatosiano no es un marco (...) adecuado para entender qué factores informan de facto el juicio de los investigadores sobre la progresividad de un programa de investigación. (shrink)

Is there more to? good science? than explaining novel facts? Social interaction within scientific communities plays a pivotal role in defining acceptable research practices. This article explores the connection between research outcomes and the socio-cultural environment they are constructed in by developing an agent-based computational model of scientific communities. Agent-to-agent interaction is added to a system of knowledge production inspired by the work of Lakatos on scientific research programs as an important factor guiding the actions of researchers. Simulation results show (...) that early in scientific inquiry, when there are new phenomena to explain, the research community is fragmented and scientists prefer to rely on their own talents in conducting research. Over time, consensus emerges in the form of a dominate research program which utilizes a mixture of past and concurrent approaches. This result illustrates Kuhn's notion of the rise and fall of scientific paradigms. (shrink)

The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics (...) of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper. (shrink)

The last century has seen many disciplines place a greater priority on understanding how people reason in a particular domain, and several illuminating theories of informal logic and argumentation have been developed. Perhaps owing to their diverse backgrounds, there are several connections and overlapping ideas between the theories, which appear to have been overlooked. We focus on Peirce’s development of abductive reasoning [39], Toulmin’s argumentation layout [52], Lakatos’s theory of reasoning in mathematics [23], Pollock’s notions of counterexample [44], and argumentation (...) schemes constructed by Walton et al. [54], and explore some connections between, as well as within, the theories. For instance, we investigate Peirce’s abduction to deal with surprising situations in mathematics, represent Pollock’s examples in terms of Toulmin’s layout, discuss connections between Toulmin’s layout and Walton’s argumentation schemes, and suggest new argumentation schemes to cover the sort of reasoning that Lakatos describes, in which arguments may be accepted as faulty, but revised, rather than being accepted or rejected. We also consider how such theories may apply to reasoning in mathematics: in particular, we aim to build on ideas such as Dove’s [13], which help to show ways in which the work of Lakatos fits into the informal reasoning community. (shrink)

In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, (...) along the lines traced by Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs. We show how current debates in cosmology could be put into this framework, shedding light on a very controversial topic. (shrink)

The paper describes the theory of mirror neurons system and reminds selected empirical researches made in its context. Author evaluates the theory from the theo-retical and methodological point of view. The background of undertaken analysis and evaluation is Lakatos' and Kuhn's methodology and philosophy of science.