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  1. Kantian and Neo-Kantian First Principles for Physical and Metaphysical Cognition.Michael E. Cuffaro - manuscript
    I argue that Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy—in particular the doctrine of transcendental idealism which grounds it—is best understood as an `epistemic' or `metaphilosophical' doctrine. As such it aims to show how one may engage in the natural sciences and in metaphysics under the restriction that certain conditions are imposed on our cognition of objects. Underlying Kant's doctrine, however, is an ontological posit, of a sort, regarding the fundamental nature of our cognition. This posit, sometimes called the `discursivity thesis', while considered (...)
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  2. The Transcendental Object, Experience, and the Thing in Itself.Michael Oberst - manuscript
    Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things (...)
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  3. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  4. Imagination and Association in Kant's Theory of Cognition.Corey W. Dyck -
    In this paper, I provide an account of the role of the associative function of the imagination in causal cognition for Kant. I consider, first, Kant’s treatment of the imaginative faculty in the student notes to Kant’s lectures on anthropology in the 1770s, with the aim of working up a more-or-less comprehensive taxonomy of its various sub-faculties. I then turn to Kant’s account of the activity of the imagination, particularly in accordance with the law of association, in the theory of (...)
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  5. The Proof Structure of Kant's A-Edition Objective Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - forthcoming - In Giuseppe Motta & Dennis Schulting (eds.), Kants transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien: Neue Interpretationen / Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: New Interpretations. Berlin: DeGruyter.
    Kant's A-Edition objective deduction is naturally (and has traditionally been) divided into two arguments: an " argument from above" and one that proceeds " von unten auf." This would suggest a picture of Kant's procedure in the objective deduction as first descending and ascending the same ladder, the better, perhaps, to test its durability or to thoroughly convince the reader of its soundness. There are obvious obstacles to such a reading, however; and in this chapter I will argue that the (...)
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  6. Reason in Kant's Theory of Cognition.Nabeel Hamid - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper reconstructs and defends Kant's argument for the transcendental status of reason's principles of the systematic unity of nature in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. On the present account, these principles are neither mere methodological recommendations for conducting scientific inquiry nor do they have the normative force of categorical imperatives, two extant interpretations of Kant's discussion of reason in the Appendix. Instead, they are regulative yet transcendental principles restricted to theoretical cognition. The principles of the systematic unity of (...)
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  7. Reason in Kant's Theory of Cognition.Nabeel Hamid - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper reconstructs and defends Kant's argument for the transcendental status of reason's principles of the systematic unity of nature in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. On the present account, these principles are neither mere methodological recommendations for conducting scientific inquiry nor do they have the normative force of categorical imperatives, two extant interpretations of Kant's discussion of reason in the Appendix. Instead, they are regulative yet transcendental principles restricted to theoretical cognition. The principles of the systematic unity of (...)
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  8. Nietzsche versus Kant on the possibility of rational self-critique.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Edgar J. Valdez (ed.), Rethinking Kant: Volume VII.
    I consider an epistemological, methodological dispute between Nietzsche and Kant about the possibility of rational self-critique: an activity where the intellect reflects on its cognitive powers, demarcates the proper use and limitations of these powers, and thereby achieves a systematically complete insight into what we can and cannot know. Kant affirms whereas Nietzsche denies that we can successfully conduct such a self-directed rational enquiry. By reconstructing the central argumentative moves that Nietzsche and Kant do or could make to defend their (...)
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  9. Kant on Cognition and Knowledge.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Kant.
    I discuss the difference and the connections between Kant’s notions of cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen). Unlike knowledge, cognition is a representational state which need not have the propositional structure of a judgments. Even cognitions that have such a structure need not coincide with knowledge, because they might rather have the doxastic status of opinion or faith, or they might be false (whereas knowledge is a certain recognition of truth). I argue that while Kant distinguishes between many different species of (...)
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  10. Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In "Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency", I aim to give a comprehensive interpretation and a qualified defense of Kant’s doctrine of freedom as a systematic conception of rational agency. -/- Although my book follows Kant in focusing on the idea of free will as a condition of moral agency, it denies that moral freedom of will is the only relevant (transcendental) type of freedom. Human beings also exercise absolute freedom of thought (intellectual autonomy) in their theoretical cognition. Moreover, our (...)
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  11. Kant on Method.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this article I offer an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. I begin with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry – focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). Then I explore the implications of this picture for philosophy — emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical (...)
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  12. Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    Famously, in the second Critique, Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds for the attribution of freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while Kant insists that we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational for us to assert that we are noumenally free from a practical one. This much is uncontroversial. What is controversial is the cognitive relation (...)
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  13. Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    This essay develops an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the faculty of reason as the capacity for what he calls "comprehension" (Begreifen). In doing so, it first discusses Kant's characterizations of reason in relation to what he describes as the two highest grades of cognition—insight and comprehension. Then it discusses how the resulting conception of reason relates to more familiar characterizations as the faculty for inference and the faculty of principles. In doing so, it focuses on how the idea of (...)
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  14. The Unity of Cognition and the Subjectivist vs. “Transformative” Approaches to the B-Deduction, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79).Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception. New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    In the context of a critique of James Conant’s (2016) important new reading of the main argument of the Deduction, I present my current, most detailed interpretation of the well-known Leitfaden passage at A79, which in my view has been misinterpreted by a host of prominent readers. The Leitfaden passage is crucial to understanding the argument of, not just the so-called Metaphysical Deduction, but also the Transcendental Deduction. This new account expands and improves upon the account of the Leitfaden I (...)
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  15. Kant and Kripke: Rethinking Necessity and the A Priori.Andrew Stephenson - forthcoming - In James Conant & Jonas Held (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Analytic Philosophy. London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
    This essay reassesses the relation between Kant and Kripke on the relation between necessity and the a priori. Kripke famously argues against what he takes to be the traditional view that a statement is necessary only if it is a priori, where, very roughly, what it means for a statement to be necessary is that it is true and could not have been false and what it means for a statement to be a priori is that it is knowable independently (...)
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  16. Kant and the Sources of Metaphysics: the Dialectic of Pure Reason, by Marcus Willaschek. [REVIEW]Andrew Stephenson - forthcoming - Dialectica.
  17. The Analytic of Concepts.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - forthcoming - In Sorin Baiasu & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Kantian Mind. London, UK:
    The aim of the Analytic of Concepts is to derive and deduce a set of pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, which play a central role in Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and judgment. This chapter is structured around two questions. First, what is a pure concept of the understanding? Second, what is involved in a deduction of a pure concept of the understanding? In answering the first, we focus on how the categories differ (...)
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  18. Knowledge, Anxiety, Hope: How Kant’s First and Third Questions Relate (Keynote address).Andrew Chignell - 2021 - In Beatrix Himmelmann & Camilla Serck-Hanssen (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th annual International Kant Congress. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 127-149.
  19. Kantian Fallibilism: Knowledge, Certainty, Doubt.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:99-128.
    For Kant, knowledge involves certainty. If “certainty” requires that the grounds for a given propositional attitude guarantee its truth, then this is an infallibilist view of epistemic justification. Such a view says you can’t have epistemic justification for an attitude unless the attitude is also true. Here I want to defend an alternative fallibilist interpretation. Even if a subject has grounds that would be sufficient for knowledge if the proposition were true, the proposition might not be true. And so there (...)
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  20. A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism.Markus Kohl - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):827-845.
  21. Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
    In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, (...)
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  22. A system of rational faculties: Additive or transformative?Karl Schafer - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):918-936.
    In this essay, I focus on two questions. First, what is Kant's understanding of the sense in which our faculties form a unified system? And, second, what are the implications of this for the metaphysical relationships between the faculties within this system? To consider these questions, I begin with a brief discussion of Longuenesse's groundbreaking work on the teleological unity of the understanding as the faculty for judgment. In doing so, I argue for a generalization of Longuenesse's account along two (...)
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  23. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 641-650.
    talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  24. A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
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  25. Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of Hermann Cohen’s Antipsychologism.Scott Edgar - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):254-273.
    Some commentators on Hermann Cohen have remarked on what they take to be a puzzle about the origins of his mature anti-psychologism. When Cohen was young, he studied a kind of psychology, the Völkerpsychologie of Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, and wrote apparently psycholgistic accounts of knowledge almost up until the moment he first articulated his anti-psychologistic neo-Kantianism. To be sure, Cohen's mature anti psycholgism does constitute a rejection of certain central commitments of Völkerpsychologie. However, the relation between Völkerpsychologie and (...)
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  26. Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer.Markus Kohl - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):395-412.
    I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argue that in the B-edition Kant does not revoke his claim (...)
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  27. Kant’s Better-than-Terrible Argument in the Anticipations of Perception.David Landy - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):77-101.
    Scholars working on Kant’s Anticipations of Perception generally attribute to him an argument that invalidly infers that objects have degrees of intensive magnitude from the premise that sensations do. I argue that this rests on an incorrect disambiguation of Kant’s use of Empfindung as referring to the mental states that are our sensings, rather than the objects that are thereby sensed. Kant’s real argument runs as follows. The difference between a representation of an empty region of space and/or time and (...)
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  28. Does Post-Newtonian Physics Suggest a Post-Kantian View of Human Experience?Paavo Pylkkänen - 2020 - Pari Perspectives 6 (December 2020):122-128.
    Immanuel Kant famously thought that the presuppositions of Newtonian physics are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in general – both “outer” and “inner” experience. Today we know, of course, that Newtonian physics only applies to a limited domain of physical reality and is radically inadequate in the quantum and relativistic domains. This gives rise to an interesting question: could the radical changes in physics suggest new conditions for the possibility of experience? In other words, does post-Newtonian physics (...)
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  29. Over een extreem fenomenalistische lezing van Kant. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2020 - Critique:xx.
    In this critical notice, I argue that Emanuel Rutten's reading of Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds rests on an extremely phenomenalist reading of Kant's idealism. Rutten makes the ontological claim that Kant's phenomena are reducible to our sensations, and do not exist as objects outside our representations. As a result, his criticism of Kant's restriction thesis that we only know appearances is uncharitably narrow; Rutten argues that, according to Kant, our ignorance of the supersensible applies, not just (...)
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  30. Finite minds and their representations in Leibniz and Kant.Anja Jauernig - 2019 - Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism 14:47-80.
    This essay examines some of the ways in which the assumption of the essential finitude of the human mind, in contrast to the infinitude of God’s mind, bears on Leibniz’s and Kant’s accounts of our representational capacities. This examination reveals several underappreciated similarities between their views, but also some notable differences that help us pinpoint where and in what ways Kant departs from his celebrated predecessor. The fruits of this examination are a better understanding of Kant’s conception of the discursivity (...)
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  31. Leaving the Enchanted World Behind: Kant on the Order of Nature, Empirical Space and the Possibility of Miracles.Pavel Reichl - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):103-125.
    Despite relative neglect in the literature, Kant’s published and unpublished writings in theoretical philosophy reveal a sustained and at times ambivalent effort to come to terms with the problem of miracles. Because they entail a form of supernatural causation that undermines the law-governedness of the order of nature, miracles pose a significant problem for Kant’s metaphysics. I explore in detail Kant’s account of miracles in conjunction with the relevant aspects of his metaphysics of nature in order to establish in what (...)
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  32. Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. -/- Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive (...)
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  33. On Categorial Illusion in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Critique:xx-xx.
  34. Kant’s Neglected Alternative and the Unavoidable Need for the Transcendental Deduction.Justin B. Shaddock - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):127-152.
    The problem of Kant’s Neglected Alternative is that while his Aesthetic provides an argument that space and time are empirically real – in applying to all appearances – its argument seems to fall short of the conclusion that space and time are transcendentally ideal, in not applying to any things in themselves. By considering an overlooked passage in which Kant explains why his Transcendental Deduction is ‘unavoidably necessary’, I argue that it is not solely in his Aesthetic but more so (...)
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  35. The Ambitious Idea of Kant’s Corollary.Susan V. H. Castro - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur Und Freiheit. Akten des Xii. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. De Gruyter. pp. 1779-1786.
    Misrepresentations can be innocuous or even useful, but Kant’s corollary to the formula of universal law appears to involve a pernicious one: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature”. Humans obviously cannot make their maxims into laws of nature, and it seems preposterous to claim that we are morally required to pretend that we can. Given that Kant was careful to eradicate pernicious misrepresentations from theoretical metaphysics, the imperative (...)
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  36. Kant on Beauty and Cognition: The Aesthetic Dimension of Cognition.Alix Cohen - 2018 - In Otávio Bueno, George Darby, Steven French & Dean Rickles (eds.), Thinking about Science and Reflecting on Art: Bringing Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Science Together. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 140-154.
    Kant often seems to suggest that a cognition – whether an everyday cognition or a scientific cognition – cannot be beautiful. In the Critique of Judgment and the Lectures on Logic, he writes: ‘a science which, as such, is supposed to be beautiful, is absurd.’ (CJ 184 (5:305)) ‘The expression "beautiful cognition" is not fitting at all’ (LL 446 (24:708)). These claims are usually understood rather straightforwardly. On the one hand, cognition cannot be beautiful since on Kant’s account, it is (...)
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  37. Report of the ‘Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philo­sophy 2’ Inter­national Seminar (Moscow, 27—29 April 2017).Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (1):88-93.
    This is a report of the international workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy 2: Kant’s Appearance, Its Ontological and Epistemic Status» (April 27—29, 2017, Moscow), the tasks of which was (1) to discuss the specificity of transcendental idealism, (2) to study the nature of one of Kant’s important concepts — that of appearance — within the framework of the essential conceptual triad of transcendentalism: thing in itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung), (3) to analyse the distinction (...)
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  38. Never Mind the Intuitive Intellect: Applying Kant’s Categories to Noumena.Colin Marshall - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (1):27-40.
    According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant believes there are noumenal substances and causes. Proponents of these readings have shown that these readings can be reconciled with Kant’s claims about the limitations of human cognition. An important new challenge to such readings, however, has been proposed by Markus Kohl, focusing on Kant’s occasional statements about the divine or intuitive intellect. According to Kohl, how an intuitive intellect represents is a decisive measure for how noumena are for Kant, but an (...)
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  39. Die Spontaneität des Verstandes.Mario Schärli - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin / Boston: pp. 1385–1394.
  40. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
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  41. Zelfbewustzijn, objectiviteit en idealisme--over Kant's radicale subjectivisme.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):313-322.
    This is a précis of my book Kant's Radical Subjectivism, to be published as part of a symposium dedicated to the book, with critics Hein van den Berg, Karin de Boer, Henny Blomme en Joris Spigt, including a reply by me. The symposium is in Dutch, but the pre-print uploaded here is in English!
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  42. 3. The Quid Juris.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - In Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. De Gruyter. pp. 28-62.
    What is the Quid Juris in Kant's Deduction? Chapter 3 from my book on the Deduction (Kant's Deduction From Apperception) provides an answer to that question, and also contains an extensive discussion of the relevant literature on this topic (Henrich, Proops, Seeberg & Longuenesse).
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  43. Erkenntnis in Kant’s Logical Works.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 1413–1420.
    In this paper, I shed light on Kant’s notion of Erkenntnis or cognition by focusing on texts pertaining to Kant’s thoughts on logic. Although a passage from Kant’s Logik is widely referred to for understanding Kant’s conception of Erkenntnis, this work was not penned by Kant himself but rather compiled by Benjamin Jäsche. So, it is imperative to determine its fidelity to Kant’s thought. I compare the passage with other sources, including Reflexionen and students’ lecture notes. I argue that several (...)
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  44. Juicios subjetivos y juicios sobre sujetos. Una distinción a propósito de los juicios de percepción.Stéfano Straulino - 2018 - In Gustavo Leyva, Álvaro Peláez & Pedro Stepanenko (eds.), Los rostros de la razón: Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica. I. Filosofía Teórica. Ciudad de México, CDMX, México: pp. 72-86.
    Subjective judgments and judgments about subjects. A distinction regarding judgments of perception [English] It is well known the number of problems that arise from the distinction between "judgments of perception" and "judgments of experience" delivered in the Prolegomena. This article focuses on the impossibility of assigning truth value to judgments of perception since it seems counterintuitive to indicate that judgments such as "I am cold" or "sugar tastes sweet" cannot be true. To solve this difficulty, it is proposed here to (...)
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  45. El papel de la noción de verdad en el planteamiento de la filosofía crítica de Kant.Stefano Straulino - 2018 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 56:49-74.
    The Role of the Notion of Truth in the Project of Kant’s Critical Philosophy [English] The discussion about Kant’s theory of truth usually revolves around his ascription to some version of the coherence or correspondence theory of truth, and the matching criteria of truth. These discussions often deliberate which theory of truth is most appropriate given the critical principles. Instead, this paper aims to exhibit, through the evolution of Kant’s notion of truth in his precritical years and through the project (...)
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  46. Kants Coherentisme en Conceptualisme: Commentaar op Schultings Kant's Radical Subjectivism.Hein Van Den Berg - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 2 (80):355-361.
    In this paper I provide some critical comments on Schulting’s Kant’s Radical Subjectivism (2017). I will focus on two aspects of Schulting’s reading of Kant: his reading of Kant as a coherentist and his reading of Kant as a conceptualist. I will argue that it is not clear whether Kant accepts a form of coherentism and I will discuss reflections of Kant on animals that may be difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant.
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  47. Hegel on Kant's Analytic–Synthetic Distinction.Andrew Werner - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):502-524.
    In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction—that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that (...)
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  48. Kant, Neo‐Kantians, and Transcendental Subjectivity.Charlotte Baumann - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):595-616.
    This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment. The second part explicates transcendental (...)
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  49. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized through inner (...)
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  50. Kant on Cognition, Givenness, and Ignorance.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):131-142.
    Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek provide a valuable service to people working on Kant’s epistemology and philosophy of mind by laying out a synoptic picture of Kant’s view of theoretical cognition. Their picture incorporates admirably clear accounts of the familiar building blocks of cognition—sensation, intuition, concept, and judgment—as well as some innovative interpretive theses of their own. Watkins and Willaschek’s basic claim is that, for Kant, theoretical cognition is “a mental state [or “representation”] that determines a given object by attributing (...)
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