Husserl: Philosophy of Science

The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, (...) normativity, etc. As a result, the new area of interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy arises: neurophilosophy. This emerging area applies neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions, limiting their responses to neuroscientific revelations about nervous systems. Neurophilosophy research focuses on problems related to the indirect nature of mind and brain, computational or representative analysis of brain process, relationships between psychological and neuroscientific research, adequate adaptations of physical and philosophical concepts in neuroscience and the place of cognitive functions. Now, the temporal representation of conscious experience and the types of the neural architecture to represent objects in time have aroused scientific interest. Under these interests, we focus on the studies on the temporary triadic structure of phenomenological consciousness in Dan Lloyd and Rick Grush. From Grush’s studies, the importance of Kantian ideas for cognitive neuroscience emerges, due to the active way in which Kant conceived space and time as forms of intuition, within which the mind interprets its experience. Under this perspective, the theoretical arguments of Dennett-Kinsbourne and Eagleman-Sejnowski represent winks in the direction of Kant-Husserl within the neuroscientific goal while considering that the contents provided by the mind included space, objects and perception of causal relationships. Then, theories of cognitive neuroscience are beginning to suggest that these elements are also, as Kant argued, interpretative elaborations provided by mind / brain, and not only content received from outside. In other words, current cognitive neuroscientific theories try to pass from its Humean phase to a Kantian phase. So, the challenge has been to explain that these elements are provided by the mind and the world itself, and how they have the content they have come from. These are lacking in current studies. Filling this gap helps to involve the analysis of the scientist’s experience in his theoretical attitude. In this sense, an investigation under the Kantian-Husserlian approach that involves pure intuitions a priori with the experience of the scientific and neuroscientific concepts represents a ground-breaking. At present, a neurophilosophical study about this does not exist. In this sense, one feasible proposal for research would be based on the application of neuroscientific results of Moser-Britt to philosophical problems of foundational notions in relativistic physics: space, time, space-time, field, etc., under the Kantian-Husserlian approach, which allows to demonstrate the multidisciplinary link between neurophilosophy and physics. This represents a ground-breaking area in current interests in scientific research, with a positive impact in the field of neuroscience, and contributing to the study of abstraction emphasizing the importance of Kant’s Copernican turn and Husserl’s phenomenological ideas in the construction of physical theories. -/- . (shrink)

Abstract: Brentano’s conception of scientific philosophy had a strong influence on his students and on the intellectual atmosphere of Vienna in the late nineteenth century. The aim of this article is to expose Brentano’s conception and to contrast his views with that of two traditions he is said to have considerably influenced: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I will shed light on the question of how and to what extent Brentano’s conception of philosophy as a rigorous science has had an impact (...) on these two traditions. The discussion will show that both took their liberties in the interpretation of the thesis, a move that allowed them to liberate themselves from Brentano’s inheritance and to fully develop their own philosophical positions. (shrink)

Le programme d’une fondation des sciences fit l’objet d’un intérêt constant de la part de Husserl, et a accompagné sa phénoménologie dans toutes les phases de son développement. Si les Prolégomènes à la logique pure confient la justification de la possibilité d’une théorie en général à l’idée d’une logique pure conçue comme « théorie pure des multiplicités », c’est au déploiement d’une ontologie matériale que revient la tâche de délimiter les domaines d’objets qui sont ceux des sciences positives effectives et (...) possibles, de même que les concepts fondamentaux en lesquels ils s’explicitent, ainsi que les principes de leur articulation. Dans la mesure où ces domaines thématiques d’objets sont conçus par Husserl comme autant de régions ontologiques, c’est en accueillant la tâche d’une ontologie régionale que la phénoménologie husserlienne, par-delà son « tournant transcendantal », a cherché à se donner les moyens de fonder non pas seulement la scientificité de ces sciences, mais aussi et surtout les grands partages qui font la diversité de leurs orientations thématiques et méthodologiques, jusqu’à fonder éventuellement chacune de ces sciences en sa singularité. Le but du colloque dont sont tirés les contributions écrites qui vont suivre – colloque qui coïncidait avec les quatre-vingts ans de la disparition de Husserl –, était d’examiner les tenants et les aboutissants de ce programme d’une fondation phénoménologique et régionale des sciences, en se demandant dans quelle mesure il confère effectivement aux sciences qu’il a prétendu fonder une plus grande intelligibilité, mais aussi en interrogeant ses limites et les apories auxquelles il se heurte, en tenant compte notamment du développement des sciences depuis l’époque de Husserl. On peut évidemment, au terme de ce parcours, douter que la phénoménologie transcendantale ait pour vocation véritable de conférer aux diverses sciences positives une authentique fondation, qui tirerait leurs concepts fondamentaux de l’intuition des essences et réglerait leurs procédés méthodiques sur le mode de donation des objets du domaine concerné ; peut-être qu’à ce projet fondationnel qui fait de la phénoménologie transcendantale la science fondatrice et omni-englobante, il faut en définitive substituer le but plus humble de comprendre ou d’élucider les sciences dans leurs effectuations réelles, c’est-à-dire celui d’une simple herméneutique des rationalités régionales. Peut-être aussi, à l’idée d’une fondation anhistorique de toute science par l’élucidation de l’a priori matérial et des concepts fondamentaux qui correspondent à son domaine d’objets respectif, faut-il substituer la tâche de thématiser la science située à un certain moment de l’histoire, dans l’effectivité historique relative de ses méthodes et de ses résultats ; le projet de fondation eidétique des sciences devrait alors laisser place à une investigation des transformations historiques essentielles de la rationalité, c’est-à-dire à une épistémologie historique – dans cette perspective, la confrontation de Husserl avec l’épistémologie historique française, ainsi qu’avec la théorie de la connaissance néokantienne, présente un intérêt majeur. Dans leur ensemble et à travers la variété de leurs approches, ces études espèrent ainsi contribuer à une détermination critique des ressources épistémologiques de la phénoménologie, y compris dans la perspective de débats contemporains. Pour ce faire, l’ouvrage qui suit se propose de suivre les grandes divisions que la classification husserlienne des sciences n’aura cessé tout à la fois d’exploiter et de problématiser : on envisagera ainsi successivement la fondation husserlienne des sciences analytico-formelles (logique, mathématique), puis celle des sciences « à teneur réale », en respectant ici l’ordre de fondation unilatérale des couches de la réalité (géométrie, physique, biologie, psychologie et sciences de l’esprit). (shrink)

Franziska Dübgen and Stefan Skupien have written a much needed overview of Paulin Hountondji’s work. While Hountondji is quite well known for his critique of ethnophilosophy, his later intellectual work on scientific dependency and his political writings are not as well known to non-specialist Anglophone readers. This partially stems from the fact that while his later work on scientific dependency has been translated into English, it has been published in the form of short articles or through transcribed interviews, which makes (...) it difficult for a reader to situate it in relation to Hountondji’s work on ethnophilosophy. Moreover, the Anglophone reception of Hountondji’s explicit political writings has been hindered by the fact that many of them have not been translated into English, e.g. his 1973 book Libertés: Contribution à la Révolution Dahoméenne, which was written as a prescription of what needs to be done by the military regime in order to end neo-colonial dependency in Benin in the aftermath of the military coup led by Mathieu Kérékou in 1972, has still not been translated into English. Dübgen and Skupien have written a book that will contribute to remedying this neglect by contextualizing Hountondji’s work on scientific dependency and his political writings in relation to his better known writings on ethnophilosophy. (shrink)

In this study I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is compatible with a realistic interpretation of scientific theories. That said, I distinguish between the realistic interpretation of scientific theories and scientific realism. The former holds that the theoretical terms of a scientific theory are intended to refer, and that if we have good reason to believe that a scientific theory is true then we also have good reason to believe the entities it refers to exist. Scientific realism holds that the world (...) as described by the physical sciences not only exists, it is the only world that exists—the world of everyday perceptual experience must be demoted to the status of a mere appearance. My case for the compatibility of Husserl’s phenomenology with a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is based on a distinction between scientific laws and scientific theories. I hold that Husserl’s instrumentalism, if one can call it that, is restricted to an interpretation of scientific laws; accordingly, his anti-realism is directed against the reification of ideal objects constructed in the course of the exact mathematical representation of scientific laws, not against the theoretical entities postulated in the explanation of those laws. At the end of the study I seek to allay the fear that if one adopts a realistic interpretation of scientific theories one is thereby committed to some version of scientific realism. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather (...) a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: a generalization of epoché; involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; discussing an arithmetical model of reality. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed again in a new way A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology. (shrink)

Starting with the claim that Quantum Mechanics is in need of a new interpretation that would allow us to understand the phenomena of this realm, I wish to analyse in this paper de Ronde's theory of power and potentia from a phenomenological perspective. De Ronde's claim is that the reason for the lack of success in the foundations of QM is due to the reluctance of both physicists and philosophers to explore the possibility of finding a new ontology, new concepts (...) for the physical theory. De Ronde proposes such new ontology and the question I wish to address here, is whether his ontology is conceptually plausible. I will, for this purpose, recur to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. After presenting some of the basic concepts and methodological tools of this theory, I shall apply them to de Ronde's ontology to determine the viability of his theory. (shrink)

This dissertation engages critically with the metaphysical implications of the respective transcendentalisms of Husserl, Deleuze, and Kant in an attempt to disclose their largely untapped resources for a renewed consideration of the ability of science to grasp reality as it is in-itself. Chapter 1 examines the metaphysical implications of Husserl’s critique of natural scientific objectivity in his later transcendental philosophy in connection to his early formulations of phenomenological objectivity around the axis of the distinction between metaphysics as the science of (...) real Being and formal ontology as the science of Being in the most universal sense. I argue that Husserl’s phenomenological metaphysics constitutes a framework in which the ideal Being of the transcendental dimension of experience operates as the condition for the possibility of natural scientific objectivity. Chapter 2 scrutinizes Deleuze’s characterization of intensity as a transcendental concept rather than a scientific one against the background of his metaphysics of difference and his critique of the shortcomings of Kant’s transcendental idealism for addressing the transcendental conditions for the genesis of real experience. Through a reading of Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference and intensity in connection to his confinement of the creative productivity of scientific thought to a plane of reference, I argue that the creativity apropos to the scientific engagement with material reality necessitates that such creativity is conditioned by the same transcendental considerations operative in a metaphysics of difference at a broad scale. Against the backdrop of Husserl’s and Deleuze’s respective criticisms of the inadequacy of Kant’s transcendental idealism for articulating the material component of experience, Chapter 3 studies Kant’s later iv conception of ether as the simultaneously empirical and transcendental condition for the possibility and unity of experience. Through an examination of Kant’s renewed understanding of materiality as the necessary and sufficient condition for scientific objectivity in connection with the problematic objectivity of the transcendental ideas created by pure reason in Kant’s Critical philosophy, I suggest that Kant’s later articulation of materiality on transcendental grounds simultaneously addresses the objectivity and the creativity pertinent to the encounter of scientific Thought with material/physical reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe crisis of European sciences in Husserl’s late work diagnoses Galilean science as specifically and necessarily losing touch with the intuitive evidence that would legitimate it due to its reliance on a formal-mathematical conceptual apparatus. While the vast majority of Husserl’s late work was focussed on a critique of the formal-mathematical paradigm of the physical science of nature, at several points the possibility of biology as the exemplary science is raised to suggest that the lack of a reliance on formal-mathematical (...) conceptual language would mean that a systemic crisis would not occur in such a case. This investigation considers the grounds for the expectation that biology would not engender a crisis, suggests that a paradigmatic role for ecology would more adequately address this expectation, and finally claims that the question of the relation between a specific exemplary science and transcendental phenomenology is not fully resolved even in this case. (shrink)

Husserl beruft sich immer wieder programmatisch auf Platon als den Gründervater der europäischen Philosophie, arbeitet jedoch die Bezüge der Phänomenologie zum Platonismus nie auf - obwohl er die "historische Rückbesinnung" auf die Urstiftung seines Denkens als wesentlichen Bestandteil der "Selbstbesinnung auf ein Selbstverständnis dessen hin, worauf man eigentlich hinaus will, als der man ist, als historisches Wesen" charakterisiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit will diese Reflexion leisten. Ihr Gegenstand ist mithin die Transformation Platonischer Gedanken in Husserls Phänomenologie. Dabei werden sechs Problemgebiete thematisiert: (...) A) Philosophie als Wissenschaft, B) Philosophie als Ethik, C) Philosophie als Polemik, D) Philosophie und das Ende der Lebenswelt, E) Philosophie und das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen, F) Philosophie und das Absolute. Den Abschnitten folgen jeweils kritische Erwägungen zu den Spannungen, die vor dem Platonischen Hintergrund innerhalb der Phänomenologie sichtbar werden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Phänomenologie tatsächlich als eine eigenwillige Endstiftung des Platonismus betrachtet werden kann, wodurch sich eine neue Perspektive auf ihre programmatische und systematische Grundkonfiguration ergibt. (shrink)

Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl’s basic epistemological principles, such as the (...) “principle of all principles,” seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities. (shrink)

Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl’s late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl’s portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science. Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a historiographical shortcoming. On Ihde’s view, it is only (...) on the basis of a distorted picture of Galileo that Husserl can “create“ the division between Lifeworld and the “world of science“, a division that is indeed fundamental for Husserl’s overall position. Hence, if successful, Ihde’s argument effectively undermines Husserl’s late philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that Ihde’s criticism does not stand up to closer historical or philosophical scrutiny. (shrink)

The distinction between activity and passivity has a deep and fundamental role in scientific and philosophical conceptual frameworks, going back to ancient Greek thinking about society and nature. I briefly indicate the importance of the activity-passivity distinction in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, in relation to Husserl. I then advance a transcendental phenomenological argument that the distinction is, however, not as simple or obvious as it might appear, specifically that it cannot be wholly and determinately defined via a purely abstract, conceptual-discursive (...) procedure, since specifying which of two interacting terms is the active one entails (I argue) an implicit reference to pre scientific, affective experience. But, as I argue, specifying this distinction is nonetheless conceptually fundamental for scientific thinking about nature, especially in biology, despite scientific efforts to abstract from it. Together these arguments amplify, within science itself, Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s point that life, as intrinsically involving affect, is a transcendental condition of science. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że Husserlowska diagnoza kryzysu, szczególnie kryzysu nauki wiąże się z konsekwencjami prowadzącymi do kryzysu europejskiego człowieczeństwa. Kryzys człowieczeństwa jest stałym motywem Husserlowskiej filozofii i polega zapoznaniu kwintesencji podmiotowości, jaką jest jej transcendentalny charakter. W związku z ideą kryzysu człowieczeństwa Husserl ukazuje, że nauki trwają w zaślepieniu, skutkującym utratą ich odniesieniu do życia, co powoduje ogólny kryzys. Możliwość przezwyciężenia kryzysu oznacza zwalczenie przesądów oraz wymaga przeprowadzenia autentycznej analizy świadomości jako zadania, któremu ma sprostać fenomenologiczna filozofia. Problem kryzysu (...) człowieczeństwa zostanie rozpatrzony w niniejszym artykule w postaci dwóch wątków: pierwszy dotyczy trudności związanych z ujęciem korelacji między podmiotowością i światem; drugi poświęcony jest koncepcji Lebenswelt która wiąże się z możliwością przezwyciężenia naturalistycznego sposobu myślenia. (shrink)

Some aspects of professional activity of the scientist presented in ethical works of E. Husserl are considered in this article. Responsibility to reason and consequences of scientific activity before civilization come to light as the ethical center of the phenomenological doctrine of Husserl. The author demonstrates that the aspect of formal following to the chosen norms and values, especially within his professional activity is very important for Husserl. The German phenomenologist selects various laws such as absorption and summaring defining standards (...) and valuable behavior of the person in his professional activities and going beyond their limits. He speaks about professional life in high sense of the word as the value giving calling and “pure” satisfaction to the person. Husserl emphasizes that it is already impossible to tear off theoretical life from practical, to split concrete life of the theorist on two parallel vital activity and professional activity of the scientist is filled with a true meaning in the self-realization as we are based on phenomenological position. (shrink)

Phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the kind of scientific naturalism or that takes empirical science to be epistemologically and metaphysically privileged over all other forms of enquiry. In this paper, I will consider one of their principal complaints against naturalism, that scientific accounts of things are oblivious to a that is presupposed by the intelligibility of science. Focusing mostly upon Husserl's work, I attempt to clarify the nature of this complaint and state it in the form of (...) an argument. I conclude that the argument is effective in exposing naturalism's reliance upon impoverished conceptions of human experience, and that it also weakens the more general case for naturalism. (shrink)

The paper presents Husserl’s conception of the relation between science and the living world, i.e. the world of everyday experience and communication. In Husserl view, science, or, more precisely, its basic aprioric structure is founded on the primal, essential core of the living world from which it obtains its sense. Science modifies, idealizes, and mathematizes the primal aprioric Lebenswelt. Due to those operations scientific theories can represent empirical reality.

In this article I intend to explore the conception of science as it emerges from the work of Husserl, Schutz, and Garfinkel. By concentrating specifically on the issue of science, I attempt to show that Garfinkel’s views on the relationship between science and the everyday world are much closer to Husserl’s stance than to the Schutzian perspective. To this end, I explore Husserl’s notion of science especially as it emerges in the Crisis of European Sciences, where he describes the failure (...) of European science and again preaches for a return to the “things themselves”. In this respect I interpret ethnomethodology’s most recent program as an answer to that call originating from a sociological domain. I then argue that the Husserlian turn within ethnomethodology marks the split between Garfinkel and Schutz. In fact I try to show that Schutz’s epistemological work is only partially inspired by phenomenology and that his conception of science retains a rationalist stance that ethnomethodology opposes. In the final section I briefly discuss Garfinkel’s most recent program as a way of closing the gap between theory and experience by linking the topics of science to the radical experiential phenomena. (shrink)

This paper argues that Weyl's view that scientific objectivity requires that concepts be freely created, i.e., introduced via Hilbert-style axiomatizations, led him to abandon the phenomenological view of objectivity.

This paper discusses Husserl’s views on physical theories in the first volume of his Logical Investigations , and compares them with those of his contemporaries Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré. Poincaré’s views serve as a bridge to a discussion of Husserl’s almost unknown views on physical geometry from about 1890 on, which in comparison even with Poincaré’s—not to say Frege’s—or almost any other philosopher of his time, represented a rupture with the philosophical tradition and were much more in tune with (...) the physical geometry underlying the Einstein-Hilbert general theory of relativity developed more than two decades later. (shrink)

Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's (...) epistemology as well as his more substantial comments regarding the natural sciences indeed result in a (sophisticated version of) scientific anti-realism which bears certain resemblances to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism; b) This scientific anti-realism can be defended against the two most common objections raised in the secondary literature; c) It is only by means of this sophisticated version of scientific anti-realism that phenomenology can circumvent the problem of ?scientific objectivism? (shrink)

Taking up the body turn in sociology, this paper discusses scientific practices as embodied action from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenological theory of the “Body”. Based on ethnographic data on a biology laboratory it will discuss the importance of the scientist’s Body for the performance of scientific activities. Successful researchers have to be skilled workers using their embodied knowledge for the process of tinkering towards the material transformation of their objects for data production. The researcher’s body then is an instrument (...) of measuring as well as a kind of archive of knowing. Their body becomes a disciplined instrument which has its own place and function inside the laboratory. Furthermore, the appresentational apperception of Bodies (Husserl) is being discussed as a basis for the emotional and ethical concerns towards laboratory-animals. Attitudes towards animals in the laboratory setting (as well as elsewhere) are highly emotional. Nevertheless, following the literature of the sociology of the body, those emotional reactions still follow certain cultural patterns which themselves can be understood as embodied ways of knowing “right” or “wrong”. Besides as an instrument, the scientist’s body can also be understood as a resource of emotional attachment towards animals. It is an instrument for performing transformation as well as one for caring. (shrink)

Husserl’s Crisis argues that early modern science, exemplified in Galileo, separates the Lifeworld from a world of science by forgetting its origins in bodily perception on the one side, and the practices which found the science on the other. This essay argues that, rather, by overemphasizing mathematization and underemphasizing instruments or technologies which mediate perception, Husserl creates the division he describes. Positively, through the embodied use of instruments science remains thoroughly immersed in the Lifeworld.

This article critically reviews an outstanding collection of new essays addressing Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences. In Science and the Life-World (Stanford, 2010), David Hyder and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger bring together an impressive range of first-rate philosophers and historians. The collection explicates key concepts in Husserl’s often obscure work, compares Husserl’s phenomenology of science to the parallel tradition of historical epistemology, and provocatively challenges Husserl’s views on science. The explications are uniformly clear and helpful, the comparative work intriguing, and the (...) criticisms interesting but uneven. The article also elaborates on Husserl’s phenomenological method as it relates to the historiography of science, and compares his views on mathematical idealisation to more recent work in the analytical tradition. (shrink)

This chapter briefly summarises work by four key figures in the phenomenological philosophy of science: Edmund Husserl; Martin Heidegger; Patrick Heelan; and Joseph J. Kockelmans. In addition, some comparison is made with well-known figures in mainstream philosophy of science, and suggestions are given for further readings in the phenomenological philosophy of science.

The concept of well-defined and mutually exclusive objective facts has no counterpart in the formalism of standard quantum mechanics. Bypassing decoherence theories, we then inquire into the conditions of use of this concept of objective fact, and find that it is grounded on the possibility of making reference to spatio-temporal continuants and permanent properties. Since these conditions are not fulfilled within the quantum paradigm, one must look for appropriate substitutes. Two such substitutes are discussed. The first one is phenomenal fact (...) , whose relevance to quantum physics is evaluated in the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology. The second substitute is intersubjective agreement, which can be disconnected from objectivity stricto sensu, as quantum mechanics seems to require. A study of intersubjectivity in terms of the pragmatics of language is undertaken. This study is applied to both Everett’s symbolism of memory brackets and Bohr’s transcendental remark that description of scientific experiments cannot dispense with ordinary language. (shrink)

Dans son étude intitulée « Aspects du vitalisme », Georges Cangui­lhem se plaît à rappeler les dangers de l?indistinction des frontières entre le savoir biologique et la spéculation philosophique, soit que la philosophie reprenne à son compte une partie du savoir biologique positif ou de la conceptualité biologique, soit que la biologie prétende s?élever, à partir de son savoir et de ses concepts, à des considérations d?ordre philosophique 1 . Canguilhem écrit ainsi, tout d?abord à propos du philosophe : Il (...) est bien difficile au philosophe de s?exercer à la philosophie biologique sans risquer de compromettre les biologistes qu?il utilise ou qu?il cite. Une biologie utilisée par un philosophe, n?est-ce pas déjà une biologie philoso­phique, donc fantaisiste ? Et, plus loin, à propos du biologiste : Le biologiste vitaliste devenu philosophe de la biologie croit apporter à la philosophie des capitaux et ne lui apporte en réalité que des rentes qui ne cessent de baisser à la bourse des valeurs scientifiques, du fait seul que se poursuit la recherche à laquelle il ne participe plus. [?] Il y a là une espèce d?abus de confiance sans préméditation 2 . Dans les deux cas, donc, celui des deux savoirs qui prétend s?annexer ou s?élever à quelque chose de l?autre compromet ce dernier et perd lui-même de sa solidité épistémique. En même temps qu?elles visent des personnalités scientifiques tout à fait précises. (shrink)

This volume is a broad anthology addressing many if not most major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general: from foundational and methodological ...

In this paper I deal with the problem of how Husserl can coherently claim that life-world is both (1) the founding presupposition of science and (2) a whole that has science as its part. The approach suggested here is based on Husserl's ideas regarding multi-layered transcenden tal intentional constitution of correlative noemata. In our intentional correlations we experi ence objectities in their appropriate horizons of co-givenness. Both the objectifies and their horizons are multi-layered structures containing a core of primordial, perceptual, (...) pre-thematic givenness and a series of historically, thematically, and scientifically established noematic sedi ments. Nevertheless, we directly experience the at-each-time actual or active constitutive layer. In its constitution, however, the latter comprises also the underlying founding noematic layers that make what is directly given possible. "Life-world", then, means two things: (a) the totality of the actual and possible horizon- and object-givenness, and (b) the core of it, i.e., the pre thematic, simple perceptual, object- and horizon-givenness - with the latter only experience able via the currently prevalent level of the former. Sense (b) supports Husserl's claim (1); sense (a) supports his claim (2). (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Husserl’s development of the nineteenth century Natur/Geist distinction is grounded in the intentional correlate between the pre-theoretical natural attitude and environing world ( Umwelt ). By reconsidering the Natur/Geist distinction through its historical context in the nineteenth century debate between Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians from the Baden or Southwest school, it is possible to understand more clearly Husserl’s appropriations and novel contributions. One of Husserl’s contributions lies in his rigorous thematization and clarification of (...) the constitutive features proper to the natural and human sciences as they arise from the pre-theoretical experience of an environing world. This ordinary lived experience between the lived body and environing world is presupposed by and forms a unity with both Natur and Geist , thereby acting as the unified ground that is inclusive of naturalized Geist and a geistig nature. This unbuilding ( Abbau ) of the Natur/Geist distinction is necessary, according to Husserl, for the radical clarification of the respective methodologies of the natural and human sciences. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological defense of Ian Hacking's experimental realism about unobservable entities in physical science, employing historically undervalued resources from the phenomenological tradition in order to clarify the warrant for our ontological commitments in science. Building upon the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heelan, the paper provides a phenomenological correction of the positivistic conception of perceptual evidence maintained by antirealists such as van Fraassen, the experimental relevance of which is illustrated through a phenomenological interpretation of the 1974 discovery (...) of the J/ ψ particle generally regarded as evidence for the charmed quark. The argument then turns to address known problems in Hacking's account, demonstrating that his own instrumentalist criterion of the real is inadequately rooted in the phenomenology of perception, and as a result, passes over the true ontological significance of experimental phenomena. The paper maintains that the proper criterion, only indirectly related to instrumentality, is the distinctive style of the real encountered in perception: empirical pregnancy. With this notion and Merleau-Ponty's associated reversibility thesis, I show that the phenomenological tradition provides insights into the warrant for our realist commitments that have yet to be adequately acknowledged by philosophers of science. (shrink)

Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant (...) Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. (shrink)

Fundamental notions Husserl introduced in Ideen I, such as epochè, reality, and empty X as substrate, might be useful for elucidating how mathematical physics concepts are produced. However, this is obscured in the context of Husserl’s phenomenology itself. For this possibility, the author modifies Husserl’s fundamental notions introduced for pure phenomenology, which found all sciences on the absolute Ego. Subsequently, the author displaces Husserl's phenomenological notions toward the notions operating inside scientific activities themselves and shows this using a case study (...) of the construction of noncommutative geometry. The perspective in Ideen I about geometry and mathematical physics includes points that are inappropriate to modern geometry and to modern physics, especially to noncommutative geometry and to quantum physics. The first point relates to the intuitive character of geometrical objects in Husserl. The second is linked to the notion of locality related to the notion of extension, by which Husserl characterizes the essence of physical things. The points show that the notion of empty X as a substrate, developed in “Phenomenology of Reason” in Ideen I, is helpful for considering the notions of physical reality and of geometrical space, especially reality in quantum physics and space in noncommutative geometry. The salient conclusions include the proposition that aphilosophical study of the relationship between the physical object X, which imparts a unity to what is given to sensibility, and the geometrical space X, which imparts a unity of sense to various mathematical operations, opens a reinterpretation of Husserl’s interpretation, supporting an epistemology of mathematical physics. (shrink)

This essay argues that phenomenology is uniquely suited to critique naturalism without lapsing into a romantic, anti-scientific, or dystopian view of modern science. This argument situates Husserl’s retrieval of the environmental relation in the Vienna Lecture between two alternative tendencies in contemporary ecological phenomenology: 1) the rejection of or indifference to the positive sciences, and 2) the adoption of naturalism in phenomenological methodology. On the one hand, the claim is that the phenomenological return to the environment should not imply a (...) rejection of methodological naturalism. On the other hand, while an ecological phenomenology is consistent with naturalistic investigation, there is nevertheless a heterogeneity between the two. In short, phenomenology need not become naturalized in order for it to be ecological. (shrink)

This article establishes some important similarities between Husserl’sthoughts about the nature of science and the semantic view of scientific theories. This last conception affirms that empirical theories do not describe the world as it is, but that they idealize and represent it using structural models. In this sense and prima facie, the semantic conception coincides with Husserl’s point of view regarding the life-world and the world of science.

Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I (...) focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory. (shrink)

Plena are the characteristic properties of material thing, of the thing we perceive in our daily experience. According to Husserl, the attempt to explain their features into the language of Physics is the core of the modern science of nature. Colours and smells are not directly reducible to geometrical forms and algebraic functions. In order to explain natural processes using mathematical terms, scientists need to find out how it is possible to measure them. Galileo claims that the world is made (...) up of mathematical formulae, Husserl instead tries to understand the limits of the validity of this claim. In order to do this, the role of subjective experience must be taken into account. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Edmund Husserl's view on the relationship between formal inquiry and the life-world, using the example of formal geometry. I first outline Husserl's account of geometry and then argue that he believed that the applicability of formal geometry to intuitive space (the space of everyday-experience) guarantees the conceptual continuity between different notions of space.

Edmund Husserl’s Nachlass includes a text enclosed in an envelope on which is written: “Overthrow of the Copernican theory in usual interpretation of a world view. The original ark, earth, does not move.” This text was chosen to be one of the first posthumous publications of Husserl. The editor, however, chose to use a less controversial title: “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature.” The title nevertheless does not change the radicality of the text itself; it (...) boldly claims that the earth does not move. Husserl knew that with such a statement he risked becoming a laughing stock. For the Western scientific community the Copernican view of the earth’s movement is the symbol of the victory of science over common sense views and religion. (shrink)

Phenomenological philosophizing is practiced out of a sense of responsibility for contemporary culture, which is experienced as existing in a profoundcrisis. The first part of this contribution contains a systematization of the theory of crisis, a theory developed in many of Husserl's works: the description of the main phenomena of the consciousness of crisis, the explanation of crisis with regard to its causes, and the demands raised in order to overcome the crisis of scientific culture (»reflection«). Husserl's teachings on crisis (...) are placed into close relation with his idea of science and science's Greek origin, an origin from which, according to Husserl, modern science has tragically distanced itself. It is argued, however, that Husserl was not at all a philosopher of decline or decay. The second part of this contribution represents an attempt to provide a critical and complex answer to the question as to the modern relevance and usefulness of Husserl's theory of crisis. (shrink)

Goethe belongs to the phenomenological tradition for a number of reasons: He shared Husserl’s deep mistrust of the mathematization of the natural world and the ensuing loss of the qualitative dimension of human existence; he understood that the phenomenological observer must free him/herself from sedimented cultural prejudices, a process which Husserl called the epoche; he experienced and articulated the new and surprising fullness of the world as it reveals itself to the patient and participatory phenomenological observer. Goethe’s phenomenological sensibilities and (...) insights become more apparent when his work is brought into dialogue with Husserl’s thinking. In turn Goethe challenges Husserlian phenomenology to a more careful investigation of the natural world and human participation within its order. Both Goethe and Husserl are searching for a science of the qualitative dimension of being. (shrink)

My scientific field is theoretical physics. My philosophical orientation is phenomenology, especially hermeneutical phenomenology, as modified and extended under the influence of Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory. In fact, I was already deeply under the influence of Bernard Lonergan's workbefore I went to Louvain/Leuven to study phenomenology as a propaedeutic to my preparation in the philosophy of science. The specific topic of this paper is one close to the center of Philip's interest, namely, to articulate the right balance among theory, experiment, (...) and what Husserl called 'die Sache selbst' or the 'givenness' of scientific objects as experienced and understood. The method I shall adopt is that of Husserl's phenomenology of perception, as modified by Lonergan's method of 'self-appropriation.' I will be concerned then with the 'constitution' of experimental data in science - any science. (shrink)

Two of Husserl’s most important, though fragmentary texts from the final phase of his thought, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and “The Origin of Geometry as an Intentional-Historical Problem,” focus on the themes of history and the life-world. It is well known that prior to these works Husserl sought to establish transcendental phenomenology as both a factually and an historically pure eidetic science. Thus the interpreter of the whole of Husserl’s thought is faced with the question of (...) whether his later focus on history and the life-world represents a significant departure from his previous thought. In what follows, I shall defend the thesis that it does not. Specifically, I shall argue that the completion of Husserl’s project of realizing the goal of First Philosophy in transcendental phenomenology renders necessary the turn both to history and to the life-world. In connection with this, I shall argue further that the peculiar phenomenological character of this necessity demands that the ‘concepts’ of history and life-world operative in Husserl’s last texts are taken to be inseparably rooted in a more original phenomenon. Husserl conceives this more original phenomenon as the crisis situation of the exemplars of European humanity, the philosophers, who, as the “functionaries of mankind” are faced with the “breakdown” situation of our time, with the “breakdown” of science itself. (shrink)

: This paper discusses the origins of two key notions in Foucault's work up to and including The Archaeology of Knowledge. The first of these notions is the notion of "archaeology" itself, a form of historical investigation of knowledge that is distinguished from the mere history of ideas in part by its unearthing what Foucault calls "historical a prioris". Both notions, I argue, are derived from Husserlian phenomenology. But both are modified by Foucault in the light of Jean Cavaillès's critique (...) of Husserl's theory of science. On Husserl's view, we demand that propositions holding of scientific objects be intersubjective and invariant, but this demand conflicts with our immediate experience, which is essentially bound to a subject's perspective. Thus the mathematical and physical sciences must utilise formal languages to fix these truths independently of the thoughts of a particular subject. This necessary procedure leads to the sedimentation of these formal systems: we forget their source in the concrete experiences of individuals, and use them as purely technical means. The technique of reactivating the intentional acts in which sedimented formal systems originated is thus, in Fink's terminology, an archaeological method. Foucault and Cavaillès retain the general outlines of this archaeology of the sciences, but they reject its appeal to conscious acts of meaning, to what Cavaillès calls "the philosophy of consciousness". I conclude by discussing the implicit difficulties in the "linguistic transcendentalism" proposed as an alternative by these French critics of Husserl. (shrink)