In this paper I investigate Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. It turns out that any such theory requires a conceptualisation of the relation between the bodily subject and the objective reality that takes historicity seriously.

Figal has long been recognized as one of the most insightful interpreters working in the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics and its leading themes concerned with ancient Greek thought, art, language, and history. With this book, Figal presses this tradition of philosophical hermeneutics in new directions. In his effort to forge philosophical hermeneutics into a hermeneutical philosophy, Figal develops an original critique of the objectification of the world that emerges in modernity as the first stage in his systematic treatment of the (...) elements of experience hermeneutically understood. Breaking through the prejudices of modernity, but not sacrificing the importance and challenge of the objective world that confronts us and is in need of interpretation, Figal reorients how it is that philosophy should take up some of its most longstanding and stubborn questions. World, object, space, language, freedom, time, and life are refreshed as philosophical notions here since they are each regarded as elements of human life engaged in the task assigned to each of us—the task of understanding ourselves and our world. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...) analytic philosophy and this by pursuing two strategies of exposition. One involves comparing Husserl with Russell, and not, as has been the usual practice, with Frege. The other, which follows the first, foregrounds Husserl’s thinking vis-à-vis Russell’s from 1905 onward, a move that constitutes a break with what has become the standard approach of emphasising the relatedness of Husserl of the Logical Investigations (1900/1) to analytic philosophy. Moreover, this approach discloses two chief grounds of relatedness between the middle Husserl and the middle Russell. One is their shared interest in exploring philosophical “fundamentals”. The second consists of common elements shared by their epistemologies and philosophies of mind. (shrink)

Examines the role of experience within Adorno’s philosophy of language and epistemology.

In 1909 A. Koyré (1892–1964) came to Göttingen as an exile and there became a student of Edmund Husserl and other philosophers (A. Reinach, M. Scheler): already before leaving his country Russia Koyré read Husserl'sLogical Investigations, a text which interested greatly Russian philosophers and was translated into Russian in the same year. As many other contemporary philosophers, in Göttingen they were discussing on the fundaments of mathematic, Cantor's set theory and Russell's antinomies. On this problems Koyré wrote a long paper (...) inspired to Husserl'sLogical Investigations, read it in the Philosophical Society at Göttingen and submitted it as draft for his Ph.D. dissertation to Prof. Husserl, who refused it. So unhappily the celebrated methodologist and historian of science began his academical career: Koyré came back to write on logical and mathematical paradoxes in 1922 and in 1946–47 saying he was “going back to his first love”. Among other factors this deep interest in mathematic and exact sciences unabled Koyré to analyze Galileo and Newton in his masterly way. (shrink)

Since the end of the last century, there has been several ambitious attempts to naturalize Husserlian phenomenology by way of mathematization. To justify themselves in view of Husserl’s adamant antinaturalism, many of these attempts appeal to the new physico-mathematical tools that were unknown in Husserl’s time and thus allegedly make his position outdated. This paper critically addresses these mathematization proposals and aims to show that Husserl had, in fact, sufficiently good arguments that make his antinaturalistic position sound even today. The (...) starting point of the discussion presented in this paper is the mathematization project introduced by Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud, and Francisco Varela in their introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology. This proposal was followed by a number of critiques but also by several alternative naturalization attempts clearly inspired by Roy et al.’s ambitious project. The review of some of Husserl’s important arguments often overlooked or misinterpreted by both the naturalization advocates and their critics leads the author of the paper to the twofold conclusion which, on the one hand, explores the deeper reasons for the impossibility of a physical and mathematical treatment of phenomenology, on the other hand, clarifies the sense in which such treatments are possible, namely by way of restriction of the variety of experiential aspects that undergo naturalization and substitution of the aspects amenable to the direct mathematization for the directly unmathematizable ones. In the fourth section of this paper, the author attempts to demonstrate that, contrary to widespread belief, Husserl’s arguments are not obsolete by the standards of the contemporary physico-mathematical approaches employed in the mathematization of phenomenology and indeed stand the test of time. (shrink)

Es dentro del marco de la fenomenología de Husserl donde Heidegger lleva a cabo su propuesta filosófica, que implica una “destrucción” o “desmontaje” de los conceptos de la tradición, comenzando por los de la fenomenología de su maestro, y una construcción de su propio proyecto filosófico, basado en una analítica de la existencia.La “destrucción” es prácticamente elevada por Heidegger al rango de método filosófico, en paralelo pero en sentido contrario a la epoché, el método fenomenológico de Husserl. Esta diferencia de (...) método, respecto a una común consideración de la intencionalidad de la conciencia, separa los proyectos fenomenológicos del Husserl de Ideen I y del Heidegger de Sein und Zeit: eidético u ontológico. A partir de su método destructivo Heidegger radicalizará las nociones de la fenomenología de Husserl.Within the framework of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger carries out a double philosophical proposal: the “destruction” or “dismantling” of the concepts from the tradition, beginning with those ones of the phenomenology of his teacher, and the construction of his own philosophical project, based on an analysis of the existence.The “destruction” is practically considered by Heidegger as a philosophical method, which is developed in parallel but in a contrary direction to the phenomenological method of Husserl: the epoché. This methodological difference, applied to the intentionality of the consciousness, that the two philosophers consider, separates the phenomenological projects of Husserl in Ideen I and Heidegger in Sein und Zeit: eidetic or ontological. So and from his destructive method Heidegger is going to radicalize the main notions of the phenomenology of Husserl. (shrink)

¿Cómo pensar hoy la naturaleza y el valor de la reflexión filosófica? La influencia omnipresente del modelo del conocimiento experto parece exigir una autocomprensión de la filosofía como una disciplina entre las disciplinas. Este artículo propone que la filosofía debe resistirse a esta tentación. Defenderé, por tanto, una especie de "excepcionalismo" para la filosofía basado en la idea de que no puede pretender ser una disciplina. Sea o no cierto que hoy en día las actividades filosóficas estén legitimadas institucionalmente por (...) los principios de un Canon, voy a sugerir una estrategia de transgresión del Canon al rechazar cualquier asimilación de la filosofía a una disciplina, aunque fuera "anómala". La filosofía debe contribuir a la comprensión de nuestros diversos modos de conceptualizar y de transformar el mundo y dar sentido a la experiencia humana. La filosofía debe reclamar para sí una "estado de excepción" y abrir un espacio para cuestionar todo aquello que parece obvio e incuestionable. How to think today about the nature and value of the philosophical reflection? The pervasive influence of the model of expert knowledge seems to require a selfunderstanding of philosophy as a discipline among the disciplines. This paper argues that philosophy should resist this move. So I will defend a kind of "exceptionalism" for philosophy based on the idea that philosophy cannot pretend to be a discipline. Be true or not that philosophical activities are nowadays institutionally legitimized by the principles of a Canon, I will suggest a strategy of transgression of the Canon by rejecting any assimilation of philosophy to a discipline, even if an "anomalous" one. Philosophy must contribute to the understanding of our different ways of conceptualizing and transforming the world and to make sense of human experience. The thesis of this paper is that philosophy must claim a "state of emergency" for itself a open a space for freely questioning what it appears as obvious and unchallengeable. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s fundamental concept of “attitude”. I first explore Husserl’s account with respect to the three faculties of intellect, will, and emotivity [Gemüt], which also define the three basic kinds of attitude. The attitude assumed by the subject plays at this level the important role of articulating and unifying, according to an overall direction, various underlying moments of a complex act. I then focus on the specific intellectual, viz. cognitive attitudes and highlight (...) the difference between the naturalistic attitude (which characterizes the natural sciences) and the personalistic attitude (which characterizes the human sciences). I then consider the notion of the natural attitude and argue that the personalistic attitude represents the systematic core of it. The natural attitude may be defined as the human attitude, i.e., as the attitude in which subjects posit themselves exclusively as human subjects belonging to the world , which is itself unceasingly posited as being. In the final part of the paper I explore the function of the phenomenological reduction insofar as it opens up a possibility of self-understanding that breaks with the natural, human self-apprehension and discloses subjectivity in its transcendental dimension. This opens up a radically new attitude, the phenomenological, which should not be confused with a first-person perspective within the framework of the natural attitude. (shrink)

Responsibility was always a key theme of Husserl and post-husserlian Phenomenology. This theme is related to Husserl's effort to give an answer, i.e. to offer a solution to the crisis of philosophy and the sciences. The article reconstructs the genesis and the successive development of the concept of responsibility in Husserl's work and its reinterpretation in the post-husserlian phenomenologies, especially those of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt, Jan Patočka, Hans Jonas, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.

This paper aims to address the relevance of the natural sciences for transcendental phenomenology, that is, the issue of naturalism. The first section distinguishes three varieties of naturalism and corresponding forms of naturalization: an ontological one, a methodological one, and an epistemological one. In light of these distinctions, in the second section, I examine the main projects aiming to “naturalize phenomenology”: neurophenomenology, front-loaded phenomenology, and formalized approaches to phenomenology. The third section then considers the commitments of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with (...) respect to the three varieties of naturalism previously discussed. I argue that Husserl rejected strong and weak forms of epistemological naturalism, strong methodological naturalism, and ontological naturalism. The fourth section presents the argument that Husserl endorsed a weak, conditional form of methodological naturalism. This point is illustrated with Husserl’s proposal of “somatology,” a natural science apt to study the corporeality of the lived body. The final section addresses the complementarity and respective limits of the transcendental phenomenological and the natural scientific frameworks. I argue that, on Husserl’s account, the function of transcendental phenomenology with respect to the natural sciences is to provide them with an epistemological foundation and an ontological clarification. I suggest that certain natural sciences can be understood, within the transcendental phenomenological framework, as “sciences of constitution,” that is, as sciences investigating the contribution of real structures acting as conditions of possibility for the occurrence of certain kinds of comprehensive unities in lived experience. (shrink)

os artículos de Husserl en la revista japonesa Kaizo contienen muchas claves sugerentes e importantes sobre su filosofía práctica. Su visión de las “formas de vida” humanas y sobre todo su concepción de la “forma de vida ética” muestran su preocupación por el significado de la fenomenología para la vida y para la búsqueda de la responsabilidad. Husserl articula el problema ético sobre la base de su concepción de la “esencia” del ser humano y la lucha o el afán de (...) la vida como lucha por una vida ética pura. (shrink)

Phenomenology of illness has grown increasingly popular in recent times. However, the most prominent phenomenologists of illness defend a psychologizing notion of phenomenology, which argues that illness is primarily constituted by embodied experiences, feelings, and emotions of suffering, alienation etc. The article argues that this gives rise to three issues that need to be addressed. (1) How is the theory of embodiment compatible with the strong distinction between disease and illness? (2) What is the difference between problematic embodiment and illness? (...) (3) How is existential edification, that illness can give rise to according to the phenomenologists, to be understood? The article then engages in an analysis of Heidegger’s and Waldenfels’ phenomenology with the ambition of developing a notion of existence, which can transgress the psychologization of illness. Rather than arguing that illness is constituted by experiences of suffering and alienation, it emphasizes that broaches upon conatively guided activities constitute illness. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende realizar uma breve exposição acerca da crítica de Levinas à tradição filosófica até então vigente, cujos espectros, desdobramentos e necessidades giram ao redor e se sustém no alicerce da Razão ou do ser. Tal postura pode ser observada mesmo no início da filosofia ocidental, aponta Levinas, com Sócrates e a maiêutica, ou mais ainda, com os filósofos da physis e sua busca por um arché, o princípio regulador de todas as coisas. Haveria uma espécie de relação com (...) o conhecimento e o intuito “controlar” e ocultar nossas próprias fraquezas perante o desconhecido. Levinas rompe com a tradição, buscando colocar o humano no cerne da questão, bem como a investigação acerca da pulsão anterior à toda tematização, oriunda da alteridade radical. (shrink)

An influential interpretation of phenomenology construes Husserl's project as an attempt to generalize the Fregean notion of sense- an attempt to extend Frege's analysis of the structure of meaningful expressions to a more general account of the structure of meaning in experience . Michael Dummett has articulated a broadly Fregean critique of this Husserlian program, arguing that the project is misguided and retrograde-a relapse into the psychologism and idealism that Frege sought to avoid. A defense of Husserl is offered, based (...) in part on key elements of the theory of meaning articulated in his Logical Investigations . But the main aim is neither to acquit nor to convict Husserl of Dummett's charges; rather it is to use the exchange to investigate some of the philosophical commitments of a broadly Husserlian phenomenology. If we are to understand how Husserl avoids psychologism then we must come to terms with the paradoxical idea of an anti-psychologistic investigation of consciousness (an anti-psychologistic psychology). If we are to understand his complex stance toward idealism then we must not only understand the grounds for his rejection of subjective idealism but also be attuned to the other forms of idealism to which his project is committed. In the course of investigating these matters the author considers how Husserl can reply to the charge of explanatory vacuity, and shows that Frege himself recognizes the legitimacy of something like the Husserlian project. (shrink)

Review of Apostolescu, I... The Subject of Phenomenology: Rereading Husserl. Cham: Springer Nature.

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be considered a form of ‘transcendental’ philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features—such as its exploitation of empirical science—might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the ‘transcendentalist challenge’ of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features—the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal (...) field, and the reduction—that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. It then examines how Merleau-Ponty modifies each of these features to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Finally, it assesses whether Merleau-Ponty’s modified position can still legitimately be considered transcendental. I argue that—despite his own rhetoric—this modified position shapes the modality of Merleau-Ponty’s claims in such a way that his phenomenology cannot meet the transcendentalist challenge and therefore should not be considered ‘transcendental.’. (shrink)

Addressing Walter Hopp’s original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phenomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations (...) he criticizes the First Investigation as having been “one-sidedly” noetically directed and as having thus neglected the noematic aspects of meaning (XVIII 13–14). Also, in an addendum to the Fifth Investigation he notes that in the transition from the First Edition to the Second he has learned to broaden the concept of “phenomenological content” to include not only the “real” ( reell ) contents (noetic, subjective) of consciousness but also the “intentional” (noematic, objective) (XIX/1 411). The fact that, in gradually moving from consciousness (noesis) to what consciousness is of (noema), Husserl struggled with this distinction is an indication of the immensity of the perplexing problems and potential solutions that Hopp has led the phenomenology of knowledge into by introducing his useful notions of agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. Like Husserl, he has focused mainly and mostly on the noetic issues; like Husserl as well, I will try to move step by step from the noetic area into the noematic. I conclude that Hopp’s approach has the potential to become seminal. (shrink)

The history of the early phenomenological movement involves a tale of two schisms. The Great Phenomenological Schism originated between 1905 and 1913, as many of his contemporaries, for example, Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of his Logical Investigations into the transcendental idealism of his Ideas I. The Phenomenological-Existential Schism started between 1927 and 1933, as with Being and Time Heidegger moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological (...) analytic of existence. Yet these schisms were not unrelated developments. Closely following the documentary evidence to determine the exemplary nature of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s move into transcendental idealism, this essay establishes the inextricable linkage between the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism. (shrink)

Este ensayo presenta una visión de conjunto del modo en el cual el «giro» (Kehre) hacia el pensamiento ontohistórico, a medidados de los años ’30, impacta sobre la concepción aleteiológica que, siguiendo a E. Lask y E. Husserl, Heidegger elabora desde comienzos de los años ‘20 hasta Sein und Zeit. Sobre esa base, se ofrece también un intento de caracterización de la reformulación eventualista-kairológica de la aleteiología presentada en Beiträge zur Philosophie. La caracterización propuesta se lleva a cabo con arreglo (...) a la distinción entre un nivel metahistórico de consideración, que corresponde al intento de pensar el seren su verdad en términos de la noción de «acontecimiento» (Ereignis), y un nivel propiamente histórico de consideración, que corresponde a la «hermenéutica de los dos comienzos». El pensar que medita históricamente el ser en su verdad sólo puede ser fiel a la intrínseca movilidad del ser mismo, si se ejerce en y desde la quietud de la contención, como temple animímico fundamental. (shrink)

Resumen: El principal objetivo de este trabajo es pensar el concepto de meditación en la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset. La meditación es la esencia de la filosofía para Ortega. Meditar y filosofar son sinónimos. La filosofía no es mera teoría, sino que implica también práctica. El elemento teórico sólo tiene sentido cuando surge de la vida, pero ante todo la teoría sólo vale si vale para vivir. El ser humano para Ortega piensa porque vive, pero lo fundamental es que (...) piensa para vivir. Sólo los pensamientos que se alcanzan viviendo tienen valor para vivir. La meditación filosófica está siempre supeditada a la vida.The principal aim of this work is to think the concept of meditation in the Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy. For Ortega, meditation is the essence of philosophy. To meditate and to philosophize are synonymous. Philosophy isn’t simply theory, but it also implies practice. The theoretical element only makes sense when it arises from life, but above all theory only have value if it have value for life. For Ortega, human being thinks because he lives, but is fundamental that he thinks for life. Only thoughts reached by living have value for life. Philosophical meditation is always subordinated to life. (shrink)

The Biotheoretical Shortcomings of the Evolutionary Epistemology. The concept of evolutionary epistemology has been critically discussed by philosophers who have mainly pointed to unacceptable philosophical tenets (cf. Vittorio Hösle, this Journal, Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 348-377). However, as most philosophers are extremely reluctant to critically treat the biological theories on which the ideas of evolutionary epistemology are based, the invalid concepts of adaption escaped their critical scrutiny. Therefore the influence of preconceived biological theories on the biological basis of evolutionary epistemology (...) and the distorting consequences on the philosophical level could not be elaborated. The following context sketches a new view of organismic reasoning and its impact on evolutionary aspects of epistemology. The basic theorem of adaptation is shown to be unacceptable and invalid if organisms are conceived as autonomous entities which can only evolve according to their specific internal organismic properties. (shrink)

Summary The concept of evolutionary epistemology has been critically discussed by philosophers who have mainly pointed to unacceptable philosophical tenets (cf. Vittorio Hösle, this Journal, Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 348–377). However, as most philosophers are extremely reluctant to critically treat the biological theories on which the ideas of evolutionary epistemology are based, the invalid concepts of adaption escaped their critical scrutiny. Therefore the influence of preconceived biological theories on the biological basis of evolutionary epistemology and the distorting consequences on the (...) philosophical level could not be elaborated. The following context sketches a new view of organismic reasoning and its impact on evolutionary aspects of epistemology. The basic theorem of adaptation is shown to be unacceptable and invalid if organisms are conceived as autonomous entities which can only evolve according to their specific internal organismic properties. (shrink)

Antinaturalistic Strategies in Beyond Good and Evil. Naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought ultimately appeal to two arguments. On the one hand, when tracing various human phenomena back to processes sufficiently explicable by the natural sciences, it would appear that Nietzsche was pursuing a de facto naturalization program. On the other hand, in BGE 230, the need for the naturalization of human beings as a whole is often interpreted as an argument de jure. After outlining some basic features of contemporary naturalism (...) and showing its incompatibility with Nietzsche’s philosophy, I argue in this paper that neither the de jure nor the de facto argument can be understood in a naturalistic sense. The task of “translating man back into nature” in BGE 230 is indeed turned against a point of view held by “old metaphysical bird-catchers.” An analysis of the manuscript and a comparison of it with the preface to HH I, in which this figure is used in the opposite sense, suggests rather that Nietzsche conceives of the renaturalization of the human in a deceptive way, that is, as one of those numerous “snares and nets for unwary birds” scattered throughout his works. Widening this view, a similar dynamic arises with respect to the de facto argument. In the concluding section, I highlight how, in On the Prejudices of Philosophers, certain naturalization operations are countered by as many arguments to the contrary. Such sudden shifts in perspective seem to indicate, at least in Beyond Good and Evil, a desire to subvert naturalism from within. (shrink)

In order to properly distinguish between pastoral and psychotherapeutic counseling, one must clarify both the interpretive presuppositions underlying each of these professional practices and their respective societal contexts. As a common ground for both kinds of practice, at least insofar as they maintain a distance from the usual medical-scientific model of therapeutic intervention, an ontology of playing is recommended. More precisely, in order for counseling to truly come “into play,” any latent neo-pastoral power discourses must be critically exposed. Psychoanalytic counseling (...) is characterized by rules of abstinence and neutrality as well as by attention to unconscious dynamics, especially those of transference and countertransference. Pastoral counseling, even when it takes place outside of the Ignatian exercises, can still orient itself toward the Ignatian model of spiritual accompaniment, thus requiring a discernment of spirits and a reference to transcendence. Both pastoral and psychotherapeutic counseling can profit from each other. Both must be evaluated in terms of whether, in the course of an authentic communication, they succeed in proposing what truly profits the person seeking advice. All of this applies with special urgency to bioethical decision making and conflict resolution: Persons seeking pastoral advice desire an authentic exposition of the values of the Gospel and their church community in order to reach a well-founded conclusion in conscience. Other persons (or even the same ones) seeking psychotherapeutic help in a bioethical conflict situation desire an empathetic mirroring back of the biographic background framing their decision and of possible psychic consequences that may ensue from their acting accordingly. (shrink)

Hermeneutic research in nursing: developing a Gadamerian‐based research method This paper takes the stance that although there are many different approaches to phenomenological and hermeneutic research, some of these have become blurred due to multiple interpretations of translated materials. Working from original texts by the German philosophers, this paper reconsiders the relevance of phenomenology and hermeneutics to nursing research. We trace the development of Gadamer's philosophy in order to propose a research method based in this tradition. Five steps have been (...) identified as a guide for nurse researchers. These are deciding upon a question, identification of preunderstandings, gaining understanding through dialogue with participants, gaining understanding through dialogue with text and establishing trustworthiness. (shrink)

This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with – and critique of – experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology – due to its naturalism – as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an (...) analysis of Husserl’s views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl’s earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of “inner perception” as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler’s 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl’s writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl’s work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light (...) on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFor Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centrepiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in apparent isolation without clarifying their systematic unity, the significance of noetics is often overlooked. Although Husserl has repeatedly stressed the importance of a phenomenological epistemology, what the concrete theses of such an undertaking are supposed to be often remains obscure. We shall see that the best (...) way to clarify this is by providing a detailed account of Husserl’s noetics as it is developed in Husserl’s lecture courses “Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge” and “Logic and General Theory of Science”. This is the main aim of the present paper. We will shed light on the significance, systematic unity, and concrete theses of noetics. Furthermore, I shall show in what way the main theses of noetics are present in Husserl’s ot... (shrink)

Abstract: Brentano’s conception of scientific philosophy had a strong influence on his students and on the intellectual atmosphere of Vienna in the late nineteenth century. The aim of this article is to expose Brentano’s conception and to contrast his views with that of two traditions he is said to have considerably influenced: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I will shed light on the question of how and to what extent Brentano’s conception of philosophy as a rigorous science has had an impact (...) on these two traditions. The discussion will show that both took their liberties in the interpretation of the thesis, a move that allowed them to liberate themselves from Brentano’s inheritance and to fully develop their own philosophical positions. (shrink)

This is the first full study in English of the German historicist tradition. Frederick C. Beiser surveys the major German thinkers on history from the middle of the eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, providing an introduction to each thinker and the main issues in interpreting and appraising his thought. The volume offers new interpretations of well-known philosophers such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Max Weber, and introduces others who are scarcely known at all, including J. A. Chladenius, Justus (...) Möser, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Beyond an exploration of the historical and intellectual context of each thinker, Beiser illuminates the sources and reasons for the movement of German historicism—one of the great revolutions in modern Western thought, and the source of our historical understanding of the human world. (shrink)

This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation - all of which remained ambiguous despite (...) his extensive programmatic discussions. The work illuminates and clarifies aspects of the Husserlian phenomenological method never before explored. -/- In order to clarify Husserl's eidetic method of inquiry, I propose a new way of thinking about the imagination - as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) and as horizonal-nexic level of consciousness exhibiting the neutrality, freedom, and possibility as its essential features. Following Husserl's studies of the imagination, I propose a three-level model of consciousness (realizing, imagining, and eidetic) and explore the dynamic flexibility of each level (as horizon within which acts such as judgments or memories can unfold). This model of consciousness allows for a rethinking of the sources and conditions for the possibility of eidetic phenomenological inquiry - topics Husserl was mostly silent about. -/- Through a rethinking of the model of consciousness, I propose a tight and substantial relationship between the natural (everyday) and artificial (methodological, theoretical) attitudes. I argue that the structure and systems of possibilities pertaining to the artificial attitude - i.e., our actual as well as possible methodological tools - are structurally and well as informationally bound to the structure and system of possibilities pertaining to the natural attitude. In order to explore the nature of the relationship between these two attitudes I argue that we must take a closer look at the structure and abilities of imagining consciousness - the sole nexic-horizonal level that can function both naturally and artificially. This insight regarding the nature of consciousness clarifies Husserl's transcendental idealism in its intimate connection to the everyday. Understanding Husserl's philosophical stance is thus purged of all possibility of mistakenly labeling it as entailing immanent detachment, solipsism, or Platonic idealism. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of the criticism that Stumpf address to Husserl's phenomenology in Ideas I. My presentation is divided into four parts: I briefly describe the relationship between Stumpf and the young Husserl during his stay in Halle (1886-1901); then I will comment Stumpf's remarks on the definition of Husserl's phenomenology as descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations; in the third part, I examine Husserl's notice in section 86 of Ideas I (...) where he compares his own terminology to that of Stumpf; finally I comment on Stumpf's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology in his last book Erkenntnislehre. (shrink)

In the 19th century, "Psychophysical Parallelism" was the most popular solution of the mind-body problem among physiologists, psychologists and philosophers. (This is not to be mixed up with Leibnizian and other cases of "Cartesian" parallelism.) The fate of this non-Cartesian view, as founded by Gustav Theodor Fechner, is reviewed. It is shown that Feigl's "identity theory" eventually goes back to Alois Riehl who promoted a hybrid version of psychophysical parallelism and Kantian mind-body theory which was taken up by Feigl's teacher (...) Moritz Schlick. (shrink)