About this topic
Summary The mind-brain identity theory (or identity thesis) is the assertion that mental states/events/processes are identical to brain states/events/processes. The type identity theory (often called just the "identity theory") says that mental types are physical types, while the token identity theory says that mental tokens are physical tokens.  Over the years the thesis has been successively understood as involving a contingent identity relation, an analytic identity relation, and then an posteriori necessary identity relation.  The most common objection to the type identity theory is the objection from multiple realizability.
Key works The thesis is explicitly defended in seminal articles by Place 1956Feigl 1958Smart 1959. This is the early stage, when the thesis is understood as an empirical and contingent one. A powerful attack on this version is put forward by Kripke 1980.  The analytic identity thesis appears for the first time in Lewis 1966, then in Armstrong 1968. Criticism of this version appears appears in Nagel 1979Jackson 1982, and Chalmers 1996. Defences appear in Braddon-Mitchell 2003 and Jackson 2003. A more recent defence, based on probability theory, appears in Aranyosi 2011.  The empirical necessary identity thesis is defended, among others, by Loar 1990 and Papineau 2002. Criticism of this approach is to be found in Chalmers 1996 and Chalmers 2009.  The multiple realizability objection to all forms of the type identity theory can be found in Putnam 1963.
Introductions A 30-year retrospective of the transformations of the thesis appears in Place 1988. A more recent introduction to and history of the thesis appears in Smart 2007.
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  1. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a (...)
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  2. An unmonstrous family? Omissions in Kathleen Stock’s history of gender identity theory.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This is a one page handout identifying some notable omissions from her brief history of gender identity theory.
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  3. Phenomenal Concepts and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.Martina Prinz & François-Igor Pris - manuscript
  4. Feigl and the development of analytic philosophy at the university of minnesota.Bruce Aune - manuscript
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  5. Reduction: Models of cross-scientific relations and their implications for the psychology-neuroscience interface.Robert McCauley - manuscript
    University Abstract Philosophers have sought to improve upon the logical empiricists’ model of scientific reduction. While opportunities for integration between the cognitive and the neural sciences have increased, most philosophers, appealing to the multiple realizability of mental states and the irreducibility of consciousness, object to psychoneural reduction. New Wave reductionists offer a continuum of comparative goodness of intertheoretic mapping for assessing reductions. Their insistence on a unified view of intertheoretic relations obscures epistemically significant crossscientific relations and engenders dismissive conclusions about (...)
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  6. The Triviality of Smart's Appeal and a Problem with Utiliatarian Calculations.Robert Goldstone - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 17.
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  7. The Physics and Electronics of Human Consciousness , Mind and their functions.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - June, 2019 - Cosmos and History 15 (No .2):63 - 110.
    Human consciousness, the result of breathing process as dealt with in the Upanishads, is translated into modern scientific terms and modeled as a mechanical oscillator of infrasonic frequency. The bio-mechanic oscillator is also proposed as the source of psychic energy. This is further advanced to get an insight of human consciousness (the being of mind) and functions of mind (the becoming of mind) in terms of psychic energy and reversible transformation of its virtual reflection. An alternative analytical insight of human (...)
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  8. IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Roadmap.Stephen Bush, Goel F., Simard Sanjay & Georges - forthcoming - Standard-Download.Org.
    This IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Roadmap is a high-levelsupplement of the full vision document IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 andBeyond. Communication is a major enabling technology for the Smart Grid. We believe that the powergrid will tend to utilize advances in communications since the data exchange requirements willscale up for the Smart Grid. Smart Grid communication will help to improve demand forecasting,enable self-healing from power disturbance events, facilitate active participation by consumers in demand-response (...)
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  9. A Critique Of Type Identity Theory.Tsz Ha Clarence Chen Chen - forthcoming - The Schola.
    Type identity theory was dismissed in 1967 by many philosophers due to Hilary Putnam’s multiple realisability objection seeming fatal. This paper delves into a critique of type identity theory, thereby paving the way for introducing an alternative theory of mind: emergentism. The longstanding philosophical discourse around the mind has been dominated by the binary opposition of classical physicalist and dualist theories. However, the impact of scientific discovery on contemporary thought has sparked an increasing inclination towards reductive physicalist frameworks, with the (...)
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  10. Different aspects of consciousness explained by distinct biophysical processes.Wieslaw L. Galus - forthcoming - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.
    The great task of cognitive science is to explain the phenomenal, first-person experience through the brain’s biophysical processes. This articles takes up this challenge by presenting the theory of how to reconcile the distinguishable properties of a material and mental processes. For this purpose, I describe how knowledge representations arise and how they can correlate with the emotions that accompany their formation. These associations can lead to first-person sense impressions, that is, qualia, which are the gist of phenomenal awareness. I (...)
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  11. Ieee vision for Smart grid communications: 2030 and beyond.Sanjay Goel, Stephen Bush, Bakken F. & David - forthcoming - Standard-Download.Org.
    This document provides a vision of the communications-related aspects of the Smart Grid in the year 2030, and lays out the technology roadmap that will lead us to the vision. This document starts with some basic knowledge of the power grid and follows up with fundamental building blocks for the communication infrastructure that will accompany the Smart Grid. Subsequently, network architectures, including overlays, are discussed at length. Also discussed, are important issues such as standards, regulations, security, and disruptive technologies. The (...)
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  12. On Aspects, Identity Theory, and the Dual Aspect Account.D. Job Morales - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.
    On the powerful qualities view, every fundamental property is both dispositional and qualitative. Identity theory is the standard account of the view, which makes the stronger claim that a property’s dispositionality and qualitativity are identical to each other, and identical to the property itself. Recent defences of the powerful qualities view have involved novel theories of powerful qualities which are not also variants of identity theory. Giannotti (Erkenntnis 86:603–621, 2021a) has suggested a novel theory of his own, the dual aspect (...)
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  13. Mental Causation.David Robb - forthcoming - In Brian McLaughlin (ed.), Macmillan's Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy of Mind. Macmillan.
    This is an introduction to mental causation. It is written primarily for students new to the topic. The chapter is organized around the following argument: P1. Everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains. P2. If everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains, then nothing we do has a mental cause. C. Therefore, nothing we do has a mental cause.
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  14. Power for the Mental as Such.David Robb - forthcoming - In Jonathan D. Jacobs (ed.), Causal Powers. Oxford University Press.
    An adequate solution to the problem of mental causation should deliver, not just the efficacy of mental properties, but the efficacy of mental properties as such, of mentality in its own right. But this appears to block an identity solution from the outset. Any property that’s both mental and physical, the argument goes, has a dual nature, and this just reintroduces the problem of mental causation, now framed in terms of these two natures. But a powers ontology promises to save (...)
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  15. Identity Theory and Falsifiability.Anders Søgaard - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-12.
    I identify a class of arguments against multiple realization (MR): BookofSand arguments. The arguments are in their general form successful under reasonably uncontroversial assumptions, but this, on the other hand, turns the table on identity theory: If arguments from MR can always be refuted by BookofSand arguments, is identity theory falsifiable? In the absence of operational demarcation criteria, it is not. I suggest a parameterized formal demarcation principle for brain state/process types and show how it can be used to identify (...)
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  16. The essence of the mental.Ray Buchanan & Alex Grzankowski - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):1061-1072.
    Your belief that Obama is a Democrat would not be the belief that it is if it did not represent Obama, nor would the pain in your ankle be the state that it is if, say, it felt like an itch. Accordingly, it is tempting to hold that phenomenal and representational properties are essential to the mental states that have them. But, as several theorists have forcefully argued (including Kripke (1980) and Burge (1979, 1982)) this attractive idea is seemingly in (...)
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  17. Causalità del mentale: dall'argomento di Kim ai qualia in una prospettiva fisicalista.Leonardo Capitaneo - 2023 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Torino
    Lo scopo dell’elaborato è presentare il problema della causalità del mentale e cercare di dare una soluzione fisicalista al problema che possa includere anche i qualia, da sempre considerati come l’ultima difesa a favore dell’irriducibilità della mente al fisico. Il primo capitolo ha il compito di trovare la teoria metafisica del mentale migliore che riesca sia a rendere conto della causalità del mentale e sia a resistere all’argomento di Kim. Dopo aver esposto in dettaglio l’argomento di Kim sono affrontati i (...)
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  18. The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena.Grace Andrus de Laguna & Joel Katzav - 2023 - In Joel Katzav, Dorothy Rogers & Krist Vaesen (eds.), Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Springer. pp. 209-215.
  19. Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.Simone Gozzano - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):371-391.
    In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in _Naming and Necessity_. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the possibility of imagining (...)
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  20. An Evidence-Based Critical Review of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.Marco Masi - 2023 - Hypothesis and Theory, Front. Psychol. - Consciousness Research 14.
    In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a ‘loss-of-function lesion premise,’ according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On (...)
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  21. Social Identity Theory and the Process of Othering Immigrant Identity: A Psychopolitical Analysis on Stereotyping.Mahmut Mete - 2023 - Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi 18 (2):470-489.
    The fact that immigrants have different identities increases their experiences of othering. In other words, immigrants are more likely to be otherized in relation to different cultural, ethnic, or religious identities. As a result of this proposition, othering is considered as a phenomenon that implies artificiality and is possible to be overcome by policies that center the struggle against it. This study; seeing the existence of the "other" as inevitable for the formation of identity, he claims that the element that (...)
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  22. Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1459-1477.
    I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the problem remains.
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  23. On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research.Peter Sjöstedt-Hughes - 2023 - Frontiers in Psychology 14.
    The essential proposal of this text is that psychedelic-induced metaphysical experiences should be integrated and evaluated with recourse to metaphysics. It will be argued that there is a potential extra benefit to patients in psychedelic-assisted therapy if they are provided with an optional, additional, and intelligible schema and discussion of metaphysical options at the integrative phase of the therapy. This schema (the “Metaphysics Matrix”) and a new Metaphysics Matrix Questionnaire (“MMQ”) stemming therefrom will be presented, the latter of which can (...)
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  24. The Two Davids and Australian Materialism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2022 - In Peter R. Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 29-51.
    This chapter by Fisher continues the theme of the relation between Armstrong and Lewis, only Fisher casts the net far wider. He begins by arguing that there were at least two different lines of influence from early twentieth-century behaviourism to the identity theory: one through logical positivism and the other through ordinary language philosophy, the latter involving Place and Smart, and Lewis and Armstrong. It was Armstrong and Lewis who were to have a profound influence on subsequent developments in analytic (...)
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  25. Dispositions manifest themselves: an identity theory of properties.Kristina Engelhard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13497-13522.
    The aim of this paper is to motivate a view on dispositions according to which dispositions and their manifestations are partially identical, the DM identity theory. It sets out by extrapolating the desiderata of a dispositionalist account of properties. It then shows that the previous theories are burdened with different problems, whose common cause, so the argument goes, is the separation assumption, which almost all share. It states that dispositions and their manifestations are numerically distinct. The paper then explores whether (...)
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  26. Must identity be necessary? (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako & Zdenka Brzović - 2021 - Metodicki Ogledi 28 (2):53-76.
    U radu se nudi opis konteksta unutar kojeg je formuliran poznati dokaz za nužnost identiteta. Iznosi se formalni prikaz ovog dokaza kako ga je formulirao poznati filozof i logičar Saul Kripke. Također se razmatra gledište filozofa Allana Gibbarda koji nasuprot Kripkeu brani tvrdnju da neki iskazi identiteta mogu biti kontingentni. Osnovni cilj rada je upoznati domaćeg čitatelja s formalnim aspektom rasprave o nužnosti identiteta te dati kratki pregled konteksta unutar kojeg su formulirani argumenti za nužnost identiteta. In the paper, we (...)
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  27. Fizikalizm, Bilgi Argümanı ve Felsefi Düşünce Deneyleri.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı & Atilla Volkan Çam - 2021 - Nosyon: Uluslararası Toplum Ve Kültür Çalışmaları Dergisi 1 (8):1-11.
    Thought experiments, one of the most effective ways of acquiring knowledge, are an intellectual tool frequently used by scientists or thinkers in their fields of study. Thought experiments used to respond to scientific issues are considered scientific thought experiments, while thought experiments used for philosophical problems are called philosophical thought experiments. In this context, firstly, the differences between scientific and philosophical thought experiments are determined in the article. In particular, philosophical thought experiments are often needed in discussions within the field (...)
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  28. Conservation of a Circle Explains (the Human) Mind.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  29. Psychophysical identity and free energy.Alex Kiefer - 2020 - Journal of the Royal Society Interface 17.
    An approach to implementing variational Bayesian inference in biological systems is considered, under which the thermodynamic free energy of a system directly encodes its variational free energy. In the case of the brain, this assumption places constraints on the neuronal encoding of generative and recognition densities, in particular requiring a stochastic population code. The resulting relationship between thermodynamic and variational free energies is prefigured in mind–brain identity theses in philosophy and in the Gestalt hypothesis of psychophysical isomorphism.
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  30. Multiple realization and compositional variation.Kevin Morris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2593-2611.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
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  31. Consciousness, mind and Meditation - An Upanishadic and cognitive scientific insight.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2020 - New Delhi, India: Authorspress publishers, New Delhi.
    The Human Consciousness and Mind will be thoroughly analyzed as expressed in the Upanishads and Brahmajnaana. The six orthodox systems of philosophy – Vaiseshika, Nyaaya, Saamkhya, Yoga, PoorvaMeemamsa, Uttara Meemsa or Vedaanta, TheSabdabrahmaSiddhanta, Gayatri Mantra, Mantrapushpam and related Indian seers’ spiritual expressions also will be used to further the understanding mind and its functions. The cognition, re-cognition, communication and action-reactions of the body through mind and sense organs and actions organs will be analyzed as cognitive science. The structure and function (...)
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  32. Leibniz's principle and psycho-neural identity.Andrea Bottani & Alfredo Paternoster - 2019 - In Richard Davies (ed.), Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics: Exercises in Analytic Ontology. Bloomsbury Academic.
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  33. The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.
    Reductionists say things like: all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery). That is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience, or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that (...)
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  34. Autonomous Mental Causation and Mental‐Qua‐Mental Causation.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):245-267.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse autonomous mental causation, the view that mental causes, as distinct from physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. The causal exclusion problem has recently pressured nonreductive physicalists to replace autonomous mental causation with reduced mental causation, the view that mental causes, as physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. Reduced mental causation, in turn, faces the problem of mental quausation, according to which reduced mental causation only delivers mental‐as‐physical causation, not the requisite mental‐as‐mental causation. Proponents (...)
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  35. Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and Identity.Mika Suojanen - 2019 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):14-34.
    Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which (...)
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  36. Austrian Identity Theory and Russellian Monism: Schlick, Russell and Chalmers.Gergely Ambrus - 2018 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 62 (4):97-116.
    This papes discusses Moritz Schlick’s “Austrian” psychophysical identity theory, formulated in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and compares it to the similar views of Russell and to contemporary Russellian monism. A close similarity between Russell’s and Schlick’s views was already stated by Herbert Feigl long ago; beyond investigating this relation, my aim is also to identify features contemporary Russellian monists may have in common with their historical ancestors. I argue that they share some fundamental assumptions: linguistic physicalism, an ontology that may be (...)
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  37. Some concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s view.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.
    This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...)
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  38. SEARLE, John : Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Alberto Luis López - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:216-222.
    Review of Searl's book Seeing Things as They are.
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  39. Review of The Multiple Realization Book by Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21.
  40. Flat Physicalism: some implications.Orly Shenker - 2017 - Iyyun 66:211-225.
    Flat Physicalism is a theory of through and through type reductive physicalism, understood in light of recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics. In Flat Physicalism, as in physics, so-called "high level" concepts and laws are nothing but partial descriptions of the complete states of affairs of the universe. "Flat physicalism" generalizes this idea, to form a reductive picture in which there is no room for levels, neither explanatory nor ontological. The paper explains how phenomena that seem to be (...)
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  41. Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett (2003).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    ``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb´to be´that looks as if it functions in the same way as´to eatánd´to drink´, as long as (...)
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  42. HIT and brain reward function: a case of mistaken identity (theory).Cory Wright, Matteo Colombo & Alexander Beard - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64:28–40.
    This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so (...)
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  43. Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in (...)
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  44. Some puzzles concerning relations between minds, brains, and bodies.Rick Grush - 2016
    In this article I explore a number of questions that have not been adequately investigated in philosophy of mind circles: are minds located in the same place as the brains (or other computing machinery) supporting them? Must they exist at the same location as the body? Must they exist at the same time? Could a single mind be implemented in multiple brains, or multiple minds in a single brain? Under what conditions might a single mind persist despite being implemented successively (...)
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  45. Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish (...)
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  46. Art and Identity: Essays on the Aesthetic Creation of Mind.Aleksandar Kordis - 2016 - The European Legacy 21 (5-6):610-611.
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  47. Experiences are Objects. Towards a Mind-object Identity Theory.Riccardo Manzotti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):16-36.
    : Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural (...)
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  48. Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines.Mirza Mehmedovic - 2016 - Giornale di Metafisica 1:262-283.
    The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...)
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  49. Il pensiero della cosa: Wahrheit hegeliana e identity theory of truth.Giovanna Miolli - 2016 - Padova (Italy): Verifiche.
    È possibile connettere la concezione hegeliana della verità con alcune teorie filosofiche a noi contemporanee? Il presente lavoro esplora gli aspetti più rilevanti della concezione hegeliana della verità attraverso la ‘lente’ del confronto con quella che oggi viene chiamata identity theory of truth. Tale confronto si articola intorno ad alcune nozioni chiave: ‘pensiero’, ‘contenuto di pensiero’, ‘giudizio’, ‘contenuto del giudizio’, ‘realtà’ e ‘identità’. Lo scopo che viene perseguito non è una traduzione della filosofia di Hegel dentro schemi, categorie e linguaggi (...)
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  50. Consciousness, Origins.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 172-176.
    To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...)
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