||The thesis is explicitly defended in seminal articles by Place 1956, Feigl 1958, Smart 1959. This is the early stage, when the thesis is understood as an empirical and contingent one. A powerful attack on this version is put forward by Kripke 1980. The analytic identity thesis appears for the first time in Lewis 1966, then in Armstrong 1968. Criticism of this version appears appears in Nagel 1979, Jackson 1982, and Chalmers 1996. Defences appear in Braddon-Mitchell 2003 and Jackson 2003. A more recent defence, based on probability theory, appears in Aranyosi 2011. The empirical necessary identity thesis is defended, among others, by Loar 1990 and Papineau 2002. Criticism of this approach is to be found in Chalmers 1996 and Chalmers 2009. The multiple realizability objection to all forms of the type identity theory can be found in Putnam 1963.