Husserl: Development and Influences

The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy during the Halle period (1886-1901). I shall first track the sources of Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. I shall then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to Lotze in his early work and research manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the third section, I examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s antipsychologistic turn (...) in the mid-1890s. The fourth section is a commentary on Husserl’s manuscript entitled “Microcosmus,” to which he explicitly refers in his Prolegomena, and which he planned to publish as an annex of his Logical Investigations. This work contains a detailed analysis of the third book of Lotze’s 1874 Logic. The last section examines Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism in his Prolegomena, which I discuss through the lens of Stumpf’s critique of psychologism in his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge”. I argue that Stumpf’s early works on this topic make it possible to establish a connection between Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas and Husserl’s antipsychologism. My hypothesis is that Stumpf’s analyses represent the background of Husserl's critique of logical psychologism in his Logical Investigations. I shall conclude this study by showing that Husserl’s position with respect to Lotze’s philosophy remains basically unchanged after the publication of his Logical Investigations, and that Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze pertains, in the final analysis, to the absence of a theory of intentionality in Lotze’s philosophy. (shrink)

Translation from German of a lit review (summarizing and evaluating) in the psychology of thinking. Focuses on experimental psychology and addresses problems of self-observation (Lipps, Ach, Judd, Gibson, Wm. James, Kiesow), reproduction (Semon, Forel, Detto), the influence of an assigned task and capacities for concentration (Ach, Bleuler, Heilbronner), perseveration (Heilbronner, Stransky, Kiesow), a few miscellaneous issues Watt couldn't fit into these categories (Aliotta, Lobsien, Ranschburg, C. Jung), diagnosing a state of affairs (Wertheimer and Klein, C. Jung), and psychopathology (Heilbronner, Stransky, (...) Reich). (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation of two paragraphs from Heidegger’s 1925-26 lectures on the question of “truth”. First, I will consider Heidegger's criticism of Lotze’s notion of “ideality”; then, I will focus on Heidegger's claim that Husserl was “fascinated” by such a Lotzean notion. In the first section I will describe Heidegger's ontological approach to the distinction between reality and ideality. In the second section I will explain why, in Heidegger's view, Lotze’s understanding of the notions of “reality” and “ideality”, (...) construed as different forms of Wirklichkeit, depends on some uncritical presumptions. In the third section, I will evaluate the consequences of Lotze's perspective on the notions of ideality and truth, so as to turn my attention to Husserl’s Prolegomenaand his allegedly adoption of Lotze’s notion of “ideality” as universality. Accordingly, I will suggest that Heidegger’s criticism is limited not only to Husserl's Prolegomena but to his phenomenology as a whole. Finally, I will discuss the problem of universality from the point of view of Heidegger’s existential analytic. By referring to a 1925 lecture, I will suggest that Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s “reduction” is to be read in light of his criticism of the notion of “ideality”. (shrink)

Husserl and Cantor were colleagues and close friends during the last 14 years of the nineteenth century, when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which he drew apart from people and writings to whom he owed most of his intellectual training and drew closer to the ideas of thinkers whose writings he had not been able to evaluate properly and had consulted too little. I study ways in (...) which Husserl and Cantor might be said to have been alike, while pointing to dissimilarities between them. In particular, I discuss how their ideas overlapped and crisscrossed with regard to mathematics and philosophy, Platonic idealism, abstraction, empiricism, psychologism, actual consciousness and pure logic, Frege’s reviews of their works, metaphysics and mysticism, sets, arithmetization, strange and imaginary numbers and manifolds. I conclude that Cantor was among those of his mentors from whose ideas Husserl drew away and Lotze and Bolzano were among those to whose ideas he drew closer. (shrink)

A common analysis of Edmund Husserl’s early works on the philosophy of logic and mathematics presents these writings as the result of a combination of two distinct strands of influence: on the one hand a mathematical influence due to his teachers is Berlin, such as Karl Weierstrass, and on the other hand a philosophical influence due to his later studies in Vienna with Franz Brentano. However, the formative influences on Husserl’s early philosophy cannot be so cleanly separated into a philosophical (...) and a mathematical pathway. Growing evidence indicates that a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics was already in place before Husserl. Rather than an original combination at the confluence of two different streams, his early writings represent an elaboration of topics and problems that were already being discussed in the School of Brentano within a pre-existing framework. The traditional account understandably neglects Brentano’s own work on the philosophy of mathematics and logic, which can be found mostly in his unpublished manuscripts and lectures, and various works by Brentano’s students on the philosophy of mathematics which have only recently emerged from obscurity. Husserl’s early works must be correctly placed in this preceding context in order to be fully understood and correctly assessed. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...) analytic philosophy and this by pursuing two strategies of exposition. One involves comparing Husserl with Russell, and not, as has been the usual practice, with Frege. The other, which follows the first, foregrounds Husserl’s thinking vis-à-vis Russell’s from 1905 onward, a move that constitutes a break with what has become the standard approach of emphasising the relatedness of Husserl of the Logical Investigations (1900/1) to analytic philosophy. Moreover, this approach discloses two chief grounds of relatedness between the middle Husserl and the middle Russell. One is their shared interest in exploring philosophical “fundamentals”. The second consists of common elements shared by their epistemologies and philosophies of mind. (shrink)

Ïntroductory remarks to the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology Special Issue "Phenomenology and the Idea of Europe".

El propósito del presente estudio es afirmar la deuda de Husserl con la filosofía de Lotze durante el período de Halle. Mi interés se centra especialmente en el pensamiento del joven Husserl desde su llegada a Halle en 1886 hasta la publicación de su Hauptwerk en 1900-1901. Primero me remontaré a las fuentes del conocimiento de la filosofía de Lotze por parte de Husserl durante sus estudios con Brentano en Viena y después con Stumpf en Halle. Luego comentaré brevemente las (...) referencias de Husserl a Lotze en sus primeros trabajos y en sus manuscritos de investigación para el segundo volumen de su Filosofía de la aritmética. En la tercera sección, examino la influencia de Lotze en el giro antipsicologista de Husserl a mediados de la década de 1890. La cuarta sección es un comentario al manuscrito de Husserl titulado "Microcosmos", al cual se refiere explícitamente en sus Prolegómenos, y que planeaba publicar como anexo a sus Investigaciones lógicas. Esta obra contiene un análisis detallado del tercer volumen de la Lógica de Lotze de 1874. La última sección examina los argumentos de Husserl contra el psicologismo lógico en sus Prolegómenos, que yo expongo a través del prisma de la crítica de Stumpf al psicologismo en su artículo "Psicología y teoría del conocimiento". Sostengo que las primeras obras de Stumpf sobre este asunto hacen posible establecer una conexión entre la interpretación de Lotze de la teoría de las Ideas de Platón y el antipsicologismo de Husserl. Mi hipótesis es que los análisis de Stumpf representan el fondo de la crítica de Husserl al psicologismo lógico en sus Investigaciones lógicas. Concluiré este estudio mostrando que la posición de Husserl respecto de la filosofía de Lotze permanece básicamente la misma después de la publicación de sus Investigaciones lógicas, y que la principal crítica de Husserl a Lotze se refiere, en un último análisis, a la ausencia de una teoría de la intencionalidad en la filosofía de Lotze. (shrink)

In his fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl intensely scrutinizes three possible significations of the concept of consciousness. In these analyses, he also strives to clearly delineate between two types of consciousness: psychological and phenomenological. The goal of this paper is to show that the way in which the (psychical) act is conceived and defined, according to the Husserlian approach, as a lived, intentional experience plays an essential role in clarifying the distinction between the empirical-psychological level of consciousness (where the act as (...) a lived experience manifests itself) and its eidetic or ideal level (wherein any type of objectivity is constituted as such). Moreover, I shall try to argue that the notion of act conceived in this manner had influenced and decisively determined the development of the entire Husserlian phenomenology and theory of knowledge exactly because it explains how knowledge in general is constituted from an objective point of view. Another highly relevant distinction that needs to be dealt with in this context is the difference that Husserl establishes between the descriptive and intentional contents of the act. I shall try to show that this distinction presupposes in fact a previous conceptual determination of the noema (undertaken jointly with the analysis of the noetical components of consciousness at this level), and that the way in which the relationship between these two strands of consciousness is described determines further and in a fundamental manner the development of the idea of intentionality itself. (shrink)

Husserl has undoubtedly considered himself being influenced by Brentano, but his conflicts with the orthodox core of the School of Brentano raise the question whether his adherence to Brentano suffices to adequately grasp the context of his early philosophy. I investigate the biographical details of Husserl’s studies in Vienna to uncover hitherto unknown ties between Husserl and Austrian philosophers outside the School of Brentano. Already during his secondary school studies in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Husserl was exposed to the philosophy textbooks (...) of Gustav Adolf Lindner; and archival records of the University of Vienna show that he had extensively attended philosophy courses held by other philosophers, especially by Robert Zimmermann. Both Lindner and Zimmermann proposed Herbartian philosophies, and what makes Zimmermann especially interesting is that he had once been a close personal disciple of Bernard Bolzano. I use an unpublished lecture transcript, written by a fellow student of Husserl, to investigate the controversial issue of Zimmermann’s possible transmission of Bolzano’s ideas. While a direct transmission seems improbable, my investigation uncovers a plethora of Herbartian influences, which are interesting on their own terms and have not only furnished Husserl with important parts of his descriptive psychological toolbox but have also helped him navigate the Brentano-School’s debate on intentionality. (shrink)

Nobody can deny that the figure of Edmund Husserl represents the key to the philosophical horizon of our time in both version, as continental as analytical one. But, how can the same approach give ground and support to the development of such diverse topics? Although much work has been done to explain the renewed sense that science and philosophy acquire inside their proposal, the way Husserl reached that conclusion is not sufficiently clear yet. That is why in this article we (...) intend to clarify some aspects of his thought transformation, keeping it up whit his early concerns that will lead, inevitably, in his critique of knowledge. To achieve this, we will follow the husserlian itinerary from The philosophy of arithmetic to his conception of philosophy as the strictest science. (shrink)

This work, a significant achievement by itself, completes J. N. Mohanty’s comprehensive two-volume study of Edmund Husserl’s body of writings. With the publication of this second volume, Mohanty has produced an immensely detailed and profound analysis of Husserl’s philosophy. At nearly one thousand pages for both volumes, the scale of this achievement cannot be overstated. As Robert Sokolowski notes in his review of the first volume (Husserl Studies 25, p. 256), Mohanty’s work offers an immeasurably helpful manual for those who (...) seek to work their way through parts or the whole of Husserl’s corpus. Where the first volume, ThePhilosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development, ranges from his early years at Halle to the publication of Ideen I and the conclusion of his teaching career at Göttingen, this second volume begins with Husserl’s “Inaugural Lecture” at Freiburg and works its way through his lectures, research manuscripts, and published writings to the Krisis texts produced in. (shrink)

Die levinassche Erschließung von Gerechtigkeit als dem Äußersten zu Denkenden fordert eine Reflexion darüber heraus, wie Gerechtigkeit jeweils wieder in der konkreten Begegnung mit den Anderen verwirklicht wird. Wie ist die erhoffte Gerechtigkeit des Einen mit dem konkret werdenden Ethischen durch die Handlung des Anderen zum Zeitpunkt des Geschehens verstrickt? Diese »Verstrickung« wird als eine Komplikation verstanden, welche die beruhigte Einsamkeit des modernen Subjekts stört. Dieses störende Ereignis der Verantwortung lässt sich nicht als Ergebnis eines Kalküls zwischen Verbotenem und Erlaubtem (...) begreifen. Denn die wirkliche Gerechtigkeit geschieht nur in der konkreten geschichtlichen Handlung, die die theoretischen Widersprüche, die sich in einem zeitlos-idealistischen Denken zu geben scheinen, übersteigt. (shrink)

How do we reconcile Husserl’s repeated criticism of Mach’s phenomenalism almost everywhere in his work with the leading role that Husserl seems to attribute to Mach in the genesis of his own phenomenology? To answer this question, we shall examine, first, the narrow relation that Husserl establishes between his phenomenological method and Mach’s descriptivism. Second, we shall examine two aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Mach: the first concerns phenomenalism and Mach’s doctrine of elements, while the second concerns the principle of (...) economy of thought, which Husserl closely associates with a form of psychologism in his Logical Investigations . Our working hypothesis is that the apparent contradictory comments of Husserl regarding Mach’s positivism can be partially explained by the double status he confers to his own phenomenology—as a philosophical program radically opposed to positivism, and as a method akin to Mach’s descriptivism. (shrink)

Lotze’s influence on the development of the XIXth and XXth century philosophy and psychology remains largely neglected still today. In this paper, I examine some Lotzean elements in Husserl’s early conception of intentionality, and more specifically in his rejection of the Brentanian concept of intentionality. I argue that Husserl and Lotze, pace Brentano, share a qualitative conception of experiences, what they both call the Zumutesein of experiences. Furthermore, I discuss other issues upon which Husserl and Lotze share common intuitions: the (...) perception of space, the theory of local signs, the realisations of thinking (Leistungen des Denkens) and phenomenology. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Husserl received important cues from Natorp and his project of a transcendental psychology. I also trace the entire relationship both thinkers had over the course of their lifetime and show how there were important cross-fertilizations on both sides. In particular, Natorp’s project of a reconstructive psychology proved crucial, I argue, for Husserl’s development of genetic phenomenology. Allowing for a reconstruction of subjective-intentional processes makes Husserl see the possibility of breaking with the paradigm of direct (...) intuition as the sole method of phenomenology. However, Natorp’s psychology was also seriously flawed, to Husserl. While exploiting the fruitful elements of Natorp’s reconstructive psychology, Husserl maintained that they could only come to actual fruition in a transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. However, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influences on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental phenomenology. It (...) is hoped that the investigation could contribute towards the better understanding of Husserl’s idea of the foundation of his phenomenology. (shrink)

Dans les « Prolégomènes à la logique pure » de ses Recherches logiques , Husserl rend hommage aux deux premiers volumes de la Wissenschaftslehre de 1837 de Bernard Bolzano comme un « ouvrage qui […] surpasse de loin tout ce que la littérature mondiale a à offrir en termes de contributions systématiques à la logique ». Cet article porte sur le jeune Husserl comme lecteur du chef-d’oeuvre de Bolzano, visant ainsi à contribuer à une compréhension adéquate de certains aspects des (...) théories de Bolzano et de Husserl et de ce sur quoi portent ces théories. Je me concentrerai sur la question de savoir comment Bolzano en 1837 et Husserl autour de 1900 ont conçu les contenus des actes et états mentaux.Dans les sections 1 et 2, je fais état de la redécouverte de la WL de Bolzano au sein de l’École de Brentano, et en ce qui concerne le problème des représentations sans objets, j’endosse la défense de Bolzano par Husserl contre Twardowski. Dans les sections 3 et 4, je présente un aperçu de la théorie des propositions et des notions , et montre comment Husserl assimile le cadre conceptuel bolzanien dans ses RL. Tandis que Bolzano considère les propositions et les notions comme étant des objets abstraits sui generis, le jeune Husserl développe une conception des notions et des propositions en termes d’espèces. J’explique cette conception dans la section 5 et je la défends contre le dernier Husserl. La discussion la plus extensive et la plus détaillée d’une seule et unique thèse de la philosophie de la logique de Bolzano qu’on puisse trouver dans les livres et les articles publiés par Husserl de son vivant se trouve dans le dernier chapitre de ses RL. Le sujet de discussion, et la dernière section de cet article, est une affirmation courageuse, pour ne pas dire outrageuse de Bolzano qui, du moins pris au pied de la lettre, contredit tout simplement ce que la plupart des philosophes ont tenu pour acquis depuis Aristote. Les questions, soutient Bolzano, sont une espèce particulière de propositions, et donc leur vérité est susceptible d’être évaluée.In the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” of his Logical Investigations Husserl praised the first two volumes of Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1837 as “a work which … far surpasses everything that world-literature has to offer in the way of systematic contributions to logic”. This paper is about the early Husserl as a reader of Bolzano’s masterpiece, hoping thereby to contribute to a proper understanding of certain aspects of Bolzano’s and Husserl’s theories and of what those theories are about. I shall concentrate on the question how Bolzano in 1837 and Husserl around 1900 conceive of the contents of mental acts and states.In sections 1-2 I report on the rediscovery of Bolzano’s WL in the school of Brentano, and as regards the issue of objectless presentations, I endorse Husserl’s defence of Bolzano against Twardowski. In sections 3-4 I present an outline of Bolzano’s theory of propositions and notions and go on to show how Husserl assimilates the Bolzanian framework in his LI. While Bolzano takes propositions and notions to be sui generis abstract objects, the early Husserl develops a species conception of notions and proposition. I explain this view in section 5 and defend it against Husserl’s later self. The most extensive and most thorough discussion of a single contention in Bolzano’s philosophy of logic that can be found in any of Husserl’s books and articles published during his lifetime is contained in the last chapter of his LI. The topic of this discussion, and of the final section of this paper, is a courageous if not outrageous Bolzanian contention : questions, he claims, are a special kind of propositions and hence truth-evaluable. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl, known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. A prolific scholar, he explored an enormous landscape of philosophical subjects, including philosophy of math, logic, theory of meaning, theory of consciousness and intentionality, and ontology in addition to phenomenology. This deeply insightful book traces the development of Husserl’s thought from his earliest investigations in philosophy—informed by his work as a mathematician—to his publication of _Ideas_ in 1913. Jitendra N. (...) Mohanty, an internationally renowned Husserl scholar, presents a masterful study that illuminates Husserl’s central concerns and provides a definitive assessment of the first phases of the philosopher’s career. (shrink)

The influence of Brentano on the emergence of Husserl`s notion of intentionality has been usually perceived as the key of understanding the history of intentionality, since Brentano was credited with the discovery of intentionality, and Husserl was his discipline. This much debated question is to be revisited in the present essay by incorporating recent advances in Brentano scholarship and by focusing on Husserl`s very first work, his habilitation essay, which followed immediately after his study years at Brentano, and also on (...) manuscript notes from the same period. It is to be shown that although Brentano failed to enact a direct influence on Husserl`s notion of intentionality, yet the core of Brentano`s notion remained operative in Husserl`s theory of relations, which is seemingly influenced by John Stuart Mill and Hermann Lotze. This investigation is intended as a contribution towards the proper understanding of the complexities of Husserl`s early philosophy. (shrink)

The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift (1887) to the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). -/- An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only the first chapter survives, which we know as Über den Begriff der Zahl). The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA. -/- The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison (...) of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the (psychological) analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA. (shrink)

The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift to the Philosophie der Arithmetik . An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift . The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA. The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is (...) taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA. (shrink)

Little is known of Edmund Husserl's direct encounter with Georg Cantor's ideas on Platonic idealism and the abstraction of number concepts during the late 19th century, when Husserl's philosophical orientation changed considerably and definitely. Closely analyzing and comparing the two men's writings during that important time in their intellectual careers, I describe the crucial shift in Husserl's views on psychologism and metaphysical idealism as it relates to Cantor's philosophy of arithmetic. I thus establish connections between their ideas which have been (...) until now been virtually unsuspected and contribute to a better understanding of the development of Husserl's thought and of the philosophical and metaphysical ideas within which Cantor chose to frame his theories. (shrink)

In the article Husserl’s view of the infinite around 1890 is analysed. I give a survey of his mathematical background and other important influences (especially Bolzano). The article contains a short exposition on Husserl's distinction between proper and symbolic presentations in the "Philosophie der Arithmetik" and between finite and infinite symbolic collections. Subsequently Husserl’s conception of surrogate presentations in his treatise "Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)" is discussed. In this text Husserl gives a detailed account of infinity, using surrogate presentations. (...) The conclusion is that with surrogates we can only operate according to blind psychological rules. (shrink)

State of affairs (Sachverhalt) is one of the few terms in philosophy, which only came into use for the first time in the twentieth century, mainly via the works of Husserl and Wittgenstein. This makes the task of finding out who introduced this concept into philosophy, and in exactly what sense, of considerable interest. Our thesis is that Lotze introduced the term in 1874 in the sense of the objective content of judgments, which is ipso facto the minimal structured ontological (...) unit. We would argue against authors such as Michael Dummett and Barry Smith, who have tried to prove that Lotze's theory of judgment, and so of states of affairs, was ad-vanced in the wake of psychologism. (shrink)

The article shows the affinity of Simmel's formal sociology with Husserl's notion of eidetic science. This thesis is demonstrated by the corroboration of Simmel's revision of neo-Kantian epistemology for sociology with Husserl's phenomenology, and the parallel discussion of Simmel and Husserl concerning cognitive levels and exact and morphological eide. Simmel's analysis of dyads is explored as an exemplar of his eidetic insights. An important consequence of this demonstration is the vindication establishing the scientific legitimacy of Simmel's methodology regarding the sociology (...) of the forms of association. Woven throughout is discussion concerning the doctrine of the complementarity of eidetic and empirical science. Simmel's methodology is shown to have been ahead of its time through conjoining these two modes of scientific investigation. (shrink)

Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the (...) areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds. (shrink)

The scope of this study is the early phase of Husserl's philosophy, from On the Concept of Number and Philosophy of Arithmetic through the Logical Investigations. Like others who have studied this period, Cooper-Wiele wants to trace the development of themes understood to play a central role in Husserl's mature, phenomenological philosophy. Of central concern to him is the emergence of Husserl's transcendental point of view, which Cooper-Wiele characterizes as "a conquest of spatio-temporal phenomena," "the dissolution of the threat" to (...) certainty and teleology posed by the assumption that causal reality is an ultimate philosophical category. The "key" to the early development of transcendental phenomenology is said to be Husserl's study of the mental act of collecting--or, as the author prefers, the "totalizing act.". (shrink)

A central aspect of the internal logic of Husserl's thought is unfolded by exploring a particular motivating factor: the ideal of a self-justifying science. The dissertation, in contrast with the standard interpretations, argues that the theme of self-justification is a unifying principle which guides Husserl's philosophical project and explains the development of his phenomenology. The Husserlian practice of self-justifying science was inspired by Weierstrass' rigorous mathematical analysis, and attempted to achieve the self-referential consistency of philosophical method and content. ;Part I, (...) "Logic and Method," examines Husserl's early works and the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, tracing the growth and formulation of the self-justification problematic and its combination with Husserl's critique of empiricist epistemology. Part II, "Experience and Science," demonstrates the application of the standard of self-referential consistency in the structure and content of the six Logical Investigations proper, especially Investigations V and VI, and considers the program of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in relation to a self-justifying description of experience. Part III, "Method and Experience," compares the description and the performance of phenomenological method in Ideas I and shows how that method operates in a self-referentially consistent and self-justifying way. It is indicated, finally, that transcendental subjectivity is essential to the philosophical purpose of Husserl's phenomenology, and that self-referential consistency is fundamental in the articulation of the transcendental phenomenology of the later works as well. (shrink)

In this paper an attempt is made to reconstruct the development of Husserl’s conception of intentionality from 1891 up to 1900/01. It is argued that Husserl’s concept of intentionality in the Logical Investigations took shape under the influence of problems originating in two different fields: the philosophy of perception and philosophical semantics. This multiple origin of the concept of intentionality of 1900/01 is then adduced as an explanation of tensions within the text of the Investigations, tensions whieh account for the (...) fact that various contradictory interpretations of Husserl’s concept of intentionality are supported by the texts.The paper starts with a brief and schematic interpretation of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Next, the theory of perception of the ‘Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic’ is compared with that contained in the Investigation’s.On the basis of an analysis of Husserl’s early theory of reference to non-existing referents and of his criticism of Twardowski, it is concluded that his concept of int.entionality of 1900/01 is not free from ambiguities: Husserl wavers between a non-relational and a relational concept. Finally, it is shown why Husserl’s “official” concept in the Investigations was the non-relational version. (shrink)

Welton's book concentrates on the development of Husserl's views concerning the relationship between the meanings of linguistic expressions and the fulfillment sense objects have for us in our perceptual experience. Welton understands the issue of this relationship to be a central problem, perhaps even the central problem, motivating the development in Husserl's phenomenology. Consequently, Welton organizes his book in a roughly chronological fashion, tracing Husserl's discussions of two different types of meaning, the fulfillment of meaning-l by meaning-p, and the manner (...) in which the two types of meaning supplement and build upon one another. (shrink)