Illness

Vaccine refusers often seem motivated by disgust, and they invoke ideas of purity, contamination and sanctity. Unfortunately, the emotion of disgust and its companion ideas are not directly responsive to the probabilistic and statistical evidence of research science. It follows that increased efforts to promulgate the results of vaccine science are not likely to contribute to increased rates of vaccination among persons who refuse vaccines because of the ‘ethics of sanctity’. Furthermore, the fact that disgust-based vaccine refusal is not monolithic (...) – vaccine refusers manifest disgust at different objects and invoke different ideas about purity and contamination – further complicates public health efforts to increase vaccination rates. (shrink)

This work proposes that pain meets the requirements of being characterized as a secondary quality, as it covers, like a color, a determined extension. The argument seeks to establish a literal pain-color analogy through an inquiry into the intensity and location of the pain. From the classic intensity/location relationship reported by patients with acute appendicitis, three degrees of pain are distinguished: mild, moderate, and severe. The objective is only achieved by examining the Body's extensional determinations (primary quality) insofar as each (...) of these degrees of pain covers three particular measures. Once these three measures have been explored according to the perforation process (tissue damage), the work ends by identifying pain as a transcendent moment. (shrink)

In this chapter we suggest that many experiences of suffering can be further illuminated as forms of transformative experience, using the term coined by L.A. Paul. Such suffering experiences arise from the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. Such features can create a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valanced forms of epistemically and personally transformative experiences, as we detail here. We argue that the productive element of suffering experiences can be articulated as transformative, although suffering experiences (...) are not the type mostly discussed in the transformative experience literature. We correct for this here by developing a taxonomy of negatively valenced transformative experiences. We suggest three features that make such experiences ones of suffering, following Michael Brady’s definition: intensity, novelty, and attentional focus. Finally, we suggest that one possible explanation for the edifying capacity of suffering comes from it requiring more transformation than positive experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that certain theoretical conceptions of health, particularly those described as ‘biomedical’ or ‘naturalistic’, are viciously epistemically unjust. Drawing on some recent work in vice epistemology, we identity three ways that abstract objects (such as theoretical conceptions, doctrines, or stances) can be legitimately described as epistemically vicious. If this is right, then robust reform of individuals, social systems, and institutions would not be enough to secure epistemic justice: we must reform the deeper conceptions of health that (...) underlie them. (shrink)

Rapidly advancing technologies in the field of extracorporeal cardiopulmonary resuscitation (ECPR) have presented a new challenge in accurate neuroprognostication following cardiac arrest. Determination of brain state informs the prognostic picture and allows providers to begin effective communication regarding likelihood of meaningful neurological recovery as defined by patients or family members. The evolving role of sedation during ECPR and its impacts on ethical tension in decision-making is reviewed. Work surrounding the advancing field of neuroprognostication after cardiac arrest and hypothermia is summarized (...) and implications of premature withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments are discussed. Advances that improve predictive value for neurological recovery are utilized in affirming and discussing the implications for end-of-life wishes of individuals in the setting of intensive resuscitative therapies. (shrink)

Due to the intricate nature of its subject matter, medicine is always threatened by speculations and disagreements about which among its entities exist, e.g., any specific biological structures, substructures or substances, pathogenic agents, pathophysiological processes, diseases, psychosomatic relationships, therapeutic effects, and other possible and impossible things. To avoid confusion, and to determine what entities an item of medical knowledge presupposes to exist if it is to be true, we need medical ontology. The term “medical ontology” we understand to mean the (...) study that seeks to ascertain what entities exist in the world of medicine, which formal relations hold between them, and whether there are any relatioships between types of medical research and practice, on the one hand; and the new worlds they create, on the other. (shrink)

Built-in decision thresholds for AI diagnostics are ethically problematic, as patients may differ in their attitudes about the risk of false-positive and false-negative results, which will require that clinicians assess patient values.

In the last decades it has become clear that medicine must find some way to combine its scientific and humanistic sides. In other words, an adequate notion of medicine requires an integrative position that mediates between the analytic-reductionist and the normative-holistic tendencies we find therein. This is especially important as these different styles of reasoning separate “illness” (something perceived and managed by the whole individual in concert with their environment) and “disease” (a “mechanical failure” of a biological element within the (...) body). While the demand for an integrative view has typically been motivated by ethical concerns, we claim that it is also motivated, perhaps even more fundamentally, by epistemological and methodological reasons. Evidence-based bio-medicine employs experimental and statistical techniques which eliminate important differences in the ways that conscious humans evaluate, live with, and react to disease and illness. However, it is precisely these experiences that underpin the concepts and norms of bio-medicine. Humanistic disciplines, on the other hand, have the resources to investigate these experiences in an intersubjectively testable way. Medicine, therefore, cannot afford to ignore its nature as a human science; it must be concerned not only with disease and illness, but also with the ways in which patients as persons respond to malady. Insofar as attitudes and expectations influence the criteria of illness and disease, they must be studied as part of the genuine subject matter of medicine as a human science. In general, we urge that this is a necessary step to overcome today's trend to split evidence-based and clinical medicine. (shrink)

[In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the efficiency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body (...) “understands” the practical meaning of a situation. Bodily understanding is then manifested in particular by the ability to adequately differentiate, adapt or vary motor and postural responses to environmental challenges. This change in the conception of embodiment also has important implications for understanding the therapist-patient relationship and the intervention itself. Physiotherapists should draw more on the fact that they are themselves a body and, on this basis, guide the patient’s bodily intentionality towards a more developed understanding of the practical meaning of situations. (shrink)

Phenomenology gives rise to certain ontological considerations that have far-reaching implications for standard conceptions of patient autonomy in medical ethics, and, as a result, the obligations of and to patients in clinical decision-making contexts. One such consideration is the phenomenological reduction in classical phenomenology, a core feature of which is the characterisation of our primary experiences as immediately and inherently meaningful. This paper builds on and extends the analyses of the phenomenological reduction in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (...) in order to identify and explain its implications for our current understanding of the principle of respect for patient autonomy and the norms of clinical decision making. (shrink)

Phenomenology of illness has grown increasingly popular in recent times. However, the most prominent phenomenologists of illness defend a psychologizing notion of phenomenology, which argues that illness is primarily constituted by embodied experiences, feelings, and emotions of suffering, alienation etc. The article argues that this gives rise to three issues that need to be addressed. (1) How is the theory of embodiment compatible with the strong distinction between disease and illness? (2) What is the difference between problematic embodiment and illness? (...) (3) How is existential edification, that illness can give rise to according to the phenomenologists, to be understood? The article then engages in an analysis of Heidegger’s and Waldenfels’ phenomenology with the ambition of developing a notion of existence, which can transgress the psychologization of illness. Rather than arguing that illness is constituted by experiences of suffering and alienation, it emphasizes that broaches upon conatively guided activities constitute illness. (shrink)

This paper tackles the concept of alterity through an embodied perspective. By questioning my lived experience of cancer and how illness—as a disruptive event (Carel, 2008, 2016, 2021)—enables philosophical reflection and the exploration of ‘other’ ways of being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 2012 [1945]), I ask if an embodied ‘chimeric-thinking’ can be used to question established notions of alterity and reshape our relationship with ‘otherness’ (Leistle 2015, 2016b). Building on a phenomenological approach to illness (Carel 2012, 2014, 2016, 2021), and a feminist post-humanist (...) approach (Haraway 1990, 1991, 2016), I present a case in which an autoethnographic and phenomenological approach focused on embodied experience may help revise dominant perspectives, providing access to understanding and engaging with profound biopsychosocial and somatic transformations. (shrink)

The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory. In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such (...) parthood choices are based on non-naturalistic considerations. We demonstrate that even when parthood choices are based on the best way to preserve BST, there are counterintuitive results which bring the central tenet of BST into question. (shrink)

The oncological disease experience is counted as a wound in the body and mind attributable to a traumatic experience that fragments and disorients the person’s biography. The neoplasia leaves marks and scars in both somatic and existential level. The illness experience suggests to patient to look for meaning that cannot be unheard. The literature associating the concept of liminality in oncological disease to understand the process of meaning making. The definition of new horizons of meaning, generated by crossing the limen, (...) opens up a new self-awareness and worldview. The autopoietic dimension present in oncological disease reveals new scenarios of generativity and existential planning in the direction of self-realization in the cipher of the possible. The contribution presents the story of Anastasia, a 41-years-old nurse. A few months after her new marriage and close to a professional promotion, she receives the diagnosis of cholangiocarcinoma: a very aggressive, low-incidence, neoplasia, without specific therapeutic lines and with a negative prognosis. Anastasia’s words, thoughts and emotions, collected in the course of some testimonies in a university classroom, are analyzed and deciphered within the pedagogical paradigm, refering to the perspective of pedagogical problematicism and phenomenological pedagogy. (shrink)

In this paper we propose that our understanding of pathocentric epistemic injustices can be enriched if they are theorised in terms of predicaments. These are the wider socially scaffolded structures of epistemic challenges, dangers, needs, and threats experienced by ill persons due to their particular emplacement within material, social, and epistemic structures. In previous work we have described certain aspects of these predicaments - pathocentric epistemic injustices, pathophobia, and so on. We argue that thinking predicamentally helps us integrate the various (...) social, epistemic, and practical obstacles experienced by ill persons and also unify the many concepts available for theorising them (microaggessions, epistemic injustices, and so on). (shrink)

Melancholy occupies a privileged place in the Kantian taxonomy of temperaments since the pre- critical phase, but it is in the Nineties that it reveals its philosophical fecundity. Melancholy becomes, in fact, an interesting notion not so much because of its relationship with Kantian biography, nor because of its presence in the description of psychopathies, but because it lies, unique in this, on the borderline between pathology and sanity. Melancholy thus provides an opportunity to show the topicality of Kantian reflection (...) on mental illness since it underlines the continuity, and not the rupture, between the healthy mental state and that affected by illness, in line with today's most widespread tendencies to consider mental illness as a privileged observatory of the subject. (shrink)

Type 1 diabetes (T1D) is a chronic illness that requires intensive lifelong management of blood glucose concentrations by means of external insulin administration. There have been substantial developments in the ways of measuring glucose levels, which is crucial to T1D self-management. Recently, continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) has allowed people with T1D to keep track of their blood glucose levels in near real-time. These devices have alarms that warn users about potentially dangerous blood glucose trends, which can often be shared with (...) ther people. CGM is consistently associated with improved glycemic control and reduced hypoglycemia and is currently recommended by doctors. However, due to the costs of CGM, only those who qualify for hospital provision or those who can personally afford it are able to use it, which excludes many people. In this paper, I argue that unequal access to CGM results in: (1) unjust health inequalities, (2) relational injustice, (3) injustice with regard to agency and autonomy, and (4) epistemic injustice. These considerations provide prima facie moral reasons why all people with T1D should have access to CGM technology. I discuss the specific case of CGM policy in the Netherlands, which currently only provides coverage for a small group of people with T1D, and argue that, especially with additional considerations of cost-effectiveness, the Dutch government ought to include CGM in basic health care insurance for all people with T1D. (shrink)

Recent discussions about medical discourse seek to demonstrate the apparent and progressive oblivion of the subject as well as the notion of subjectivity in the development of modern medicine - in its foundations in clinical practice and basic theoretical framework. As a result, they show that medicine has evolved in the understanding of the disease, while still keeping the experience of suffering as a blind spot. The response is to carry out countless attempts to restore subjectivity in the therapeutic process (...) and medical discourse, aiming at an integral and humanized care in contrast to what we might call an exteriority discourse. Having as reference the analytical psychology of Jung and based on observations made in the public health service, we analyze how the experience of suffering is present in clinical practice and its consequences as expression of subjectivity to theoretical and practical fields. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty se vale de casos patológicos para elaborar una teoría de la percepción que ubica a la corporalidad como expresión central. El artículo indaga y problematiza la experiencia de enfermedad a partir de la propuesta fenomenológica en torno al cuerpo vivido o fe-nomenal. Repensar esta vivencia, desde las antípodas a un abordaje biomédico que la circunscribe a un cuerpo objetivo, permite considerarla a la luz de una perspectiva filosófica como instancia crítica. La experiencia de enfermedad, inaugura una disrupción en el (...) modo de ser-en-el-mundo e introduce la inhabitualidad, como dimensión que participa de una reconfiguración necesaria del esquema corporal. Este aspecto permite repensar los procesos de salud/enfermedad y discutir con concepciones de índole restitutivas, tan características a la hora de abordar los mismos.Merleau-Ponty uses pathological cases to elaborate a theory of perception that places corporality as the central expression. The article investigates and problematizes the experience of illness from the phenomenological proposal around the lived or phenomenal body. Rethinking this experience, from the antipodes to a biomedical approach that circumscribes it to an objective body, allows us to consider it in the light of a philosophical perspective as a critical instance. The experience of illness inaugurates a dis-ruption in the way of being-in-the-world and introduces the unusual, as a dimension that participates in a necessary reconfiguration of the body scheme. This aspect allows to rethink the health / disease processes and to discuss with concepts of a restorative nature, so characteristic when it comes to addressing them. (shrink)

According to evolutionary theory, humor is a psychological coping mechanism - a ploy that the human brain uses for conflict resolution. This study aims to investigate, through an autoethnographic approach based on one of the author's personal experience as a patient and as a doctor, and through theoretical elaboration, how humor can be understood, in its textual form, to improve the relationship between physicians, other healthcare personnel, and patients. Furthermore, it evaluates how humor can reduce the anguish produced by the (...) daily contact with disease, or at least can minimize some of the existential consequences of illness. This paper is a conceptualization of humor, anecdote, and "chiste" to understand why and how humor is perceived as a means of fostering closeness, understanding and even emotional protection of those involved in the healing process. (shrink)

Illness episodes are events in the life of patients, which stand out in their narratives. Being ill is to be interpreted as ill. In this hermeneutical process, the analysing of the story is decisive. The objective of our study has been to analyse the clinical interviews of patients with respiratory diseases. Through qualitative methodology, codes related to the experience of the disease were created. Subsequently, the textual content linked to the codes was discussed considering the contemporary hermeneutical philosophy. Text coding (...) of the text shows that the units of meaning related to respiratory disease occupy less than a half of those of the textual corpus. If we circumscribe the encounter from a conventional point of view, we can consider just of part of the speech of the patient, which is predetermined by our methods and conceptual networks. Human experience is associated with the act of telling in time. The testimonies show that health is an unconscious process, when everything flows smoothly, without obstacles. It is the ability to achieve vital goals. The disease alters the life of the patient, his projects and the previous balance. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial model, which was deeply influential on psychiatry following its introduction by George L. Engel in 1977, has recently made a comeback. Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett have argued that Engel’s original formulation offered a promising general framework for thinking about health and disease, but that this promise requires new empirical and philosophical tools in order to be realized. In particular, Bolton and Gillett offer an original analysis of the ontological relations between Engel’s biological, social, and psychological levels of (...) analysis. I argue that Bolton and Gillett’s updated model, while providing an intriguing new metaphysical framework for medicine, cannot resolve some of the most vexing problems facing psychiatry, which have to do with how to prioritize different sorts of research. These problems are fundamentally ethical, rather than ontological. Without the right prudential motivation, in other words, the unification of psychiatry under a single conceptual framework seems doubtful, no matter how compelling the model. An updated biopsychosocial model should include explicit normative commitments about the aims of medicine that can give guidance about the sorts of causal connections to be prioritized as research and clinical targets. (shrink)

Gaston Franssen’s essay touches on important medical and literary topics: the experience of patients with unexplained somatic complaints, the importance of giving their symptoms a name or diagnosis, the verbal representation of what bothers them, or the uncertainty all parties have to live with when an underlying cause of the symptoms is missing. A diagnosis or name such as chronic fatigue syndrome can be a relief for its sufferers, as is expressed by one of the patients in the article: “I (...) wept with relief at having a name for it.” Yet CFS is but a name for something that, medically speaking, has no substance except for the patients” complaints. CFS shares this lack of objective physical signs with other... (shrink)

In this chapter we suggest that many experiences of suffering can be further illuminated as forms of transformative experience, using the term coined by L.A. Paul. Such suffering experiences arise from the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. Such features can create a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valanced forms of epistemically and personally transformative experiences, as we detail here. We argue that the productive element of suffering experiences can be articulated as transformative, although suffering experiences (...) are not the type mostly discussed in the transformative experience literature. We correct for this here by developing a taxonomy of negatively valenced transformative experiences. We suggest three features that make such experiences ones of suffering, following Michael Brady’s definition: intensity, novelty, and attentional focus. Finally, we suggest that one possible explanation for the edifying capacity of suffering comes from it requiring more transformation than positive experiences. (shrink)

In Nietzsche the autobiographical theme of disease has at its core the philosophical problem of pain. While he reflects daily on the actual condition of the ill person, Nietzsche oscillates the man like a pendulum. He defines him as ‘the most melancholic and most happy animal who suffers so profoundly that he must invent laughter’, as ‘the ill animal’ but also ‘the most courageous and most used to pain’. Nietzsche seems to be entertained no end by playing around with these (...) definitions, almost as if he is making fun of Aristotle. It is in fact these two later quotations from the Genealogy that go on to construct the tracks on which his reflections on badness and suffering will move, marking out the area in which the decisive ‘match’ of the health of humanity is discussed. The first displays a Nietzsche who is always tranchant and blazing in its ability to conjure up the humanity of humans in few words. The highlight of the determinate article is original and shows that man is a unique animal who can define himself as being ill. The second suggests the image of a human being who tolerates pain with courage, arriving, just thanks to this journey of pain, to embark on a voyage leading to internal transformation. Nietzsche’s lifelong illness was what prompted him to develop the philosophical problem of pain and its relationship with thought. Taking advantage of his condition as a constant sufferer, Nietzsche strived to understand which directions human thought is able to take whenever it is ‘subjected to the pressure of evil’. The first is a hypocritical direction, represented by man’s attempts to remove pain from his life. Nietzsche denounces all justifications made for the purpose of providing at all costs a meaning for suffering, and which converge with the modern welfare society that dares to fashion mankind ‘without evil’. The other direction, however, is that of those who are not afraid to listen to suffering. Reflecting on his own personal situation, Nietzsche outlines the traits of human beings who reach out towards the mystery of existence and, shaken by the experience of pain, come to abandon their certainties and adopt a more critical view of themselves. ‘Every man is a medical history’, recites a posthumous fragment. Certainly, Nietzsche himself is the first to notice ‘his own story is the story of an illness and also of a healing’ – and this is not only true for him but for everyone who experiences suffering up close. This experience of pain – so intimate that it seems difficult to express in words – does not cause one to be locked up inside of oneself but rather serves to introduce a discussion on one’s subjectivity and as an occasion for a moral adventure into the profundities of one’s existence. (shrink)

Geleneksel tıptaki büyük ilerlemelere rağmen tamamlayıcı ve alternatif tıp (TAT) uygulamaları hala yaygın olarak kullanılmaktadır. TAT, geleneksel tıbbın bir parçası olarak görülmeyen, çeşitli tıbbi ve sağlık sistemlerini ve ürünlerini içeren uygulamalardır. Bu derlemede kalp hastalıklarında sıklıkla kullanılan TAT yöntemleri, hasta ve hastalık üzerine etkilerinden bahsedilecektir.

I introduce the concept pathophobia, to capture the range of morally objectionable forms of treatment to which somatically ill persons are subjected. After distinguishing this concept from sanism and ableism, I argue that the moral wrongs of pathophobia are best analysed using a framework of vice ethics. To that end I describe five clusters of pathophobic vices and failings, illustrating each with examples from three influential illness narratives.

According to the biomedical model of medicine, the subject of the illness event is the pathology rather than the person diagnosed with the disease. In this view, a body-self becomes a ‘patient’ body-object that can be enrolled in a therapeutic protocol, investigated, assessed, and transformed. How can it be possible for cancer patients to make sense of the opposite dimensions of their body-self and their body-diseased-object? Could a creative embodied approach enable the coping with trauma tied to the experience of (...) illness? By applying a phenomenological approach and auto-ethnographic analysis to the experience of cancer, this visual exploration provides support for rethinking the cancer event through a performative perspective. This work previews images and video material collected over ten years of haematological treatments, video dance performances and physical explorations. This work displays how processes of healing can be set in motion by creative embodied practices, physical explorations and unexpected journeys. By resisting the biomedical model and allowing the emergence of new meanings, it illustrates how dance and performative practices offer ground for transformation. (shrink)

Despite their shared origins, medicine and dentistry are not always two sides of the same coin. There is a long history in medical philosophy of defining disease and various medical models have come into existence. Hitherto, little philosophical and phenomenological work has been done considering dental caries and periodontitis as examples of disease and illness. A philosophical methodology is employed to explore how we might define dental caries and periodontitis using classical medical models of disease – the naturalistic and normativist. (...) We identify shared threads and highlight how the features of these highly prevalent dental diseases prevent them fitting in either definition. The article describes phenomenology and the current thought around the phenomenology of illness, exploring how and why these dental illnesses might integrate into a phenomenological model. We discover that there are some features particular to dental caries and periodontitis: ubiquity, preventability and hyper-monitorablility. Understanding the differences that these dental diseases have compared to many other classically studied diseases leads us to ethical questions concerning how we might manage those who have symptoms and seek treatment. As dental caries and periodontitis are common, preventable and hyper-monitorable, it is suggested that these features affect the phenomenology of these illnesses. For example, if we experience dental illness when we have consciously made decisions that have led to it, do we experience them differently to those rarer illnesses that we cannot expect? Other diseases share these features are discussed. This paper highlights the central differences between the classical philosophical notion of disease in medicine and the dental examples of caries and periodontitis. It suggests that a philosophical method of conceptualising medical illness - phenomenology - should not be applied to these dental illnesses without thought. A phenomenological analysis of any dental illness is yet to be done and this paper highlights why a separate strand of phenomenology should be explored, instead of employing those that are extant. The article concludes with suggestions for further research into the nascent field of the phenomenology of dental illness and aims to act as a springboard to expose the dental sphere to this philosophical method of analysis. (shrink)

In this bioethical poem, the narrator reflects on the experience of their father's degenerative illness, and decisions that must be made about whether to continue life support technologies such as ventilation and nutrition/hydration. What is it that is owed to family and patient at the end of life? What must no one who loves anyone ever do to the one they love?

In the context of the end of life, many authors point out how the experience of identity is crucial for the well-being of patients with advanced disease. They define this identity in terms of autonomy, control, or dependence, associating these concepts with the sense of personal dignity. From the perspective of the phenomenology of embodiment, Kay Toombs and other authors have investigated the ways disease can impact on the subjective world of patients and have stressed that a consideration of this (...) personal world can promote understanding and recognition of their experience. Based on the findings of qualitative studies of the perception of dignity and autonomy in patients at the end of life, this analysis assesses concepts such as being-in-the-world in illness, embodiment, lived body versus objective body or the gaze of the other from a Toombsian phenomenological perspective. (shrink)

The concepts of disease, illness and sickness capture fundamentally different aspects of phenomena related to human ailments and healthcare. The philosophy and theory of medicine are making manifold efforts to capture the essence and normative implications of these concepts. In parallel, socio-empirical studies on patients’ understanding of their situation have yielded a comprehensive body of knowledge regarding subjective perspectives on health-related statuses. Although both scientific fields provide varied valuable insights, they have not been strongly linked to each other. Therefore, the (...) article aims to scrutinise the normative-ethical implications of patient perspectives in building a bridge to the empirical ethics debates. Three potential fields of tension between the illness and the disease perspective are presented. Consequently, findings from empirical research examining patient perspectives on illness are displayed and the practical implications and associated ethical issues which arise are discussed. This leads to the conclusion that an explicit and elaborate empirical-ethical methodology is needed to deal appropriately with the complex interaction between patients’ views and the medico-professional view of disease. Kon’s four-stage model of normative-empirical collaboration is then applied against the background of empirical data on patient perceptions. Starting from this exemplary approach, the article suggests employing empirical-ethical frameworks for further research on the conceptual and normative issues, as they help to integrate perspectives from the philosophy of medicine with socio-empirical research. The combination of theoretical and empirical perspectives suggested contributes to a more nuanced discussion of the normative impact of patients’ actual understanding of illness. Further empirical research in this area would profit from explicitly considering potential ethical issues to avoid naturalistic fallacies or crypto-normative conclusions that may compromise healthcare practice. Vice versa, medico-theoretical debates could be enriched by integrating subjective views of those people who are immediately affected. (shrink)

This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...) an approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. (shrink)

Ill persons suffer from a variety of epistemically-inflected harms and wrongs. Many of these are interpretable as specific forms of what we dub pathocentric epistemic injustices, these being ones that target and track ill persons. We sketch the general forms of pathocentric testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, each of which are pervasive within the experiences of ill persons during their encounters in healthcare contexts and the social world. What’s epistemically unjust might not be only agents, communities and institutions, but the theoretical (...) conceptions of health that structure our responses to illness. Thus, we suggest that although such pathocentric epistemic injustices have a variety of interpersonal and structural causes, they are also sustained by a deeper naturalistic conception of the nature of illness. (shrink)

This paper contends, following Plato and Broekman, that seeing images as images is crucial to theorizing medicine and that considering clinical pictures as images of images is a much-needed epistemic complement to the domineering view that sees clinical pictures as mirrors of disease. This does not only offer epistemic, but also ethical benefits to individual patients, especially in those cases where patients suffer from chronic, debilitating, and terminal illnesses and where medicine provides no, or limited, answers in terms of treatment, (...) intervention, and meaning. By creating room for a theory of clinical pictures that rightfully emphasizes its pictorial nature, patients and doctors alike may be encouraged to consider under what authorship, and with which epistemic tools, alternative, supplemental images may be produced to get at the existential reality of disease and suffering. Ultimately, this paper argues that the epistemic tools provided by aesthetics may offer such glimpses into the reality of disease and suffering, and I conclude by discussing a few artistic renditions of breast cancer to illustrate my point. (shrink)

Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scienti c breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative bene cence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose (...) the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children. (shrink)

Engaging in self-narrative is often touted as a powerful antidote to the bad effects of illness. However, there are various examples of what may broadly be termed “aversion” to illness narrative. I group these into three kinds: aversion to certain types of illness narrative; aversion to illness narrative as a whole; and aversion to illness narrative as an essentially therapeutic endeavor. These aversions can throw into doubt the advantages claimed for the illness narrator, including the key benefits of repair to (...) the damage illness does to identity and life-trajectory. Underlying these alleged benefits are two key presuppositions: that it is the whole of one’s life that is narratively unified, and that one’s identity is inextricably bound up with narrative. By letting go of these assumptions, illness narrative advocates can respond to the challenges of narrative aversions. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Little is known about how hospitalized patients share decisions with physicians. METHODS: We conducted an observational study of patient-doctor communication on an inpatient medicine service among 18 hospitalized patients and 9 physicians. A research assistant (RA) approached newly hospitalized patients and their physicians before morning rounds and obtained consent. The RA audio recorded morning rounds, and then separately interviewed both patient and physician. Coding was done using integrated analysis. RESULTS: Most patients were white (61%) and half were female. Most (...) physicians were male (66%) and of Southeast Asian descent (66%). All physicians explained the plan of care to the patients; most believed that their patient understood. However, many patients did not. Physicians rarely asked the patient for their opinion. In all those cases, the decision had been made previously by the doctors. No decisions were made with the patient. Patients sometimes disagreed. CONCLUSIONS: Shared decision-making may not be the norm in hospital care. Although physicians do explain treatment plans, many hospitalized patients do not understand enough to share in decisions. When patients do assert their opinion, it can result in conflict. PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS: Some hospitalized patients are interested in discussing treatment. Improving hospital communication can foster patient autonomy. (shrink)

We propose that certain forms of chronic illness can be transformative experiences, in the sense described by L.A. Paul.

Antibiotic-resistant bacteria pose a serious threat to our health. Our ability to destroy deadly bacteria by using antibiotics have not only improved our lives by curing infections, it also allows us to undertake otherwise dangerous treatments from chemotherapies to invasive surgeries. The emergence of antibiotic resistance, I argue, is a consequence of various iterations of prisoner’s dilemmas. To wit, each participant (from patients to nations) has rational self-interest to pursue a course of action that is suboptimal for all of us. (...) The standard solutions to prisoner’s dilemma look to realign cost-benefit such that individuals’ interests match those of the collective. However, the lack of a global organization to enforce an effective carrot-and-stick system makes it unlikely that we can solve the antibiotic resistance problem this way. I argue that our best chance might be an attempt to teach altruism and convince individuals to act not out of their self-interests. (shrink)

This anthology provides a collection of new essays on ethical and philosophical issues that concern the development, dispensing, and use of pharmaceuticals. It brings together critical ethical issues in pharmaceutics that have not been included in any collection (e.g., the ethics of patients as researchers). In addition, it includes philosophical issues that are not within the traditional domain of applied ethics. For example, a game-theoretic approach to combating the emergence of antibiotic-resistent pathogens by spreading altruism. A tripartite distinction provides an (...) organized series of discussions that shows the interrelatedness of philosophical issues from the creation of pharmaceuticals, the creation of demand for them, through their delivery to their ultimate consumption. (shrink)

This piece returns to the writer’s memoir essays about her mother’s chronic lung disease to examine the relationship between the act of caregiving and the act of writing. In arguing for important differences between the clinical, healing imperatives of narrative medicine and the primacy for the writer of self-reflection, personal need and career, the essay demonstrates how writing remains in many ways at odds with the obligations and the hopes of caregiving. At the same time, the essay argues that writing (...) her mother’s stories of illness holds the potential for both honor and mutuality—and can, in fact, constitute a form of caregiving. (shrink)

An essay review of Havi Carel, 'Phenomenology of Illness' (OUP 2015).

Many people report that reading first-person narratives of the experience of illness can be morally instructive or educative. But although they are ubiquitous and typically sincere, the precise nature of such educative experiences is puzzling—for those narratives typically lack the features that modern philosophers regard as constitutive of moral reason. I argue that such puzzlement should disappear, and the morally educative power of illness narratives explained, if one distinguishes two different styles of moral reason: an inferentialist style that generates the (...) puzzlement and an alternative exemplarist style that offers a compelling explanation of the morally educative power of pathographic literature. (shrink)

We survey several ways in which the structures and norms of medicine and healthcare can generate epistemic injustice.

We defend a view of the distinction between the normal and the pathological according to which that distinction has an objective, biological component. We accept that there is a normative component to the concept of disease, especially as applied to human beings. Nevertheless, an organism cannot be in a pathological state unless something has gone wrong for that organism from a purely biological point of view. Biology, we argue, recognises two sources of biological normativity, which jointly generate four “ways of (...) going wrong” from a biological perspective. These findings show why previous attempts to provide objective criteria for pathology have fallen short: Biological science recognizes a broader range of ways in which living things can do better or worse than has previously been recognized in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

Today, phenomenology, with an emphasis on direct explanations with regard to the lived experience of people is interest of different areas. With emphasis on body, Merleau- Ponty's phenomenology is considered in medical science. In his phenomenology, Merleau- Ponty gives new definition of body and names it lived body. Lived body is against of mechanical body and is the central of subjectivity and being- in- the – world and included all of existential aspects of man. Such definition enable doctors to consider (...) all of existential aspects of man besides his physiological and same understanding of the disease based on the patient lived experience. This paper attempts to examine the implications of this new concept of the body as it is described in the medical field. (shrink)

The myriad controversies embroiling the mental health field—heightened in the lead-up to the release of DSM-5 —merit a close analysis of the field and its epistemological underpinnings. By using DSM as a starting point, this paper develops to overview the entire mental health field. Beginning with a history of the field and its recent crises, the troubles of the past “external crisis” are compared to the contemporary “internal crisis.” In an effort to examine why crises have recurred, the internal dynamics (...) of the field are assessed: applying Kuhn’s paradigmatic framework, crises are appraised to situate the differences between the natural sciences and the mental health field. Next, a Foucauldian analysis examines the functioning of the field’s power over the body, which is disproportionate in comparison to its scientific grounding. This is followed by investigating the field’s combination of contested scientific grounding and significant power, through a Latourian consideration of the assumptions and meaning behind the mental health field’s deployment of science. This includes scrutinizing the history of the classification of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The paper closes by assessing the field’s potential to address these issues effectively. (shrink)

Review of Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, ed James A Marcum.