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  1. The age of liberal adulthood: a puzzle for Rawlsians.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I present a puzzle for Rawlsians given an attractive way for them to approach defining an adult citizen.
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  2. Affording autistic persons epistemic justice.Janko Nešić - manuscript
    Autism is a psychopathological condition around which there is still much prejudice and stigma. The discrepancy between third-person and first-person accounts of autistic behavior creates a chasm between autistic and neurotypical (non-autistic) people. Epistemic injustice suffered by these individuals is great, and a fruitful strategy out of this predicament is much needed. I will propose that through the appropriation and implementation of methods and concepts from phenomenology and ecological-enactive cognitive science, we can acquire powerful tools to work towards greater epistemic (...)
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  3. On the Uses and Abuses of Celebrity Epistemic Power.Alfred Archer, Mark Alfano & Matthew Dennis - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    The testimonies of celebrities affect the lives of their many followers who pay attention to what they say. This gives celebrities a high degree of epistemic power, which has come under close scrutiny during the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper investigates the duties that arise from this power. We argue that celebrities have a negative duty of testimonial justice not to undermine trust in authoritative sources by spreading misinformation or directing attention to untrustworthy sources. Moreover, celebrities have a general imperfect duty (...)
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  4. Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter.Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela & Andrés Páez - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. (...)
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  5. Allies Against Oppression: Intersectional Feminism, Critical Race Theory, and Rawlsian Liberalism.Marcus Arvan - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Liberalism is often claimed to be at odds with feminism and critical race theory (CRT). This article argues, to the contrary, that Rawlsian liberalism supports the central commitments of both. Section 1 argues that Rawlsian liberalism supports intersectional feminism. Section 2 argues that the same is true of CRT. Section 3 then uses Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’—a classic work widely utilized in feminism and CRT to understand and contest many varieties of oppression—to illustrate how Rawlsian liberalism supports diverse feminist (...)
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  6. Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-19.
    Rima Basu and I have offered separate accounts of wokeness as an anti-racist ethical concept. Our accounts endorse controversial doctrines in epistemology: doxastic wronging, doxastic voluntarism, and moral encroachment. Many philosophers deny these three views, favoring instead some ordinary standards for epistemic justification. I call this denial the standard view. In this paper, I offer an account of wokeness that is consistent with the standard view. I argue that wokeness is best understood as “group epistemic partiality.” The woke person does (...)
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  7. Land as a Global Commons?Megan Blomfield - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Land is becoming increasingly scarce relative to the demands of the global economy; a problem significantly exacerbated by climate change. In response, some have suggested that land should be conceptualised as a global commons. This framing might seem like an appealing way to promote sustainable and equitable land use. However, it is a poor fit for the worldʼs land because global commons are generally understood as resources located beyond state borders. I argue that land can be seen to fit the (...)
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  8. Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.
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  9. Intellectual Humility, Testimony, and Epistemic Injustice.Ian M. Church - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, USA: Routledge.
    In this exploratory paper, I consider how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might contribute to the failure of testimonial exchanges. In §1, I will briefly highlight four broad ways a testimonial exchange might fail. In §2, I will very briefly review the nature of epistemic injustice. In §3, I will explore how both epistemic injustice and intellectual humility can lead to failures in testimonial exchange, and I’ll conclude by suggesting how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might be related.
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  10. Content Focused Epistemic Injustice.Robin Dembroff & Dennis Whitcomb - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    There has been extensive discussion of testimonial epistemic injustice, the phenomenon whereby a speaker’s testimony is rejected due to prejudice regarding who they are. But people also have their testimony rejected or preempted due to prejudice regarding what they communicate. Here, the injustice is content focused. We describe several cases of content focused injustice, and we theoretically interrogate those cases by building up a general framework through which to understand them as a genuine form of epistemic injustice that stands in (...)
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  11. One Too Many: Hermeneutical Excess as Hermeneutical Injustice.Nicole Dular - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    Hermeneutical injustice, as a species of epistemic injustice, is when members of marginalized groups are unable to make their experiences communicatively intelligible due to a deficiency in collective hermeneutical resources, where this deficiency is traditionally interpreted as a lack of concepts. Against this understanding, this paper argues that even if adequate concepts that describe marginalized groups’ experiences are available within the collective hermeneutical resources, hermeneutical injustice can persist. This paper offers an analysis of how this can happen by introducing the (...)
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  12. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Miranda Fricker. [REVIEW]Lauren Freeman - forthcoming - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy.
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  13. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Social Virtue Epistemology.
    I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social positions. A (...)
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  14. The Banality of Vice.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Alfano Mark, Colin Klein & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology.
    Ian James Kidd investigates how social forces shape epistemic character. I outline his proposed 'critical character epistemology' and I critically assess his discussion of the roles of salience in sustaining epistemic vice. -/- I emphasise how patterns of salience affect how social position—race, gender, class, and so on—shapes epistemic character. I dispute Kidd’s claim that all epistemic vices are salient. Instead, I argue, epistemic vice is camouflaged by ubiquity. Similarly, I dispute his claim that ‘normed-vices’ are particularly salient. -/- .
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  15. Developing Sensitivity to Structural Injustice in a Foundation Humanities Course in advance.A. Kelly Kathleen - forthcoming - Teaching Ethics.
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  16. Pathocentric epistemic injustice and conceptions of health.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - forthcoming - In Benjamin R. Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 00-00.
    In this paper, we argue that certain theoretical conceptions of health, particularly those described as ‘biomedical’ or ‘naturalistic’, are viciously epistemically unjust. Drawing on some recent work in vice epistemology, we identity three ways that abstract objects (such as theoretical conceptions, doctrines, or stances) can be legitimately described as epistemically vicious. If this is right, then robust reform of individuals, social systems, and institutions would not be enough to secure epistemic justice: we must reform the deeper conceptions of health that (...)
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  17. Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science.Carole J. Lee - forthcoming - In Jennifer Saul Michael Brownstein (ed.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    On the surface, developing a social psychology of science seems compelling as a way to understand how individual social cognition – in aggregate – contributes towards individual and group behavior within scientific communities (Kitcher, 2002). However, in cases where the functional input-output profile of psychological processes cannot be mapped directly onto the observed behavior of working scientists, it becomes clear that the relationship between psychological claims and normative philosophy of science should be refined. For example, a robust body of social (...)
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  18. Nonhuman Animals and Epistemic Injustice.Andrew Lopez - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    In this paper, I argue that nonhuman animals can be subject to epistemic injustice. I consider Miranda Fricker’s account of the harm of epistemic injustice and highlight that it requires a knower to be invested in being recognized as a knower. I argue that a turn away from a focus on testimony and concepts toward a consideration of the consequences of the distribution of epistemic resources can allow us to consider how epistemic injustice interacts with another form of knowledge: know-how. (...)
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  19. Deception-Based Hermeneutical Injustice.Federico Luzzi - forthcoming - Episteme:1-19.
    I argue that patients who suffer genital surgery to ‘disambiguate’ their sexual anatomy, a practice labelled ‘intersex genital mutilation’ by intersex advocates, can be understood as victims of hermeneutical injustice in the sense elaborated by Miranda Fricker. This claim is clarified and defended from two objections. I further argue that a particular subset of cases of IGM-based hermeneutical injustice instantiate a novel form of hermeneutical injustice, which I call deception-based hermeneutical injustice. I highlight how this differs from central types of (...)
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  20. Paul Hirst, Education and Epistemic Injustice.Alessia Marabini - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.
    In this paper I individuate and analyse a new type of epistemic injustice that can arise in education and depends on the so-called ‘backtracking fallacy’ in student assessment, which occurs when a teacher confuses (or does not distinguish between) the logical dimension of a framework of disciplinary concepts and its psychological dimension. I will also touch upon a different type of social injustice that might transpire in education. I suggest that familiarity with Paul Hirst's view of liberal education, which presupposes (...)
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  21. Moral emotions and unnamed wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice.Usha Nathan - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. By moral (...)
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  22. Disability and Social Epistemology.Joel Michael Reynolds & Kevin Timpe - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter canvases a number of ways that issues surrounding disability intersect with social epistemology. We begin with a discussion of how social epistemology as a field and debates concerning epistemic injustice in particular would benefit from further (a) engaging the fields of disability studies and philosophy of disability and (b) more directly addressing the problem of ableism. In section two, we turn to issues of testimony, “intuitive horribleness,” and their relationship to debates concerning disability and well-being. We address how (...)
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  23. How I Know What You Know.Shannon Spaulding - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Mentalizing is our ability to infer agents’ mental states. Attributing beliefs, knowledge, desires, and intentions are frequently discussed forms of mentalizing. Attributing mentalistically loaded stereotypes, personality traits, and evaluating others’ rationality are forms of mentalizing, as well. This broad conception of mentalizing has interesting and important implications for social epistemology. Several topics in social epistemology involve judgments about others’ knowledge, rationality, and competence, e.g., peer disagreement, epistemic injustice, and identifying experts. Mentalizing is at the core of each of these debates. (...)
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  24. Knowing Disability, Differently.Shelley Tremain - forthcoming - In Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina & Pohlhaus Jr (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge.
  25. The Politics of Relevant Alternatives.William Tuckwell - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    The main aim of this paper is to use the resources of relevant alternatives contextualism to provide an account of an unrecognized form of epistemic injustice that I call irrelevance injustice. Irrelevance injustice occurs either when a speaker raises an alternative that is not taken seriously when it should be, or when a speaker raises an alternative that is taken seriously when it should not be. Irrelevance injustice influences what alternatives are perceived to be relevant and patterns of knowledge ascriptions (...)
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  26. Audre Lorde’s Erotic as Epistemic and Political Practice.Caleb Ward - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    Audre Lorde’s account of the erotic is one of her most widely celebrated contributions to political theory and feminist activism, but her explanation of the term in her brief essay “Uses of the Erotic” is famously oblique and ambiguous. This article develops a detailed, textually grounded interpretation of Lorde’s erotic, based on an analysis of how Lorde’s essay brings together commitments expressed across her work. I describe four integral elements of Lorde’s erotic: feeling, knowledge, power, and concerted action. The erotic (...)
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  27. Injusticias Epistémicas en la Deliberación Democrática: El Caso de Las Personas Privadas de La Libertad.Jack Warman & Leandro De Brasi - forthcoming - In Cristián Santibáñez & Leandro De Brasi (eds.), Injusticias Epistémicas: Análisis y Contextos. Lima, Peru: Palestra Editores.
    En este capítulo, defendemos la tesis de que ciertas injusticias epistémicas relacionadas al testimonio que afectan a las personas privadas de la libertad están en tensión con la deliberación democrática. En la primera sección, ofrecemos una breve discusión de la noción de la deliberación democrática. En la segunda sección, presentamos cuatro variedades de injusticia epistémica relacionadas al testimonio. En la tercera sección, consideramos algunos casos de estas variedades de injusticia epistémica en el sistema carcelario a modo ilustrativo y explicaremos cómo (...)
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  28. When to Psychologize.A. K. Flowerree - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...)
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  29. Who Should We Be Online? A Social Epistemology for the Internet.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    From social media to search engines to Wikipedia, the internet is thoroughly embedded in how we produce, locate, and share knowledge around the world. Who Should We Be Online? provides an account of online knowledge that takes seriously the role of sexist, racist, transphobic, colonial, and capitalist forms of oppression. Frost-Arnold argues against analyzing internet users as a collection of identical generic people with smartphones. The novel epistemology developed in this book recognizes that we are differently embodied beings interacting within (...)
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  30. Commission to Inquire into Ireland's Mother & Baby Homes : an epistemology of ignorance.Katherine O'Donnell - 2023 - In Paul Giladi & Nicola McMillan (eds.), Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
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  31. Genozidleugnung: Organisiertes Vergessen oder Substanzielle Erkenntnispraxis?Melanie Altanian - 2022 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 9 (1):251-278.
    Die Begriffe "kollektive Amnesie" und "organisiertes Vergessen" werden oft verwendet, um Fälle zu beschreiben, in denen historisches Wissen, das im gesellschaftlichen, kollektiven Gedächtnis verfügbar sein sollte – weil es sich beispielsweise um gerechtigkeitsrelevantes Wissen handelt – aus unterschiedlichen, meist politisch problematischen Gründen nicht verfügbar ist. Beispielsweise, weil es gegebene Herrschaftsverhältnisse bedrohen würde. In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, weshalb diese Begriffe gerade in solchen Fällen irreführend sind. Insbesondere nationale Erinnerungspolitik kann oftmals aus Erkenntnispraktiken bestehen oder befördern, die nicht primär Vergessen (...)
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  32. 'Theorizing "Linguistic" Hermeneutical Injustice as a Distinctive Kind of "Intercultural" Epistemic Injustice'.Alicia García Álvarez - 2022 - In Noelia Bueno Gómez & Salvador Beato Bergua (eds.), Intercultural Approaches to Space and Identity. Nova Science.
    Literature on epistemic injustice has grown tremendously as an increasingly rich and diverse body of work in recent years. From the point of view of intercultural and anticolonial discussions, contemporary contributions have also helped to illuminate how epistemic injustice and other forms of cultural domination might be related to essential processes within the structures of colonial and racial supremacy. -/- This proposal aims to contribute to such relevant and illuminating discussions by focusing on the role that language and culture might (...)
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  33. Theorizing ‘Linguistic’ Hermeneutical Injustice as a Distinctive Kind of ‘Intercultural’ Epistemic Injustice.Alicia García Álvarez & Alicia García Álvarez - 2022 - Nova Science.
    Literature on epistemic injustice has grown tremendously as an increasingly rich and diverse body of work in recent years. From the point of view of intercultural and anticolonial discussions, contemporary contributions have also helped to illuminate how epistemic injustice and other forms of cultural domination might be related to essential processes within the structures of colonial and racial supremacy. -/- This proposal aims to contribute to such relevant and illuminating discussions by focusing on the role that language and culture might (...)
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  34. On the Relation Between Ignorance and Epistemic Injustice: An ignorance-first analysis.Zara Bain - 2022 - In Linsey McGoey & Matthias Gross (eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. London, UK: pp. 47-60.
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  35. Children and Marginalization: Reflections on Arlene Lo’s “Hermeneutical Injustice and Child Victims of Abuse”.Gary Bartlett - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (12):27-35.
    I am in almost complete agreement with Arlene Lo (2022). Child abuse victims surely suffer hermeneutical injustice if they are denied the concepts necessary to understand their experience, and that injustice is immensely harmful. In this reply, I offer an amendment to Lo’s use of Sally Haslanger’s distinction between manifest and operative concepts. I then raise some wider questions about the hermeneutical marginalization of children. The work that has so far been done on epistemic injustice against children has focused mostly (...)
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  36. Children, credibility, and testimonial injustice.Gary Bartlett - 2022 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (3):371-386.
    Several recent authors have argued that children are subject to testimonial injustice in the same way as are women, Blacks, and several other social identity groups. Testimonial injustice is standardly conceptualized, following Miranda Fricker’s seminal account, as a wrongful credibility deficit. I argue that this concept of testimonial injustice is too narrow to capture testimonial injustice against children. There is good reason to think that children are less reliable testifiers than adults, so it is not necessarily wrong to assign a (...)
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  37. Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)justice.John Beverley - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):431-454.
    Miranda Fricker's original presentation of Hermeneutical Injustice left open theoretical choice points leading to criticisms and subsequent clarifications with the resulting dialectic appearing largely verbal. The absence of perspicuous exposition of hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice might suggest scenarios exhibiting some – but not all – such hallmarks are within its purview when they are not. The lack of clear hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice, moreover, obscures both the extent to which Fricker's proposed remedy Hermeneutical Justice – roughly, virtuous communicative practices – (...)
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  38. Lyotard, 'The Differend', and the Philosophy of Deep Disagreement.James Cartlidge - 2022 - Synthese 200 (359):1-19.
    This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues not just that his work has relevance for this debate, but that it offers a challenge to the ‘epistemic paradigm’ present in its academic literature, represented by the two most prominent sets of theories within it – the ‘fundamental epistemic principle’ and ‘hinge epistemology’ views, arguably most strongly represented by Michael Lynch and Duncan Pritchard, respectively. Focussing on Lyotard’s text ‘The Differend’, (...)
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  39. Epistemic Injustice and Trans Lives.Matthew J. Cull - 2022 - In Trans Bodies, Trans Selves 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  40. Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness.Arianna Falbo - 2022 - Hypatia 37 (2):343-363.
    This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experience, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn’t result from a lack (...)
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  41. Est-ce que Vous Compute? Code-Switching, Cultural Identity, and AI.Arianna Falbo & Travis LaCroix - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (8).
    Cultural code-switching concerns how we adjust our overall behaviours, manners of speaking, and appearance in response to a perceived change in our social environment. We defend the need to investigate cultural code-switching capacities in artificial intelligence systems. We explore a series of ethical and epistemic issues that arise when bringing cultural code-switching to bear on artificial intelligence. Building upon Dotson’s (2014) analysis of testimonial smothering, we discuss how emerging technologies in AI can give rise to epistemic oppression, and specifically, a (...)
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  42. Testimonial Smothering’s Non-Epistemic Motives: A Reply to Goetze and Lee.Eric Bayruns García - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (11):18-20.
    I argue that according to Kristie Dotson, non-epistemic motives such as social, ethical and material harm can motivate a speaker to smother her testimony. I present this exegesis of Dotson's view of testimonial smothering in response to J. L. Lee's and Trystan Goetze's reply to my commentary of Lee's view that anticipatory epistemic injustice is distinct from testimonial smothering.
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  43. Hermeneutical Justice for Extremists?Trystan S. Goetze & Charlie Crerar - 2022 - In Leo Townsend, Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, Hans Bernhard Schmid & Michael Staudigl (eds.), The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions. New York: Routledge. pp. 88-108.
    When we encounter extremist rhetoric, we often find it dumbfounding, incredible, or straightforwardly unintelligible. For this reason, it can be tempting to dismiss or ignore it, at least where it is safe to do so. The problem discussed in this paper is that such dismissals may be, at least in certain circumstances, epistemically unjust. Specifically, it appears that recent work on the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice compels us to accept two unpalatable conclusions: first, that this failure of intelligibility when we (...)
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  44. Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard.Jumbly Grindrod - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):455-469.
    This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section argues that the possibility the epistemic standard could be raised in some epistemic inappropriate way warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier (...)
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  45. Illness Narratives and Epistemic Injustice: Toward Extended Empathic Knowledge.Seisuke Hayakawa - 2022 - In Karyn Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 111-138.
    Socially extended knowledge has recently received much attention in mainstream epistemology. Knowledge here is not to be understood as wholly realised within a single individual who manipulates artefacts or tools but as collaboratively realised across plural agents. Because of its focus on the interpersonal dimension, socially extended epistemology appears to be a promising approach for investigating the deeply social nature of epistemic practices. I believe, however, that this line of inquiry could be made more fruitful if it is connected with (...)
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  46. Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy.Sukaina Hirji - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (16).
    Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us, and our anger is a protest against our perceived mistreatment. In these cases, its function is to hold the abuser accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a different form (...)
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  47. Ameliorating Algorithmic Bias, or Why Explainable AI Needs Feminist Philosophy.Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Hsiang-Yun Chen, Ying-Tung Lin, Tsung-Ren Huang & Tzu-Wei Hung - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted to make decisions in domains such as business, education, health care, and criminal justice. However, such algorithmic decision systems can have prevalent biases against marginalized social groups and undermine social justice. Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a recent development aiming to make an AI system’s decision processes less opaque and to expose its problematic biases. This paper argues against technical XAI, according to which the detection and interpretation of algorithmic bias can be handled (...)
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  48. Manipulation, injustice, and technology.Michael Klenk - 2022 - In Fleur Jongepier & Michael Klenk (eds.), The Philosophy of Online Manipulation. New York: Routledge. pp. 108-131.
    This chapter defends the view that manipulated behaviour is explained by an injustice. Injustices that explain manipulated behaviour need not involve agential features such as intentionality. Therefore, technology can manipulate us, even if technological artefacts like robots, intelligent software agents, or other ‘mere tools’ lack agential features such as intentionality. The chapter thus sketches a comprehensive account of manipulated behaviour related to but distinct from existing accounts of manipulative behaviour. It then builds on that account to defend the possibility that (...)
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  49. Science, Trust and Justice: More lessons from the Pandemic.Faik Kurtulmuş - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (6):11-17.
    Take a question like the safety and effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. Whether an ordinary citizen or a public official can acquire the correct answer to this question depends on the functioning of the epistemic basic structure of their society. The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of “the institutions that have a crucial role in the distribution of knowledge, that is, in the production and dissemination of knowledge, and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate what is (...)
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  50. Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.
    In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...)
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