- Jury Theorems for Peer Review.Marcus Arvan, Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
- Support for Geometric Pooling.Jean Baccelli & Rush T. Stewart - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-40.details
- To be Scientific is to be Communist.Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
- Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
- Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science.Remco Heesen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
- Can Real Social Epistemic Networks Deliver the Wisdom of Crowds?Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-25.details
- Argumentative landscapes: the function of models in social epistemology.N. Emrah Aydinonat, Samuli Reijula & Petri Ylikoski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):369-395.details
- Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers.Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro & Bryan Frances - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1063-1073.details
- Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight?Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
- Disagreement in a Group: Aggregation, Respect for Evidence, and Synergy.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 184-210.details
- The Necessity of Commensuration Bias in Grant Peer Review.Remco Heesen - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (39):423--443.details
- Is Peer Review a Good Idea?Remco Heesen & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.details
- Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
- Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
- The Humility Heuristic, or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don’t Know.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (3):323-336.details
- Introducing the Argumentation Framework within Agent-Based Models to Better Simulate Agents’ Cognition in Opinion Dynamics: Application to Vegetarian Diet Diffusion.Patrick Taillandier, Nicolas Salliou & Rallou Thomopoulos - 2021 - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 24 (2).details
- Toward a general theory of knowledge.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):63-97.details
- A deference model of epistemic authority.Sofia Ellinor Bokros - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12041-12069.details
- Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
- The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science.Carole J. Lee - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):1026-1036.details
- Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):801-828.details
- A puzzle about experts, evidential screening-off and conditionalization.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):64-72.details
- On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):732-746.details
- Theory-choice, transient diversity and the efficiency of scientific inquiry.AnneMarie Borg, Daniel Frey, Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):26.details
- One standard to rule them all?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.details
- Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
- Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.details
- Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg, eds., Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press (2017), 240 pp., $85.00 (cloth). [REVIEW]Remco Heesen - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):192-198.details
- The credit incentive to be a maverick.Remco Heesen - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 76:5-12.details
- Epistemic Diversity and Editor Decisions: A Statistical Matthew Effect.Remco Heesen & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
- On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
- Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
- Spatial opinion dynamics and the effects of two types of mixing.Bert Baumgaertner, Peter A. Fetros, Stephen M. Krone & Rebecca T. Tyson - 2018 - Physical Review E 98 (2):022310.details
- A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers.Liam Kofi Bright, Haixin Dang & Remco Heesen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252.details
- When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.details
- The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
- Voting, deliberation and truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1-21.details
- When journal editors play favorites.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):831-858.details
- Why the Reward Structure of Science Makes Reproducibility Problems Inevitable.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):661-674.details
- Expediting the Flow of Knowledge Versus Rushing into Print.Remco Heesen - 2018 - PhilSci Archive.details
- Epistemic Landscapes Reloaded: An Examination of Agent-Based Models in Social Epistemology.Manuela Fernández Pinto & Daniel Fernández Pinto - 2018 - Historical Social Research 43 (1):48-71.details
- A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
- Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.details
- Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
- Crowdsourced science: sociotechnical epistemology in the e-research paradigm.David Watson & Luciano Floridi - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):741-764.details
- Is evidence of evidence evidence? Screening-off vs. no-defeaters.Roche William - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):451-462.details
- Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap.Liam Bright - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):421-442.details
- On fraud.Liam Kofi Bright - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):291-310.details
- Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized. Part One: General Agendas.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):747–786.details
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