62 found
Order:
See also
Bryan Frances
United Arab Emirates University
  1. Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  2. The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.
    Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  3. Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):18-26.
    Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2014 - Polity.
    Regardless of who you are or how you live your life, you disagree with millions of people on an enormous number of topics from politics, religion and morality to sport, culture and art. Unless you are delusional, you are aware that a great many of the people who disagree with you are just as smart and thoughtful as you are - in fact, you know that often they are smarter and more informed. But believing someone to be cleverer or more (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  5.  58
    Scepticism Comes Alive.Bryan Frances - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In epistemology the nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present, whispering that 'You can't know that you have hands, or just about anything else, because for all you know your whole life is a dream.' Philosophers have recently devised ingenious ways to argue against and silence this voice, but Bryan Frances now presents a highly original argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes defeat the traditional sceptic. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  6. Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    This is a short essay that presents what I take to be the main questions regarding the epistemology of disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  7. Philosophical Renegades.Bryan Frances - 2013 - In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-166.
    If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are false, either (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  8. Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):289-303.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live.Bryan Frances - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):559–595.
    I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here’s a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  10. Religious Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2021 - In Charles Taliaferro & Goetz (eds.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion.
    Many people with religious beliefs, pro or con, are aware that those beliefs are denied by a great number of others who are as reasonable, intelligent, fair-minded, and relatively unbiased as they are. Such a realization often leads people to wonder, “How do I know I’m right and they’re wrong? How do I know that the basis for my belief is right and theirs is misleading?” In spite of that realization, most people stick with their admittedly controversial religious belief. This (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  55
    Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers.Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro & Bryan Frances - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1063-1073.
    For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically—a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Review of "Scepticism Comes Alive".Bryan Frances - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):463-465.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  13. Scepticism and Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2018 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 581-591.
    There is a long history of using facts about disagreement to argue that many of our most precious beliefs are false in a way that can make a difference in our lives. In this essay I go over a series of such arguments, arguing that the best arguments target beliefs that meet two conditions: (i) they have been investigated and debated for a very long time by a great many very smart people who are your epistemic superiors on the matter (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.
    This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.
    Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Live Skeptical Hypotheses.Bryan Frances - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-245.
    Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, is plausible (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  17. Philosophical Expertise.Bryan Frances - 2018 - In James Chase & David Cody (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 297-306.
    Philosophical expertise consists in knowledge, but it is controversial what this knowledge consists in. I focus on three issues: the extent and nature of knowledge of philosophical truths, how this philosophical knowledge is related to philosophical progress, and skeptical challenges to philosophical knowledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. Rationally Held ‘P, but I Fully Believe ~P and I Am Not Equivocating’.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):309-313.
    One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Metaphysics, Bullshit, and the Analysis of Philosophical Problems.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11541-11554.
    Although metaphysics has made an impressive comeback over the past half century, there are still a great many philosophers today who think it is bullshit, under numerous precisifications of ‘That’s just bullshit’ so that it’s a negative assessment and doesn’t apply to most philosophy. One encounters this attitude countless times in casual conversations, social media, and occasionally in print. Is it true?
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Religious Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2015 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Routledge.
    In this essay I try to motivate and formulate the main epistemological questions to ask about the phenomenon of religious disagreement. I will not spend much time going over proposed answers to those questions. I address the relevance of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement. I start with some fiction and then, hopefully, proceed with something that has at least a passing acquaintance with truth.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.
    Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P's truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. In those situations (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.
    Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25.  81
    The Philosopher's Doom: Unreliable at Truth or Unreliable at Logic.Bryan Frances - 2019 - In Ted Poston & Kevin McCain (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism. Brill.
    By considering the epistemology and relations among certain philosophical problems, I argue for a disjunctive thesis: either (1) it is highly probable that there are (i) several (ii) mutually independent philosophical reductios of highly commonsensical propositions that are successful—so several aspects of philosophy have succeeded at refuting common sense—or (2) there is enough hidden semantic structure in even simple sentences of natural language to make philosophers highly unreliable at spotting deductive validity in some of the simplest cases—so we are much (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Plato’s Response to the Third Man Argument in the Paradoxical Exercise of the Parmenides.Bryan Frances - 1996 - Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):47-64.
    An analysis of the Third Man Argument, especially in light of Constance Meinwald's book Plato's Parmenides. I argue that her solution to the TMA fails. Then I present my own theory as to what Plato's solution was.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Spirituality, Expertise, and Philosophers.Bryan Frances - 2008 - In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-81.
    We all can identify many contemporary philosophy professors we know to be theists of some type or other. We also know that often enough their nontheistic beliefs are as epistemically upstanding as the non-theistic beliefs of philosophy professors who aren’t theists. In fact, the epistemic-andnon-theistic lives of philosophers who are theists are just as epistemically upstanding as the epistemic-and-non-theistic lives of philosophers who aren’t theists. Given these and other, similar, facts, there is good reason to think that the pro-theistic beliefs (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing.Bryan Frances - 2018 - Think 17 (50):27-38.
    One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn't have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Rationality of Religious Beliefs.Bryan Frances - 2015 - Think 14 (40):109-117.
    Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In this essay I explain why they think religious belief is rational. In a sequel essay I explain why they think the very same beliefs are irrational.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. The Irrationality of Religious Belief.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Think 15 (42):15-33.
    Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In my previous essay I explained why they think so many religious beliefs are rational. In this essay I explain why they think those same beliefs are irrational.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. How to Write a Good, or Really Bad, Philosophy Essay.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    This is an essay written for students regarding how to write a philosophy paper.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. The Epistemology of Disagreement.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - In Gerry Dunne (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy.
    Short introduction to the epistemology of disagreement.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. The Epistemology of Theistic Philosophers’ Reactions to the Problem of Evil.Bryan Frances - 2020 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):547-572.
    I first argue that, contrary to many atheistic philosophers, there is good reason to think the typical theistic philosopher’s retaining of her theism when faced with the Problem of Evil is comparatively epistemically upstanding even if both atheism is true and the typical theistic philosopher has no serious criticism of the atheist’s premises in the PoE argument. However, I then argue that, contrary to many theistic philosophers, even if theism is true, the typical theistic philosopher has no good non-theistic reasons (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Justifying a Large Part of Philosophy.Bryan Frances - 2019 - Think 18 (51):93-99.
    I explain why research in non-applied, non-interdisciplinary, non-historical philosophy is worthwhile. The key move in the explanation is the realization that many philosophical problems can be put in the form of a set of highly plausible yet apparently jointly inconsistent claims regarding a fundamental notion.Export citation.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic?Bryan Frances - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):479-488.
    I argue that, for all we know, there are perfectly ordinary actual entities that are temporal in the usual sense and yet never present, past, or future. This epistemic fact requires us to modify the theses of presentism and eternalism. More importantly, it generates three new and quite serious objections to presentism, which I formulate and partially evaluate in this paper.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. The Atheistic Argument From Outrageousness.Bryan Frances - 2018 - Think 17 (48):107-116.
    When pressed, many atheists offer three reasons why they reject theism: there is strong evidence against theism, there is no strong evidence for theism, and theism is so outrageous that it needs a great deal of support in order for us to believe it in a reasonable manner. I examine the third reason, arguing that it fails.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. The Beauty of Philosophy.Bryan Frances - manuscript
  41. Ontology, Composition, Quantification and Action.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):137-142.
    The literature on material composition has largely ignored the composition of actions and events. I argue that this is a mistake. I present a set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims regarding the connection between quantification and existence, the composition of physical entities and the logical forms of action sentences.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Disquotation and Substitutivity.Bryan Frances - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Kripke.Bryan Frances - 2011 - In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum. pp. 249-267.
    This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Why Afterimages Are Metaphysically Mysterious.Bryan Frances - 2018 - Think 17 (49):33-44.
    A short essay for a popular audience on why afterimages are difficult to fit into any ontology.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. “Please Explain What a Rigid Designator Is”.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    This is an essay written for undergraduates who are confused about what a rigid designator is.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Introduction to the Semantic Paradoxes.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    In this essay (for undergraduates) I introduce three of the famous semantic paradoxes: the Liar, Grelling’s, and the No-No. Collectively, they seem to show that the notion of truth is highly paradoxical, perhaps even contradictory. They seem to show that the concept of truth is a bit akin to the concept of a married bachelor—it just makes no sense at all. But in order to really understand those paradoxes one needs to be very comfortable thinking about how lots of interesting (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The Material Composition Problem.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    This is an essay for undergraduates. I set out the statue/clay problem and Tibbles/Tib in rich detail. I also present, with less detail, some other puzzles about material composition.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. The Ontology of Some Afterimages.Bryan Frances - 2017 - In Manuel Curado & Steven Gouvei (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 118-144.
    A good portion of the work in the ontology of color focuses on color properties, trying to figure out how they are related to more straightforwardly physical properties. Another focus is realism: are ordinary material objects such as pumpkins really colored? A third emphasis is the nature of what is referred to by the terms ‘what it’s like’ or ‘phenomenal character’, as applied to color. In contrast, this essay is exclusively about select color tokens. I will be arguing that whether (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
1 — 50 / 62