Ratio 32 (1):12-21 (2019)

Authors
Marc-Kevin Daoust
École de Technologie Supérieure
Abstract
It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent’s evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. My strategy relies on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. This gives rise to an important problem for those who argue that epistemic standards are permissive, since the reliability criterion is incompatible with such a type of Permissiveness.
Keywords Permissiveness  epistemic standards  reliability  Condorcet Jury Theorem  permissivism  uniqueness  epistemic rationality  standards of reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12201
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.
Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 298.

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Citations of this work BETA

Should Agents Be Immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.

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