Episteme 17 (1):64-72 (2020)

Authors
Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
I present a puzzle about the epistemic role beliefs about experts' beliefs play in a rational agent's system of beliefs. It is shown that accepting the claim that an expert's degree of belief in a proposition, A, screens off the evidential support another proposition, B, gives to A in case the expert knows and is certain about whether B is true, leads in some cases to highly unintuitive conclusions. I suggest a solution to the puzzle according to which evidential screening off is rejected, but show that the price of this solution is either giving up on the mere idea of deferring to expert's opinion or giving up on Bayesian conditionalization.
Keywords Bayesian conditionalisation  screening off  expert
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2018.17
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References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.
VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James M. Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.
The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.

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