Epistemic Diversity and Editor Decisions: A Statistical Matthew Effect

Philosophers' Imprint 19 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper offers a new angle on the common idea that the process of science does not support epistemic diversity. Under minimal assumptions on the nature of journal editing, we prove that editorial procedures, even when impartial in themselves, disadvantage less prominent research programs. This purely statistical bias in article selection further skews existing differences in the success rate and hence attractiveness of research programs, and exacerbates the reputation difference between the programs. After a discussion of the modeling assumptions, the paper ends with a number of recommendations that may help promote scientific diversity through editorial decision making.

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Author Profiles

Remco Heesen
London School of Economics
Jan-Willem Romeijn
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

When journal editors play favorites.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):831-858.
Values in Psychometrics.Lisa D. Wijsen, Denny Borsboom & Anna Alexandrova - forthcoming - Perspectives on Psychological Science.
The Necessity of Commensuration Bias in Grant Peer Review.Remco Heesen - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (39):423--443.

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References found in this work

Against method.Paul Feyerabend - 1988 - London: New Left Books.
The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
Is Peer Review a Good Idea?Remco Heesen & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):635-663.

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