Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):732-746 (2020)

Authors
Rush T. Stewart
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Michael Nielsen
University of Sydney
Abstract
Recent impossibility theorems for fair risk assessment extend to the domain of epistemic justice. We translate the relevant model, demonstrating that the problems of fair risk assessment and just credibility assessment are structurally the same. We motivate the fairness criteria involved in the theorems as also being appropriate in the setting of testimonial justice. Any account of testimonial justice that implies the fairness/justice criteria must be abandoned, on pain of triviality.
Keywords calibration  credibility  epistemic justice  testimonial justice  equalized odds  fair algorithms
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2019.1706183
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