Authors
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Abstract
There are many reasons we might want to take the opinions of various individuals and aggregate them to give the opinions of the group they constitute. If all the individuals in the group have probabilistic opinions about the same propositions, there is a host of aggregation functions we might deploy, such as linear or geometric pooling. However, there are also cases where different members of the group assign probabilities to different sets of propositions, which might overlap a lot, a little, or not at all. There are far fewer proposals for how to proceed in these cases, and those there are have undesirable features. I begin by considering four proposals and arguing that they don't work; then I'll describe my own proposal. In fact, my proposal breaks down into two proposals, each suited to a different purpose we might have when we aggregate. One purpose is descriptive, the other normative. In descriptive cases, we aggregate the individuals' credences in order to provide a compressed summary description of their opinions; in normative cases, we aggregate the credences to provide an account of the group's opinion, where the group is in some sense treated as an entity in its own rights.
Keywords judgment aggregation  opinion pooling  probability  group belief  awareness growth  collective belief  credences  expert judgment
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References found in this work BETA

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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