Capabilities for All?

Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):154-179 (2017)
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Abstract

The capability approach aims to ensure all individuals are able to form and pursue their own conception of the good, whilst the state remains neutral between them, and has done much to include oppressed and marginalised groups. Liberal neutrality and social inclusivity are worthy goals, yet I argue that Martha Nussbaum’s influential formulation of the capability approach, at least, cannot meet them. Conceptualising capabilities as opportunities to perform specific, valuable functionings fails to accommodate those who do not value, or cannot perform, these functionings. I therefore propose that the capability approach be modified, such that capabilities are conceptualised, instead, as opportunities to exercise control in certain central domains of our life.

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Jessica Begon
Durham University

Citations of this work

Disability: a justice-based account.Jessica Begon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):935-962.
Sexual Perversion: A Liberal Account.Jessica Begon - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (3):341-362.

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