Animal Captivity

When making decisions about action to improve animal lives, it is important that we have accurate estimates of how much animals are suffering under different conditions. The current frameworks for making comparative estimates of suffering all fall along the lines of multiplying numbers of animals used by length of life and amount of suffering experienced. However, the numbers used to quantify suffering are usually generated through unreliable and subjective processes which make them unlikely to be correct. In this paper, I (...) look at how we might apply principled methods from animal welfare science to arrive at more accurate scores, which will then help us in making the best decisions for animals. I argue that a combined use of both a whole-animal measure and a combination measurement framework for assessing welfare will give us the most accurate answers to guide our action. (shrink)

The authors critique the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which does not denounce continued captivity and invasive research in the pursuit of animal consciousness markers. They argue that such research often increases animal suffering by accepting harmful practices. Instead, they propose a nonanthropocentric, ethical framework aligned with the Belmont Report’s principle of beneficence, advocating for noninvasive methods in natural habitats. This approach prioritizes animal well-being, recognizing and safeguarding the intrinsic value of all conscious beings.

This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which (...) is critical of the Civil Law Rules on Robotics. The paper reviews issues related to the moral and legal status of intelligent robots and the notion of legal personhood, including an analysis of the relation between moral and legal personhood in general and with respect to robots in particular. It examines two analogies, to corporations and animals, that have been proposed to elucidate the moral and legal status of robots. The paper concludes that one should not ascribe moral and legal personhood to currently existing robots, given their technological limitations, but that one should do so once they have achieved a certain level at which they would become comparable to human beings. (shrink)

Exploring Topics in Non/human Coexistence serves as a unifying platform for individuals from diverse backgrounds who share a common goal of achieving total liberation and fostering coexistence between humans and nonhumans beyond the confines of our shared planet. The chapters delve into a wide range of subjects, including critical analyses of human/nonhuman interactions, strategies for enhancing liberation efforts, and the significance of drawing inspiration from nonhuman entities. Several chapters within this book push the field towards innovative pathways by proposing solutions (...) to detrimental practices and organizational frameworks. Moreover, they underscore the interconnectedness of animal advocacy with other social justice movements, thereby fostering collaboration among advocates of various liberation causes. Veganism, in its broadest sense, emerges as a recurring motif that threads together the diverse themes explored in this book, facilitating a cohesive approach towards anti-oppressive endeavors. To amplify the voices of marginalized communities, the editors have strategically positioned chapters authored by individuals of color and other underrepresented groups at the forefront of this book, granting them prominent roles in sections such as the foreword, preface, and afterword. This arrangement challenges content creators to redefine their understanding of 'meaningful' content creation, urging them to prioritize original insights, emotionally resonant narratives, and incisive critiques over recycled ideas that may saturate discourse and stifle diverse perspectives. Readers are encouraged to actively engage in alleviating nonhuman suffering while respecting the autonomy of nonhuman entities to flourish, equipping themselves with the skills necessary to discern between the two. This call to action underscores the imperative of fostering empathy and understanding in our interactions with the nonhuman world, paving the way for a more compassionate and inclusive future. (shrink)

Zoos are typically public attractions that do not explicitly, or through a more implicit culture, expect quietness from their guests. This paper will explore whether quietness is something we should aim for when we are visiting zoos. Primarily through analogy with other public spaces which share some of the key characteristics of zoos (libraries and schools, cinemas, theatres and galleries, war memorials, and hospitals and gardens), we suggest that quiet is indeed appropriate in zoos (more appropriate than being noisy). A (...) major component of this argument will be the exploration of what is meant by quiet (and noise), and outlining a concept of quietness based on an idea of attention. The central premise here, drawing upon theories of attention and love, is that noise involves a certain kind of outward expression, which leaves less room for the appreciation of, and attention to, the animals and information that the zoo provides. The article will reflect on how a call for quiet may create scope for enhancing the educational possibilities of zoos, and how zoos might profit by taking the acoustic dimension of visitor behaviour into account when considering their values. (shrink)

This paper examines existing frameworks for understanding domestication and proposes a domestication landscape framework. Driven by the selection pressures of captivity and/or mutualism within a domesticator-dominated environment, domestication is the generations-long multidirectional process through which a domesticate accumulates new genetic and behavioral traits, potentially causing reproductive isolation between wild and domestic forms of the domesticate organism. Rather than understanding domestication as fixed states in a wild/domestic binary, domestication can be best understood as a dynamic multidimensional process of growing and declining (...) domesticator influence on a domesticate’s genes and behavior. The categories, of wild, feral, tame, and domestic exist as blurry regions within a two-dimensional landscape that species will traverse at variable speeds. An organism’s path will vary depending on its environment and the particular domestication relationship at play. Domestication occurs through two potential pathways, either through captivity or through mutualism, though both may no longer be required once a domesticate’s dependence on the domesticator becomes clearly established. For the purposes of domestication, captivity requires intentional containment and resource dependence or reproductive control. When driven by mutualism, the domestication process does not require intent and, thereby, can occur with non-human domesticators. Alongside the coordinative consensus principle, the domestication landscape model can help achieve more functional pluralism between disciplines within domestication studies when organisms’ levels of genetic and behavioral influence are provided. Finally, this model suggests that while dingoes may have at one point been domesticated, it may be appropriate to view them as wild and perhaps even native organisms. (shrink)

This article argues in favour of voluntary active euthanasia in human beings on the grounds that we (society in general) perform euthanasia on valued companion animals when their suffering is considered great. I argue that suffering is a morally relevant criterion that should be considered in all cases (human and animal) of euthanasia. I further argue that human beings possess autonomy, a morally relevant difference to companion animals, that allows them to reason about their futures in a way that animals (...) cannot, which gives us more reason to grant euthanasia, if requested autonomously by terminally ill patients who are experiencing extreme suffering. I consider objections around the sanctity of human life and sufficient palliation. I argue that neither of these objections give sufficient reason to deny competent human beings euthanasia if autonomously requested. (shrink)

What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that (...) we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists. (shrink)

Venomous snakebite is a neglected tropical disease and disease of poverty, affecting hundreds of thousands of people annually. The only effective medical intervention for snakebite is antivenom, produced primarily using captive venomous snakes as a source of venom. This paper analyzes snakes’ welfare at venom labs within this global health context. I recommend significant changes to improve the welfare of captive snakes, particularly in light of recent ethological research and attention on snakes. These recommendations are broadly consequentialist, aiming to improve (...) the lives of the snakes and ensure that people have increased access to affordable antivenom. (shrink)

Happy cow messages are instances of commercial speech by the animal industry which, by action or by omission, mislead consumers about the harmful effects that the industry has for nonhuman animals, the environment, or human health. Despite their ubiquity, happy cow messages have received little philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to call attention to this form of speech, and to make the case for its restriction. To do so we first conceptualize happy cow messages. Second, we argue that they encroach (...) upon individual autonomy in two particularly objectionable ways: by impairing our ability to behave according to our moral convictions, and by thwarting our capacity to identify and reason about our moral duties. This, we hold, grounds a pro tanto case for stricter and more comprehensive regulations of commercial speech by the animal industry. Third, and against the objection that restricting happy cow messages would violate freedom of speech, we contend that none of the most influential arguments for free speech grants them protection. Indeed, we suggest, those rationales seem to call for their restriction. Fourth, and finally, we review some possible ways to defuse the misleading potential of happy cow messages through commercial speech regulations. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss the ethics of research suspensions in animal research facilities and the consequent (mis)treatment of laboratory animals during emergencies. Through a case study from Switzerland during the COVID-19 pandemic, we articulate ethical principles and moral considerations that ought to guide the treatment and care of laboratory animals within animal research facilities during emergencies. They include a principle of preparedness, the importance of recognizing animal laboratory personnel as essential workers and conducting a Harm-Benefit Analysis in the case (...) of an emergency, assigning responsibilities in a clear way, and providing psychological support in the aftermath of an emergency. More generally, we suggest that the pandemic should be taken as a learning opportunity for critically re-evaluating and improving emergency planning within animal research institutions worldwide, in view of mitigating risks to both human and animal well-being in future emergencies. (shrink)

With the aim of recovering some of their lived experiences, this chapter describes the lives of small horses who were forced to work in British coal mines. It does this from a critical perspective and looks at why and how thousands came to be transported and used, their loss of liberty, the difficult and dangerous labour forced upon them, the conditions under which they lived and the likely traumatic effects on the bodies and minds of these sentient and sensitive beings. (...) It suggests that if it was not for the prevailaing anthropocentric legal system, this would be understood as a crime of immense proportions perpetuated against those with no power to resist. (shrink)

One of the issues with introducing animal rights law is whether the problem is quantitative or qualitative, whether it can be achieved by working within existing legal paradigms or whether it requires a new set of paradigms. The answer is fundamental: a quantitative problem can be solved by applying more of the same solutions, while a qualitative problem requires completely different solutions. The qualitative camp can be represented by, say, Professor Gary Francione, demanding not only rights for animals but that (...) they have personhood and are no longer considered “property.” The quantitative approach can be finely represented by Professor David Favre, who has argued for many years that we can make progress by developing existing legal principles to give some rights to some animals, and he does so eloquently in his new book. He is clear in his view that progress is, and can continue to be, made with a series of steps, as he puts it, “climbing the slippery slope toward personhood” (p. viii).His case is supported by looking backward—progress made in establishing the rules governing humans in their relationships with animals—as well as forward to developments that will support continuing improvement in the lives of animals, not least the potential for technology (for example, through cell- and plant-based meat). At the same time, he also rightly rejects the concepts of animal welfare and animal rights being at odds, let alone either of them being a panacea for better lives for animals.One aspect of animal law that Favre believes does need to change is that of property status. As he says, the status of animals as personal property is “critical to the future of animal law” (p. 25). In general, the solutions have been largely binary—that animals simply cannot be property for them to have meaningful rights or that animals can be property and still have rights. The former makes intuitive good sense (and is consistent with the objectives of the human abolitionist movements) but would have enormous effects on economic activity throughout the world. The latter is appealing because it does not change the current paradigm, so can be developed more easily.Favre's premise is that we are moving toward rights for animals, so we need to find a way of integrating animals into the current legal system rather than having to destroy and reconstruct the legal system. His ingenious solution is to propose a fourth category of property, alongside real, personal, and intellectual property: “living property.”Within this category, he envisages using the common law concept of the trust to provide equitable “self-ownership,” where an animal has equitable “ownership” while a human retains legal “ownership.” He then connects this concept to adaptations in other aspects of law that start to recognize the selfhood of animals, creating a platform onto which broader and deeper rights for animals can develop, such as the status of “animalhood” (p. 72) and the corresponding legal right of consideration before decisions are made by the state affecting an animal's fundamental interests (such as continuing to be alive). By putting animals in a separate class—rather than uncomfortably leaving them in personal property—he creates a possible route for animal rights that seems less paradigm-busting than removing them from being property altogether.Drawing on evidence from criminal law, tort law, equity (trusts), property law, and family law, he shows how in many places—with a focus on states in the United States—existing laws are being adapted (“green shoots” p. 81) to recognize that animals are more than personal property, in ways that cannot be explained simply through the growth of regulations. For example, family law is starting to recognize that in the division of matrimonial assets, companion animals cannot be treated simply like any other personal property such as a table or a car based on who paid for them. Because animals are “living property,” the courts should take account of other aspects, such as who cared for the animals and who looked after them. Similarly, the concept of extending trust law so that an animal can be the beneficiary of a trust—in the same way as a human can be but inanimate personal property cannot—shows that the law can understand that companion animals can play a large emotional role in our lives (as well as we in theirs), such that we want to ensure proper care for them after we die.The book raises important issues. First, it is intentionally about domestic animals, with their close links with humans, so the potential for laws to engage is much easier than with, say, farmed animals. The danger with solutions that focus on domestic or charismatic animals (e.g., dogs, chimpanzees, elephants) is that the arguments may be pertinent essentially only to those species and therefore hard to apply to animals of less charismatic species, say in a factory farm (but who are present in much greater numbers and generally badly treated in comparison). He “leaves for another day” (p. 32) the discussion about other animals. Hopefully that day will come, as it would be interesting to see how Favre could extend his concept to animals for whom the public has less affection and less appreciation of their capacities (and for whom the prospect of death is much more real and imminent).Secondly, public support for these ideas about living property may simply not be present. If there is not a sufficient groundswell of support for changing the status of animals, then whether one proposes changing it to not-property or “self-owned” property doesn't matter (if someone doesn't like needles, it doesn't matter whether the needle you propose to use is big or small). This may be too pessimistic, of course (people can be helped to overcome a fear of needles, and one way to start is with small needles). Perhaps the law should start with small changes to recognize at least a few animals—their sentience, their capacities for pleasure and pain, their emotions and preferences, their potential for autonomy—and build public support from there.There is also the underlying and more radical point about whether these ideas—the trust for a beloved companion set up by the human, the divorce settlement that doesn't just give the companion to the party who paid for them—are actually bringing about changes for animals as such or are simply adapting laws to help humans, recognizing human needs, and do not actually change the status of animals. The ends are still humans, and the means are still animals.This is not intended to paint a bleak picture: The more bluntand uncompromising part of the animal rights movement that has been focused on the qualitative problem has hardly been successful at getting animal rights laws passed anywhere in the world, so everything that moves us closer to a better, richer, more thoughtful view of animals will help. Favre's approach has ingenuity, shows good sense, and has the potential to bring about real animal rights. The themes and cases in this book that show how courts and legislatures are becoming more aware of the sentience of at least some animals, as well as proposing a middle path in the debate about animals as property, are important in the journey toward recognition of animal rights. Even more important, they may actually work. (shrink)

The animal entertainment industry includes different practices. Some consist in torturing an animal to death, as in bullfighting and countless other popular traditions, while others involve watching an animal in captivity, which can be another form of torture. Perhaps the most profitable practice is forcing very intelligent animals to perform the same routine several times daily in zoos and aquariums containing marine mammals, or in circuses containing terrestrial mammals. These businesses then present the animals in whatever way that makes the (...) practice appear less immoral, claim to have education and conservation as their mission, and present their entertainment businesses as altruistic charities. Disseminating their misleading discourse is unethical. (shrink)

Animals in Brazil: Economic, Legal and Ethical Perspectives presents a broad overview of the complicated role of animals in Brazilian society. Its four substantive chapters survey the landscape of animal agriculture, animal protection laws, recent animal jurisprudence, and the underlying cultural factors that have shaped the Brazilian people's relationship with and treatment of animals. Despite the book's title, there is no chapter addressing economics. However, it represents the first book in English addressing the plight of animals in Brazil and makes (...) a marked contribution to animal ethics in Latin America. At its best, it is very good, and overall, the volume is a worthwhile addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in Brazilian animal law.The introduction by the book's editor, Carlos Naconecy, does exactly what an introduction should do: it succinctly describes the content of the chapters to follow. My quibble is that while Naconecy has excellent English and expresses himself well, the essay badly needed the editorial scrutiny of a native English speaker. The succeeding chapters each begin with an abstract, a simple but useful aid to any scholar who might not be interested in all of the issues the book covers.Chapter 1, “Food Animals in Brazil: Five Decades of Transformation,” ably describes Brazil's progression from a primarily subsistence-based agrarian culture to its full-scale embrace of industrial agriculture with all of its incumbent horrors. In just 50 years, Brazil has gone from a net importer to the world's second-largest exporter.The story of the country's transition to confinement, meat-based agriculture is all too familiar. It wrought havoc on community and family ties and overwrote traditional dietary practices, leading to widespread obesity, disease, and nutrient deficiencies. It also made indifference toward agricultural animals a new national norm. The level of cruelty that is both legal and common in Brazilian industrial agriculture would strain credulity if it weren't so similar to those of so many other countries. Indeed, the authors’ discussion of the systemic animal mistreatment, devastating environmental consequences, and accompanying cultural erosion in Brazil could easily have been cut and pasted into a chapter surveying the last 50 years in the United States.The second chapter is the strongest in the collection. “The Legal Protection of Animals in Brazil: An Overview” summarizes the country's animal-legal framework and situates it within the context of Brazil's constitutional prohibition against animal cruelty. The authors explain why the constitution offers little practical protection. Under the prevailing view, only those acts undertaken for the purpose of causing needless suffering constitute cruelty. Since much animal cruelty is ostensibly done for other reasons (food, science, etc.), the cruelty prohibition does not reach the majority of offenses.The authors next construct a syllogistic argument that the current legal classification of animals as “things” rather than beings who are the subjects of rights is logically and ethically flawed. Since cruelty involves suffering, and objects cannot suffer, and since animals suffer (otherwise animal cruelty laws would be pointless), then animals must be subjects of the law. Phrased differently, animals must be rights-holders. This leads into a compelling argument that the constitution not only supports but requires such an interpretation.“Cases and Debates in the Brazilian Animal Rights Arena” does exactly what its title suggests. It looks at recent animal-related judicial developments and situates them within a broader cultural and legal context. For example, the Supreme Court recently held that the Vaquejada, a rodeo-like event involving chasing and tackling terrified cows, was unconstitutional.Immediately following the decision, the legislature amended the constitution to classify the Vaquejada as an important cultural activity and thus protected under a different constitutional provision. The courts are currently considering whether that constitutional amendment is itself unconstitutional. We are further told about movements against foie gras and vivisection and about recent developments regarding custody disputes over domestic animal companions.The final chapter, “Factors That Influence the Brazilian Ethos Regarding Animals” is a broad discussion of the ways Brazilian history and culture have impacted attitudes toward animals. It is argued that because Brazil was the last Western country to eliminate slavery, Brazilians are more prone to treat animals like property and that the Brazilian temperament makes them more likely to be passionate than pragmatic. We also learn that a cultural reluctance to protest against social wrongs enables Brazilians to remain silent in the face of animal injustice and that the country's Catholic tradition instilled the idea that only people were made in the image of God and that animals therefore matter less. These observations strike me as overbroad and problematic. For example, millions of Brazilians have spent much of the past decade protesting government corruption, and the country has an impassioned animal advocacy movement. Furthermore, it is not clear that Brazilians necessarily treat animals differently than people from other countries with very different histories.Overall, Animals in Brazil begins the work of new scholarship in English on animals in the Brazilian context. The fact that some chapters are more informative and useful than others is an inevitable by-product of an edited volume and should not deter those interested in Brazilian animal law from reading it. The excellence of the first two chapters alone makes the book worthwhile. (shrink)

Visiting the zoo is often a joyful part of childhood. Some people say that zoos help educate people about animals and can help with conservation. Other people say that animals should be able to live in the wild. Young readers may have never considered this issue before, so learning the arguments and facts can help open their mind to new ideas about a familiar situation. This book provides readers with tools-including clear arguments, fact boxes, and a graphic organizer-to make their (...) own informed opinion on the topic of zoo animals. Readers will gain a deep understanding of the topic in this introduction to critical thinking. (shrink)

In 1979, the Council of the European Communities declared its intention to ban battery cages for laying hens; one year later, everything about the ban is forgotten. During this preparatory year (1979-1980), all that happened is the publication of scientific reports, that is, attempts at producing knowledge as a basis for and justification of the ban decision. This paper aims at understanding to what extent ignorance and doubt were produced instead. By examining the reports, I demonstrate that there are three (...) interrelated levels of ignorance production: (1) the missions given by the Commission to scientists were ambiguous, (2) questions inherent to animal welfare sciences, such as the significant variability of their measures and results, lead to a systematic standardization, and (3) the battery cage works as a techno-scientific promise and an “obligatory passage point” where scientists and industry meet. Disciplinary identity issues therefore lead scientists to adopt a double standard about the welfare of laying hens. (shrink)

Research in zoos is an important scientific endeavor that requires several complex considerations in order to occur. Among those many considerations are the ethics involved in conducting zoo research. However, it is not always clear how zoo researchers should go about resolving any research ethics matters, even determining when some type of research ethics committee should be involved in those deliberations. Our paper attempts to provide some resolutions for these issues, namely in three sections: (1) a brief history of human (...) and animal research ethics, (2) general guidelines for zoo research ethics applications, and (3) theoretical, ethical dilemmas at the zoo. In each section, we consider pragmatic attempts to resolve any issues, as well as provide examples to illustrate our points. The primary focus of the paper is to facilitate consideration of the wide array of ethical factors any zoo researcher might encounter, as well as provide a basic set of ethical guidelines for zoo research. We also emphasize the importance of the welfare of the animals for all zoo research projects. (shrink)

Jauernig defends the view that all living beings are of equal moral worth and are owed compassion, on account of which we are also obligated to adopt a vegan diet. Fischer denies that we have an obligation to become vegans, and argues for the position that humans morally matter more than all other living creatures.

In contemporary society, humans interact with nonhuman animals in a number of ways, many of which involve the captivity of the nonhuman animals involved. Nonhuman animals trained for sport (sled dogs, horses trained for dressage, etc.), nonhuman animals confined for human entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, etc.), and companion animals are all held captive by the human beings who interact with them. However, the moral acceptability of these forms of captivity seems to vary widely; this variance isn’t only a function of (...) the conditions of the captivity itself, but the reasons, attitudes, and intentions of the captors. Martha Nussbaum’s conception of species-specific flourishing allows for what she calls ‘respectful paternalism’ in the case of nonhuman animals, and in this paper, we will explore (a) Nussbaum’s account of ‘respectful paternalism’ as an aspect of justice that governs our interactions with nonhuman animals, (b) what the ‘respectful’ aspect of that paternalism involves by examining what it means for a captor to limit the autonomy of a nonhuman animal respectfully and (c) implications for our interactions with nonhuman animals in sport and entertainment environments. (shrink)

Understanding Animal Welfare, 2nd Edition is revised and expanded to incorporate new research and developments in animal welfare. Updated with greater accessibility in mind, the reader is guided through animal welfare in its cultural and historical context, methods of study, and applications in practice and policy. Drawing examples from farm, companion, laboratory and zoo animals, the text provides an up-to-date overview of research and its applications, while also tracing how concepts and methods have evolved over time. Originally intended for scientists (...) and professionals, Understanding Animal Welfare has also found a home in undergraduate classrooms. It is now the essential text for students, practitioners, veterinarians, and researchers in animal welfare and related fields. (shrink)

The case for an eco-emancipatory politics to release the Earth from human domination and free us all from lives that are both exploitative and exploited Human domination of nature shapes every aspect of our lives today, even as it remains virtually invisible to us. Because human beings are a part of nature, the human domination of nature circles back to confine and exploit people as well—and not only the poor and marginalized but also the privileged and affluent, even in the (...) world’s most prosperous societies. Although modern democracy establishes constraints intended to protect people from domination as the arbitrary exercise of power, it offers few such protections for nonhuman parts of nature. The result is that, wherever we fall in human hierarchies, we inevitably find ourselves both complicit in and entrapped by a system that makes sustainable living all but impossible. It confines and exploits not only nature but people too, albeit in different ways. In Eco-Emancipation, Sharon Krause argues that we can find our way to a better, freer life by constraining the use of human power in relation to nature and promoting nature’s well-being alongside our own, thereby releasing the Earth from human domination and freeing us from a way of life that is both exploitative and exploited, complicit and entrapped. Eco-emancipation calls for new, more-than-human political communities that incorporate nonhuman parts of nature through institutions of representation and regimes of rights, combining these new institutional arrangements with political activism, a public ethos of respect for nature, and a culture of eco-responsibility. (shrink)

Happy the elephant is intelligent, social, and self-aware--and considered a thing in the eye of the law. Led by lawyer Steven M. Wise, the Nonhuman Rights Project has filed cases on behalf of captive nonhuman animals like Happy since 2013, arguing that their autonomy entitles them to certain legal rights. In Thing: Inside the Struggle for Animal Personhood, comic artists Sam Machado and Cynthia Sousa Machado bring together Wise's groundbreaking work and their own illustrations in the first graphic nonfiction book (...) about the animal personhood movement. Beginning with Happy's story and the central ideas behind animal rights, Thing then turns to the scientists that are revolutionizing our understanding of the minds of such nonhuman animals as great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales. Combining legal and social history, innovative science, and illustrated storytelling, Thing presents a visionary new way of relating to the nonhuman world. (shrink)

Creative writing, transdisciplinary literary animal studies, and law-anthropology don’t often appear in the same sentence, but this interdisciplinary mingling is where we as editors meet in animal studies. We were particularly enthused by discussions that emerged during the Australasian Animal Studies Conference, held at the University of Sydney in November 2023, providing a rich source from which to consider the conference theme: ‘Animal Cultures’. Keynote speaker, Carol Gigliotti, wondered about the animal cultural research ideas that can be taken with us (...) to ‘make lives better for animals, both wild and captive'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Amicus BriefMartha C. Nussbaumii. summary of the argumentThis brief argues that the law requires reformation to protect our modern scientific and philosophical understanding that many animals can live their own meaningful lives and that the Court should reform the law in this case.1 Modern science demonstrates that elephants are complex beings that can form a conception of the self, as observed by Judge Fahey, form strong social and emotional (...) bonds among themselves and others, and that the Zoo's conduct harms Happy in both physical and intangible ways.Furthermore, this brief argues that the lower courts in Lavery I and II applied the wrong philosophical framework to the question of whether certain non-human animals should be considered legal persons. Instead of animal rights being based on the capacity to engage in a social contract and to bear legal duties, the proper framework for animal rights is the capabilities approach, which asks how the law can help animals like Happy not only live but thrive. Accordingly, this brief explains the importance of this appeal, the Court's opportunity to reform [End Page 15] the field of animal law, and the potential to release Happy from a life of captivity, ensuring she lives the rest of her life in a manner that respects her capabilities.iii. argument1. This Case Matters Because It Is Time to Reform the Law to Protect Our Modern Scientific and Philosophical Understanding That Many Animals Are Capable of Living Their Own Meaningful LivesModern science now recognizes a very important fact about many animals, including elephants. They are not merely biological units that simply need food and a suitable environment to survive and maintain a viable population. Today, scientists view many animals as beings capable of living their own meaningful lives. Early Indian and Roman cultures understood the complexity of animal lives and the implications of this complexity surrounding the humane treatment of animals; public awareness of this fact is widespread today. Almost all ancient Greek and Roman philosophical schools attributed complex forms of cognition and numerous emotions to animals,2 a precursor to our current laws against cruel practices to animals.What philosophy and, more recently, science have understood but the law has not, is that elephants are sentient beings who can feel emotion, foster relationships, create communities, and form a conception of the self. Our current legal system fails to respect species-specific, central capabilities. Although each of the fifty states has animal cruelty laws,3 these laws protect only a small number of animals and fail to constrain, to any meaningful extent, the widespread infliction of suffering. They ban only the intentional, purposeful suffering of some animals, and fail to recognize the impact that captivity, lack of relationships, and solitude cause a creature like Happy.This Court has the opportunity to create legal precedent that provides these living creatures the legal right to thrive and survive in ways that coincide with their specific capabilities, and prevent not only the infliction of physical pain, but emotional and psychological injury as well.2. The Magical Lives of ElephantsElephants are cognitive, complex creatures with distinct societies, emotions, and lives. They form societies that foster the wellbeing of each member, in which their emotions and development from childhood through adulthood are readily apparent.4 A combat staged between humans and elephants in 55 B.C. by the Roman leader Pompey paints a prime example of these complex emotions and connections with other animals, namely humans. Surrounded in the arena, the elephants perceived that they had no hope of escape. According to Pliny, the elephants then "entreated the crowd, trying to win its compassion with indescribable [End Page 16] gestures, bewailing their plight with a sort of lamentation."5 The audience, moved to pity and anger by their plight, rose to curse Pompey—feeling, wrote Cicero, that the elephants had a relation of commonality (societas) with humans.6 However, this connection with humans cannot be substituted for true, similar companionship from other elephants, which Happy has lacked for almost two decades.Elephants' ability to connect with other elephants and animals may be attributable to their long life spans; they are the most... (shrink)

On expectation, most wild animals have lives of net suffering due to naturogenic causes. Some have claimed that concern for their well-being gives us reasons to intervene in nature on their behalf. Against this, it has been said that many interventions to assist wild animals would be wrong, even if successful, because they would violate their freedom. According to the Freedom-based Approach I defend in this paper, this view is misguided. Concern for wild animal freedom does indeed gives us reasons (...) to secure these animals against control-undermining interferences, but also to intervene in nature in order to enrich their choices. (shrink)

Wildlife Ethics A systematic account of the ethical issues related to wildlife management and conservation Wildlife Ethics is the first systematic, book-length discussion of the ethics of wildlife conservation and management, and examines the key ethical questions and controversies. Tackling both theory and practice, the text is divided into two parts. The first describes key concepts, ethical theories, and management models relating to wildlife; the second puts these concepts, theories, and models to work, illustrating their significance through detailed case studies (...) on controversies in wildlife management and conservation. The book explores pressing topics including human responsibilities due to climate change, tradeoffs when managing zoonotic disease risks, the ethics of the wildlife trade, culling non-native species, indigenous wildlife use, and zoo-based conservation programs. Readers are encouraged to explore different ways of valuing wild animals and their practical implications. This essential text: Explains and explores relationships between valuing biodiversity, human utility, ecosystems, species, and animal welfare Describes established approaches to wildlife management, such as sustainable use, and emerging concepts, such as compassionate conservation Discusses key ethical theories, including utilitarianism, ecocentrism, and animal rights Offers a practical model of how to analyze ethical issues in wildlife management and conservation Wildlife Ethics: The Ethics of Wildlife Management and Conservation is an accessible introduction to complex ethical issues, making the book an important resource for students in fields such as conservation biology, ecology, environmental science and policy, game management, public health and veterinary medicine. It will also be an invaluable tool for wildlife managers, conservationists, One Health practitioners, practicing veterinarians and animal rehabilitation staff, contemporary wildlife professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Given the vast distances separating astronomical objects, multi-generational space travel may eventually become a practicable option in the future. Such an expedition would most likely include companion animals as well. Especially since they are deemed important in assisting humans to cope with stress and anxiety. However, just as with humans, extended periods of confinement would be detrimental to companion animals as well, resulting in psychological, physiological, and behavioural disorders. Already occurring to animals locked up in terrestrial households, it would be (...) an even bigger welfare problem during a life-long journey in a no-way-out confined spaceship. A conceivable solution could be to genetically enhance them to fit the spaceship environment. Assuming that companion animals will be part of future multi-generational space travels, this article aims at examining how such an experience would affect their welfare, even considering the implications of genetic adaptation. (shrink)

I argue for developing a unified moral framework for assessing human and nonhuman subjects research. At present, our standards for human subjects research involve treating humans with respect, compassion, and justice, whereas our ethical standards for nonhuman subjects research merely involve (half-heartedly) aspiring to replace, reduce, and confine our use of nonhuman animals. This creates an unacceptable double standard and leads to pseudo-problems, for example regarding how to treat human-nonhuman chimeras. I discuss general features that a more integrated moral framework (...) might have, assess the pros and cons of this kind of this framework, and suggest that the pros decisively outweigh the cons. (shrink)

Why can't we own people? Boyer proposes that the key consideration concerns inclusion in the moral circle. I propose an alternative, which is that specific mental capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, play a key role in determining judgments about human and animal ownership. Autonomous beings are viewed as owning themselves, which precludes them from being owned by others.

Tony Milligan argues that some forms of covert non-human animal rescue, wherein activists anonymously and illegally free non-human animals from confinement, should be understood as acts of civil disobedience. However, most traditional understandings of civil disobedience require that the civil disobedient act publicly rather than covertly. Thus Milligan’s proposal is that we revise our understanding of civil disobedience to allow for covert in addition to public disobedience. I argue we should not. Milligan cannot justify using paradigm cases to expand the (...) scope of civil disobedience without justifying similar reasons to limit the scope, and he does nto give convincing reasons for discarding the communication requirement, according to which an action cannot count as civil disobedience unless it is communicative. The immediate conclusion is that animal rescue is not civil disobedience, while the broader conclusion is one about civil disobedience more broadly: an act must be public to count as civil disobedience. (shrink)

Many nonhuman animals have the emotional capacities to form caring relationships that matter to them, and for their immediate welfare. Drawing from care ethics, we argue that these relationships also matter as objectively valuable states of affairs. They are part of what is good in this world. However, the value of care is precarious in human-animal interactions. Be it in farming, research, wildlife ‘management’, zoos, or pet-keeping, the prevention, disruption, manipulation, and instrumentalization of care in animals by humans is ubiquitous. (...) We criticize a narrow conception of welfare that, in practice, tends to overlook non-experiential forms of harm that occur when we interfere with caring animals. Additionally, we point out wrongs against caring animals that are not just unaccounted for but denied by even an expansive welfare perspective: The instrumentalization of care and caring animals in systems of use can occur as a harmless wrong that an approach purely focused on welfare may, in fact, condone. We should therefore adopt an ethical perspective that goes beyond welfare in our dealings with caring animals. (shrink)

Those who claim to be committed to the moral equality of animals don’t always act as if they think all animals are equal. For instance, many animal liberationists spend hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars each year on food, toys, and medical care for their companion animals. Surely, more animals would be helped if the money spent on companion animals were donated to farmed animal protection organizations. Moreover, many animal liberationists feed their companion animals the flesh of farmed animals, and (...) some let their cats roam outdoors, foreseeing that they will kill wildlife. Maybe these companion-animal loving animal liberationists are moral hypocrites. Or maybe their behavior is justified. I defend the latter claim. By developing an ethic that emphasizes the moral significance of life-meaning and recognizes the important role that companion animals play in giving meaning to human lives, I argue that there are stringent side-constraints that apply to companion animals, but not to other animals. Consequently, it isn’t hypocritical to prioritize companion animals over other animals. We can have (and value) our carnivorous companions and be animal liberationists too. (shrink)

Animal welfare theorists tend to assume that most animals in captivity—especially those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—can, with sufficient care and environmental enrichment, live genuinely good lives. This misguided belief stems from the view that animal well-being should be assessed only in terms of the felt experiences of animals. Against this view, I argue that in assessing how well an animal’s life is going, we ought to consider two distinct kinds of welfare: experiential welfare and subject welfare. Once (...) we take seriously the notion of subject welfare, which pertains to the non-sentient nature of animals, we will be forced to accept the unfortunate reality that most, if not all, animals in confinement—including those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—fare quite poorly and live lives that should be characterized as having overall ill-being. (shrink)

Animal welfare theorists tend to assume that most animals in captivity—especially those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—can, with sufficient care and environmental enrichment, live genuinely good lives. This misguided belief stems from the view that animal well-being should be assessed only in terms of the felt experiences of animals. Against this view, I argue that in assessing how well an animal’s life is going, we ought to consider two distinct kinds of welfare: experiential welfare and subject welfare. Once (...) we take seriously the notion of subject welfare, which pertains to the non-sentient nature of animals, we will be forced to accept the unfortunate reality that most, if not all, animals in confinement—including those living in our homes and in sanctuaries—fare quite poorly and live lives that should be characterized as having overall ill-being. (shrink)

There are many examples of human speciesism prejudice toward their specie and neglect toward members of other species. This article will consider one example of speciesism, the keeping of animals in captivity in ZOOs. Legal norms concerning animal protection in ZOOs are described, emphasising criminal and misdemeanour charges brought up for animal negligence and/or animal torture and their euthanasia. Although the ZOO establishment and functioning, as well as animal protection within ZOO, is legally prescribed, the article affirmed Visković’s thought that (...) not even in the most prosperous societies “there is no real moral or legal discipline in keeping and exhibiting captive fauna”. Speciesism believes justifying ZOO existence will be morally and ethically reexamined. Speciesism could be found in malicious language constructions affirmed in semantical field zoological garden in the Croatian language. (shrink)

Our topic is food that is "local, ethical, and sustainable." We defend a surprising claim about such a conception (at least, on certain ways of specifying its three central components): namely, that it may lend support to some varieties of “conscientious carnivorism.” We focus on an especially illustrative instance of (potentially) moral meat-eating: the case of Cinta Senese, a once-endangered pig that holds a special place in the cultural and environmental landscape in Tuscany, Italy. In Tuscany, Cinta Senese constitute a (...) robustly local food product (in the genealogical sense of "local"), where plausibly they lead quite worthwhile lives (in a welfarist sense of "worthwhile"). Further, the recent revival of their dwindling populations seemingly represents a “sustainability success” (in a conservationist sense). Thus, we argue that locavores with welfarist and conservationist proclivities may actually find that they have considerable reason to support, rather than to oppose, this form of animal agriculture – as well as others relevantly like it. (shrink)

Since Russell and Burch (1959) suggested the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement (3Rs) as a foundation for animal research, their influence has only grown in the research community. In this paper, we discuss whether the 3Rs can be constructively used as a prism to analyse decisions regarding the welfare of animals housed in zoos and aquariums (henceforth “zoo animals”). We analyse opportunities and challenges for each of the three Rs when applied to zoo animals. We discuss the following reasons (...) to consider the use of the 3Rs in relation to zoo animals: (1) there are similarities between motivations for housing animals in zoos and using them in research that are ethically relevant to consider; (2) the professional zoo community has committed to progress towards evidence-based best practice models to ensure and enhance the welfare of animals housed in zoos; and (3) there is a growing public concern regarding the welfare of zoo animals which can, to some extent, be met by viewing current practices through the prism of the 3Rs. (shrink)

We present ethical reasons that the court should grant the Nonhuman Rights Project’s (NhRP) request for habeas corpus relief for Happy, an elephant. Happy has a basic interest in not being confined, an interest that should be legally protected just as the human interest in not being confined is legally protected. Since the decision in The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Breheny failed to weigh Happy’s interests properly, we ask this body to correct the error.

Should the law recognize an elephant’s right to be released from solitary confinement? The New York State Court of Appeals—the highest court in the State of New York—will consider this question on May 18. At issue is an Asian elephant named Happy. But happy she is not. Every human being has a right to bodily liberty because they have strong interests that this right protects. Since Happy has the same strong interests, the Court should recognize Happy’s right to be freed (...) from solitary confinement. (shrink)

Intense or industrial animal husbandry is morally bad. This consensus in animal ethics led to the emergence of veganism which is recently in decline in favour of ‘conscientious carnivorism’ which advocates eating animal products from animal-friendly animal husbandry in response to the moral problems of industrial farming. Advocates of animal-friendly husbandry justify rearing and killing ‘happy animals’ by highlighting that the animals live pleasant lives and would not have existed if not reared for human consumption. In this paper, I tackle (...) this ‘logic of the larder’ by showing that it serves as a purification strategy to conceal the harm that animals experience in this alleged animal-friendly type of farming. Defenders of ‘happy meat’ claim that animal-friendly animal husbandry is in the animals’ best interests and that it is in effect a ‘win-win situation’ for humans and farm animals alike. Departing from two critics of animal-friendly animal husbandry, I will show that the problem of this logic is that it evades the fact that moral residuals, which is the experienced harm by the animals, remain by engaging in this practice. Even if there may be strong reasons for the consumption of meat and derivatives of ‘happy animals’, the experienced harm for the animals will not be extinguished. I will denote the detachment that derives from the strategy of rendering the animals’ experienced harm in animal-friendly animal husbandry invisible as guilt. I will conclude that instead of purifying eating animals the ‘good way’, we should face the responsibility we have when killing ‘happy animals’ for ‘happy meat’. (shrink)

Following recent arguments that cultural practices in wild animal populations have important conservation implications, we argue that recognizing captive animals as cultural has important welfare implications. Having a culture is of deep importance for cultural animals, wherever they live. Without understanding the cultural capacities of captive animals, we will be left with a deeply impoverished view of what they need to flourish. Best practices for welfare should therefore require concern for animals’ cultural needs, but the relationship between culture and welfare (...) is also extremely complex, requiring us to rethink standard assumptions about what constitutes and contributes to welfare. (shrink)

There is widespread and growing concern among U.S. consumers about the treatment of farmed animals, and consumers are consequently paying attention to food product labels that indicate humane production practices. However, labels vary in their standards for animal welfare, and prior research suggests that consumers are confused by welfare-related labels: many shoppers cannot differentiate between labels that indicate changes in the way animals are raised and those that do not. We administered a survey to 1,000 American grocery shoppers to better (...) understand the extent to which consumers purchase and pay more for food with certain labels based on an assumption of welfare improvement. Results showed that 86% of shoppers reported purchasing at least one product with the following labels in the last year: “cage or crate-free”, “free-range”, “pasture-raised”, “natural”, “organic”, “no hormone”, “no antibiotic”, “no rBST”, “humane”, “vegetarian-fed”, “grass-fed”, “farm-raised”. Of those who purchased one of the aforementioned labels, 89% did so because they thought the label indicated higher-welfare production practices, and 79% consciously paid more for the product with the label because they thought that the label indicated better-than-standard animal welfare. However, many of these labels lack uniform standards for the production practices they represent, and some labels represent production practices that do not influence animal welfare, thus the degree of the animal welfare impact of a given label is highly variable. These results indicate that labels need to clearly and accurately specify their animal welfare benefits to improve the consumers’ ability to purchase products that align with their expectations. (shrink)

A standard argument for ethical vegetarianism contends that factory farming – the source of nearly all animal products – is morally wrong due to its extreme cruelty, and that it is wrong to buy products produced in an extremely immoral manner. This article defends this argument against objections based on appeal to libertarian political philosophy, the supposed benefit to animals of being raised for food, and nonhuman animals’ supposed lack of rights.

The distinctive feature of a hybrid view (such as Nozick’s “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”) is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important (in proportion to the magnitude of those interests), but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any (...) other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting a hybrid view: a case-based argument; an autonomy-based rationale; and a rationale based in a capacity for what we call deep commitments. Finally, we discuss a way in which considerations about the moral significance of relationships might support an approximation of a hybrid view. (shrink)

Systems of oppression function by exploiting the most vulnerable amongst us. Where these oppressive systems overlap, the victims are pitted against one another. Slaughterhouses provide a particularly brutal example, wherein speciesism, capitalism, and carcerality intersect at the expense of their collective victims. In a dozen compelling essays from around the world, Vegan Entanglements: Dismantling Racial and Carceral Capitalism examines the ways human and animal bodies are controlled, manipulated, and sectioned within a system that commodifies labor, production, and individual beings for (...) profit. The book is divided into four sections: 1: The Intersection(s) Between Prison- and Animal-Industrial Complexes; 2: Critical Animal Geographies and the Panopticon; 3: Law, Veganism, and the Carceral State; and 4: Fighting for Our Collective Liberation with Consistent Anti-Oppression. (shrink)

Photo by Ricky Kharawala on Unsplash INTRODUCTION When people think of biomedical research, they often envision rats kept in cages with scientists in white coats and blue gloves checking on them, taking notes, and injecting them with substances. The images make some people uncomfortable, evoking a twinge of guilt as they think of the rats suffering. However, the idea that the sacrifice of a few mice saves thousands of human lives may outweigh their guilty conscience. Based on arguments for and (...) against non-human primate use in research, this paper concludes that NHP use is scientifically necessary but would be more ethically sound if novel policies and regulations were added to existing measures. l. Arguments that the Use of NHPs is Ethically Unjustified On one end of the spectrum, bioethicist Peter Singer argues that animals, including rats, should not be used in biomedical research at all.[1] He states that the use of animals is an indicator of speciesism.[2] Like racism, speciesism condemns exploiting a group, here, animals. Singer also challenges differentiating humans and animals based on sentience. He claims that if sentience, autonomy, and self-consciousness provided the basis to deprive animals of the same rights and privileges as humans, then humans who lack such traits would, theoretically, not be entitled to the rights and privileges that other humans have.[3] Lastly, Singer argues that using animals in experimentation forces researchers to acknowledge similarities between animals and humans.[4] If a human were to be largely stressed by an experiment, it may be safe to assume that animals, such as rats, would be as well. Beyond Singer, other authors suggest that it may be ethically impermissible to use NHPs as animal models in biomedical research. They emphasize NHPs’ phylogenetic similarities to humans and their need for more complex social, behavioral, and psychological care in a laboratory environment.[5] It is difficult to meet these needs, as researchers do not have the resources or the time to devote to consistently fulfilling them.[6] In addition, NHP use in the US compromises the integrity of the animal model itself. Most NHPs are imported from Asia, Africa, and South America as[7] there are relatively few captive breeding sites in the US.[8] These journeys are long and tedious, causing considerable stress on the animal.[9] Housing conditions, weaning, and quarantine practices further jeopardize animal welfare.[10] Climate change, new patterns in light-dark cycles, and different diets can alter the physical and social integrity of the NHP.[11] Some argue that NHPs should not be used in research due to their long lifespan. NHPs can be used for multiple experiments throughout their lifespan.[12] This can be physically and emotionally taxing on the animals, who would spend years in captivity.[13] Subjecting NHPs to multiple experiments inflicting varying levels of harm can be seen as a form of abuse. Forcing these highly social and complex animals to live in captivity their whole life, often in inadequate living environments that do not satisfy their complex needs, can result in immense suffering. As anti-vivisection and animal welfare organizations argue, the close phylogenetic similarity of NHPs to humans highlights that they suffer in similar ways to humans.[14] NHPs respond to pain, and they reflect upon pain as well.[15] Painful memories endure after experimentation, magnifying the suffering of the animal.[16] NHPs also exhibit a level of sentience comparable to humans. This challenges Cohen’s belief that animals have no rights since NHPs theoretically exercise and respond to moral claims to a certain degree.[17] NHPs demonstrate reflective self-awareness, a rudimentary theory of mind, linguistic abilities, and deep emotional attachments.[18] Given their cognitive complexity and sociality, some would argue that the benefits to the NHP should also be taken into account. NHP use in research rarely, if ever, benefits the NHP. For an animal that expresses a level of sentience, NFT use violates the research principles of autonomy and beneficence. ll. Arguments Favoring Ethical Use On the other end of the spectrum, bioethicist Carl Cohen argues that animals have no rights and research should freely use them.[19] Cohen claims that animals are incapable of exercising, or responding to, moral claims.[20] Thus, they cannot engage in free moral judgment. He notes that humans kill millions of animals daily for consumption, despite scientific advancements that have made animal consumption largely unnecessary. Thus, humans kill and consume animals purely for taste and pleasure in the modern day. Cohen questions why it would be ethically permissible to recreationally kill animals without benefit but impermissible to use animals to serve medical science and human advancement.[21] If the rats in cages were to be altered and a dog was in the place of the rat, more would object to Cohen’s utilitarian idea. As dogs are social beings that form bonds with humans, their suffering to save human lives evokes different emotional reactions and is ethically problematic. The closer the bond between an animal and humans, the more unethical their research use seems to be. The ethical implications of animal use reach a pinnacle when the previous example uses a monkey. NHPs are the closest phylogenetic relatives of humans.[22] NHPs exhibit high levels of intelligence, reflective self-awareness, self-recognition, linguistic abilities, and distinct personalities.[23] Similar to humans, NHPs create social mechanisms in which they transmit learned behaviors and customs.[24] NHPs have proven valuable in the advancement of science and medicine. Approximately 100,000 to 200,000 NHP’s are used annually for research worldwide.[25] The use of NHPs has been rising due to increasing research on monoclonal antibodies, in which NHP’s are the only animal that can be used for preclinical safety studies.[26] lll. The Middle of the Spectrum: Permissible Use This paper argues that using NHPs as animal models in biomedical research is ethically permissible. NHPs are very phylogenetically similar to humans, making them the ideal models to represent humans in biomedicine.[27] The Weatherall Report, published in 2006, argues that the use of NHPs in research is “not only morally accepted, but morally required.”[28] However, the Report specifies that this argument is credible only if there are no more effective ways of pursuing the research in question.[29] The report outlines a utilitarian approach to the need for NHPs in research.[30] The report claims that, while NHPs are harmed in research, the harm is necessary to prevent harm to humans.[31] While relatively few NHPs are used in research, the number of humans that benefit from the harm decreases the net harm under a utilitarian approach.[32] Given an NHP’s long lifespan and ability to learn social tasks,[33] an NHP may be used for one study in which it learns a specific skill, then used in subsequent studies that require demonstration of the skill,[34] resulting in the sacrifice of fewer animals for medical research. The similarity of NHPs to humans both socially and cognitively may increase better animal welfare practices in the laboratory and a net reduction in harm to animal models in general. For example, positive reinforcement rather than physical restraint can be used with NHPs, encouraging researchers to treat NHPs with more respect than other animals. Exposure to signs of suffering may lead researchers to adopt research practices that are more humane and minimize the harm to animals.[36] To be ethical, scientists must consider the importance of the research and the inability to use other animals. If the research can be performed another way, the use of NHPs would not be morally justified. Despite the ethical dilemmas, utilitarianism is the best approach to animal research. NHPs’ expressing a cognitive and emotional complexity does not outweigh the benefit to humans as animal models in research. As with the rules surrounding human research subjects, research using NHPs requires protection of the research subjects and requires attention to the scientific benefits. Current policies guided by Russell and Burch’s “3 R’s Principle” reduce the harm to NHPs.[37] The Principle states that in research, there should be a “replacement of animals with non-animal methods;” “reduction of the number of animals used to obtain information of a given amount and precision;” and “refinement of scientific procedures and husbandry to minimize suffering and improve animal welfare.”[38] A stringent set of rules and regulations govern NHP use.[39] The 2000 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act legally prohibits the euthanasia of chimpanzees used in biomedical research.[40] The Act mandates the creation of sanctuaries where chimpanzees can be retired and cared for until their death.[41] Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees regulate the use of NHPs and serve as ethical regulatory committees similar to Institutional Review Boards overseeing human subjects research.[42] IACUCs prohibit academic or commercial research on NHPs unless researchers are appropriately trained, procedures for independent oversight are established, use of the specific species is justified, and the data’s significance is established.[43] The United Kingdom American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has stated that NFT use can occur only if other species are unsuitable for reaching scientific gains.[44] [45] lV. Recommendations While the above policies build a strong foundation to ensure that the research setting ethically respects NPHs, more can be done. Limiting continuous research on one NFT and limiting the number of studies an NHP can participate in would protect the NFT and could consider the level of harm an NHP is exposed to per study. To meet the complex needs of NFTs, animal research labs should be created for NHP use only and should include comprehensive care and specialized captivity practices. [46] A ranking system for labs could help distinguish which labs have enough protective measures and a complex environment to be entitled to engage in NHP research. Similar to biosafety levels from one to four for research labs, with each level requiring unique sets of protective measures, animal research labs should be created for NHP use that requires the implementation of specific captivity practices. CONCLUSION NHPs have contributed greatly to the scientific community and the advancement of modern medicine. As emotionally and cognitively sophisticated beings, they need special protections in research contexts. As utilitarianism calls for their continued use to save human lives, improving their care in captivity is important to ethical research practices. Policies similar to those regulating human subjects in research should be implemented to protect them. This paper, therefore, sought to offer novel solutions, such as creating a ranking system for animal research laboratories and limiting the number of studies in which an animal can be used. - [1] Singer, Peter. “Equality for Animals?” In Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [2] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [3] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [4] Singer, “Equality for Animals?” [5] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [6] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [7] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [8] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [9] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [10] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [11] Carlsson, Hans‐Erik, Steven J. Schapiro, Idle Farah, and Jann Hau. "Use of Primates In Research: A Global Overview." American Journal of Primatology: Official Journal of the American Society of Primatologists 63, no. 4 : 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20054 [12] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [13] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [14] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [15] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [16] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [17] Cohen, Carl. "The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.". https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp [18] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in science and research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [19] Cohen, Carl. "The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.". https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp [20] Cohen, “The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.” [21] Cohen, “The case for the use of animals in biomedical research.” [22] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [23] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in science and research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [24] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [27] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [28] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [29] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [30] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [31] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [32] Gardar, “The ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research.” 328-331 [33] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [34] Tardif et al., “IACUC review of nonhuman primate research.” 234-235 [35] Olsson, I. Anna S., and Peter Sandøe. "“What’s wrong with my monkey?” Ethical perspectives on germline transgenesis in marmosets." Transgenic research 19, no. 2 : 181-186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11248-009-9316-6 [36] Olsson et al., “What’s wrong with my monkey?” [37] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [38] Prescott, “Ethics of primate use.” 11-22 [39] Phillips, Kimberley A., Karen L. Bales, John P. Capitanio, Alan Conley, Paul W. Czoty, Bert A. ‘t Hart, William D. Hopkins et al. "Why primate models matter." American journal of primatology76, no. 9 : 801-827. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.22281 [40] Carlsson, Hans‐Erik, Steven J. Schapiro, Idle Farah, and Jann Hau. "Use of primates in research: a global overview." American Journal of Primatology: Official Journal of the American Society of Primatologists 63, no. 4 : 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.20054 [41] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [42] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC Review of Nonhuman Primate Research." ILAR Journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040 [43] Phillips, Kimberley A., Karen L. Bales, John P. Capitanio, Alan Conley, Paul W. Czoty, Bert A. ‘t Hart, William D. Hopkins et al. "Why primate models matter." American journal of primatology76, no. 9 : 801-827. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.22281 [44] Prescott, Mark J. "Ethics of primate use." Advances in Science and Research 5, no. 1 : 11-22. https://doi.org/10.5194/asr-5-11-2010 [45] Article 7 of Directive 86/609/EEC in the European Commission on the Protection of Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes states that “in a choice between experiments, those which use the minimum number of animals, involve animals with the lowest degree of neurophysiological sensitivity, cause the least pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm, and which are most likely to provide satisfactory results, shall be selected.” [46] Tardif, Suzette D., Kristine Coleman, Theodore R. Hobbs, and Corrine Lutz. "IACUC review of nonhuman primate research." ILAR journal 54, no. 2 : 234-245. https://doi.org/10.1093/ilar/ilt040. (shrink)

Zoos and aquariums have an enormous global reach and hence an ability to craft meaningful conservation action for threatened species, implement educational strategies to encourage human engagement, development and behavior change, and conduct scientific research to enhance the husbandry, roles and impacts of the living collection. The recreational role of the zoo is also vast- people enjoy visiting the zoo and this is often a shared experience amongst family and friends. Evaluating how the zoo influences this “captive audience” and extending (...) its reach to include a compassionate approach to animals and people can further enhance the mission, value, and relevance of their work. The modern zoo’s current aims—Conservation, Education, Research and Recreation—provide useful foundations for the activities that zoos conduct at a local and national level. However, to improve sustainability of their actions and outcomes, we feel that Wellbeing should become the fifth aim of the modern zoo for the future- both from an animal perspective and from a human perspective. This paper provides discussion and review of how Wellbeing is already a substantial part of what zoos work on as well as posing the idea of altering the Recreation aim of the zoo to one of Engagement, which potentially is more measurable and therefore can allow zoo researchers and managers further options for the collection of evidence on the local and global reach of their zoo’s aims. Education, Engagement, Conservation, Research and Wellbeing provide a more complete picture of the roles of the modern zoo for the animals, human visitors and workforce, and to society more widely. (shrink)

Freedom is among the central values in political philosophy. Freedom also features heavily in normative arguments in ethics, politics, and law. Yet different sides often invoke freedom to establish very different conclusions. Some argue that freedom imposes strict constraints on state power. For example, when promoting public health, there is a limit on how far the state can interfere with individual freedom. Others, in contrast, argue that freedom is not just a constraint but also an important goal of state power (...) and collective action. Good public health policy, for example, promotes people’s freedom. Of course, different arguments often draw on different theories of freedom. So, to evaluate such arguments, we need to analyze these different theories and their implications and assess their plausibility. -/- The broadly liberal tradition views freedom as being about external options. Such theories typically start with an account of when someone has a specific freedom or unfreedom to do something. For example, some argue that only a narrow set of interpersonal interferences count as constraints on freedom. Others argue that a far broader set of factors, including ill health and natural constraints, can reduce one’s freedom. -/- Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship has increasingly recognized that to use liberal freedom in normative arguments, one must move beyond specific freedom and unfreedom. Most laws and policies both subtract and add specific freedoms. What matters is how a person’s freedom is affected overall. Philosophers and economists have thus engaged in intricate debates about how to measure overall freedom. Moreover, policies and law affect not only one person at one point in time but also multiple persons across time. So, liberal freedom-based arguments also require distributive criteria for intertemporal and interpersonal distributions of freedom. -/- In the early 21st century, republicanism has developed into a prominent alternative to liberal theories. Republicans argue that being a free person is not just, or not even primarily, about liberal option-freedom. Freedom requires being free from dominating power. Republicans and liberals have engaged in a lively debate on who offers the better theory. In developing the republican ideal, republicans also engage in intramural debates. For example, is domination primarily an interpersonal or structural phenomenon? And what economic institutions does republicanism imply? -/- Theorizing around freedom has become richer and moved from narrower questions regarding specific freedom and unfreedom to overall freedom and to republican theories of nondomination. But recent theorizing also seeks to extend its focus and scope. Historically, theorizing started with the freedom of able-bodied male citizens within nation states. Recent theorizing shifts the focus to include issues around gender, disability, freedom at the international level, and the freedom of nonhuman animals and future generations. Beyond fascinating implications of existing theories, a more inclusive focus is likely to also yield important lessons on how current theories can be improved. (shrink)