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  1. Mind, Body, Space, and Time.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  2. A Simple View of the Mind, Instinct & Intuition.Yoji K. Gondor & Joseph Krecz - manuscript
    Abstract: The understanding our own mind seems to be an interesting topic in philosophy. I recall reading Kant, he ran far away in the metaphysical space when chalanged complex problems. He used the “intuition” as a mean to justify things, much before the awareness of scientific genetics and such things that made it feasible for such a use. Not much else he could do, the 18th century access to scientific knowledge was just very limited. My view of instinct and intuition (...)
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  3. On the notion of existence.Piotr Witas - manuscript
    I argue that a slight shift in our understanding of the notion of existence is needed in order to cope with the problem of external world and the problem of mind and body. As a consequence of it being taught by "givenness" of the subjective mind, and despite its applicability in objective contexts, it should be considered a "tool" akin to qualia, rather than pertaining to a "true", objective reality. In plain language, one's supposed relation with their surroundings is known (...)
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  4. The Substrate-Prior of Consciousness.Gabriel Leuenberger -
    Given functionally equivalent minds, how does the expected quantity of their conscious experience differ across different substrates and how could we calculate this? We argue that a realistic digital brain emulation would be orders of magnitude less conscious than a real biological brain. On the other hand, a mind running on neuromorphic hardware or a quantum computer could in principle be more conscious than than a biological brain.
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  5. The Epistemic Insignificance of Doxastic Wronging.DiDomenico David - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophy Review.
    Doxastic wronging is wronging that occurs in virtue of a belief. What epistemic significance, if any, does doxastic wronging have for the normativity of inquiry? Recently, some philosophers have defended views according to which doxastic wronging has an epistemic impact on the norms governing belief formation and revision. In this paper, I sketch a theory of the zetetic significance of doxastic wronging that denies its epistemic significance. In other words, although doxastic wronging is relevant to the normativity of inquiry, it (...)
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  6. Might Technology Undermine First-Person Authority?Casey Doyle - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    No. The paper focuses on self-knowledge of attitudes like belief, desire, and intention. It motivates a constraint on when it is rational to treat a source as an authority. Then, drawing on the “transparency” of belief and other attitudes, it argues that the constraint is not satisfied in the case of knowing one’s own mind by relying on AI or any other technology. Against some AI optimists, the paper argues that there are principled reasons why the task of knowing one’s (...)
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  7. Miracle of Mindreading: A Discussion of Adam Toon’s Mental Fictionalism.Agata Machcewicz-Grad - forthcoming - Philosophia.
    In this paper, I provide a critique of the version of mental fictionalism presented in the recent book by Adam Toon (2023). I contend that Toon’s attempt to reconcile the explanatory power of folk psychology with the denial of its substantial ontological commitments eventually fails. I point out three worries regarding Toon’s position. First, I argue that his claim that folk psychological metaphors are about behaviour – although they are untranslatable into descriptions of behaviour – looks ad hoc. As such, (...)
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  8. It is never rational for anyone to believe they don't know the logical truth.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    Let T be any logical truth. Does the subject know that T (any random subject)? It is not rational for any subject to believe that they don’t, whoever they are. Similarly, it is not rational for them to believe that their evidence doesn’t support T, and it is not even rational for them to believe that they don’t believe that T. It is not rational for anyone anywhere at any time to believe that they don’t know that T. Such are (...)
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  9. Beyond the mirror: An action-based model of knowing through reflection.Jedediah Allen - 2024 - Frontiers in Developmental Psychology 2:1-11.
  10. Knowing what it is like and the three "Rs".Yuri Cath - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    There is an intimate relationship between our experiences and our knowledge of what it is like to have those experiences. For having an experience of Φ-ing is clearly an important way of coming to know what it is Φ, and some philosophers have even suggested that it is the only way of coming to possess such knowledge. But despite this intimate connection, we often possess WIL-knowledge after any generating experience has ended. How is this possible? One popular suggestion, roughly following (...)
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  11. Knowing What It Is Like.Yuri Cath - 2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...)
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  12. Extended mentality and ascriptive authority.Benjamin Winokur - 2024 - Synthese 204 (1).
    Self-ascriptions of one’s current mental states often enjoy a distinctively strong presumption of truth. Some philosophers claim that this ascriptive authority is _non-transferable_ in the sense that it cannot be matched or surpassed by anyone else. In this paper I examine this non-transferability claim in the light of potential extended mentality cases. These cases threaten to show that popular accounts of ascriptive authority do not vindicate its alleged non-transferability. However, I also argue that a less popular account of ascriptive authority (...)
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  13. Comment comprendre un être dépourvu de langage?Benoit Gaultier - 2023 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 119 (3):353-369.
    Répondre à la question de savoir comment comprendre un être dépourvu de langage implique de savoir quels types d’attitudes intentionnelles, et avec quels contenus, il est possible de lui attribuer. On examinera ici trois réponses « différentialistes » à cette dernière question, d’après lesquelles une différence de catégorie ou de nature sépare, s’agissant de ces attitudes et de leurs contenus, les êtres pourvus de langage, tels les humains, et ceux qui en sont dépourvus, tels les animaux. On discutera en particulier (...)
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  14. Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.
    I propose an account of desire that reconciles two apparently conflicting intuitions about practical agency. I do so by exploring a certain intuitive datum. The intuitive datum is that often when an agent desires P she will seem to immediately and conclusively know that there is a reason to bring P about. Desire-based theories of reasons seem uniquely placed to explain this intuitive datum. On this view, desires are the source of an agent’s practical reasons. A desire for P grounds (...)
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  15. I Feel You: Toward a Schelerian Conception of Empathy.Jean Moritz Müller - 2023 - In Christiana Werner (ed.), Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 272-295.
    In his The Nature of Sympathy, Max Scheler (2007 [1923]) offers an intriguing, if puzzling, account of empathy. According to this account, empathy is a specific kind of feeling through which we are immediately aware of others’ emotions but which is not itself an emotion and doesn’t require us to have those emotions ourselves. Moreover, qua immediate awareness of others’ emotions empathy is supposed to afford understanding why they feel those emotions. Although having echoes with ordinary discourse and experience, Scheler's (...)
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  16. A Framework for Studying Consciousness.Jeremy Horne - 2022 - CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century 9 (1):29.
    Scholars have wrestled with "consciousness", a major scholar calling it the "hard problem". Some thirty-plus years after the Towards a Science of Consciousness, we do not seem to be any closer to an answer to "What is consciousness?". Seemingly irresolvable metaphysical problems are addressed by bootstrapping, provisional assumptions, not unlike those used by logicians and mathematicians. I bootstrap with the same ontology and epistemology applicable to everything we apprehend. Here, I argue for a version of the unity of opposites, a (...)
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  17. How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.
    Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue (...)
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  18. Panpsychism and ensemble explanations.Han Li & Bradford Saad - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3583-3597.
    Panpsychism claims that the vast majority of conscious subjects in our world are inanimate and physical. Ensemble explanations account for striking phenomena by placing them within an ensemble of outcomes, most of which are not striking. This paper develops an explanatory problem for panpsychism: panpsychism renders two appealing ensemble explanations unsatisfactory. Specifically, we argue that panpsychism renders unsatisfactory the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.
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  19. Maps, Language, and the Conceptual–Non-Conceptual Distinction.Mariela Aguilera & Federico Castellano - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (2):287-315.
    To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck draws on an apparent dichotomy between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, (...)
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  20. The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.
    Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very (...)
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  21. Phenomenal transparency and the transparency of subjecthood.Kevin Morris - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):39-45.
    According to phenomenal transparency, phenomenal concepts are transparent where a transparent concept is one that reveals the nature of that to which it refers. What is the connection between phenomenal transparency and our concept of a subject of experience? This paper focuses on a recent argument, due to Philip Goff, for thinking that phenomenal transparency entails transparency about subjecthood. The argument is premissed on the idea that subjecthood is related to specific phenomenal properties as a determinable of more specific determinates. (...)
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  22. The Epistemic Status of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3251-3270.
    Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a justified belief on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing (...)
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  23. The "Ten-Percent Brain Myth" guided with the Fundamentals of Jaina's Theory of Knowledge.Megha Arora - 2020 - International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24 (08):5977-5982.
    Great religions to pragmatic capacities sporadically abound in the stories of supernatural phenomena which subsumes telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. However, unfortunately treated as the topics of spiritualism, witchcraft and edification, not the materials of Scientific Enquiry. Whatsoever, have been deciphered about these queer speculations, the most prevalent sole concept is : namely, that there can be senseexperiences from the realm which is not accessible to human brain and sense organs. Possessor of these senses which are not currently accessible to average (...)
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  24. Empiricist Intuitions Arise from an Ontological Dissonance: Reply to Carruthers.I. Berent - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):220-229.
    People are systematically biased against the possibility that ideas are innate. Berent (2020) traces these attitudes to an ontological dissonance, arising from the collision of two fundamental principles of human cognition -- dualism and essentialism. Carruthers (this issue) challenges this hypothesis and attributes our empiricist bias primarily to mindreading intuitions. Here, I counter Carruthers' concerns and show that mindreading cannot be the sole source of the empiricist bias. Specifically, mindreading fails to explain why our empiricist intuitions depend on the perceived (...)
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  25. How Mindreading Might Mislead Cognitive Science.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):195-219.
    This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...)
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  26. Explaining the Empiricist Bias: Reply to Berent.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):230-235.
    Berent (this issue) critiques one of the three main proposals put forward by Carruthers (this issue), who suggests that cognitive scientists are biased against innateness-claims by the tacit assumptions of the mentalizing faculty. Berent proposes, instead, that the bias results from dissonance produced by a conflict between our innate dualism and our innate essentialism. The present response raises a number of difficulties for her argument.
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  27. Intellectually Humble, but Prejudiced People. A Paradox of Intellectual Virtue.Matteo Colombo, Kevin Strangmann, Lieke Houkes, Zhasmina Kostadinova & Mark J. Brandt - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):353-371.
    Intellectual humility has attracted attention in both philosophy and psychology. Philosophers have clarified the nature of intellectual humility as an epistemic virtue; and psychologists have developed scales for measuring people’s intellectual humility. Much less attention has been paid to the potential effects of intellectual humility on people’s negative attitudes and to its relationship with prejudice-based epistemic vices. Here we fill these gaps by focusing on the relationship between intellectual humility and prejudice. To clarify this relationship, we conducted four empirical studies. (...)
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  28. Remembering: Epistemic and Empirical.Carl F. Craver - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):261-281.
    The construct “remembering” is equivocal between an epistemic sense, denoting a distinctive ground for knowledge, and empirical sense, denoting the typical behavior of a neurocognitive mechanism. Because the same kind of equivocation arises for other psychologistic terms (such as believe, decide, know, judge, decide, infer and reason), the effort to spot and remedy the confusion in the case of remembering might prove generally instructive. The failure to allow these two senses of remembering equal play in their respective domains leads, I (...)
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  29. Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.
    This paper disputes the widespread assumption that beliefs and desires may be attributed as theoretical entities in the service of the explanation and predic- tion of human behavior. The literature contains no clear account of how beliefs and desires might generate actions, and there is good reason to deny that principles of rationality generate a choice on the basis of an agent’s beliefs and desires. An alter- native conception of beliefs and desires is here introduced, according to which an attribution (...)
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  30. Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).
    Recently, a view I refer to as “hypothetical continuism” has garnered some favour among philosophers, based largely on empirical research showing substantial neurocognitive overlaps between episodic memory and imagination. According to this view, episodically remembering past events is the same kind of cognitive process as sensorily imagining future and counterfactual events. In this paper, I first argue that hypothetical continuism is false, on the basis of substantive epistemic asymmetries between episodic memory and the relevant kinds of imagination. However, I then (...)
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  31. Putnam et McDowell sur les objets de l'introspection.Michael Murez - 2020 - Klesis 47:183-218.
  32. Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):664-682.
    Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by natural selection and (...)
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  33. Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas on the Nature of Signs.Mercedes Rubio - 2020 - In Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Alfredo Storck & Alfredo Culleton (eds.), Homo, Natura, Mundus: Human Beings and Their Relationships (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 22). Brepols. pp. 477-488.
  34. Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołęga & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive (...)
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  35. Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.
    Self‐ascriptions of desire seem to differ in their epistemic security. There are easy cases in which a sincere self‐ascription immediately counts as knowledgeable, and there are hard cases in which it is an open question whether an agent actually knows that they have the desire that they take themselves to have. In this paper, I suggest an explanation according to which whether a self‐ascription of desire is easy or hard depends on whether one is familiar with the content of the (...)
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  36. Epistemic Territory.Jennifer Nagel - 2019 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93:67-86.
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  37. Reseña de ' Filosofía en un Nuevo Siglo ' (‘Philosophy in a New Century’)por John Searle (2008) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Reality Press. pp. 125-144.
    Antes de comentar sobre el libro, ofrezco comentarios sobre Wittgenstein y Searle y la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Los ensayos aquí son en su mayoría ya publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en (...)
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  38. Reseña de ‘Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy’ de Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Reality Press. pp. 145-167.
    The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...)
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  39. Otro retrato de caricatura de la mente de la metafísicos reduccionista-un review de Peter Carruthers ' La Opacidad de la Mente ' (The Opacity of Mind) (2011) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Reality Press. pp. 222-249.
    El materialismo, el reduccionismo, el Behaviorismo, el funcionalismo, la teoría de los sistemas dinámicos y el computacionalismo son puntos de vista populares, pero Wittgenstein demostró que no era coherente. El estudio del comportamiento abarca toda la vida humana, pero el comportamiento es en gran medida automático e inconsciente e incluso la parte consciente, expresada principalmente en lenguaje (que Wittgenstein equipara con la mente), no es perspicuo, por lo que es fundamental tener un marco que Searle llame a la estructura lógica (...)
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  40. The Three Formal Phenomenological Structures: A Means to Assess the Essence of Mathematical Intuition.A. Van-Quynh - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):219-241.
    In a recent article I detailed at length the methodology employed to explore the reflective and pre-reflective contents of singular intuitive experiences in contemporary mathematics in order to propose an essential structure of intuition arousal in mathematics. In this paper I present the phenomenological assessment of the essential structure according to the three formal structures as proposed by Sokolowski's scheme and show their relevance in the description of the intuitive experience in mathematics. I also show that this essential structure acknowledges (...)
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  41. Appearance and inference.Edward Allbless - 2018 - Kibworth Beauchamp, Leicestershire: Matador, an imprint of Troubadour Publishing.
    Inference is a powerful tool; after all, it generally plays a central role in the activity of thinking. But the process of making an inference is not universally correctly applied, nor is it always understood. The rules of inference are capable of misapplication, in the sense that we sometimes infer 'too much', or might infer something which is qualitatively different from the premises we have started with. Certain kinds of inference, or inferences drawn from certain kinds of phenomena or certain (...)
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  42. Odors, Objects and Olfaction.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):81-94.
    Olfaction represents odors, if it represents anything at all. Does olfaction also represent ordinary objects like cheese, fish and coffee-beans? Many think so. This paper argues that it does not. Instead, we should affirm an austere account of the intentional objects of olfaction: olfactory experience is about odors, not objects. Visuocentric thinking about olfaction has tempted some philosophers to say otherwise.
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  43. On Engaging Buddhism Philosophically.Christian Coseru - 2018 - Sophia 57 (4):535-545.
    This paper provides an outline and critical introduction to a symposium on Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. The main issues addressed concern: (i) the problem of personal identity, specifically the issue of whether the no-self view can satisfactorily account for such phenomena as agency, responsibility, rationality, and subjectivity, and the synchronic unity of consciousness they presuppose; (ii) a critique of phenomenal realism, which is shown to rests on a false dilemma, namely: either we must take people’s introspective (...)
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  44. Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  45. Remembering with and without Memory: A Theory of Memory and Aspects of Mind that Enable its Experience.Stan Klein - 2018 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 5:117-130.
    This article builds on ideas presented in Klein (2015a) concerning the importance of a more nuanced, conceptually rigorous approach to the scientific understanding and use of the construct “memory”. I first summarize my model, taking care to situate discussion within the terminological practices of contemporary philosophy of mind. I then elucidate the implications of the model for a particular operation of mind – the manner in which content presented to consciousness realizes its particular phenomenological character (i.e., mode of presentation). Finally, (...)
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  46. Information Systems Governance and Industry 4.0 - epistemology of data and semiotic methodologies of IS in digital ecosystems.Ângela Lacerda Nobre, Rogério Duarte & Marc Jacquinet - 2018 - Advances in Information and Communication Technology 527:311-312.
    Contemporary Information Systems management incorporates the need to make explicit the links between semiotics, meaning-making and the digital age. This focus addresses, at its core, pure rationality, that is, the capacity of human interpretation and of human inscription upon reality. Creating the new real, that is the motto. Humans are intrinsically semiotic creatures. Consequently, semiotics is not a choice or an option but something that works like a second skin, establishing limits and permeable linkages between: human thought and human's infinite (...)
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  47. Sizing Up Consciousness: Towards an Objective Measure of the Capacity for Experience.Marcello Massimini & Giulio Tononi - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Giulio Tononi & Frances Anderson.
    This book explores how we can measure consciousness. It clarifies what consciousness is, how it can be generated from a physical system, and how it can be measured. It also shows how conscious states can be expressed mathematically and how precise predictions can be made using data from neurophysiological studies.
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  48. Justification Upgrading and the Knowledge Baseline.Kateryna Samoilova - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):512-523.
    In her exciting and thought-provoking book, The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel tackles some bedrock issues concerning the nature and epistemology of perception: its rationality and relation to inference. Examining those issues from the perspective of everyday perception, where our vanity, fears, wishful thinking, general outlook, etc. can influence what we believe ourselves to see, Siegel offers a constructive defence of the claim that ‘both perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational’ and goes (...)
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  49. Imagination is Ancient.Stephen Asma - 2017 - Aeon 1:1.
    Imagination, like other higher cognition, is often thought to arise after the evolution of language. Stephen Asma argues instead that imagination is much older and forms a kind of early cognition --harvesting sensory, motor and affective impressions, and generating novel generate-and-test information.
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  50. If You Believe, You Believe.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
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