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Summary Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology describe our capacity to understand and interact with other agents. One important way we make sense of other agents' behavior is by attributing various mental states to them and explaining and predicting their behavior on the basis of these attributed mental states.This is called mindreading. The main debates at issue in this area are (i) the general nature of our ability to understand and interact with other agents, (ii) theories of how we attribute mental states, e.g., Theory Theory or Simulation Theory, (iii) the ontogenetic development of our folk psychological and mindreading skills, (iv) the nature of the mental state concepts we employ in folk psychology, and (v) skepticism about the propositional attitudes folk psychology attributes to agents.
Key works Two books that have served as pillars of the debate about theory of mind and folk psychology are Davies & Stone 1995 and Davies & Stone 1995. These two volumes contain essays that defined the relevant debates and gave shape to the field. More contemporary works that have had a significant impact on the field are Nichols & Stich 2003:Mindreading and I. Goldman 2006:Simulating Minds. These two books present different accounts of the nature of our folk psychological practices, how we attribute mental states, the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of folk psychology, introspection, and a host of other issues. These works have had an enormous impact on both general and specific theories of theory of mind and folk psychology.
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  1. Teleology First: Goals Before Knowledge and Belief.Tobias Schlicht, Johannes L. Brandl, Frank Esken, Hans-Johann Glock, Albert Newen, Josef Perner, Franziska Poprawe, Eva Schmidt, Anna Strasser & Julia Wolf - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.
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  2. Social Sampling: Children Track Social Choices to Reason About Status Hierarchies.Isobel A. Heck, Tamar Kushnir & Katherine D. Kinzler - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 150 (8):1673-1687.
    We tested whether preschool-aged children (N = 280) track an agents’ choices of individuals from novel social groups (i.e., social choices) to infer an agent’s social preferences and the social status of the groups. Across experiments, children saw a box containing 2 groups (red and blue toy cats). In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to Social Selection in which items were described as “friends,” or to Object Selection in which items were described as “toys.” Within each selection type, the (...)
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  3. Does Amy Know Ben Knows You Know Your Cards? A Computational Model of Higher-Order Epistemic Reasoning.Cedegao Zhang, Huang Ham & Wesley H. Holliday - 2021 - Proceedings of CogSci 2021.
    Reasoning about what other people know is an important cognitive ability, known as epistemic reasoning, which has fascinated psychologists, economists, and logicians. In this paper, we propose a computational model of humans’ epistemic reasoning, including higher-order epistemic reasoning—reasoning about what one person knows about another person’s knowledge—that we test in an experiment using a deductive card game called “Aces and Eights”. Our starting point is the model of perfect higher-order epistemic reasoners given by the framework of dynamic epistemic logic. We (...)
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  4. Social and Enactive Perspectives on Pretending.Zuzanna Rucinska - 2019 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 10 (3).
    This paper presents pretending as an enacted and fundamentally social activity. First, it demonstrates why we should think of pretense as inherently social. Then, it shows how that fact affects our theory in terms of what is needed in order to pretend. Standardly, pretense is seen as requiring a mechanism that allows one to bypass the “obvious” re- sponse to the environment in order to opt for a symbolic response; that mechanism is im- aginative and representational. This paper shows that (...)
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  5. Knowledge is a Mental State (at Least Sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    It is widely held in philosophy that knowing is not a state of mind. On this view, rather than knowledge itself constituting a mental state, when we know, we occupy a belief state that exhibits some additional non-mental characteristics. Fascinatingly, however, new empirical findings from cognitive neuroscience and experimental philosophy now offer direct, converging evidence that the brain can—and often does—treat knowledge as if it is a mental state in its own right. While some might be tempted to keep the (...)
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  6. Linking Metacognition and Mindreading: Evidence From Autism and Dual-Task Investigations.Toby Nicholson, David M. Williams, Sophie E. Lind, Catherine Grainger & Peter Carruthers - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 150 (2):206-220.
    Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and mindreading rely on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In Experiment 1, children/adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) showed significantly lower accuracy on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly metacognitive implicit one. In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task condition or a dual-task condition that required concurrent completion of a secondary (...)
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  7. Seeing Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):24-43.
    I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
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  8. Interoception and Empathy Impact Perspective Taking.Lukas Heydrich, Francesco Walker, Larissa Blättler, Bruno Herbelin, Olaf Blanke & Jane Elizabeth Aspell - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Adopting the perspective of another person is an important aspect of social cognition and has been shown to depend on multisensory signals from one’s own body. Recent work suggests that interoceptive signals not only contribute to own-body perception and self-consciousness, but also to empathy. Here we investigated if social cognition – in particular adopting the perspective of another person – can be altered by a systematic manipulation of interoceptive cues and further, if this effect depends on empathic ability. The own-body (...)
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  9. Does Criminal Responsibility Rest Upon a False Supposition? No.Luke William Hunt - 2020 - Washington University Jurisprudence Review 13 (1):65-84.
    Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. The upshot is that (...)
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  10. When a Circle Becomes the Letter O: Young Children’s Conceptualization of Learning and Its Relation With Theory of Mind Development.Zhenlin Wang & Douglas A. Frye - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children’s conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did (...)
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  11. Re-conceptualizing the role of stimuli: an enactive, ecological explanation of spontaneous-response tasks.Alan Jurgens - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):915-934.
    This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers : 141-172, 2013, Consciousness and Cognition, 36: 498-507, 2015) claim that only by appealing to a theory of mind is it possible to explain infant responses in spontaneous-response false-belief tasks when there are no one-to-one correspondences between observable behavior and mental states. Heyes, 131–143, 2014a, Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. b) responds to this (...)
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  12. Self-Oriented Empathy and Compassion Fatigue: The Serial Mediation of Dispositional Mindfulness and Counselor’s Self-Efficacy.Lin Zhang, Zhihong Ren, Guangrong Jiang, Dilana Hazer-Rau, Chunxiao Zhao, Congrong Shi, Lizu Lai & Yifei Yan - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This study aimed to explore the association between self-oriented empathy and compassion fatigue, and examine the potential mediating roles of dispositional mindfulness and the counselor’s self-efficacy. A total of 712 hotline psychological counselors were recruited from the Mental Health Service Platform at Central China Normal University, Ministry of Education during the outbreak of Corona Virus Disease 2019, then were asked to complete the questionnaires measuring self-oriented empathy, compassion fatigue, dispositional mindfulness, and counselor’s self-efficacy. Structural equation modeling was utilized to analyze (...)
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  13. Complex Inferential Processes Are Needed for Implicature Comprehension, but Not for Implicature Production.Irene Mognon, Simone A. Sprenger, Sanne J. M. Kuijper & Petra Hendriks - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Upon hearing “Some of Michelangelo’s sculptures are in Rome,” adults can easily generate a scalar implicature and infer that the intended meaning of the utterance corresponds to “Some but not all Michelangelo’s sculptures are in Rome.” Comprehension experiments show that preschoolers struggle with this kind of inference until at least 5 years of age. Surprisingly, the few studies having investigated children’s production of scalar expressions like some and all suggest that production is adult-like already in their third year of life. (...)
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  14. Theory Theory (Simulation Theory, Theory of Mind).Louise Röska-Hardy - 2008 - In M. Binder, N. Hirokawa, U. Windhorst & H. Hirsch (eds.), Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany: pp. 4064-4067.
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  15. Compassion: From Its Evolution to a Psychotherapy.Paul Gilbert - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    The concept, benefits and recommendations for the cultivation of compassion have been recognized in the contemplative traditions for thousands of years. In the last 30 years or so, the study of compassion has revealed it to have major physiological and psychological effects influencing well-being, addressing mental health difficulties, and promoting prosocial behavior. This paper outlines an evolution informed biopsychosocial, multicomponent model to caring behavior and its derivative “compassion” that underpins newer approaches to psychotherapy. The paper explores the origins of caring (...)
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  16. The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding.Albert Newen & Julia Wolf - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):717-744.
    How can we solve the paradox of false-belief understanding: if infants pass the implicit false belief task by nonverbal behavioural responses why do they nonetheless typically fail the explicit FBT till they are 4 years old? Starting with the divide between situational and cognitive accounts of the development of false-belief understanding, we argue that we need to consider both situational and internal cognitive factors together and describe their interaction to adequately explain the development of children’s Theory of Mind ability. We (...)
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  17. How to Count Biological Minds: Symbiosis, the Free Energy Principle, and Reciprocal Multiscale Integration.Matthew Sims - 2020 - Synthese 8:1-1.
    The notion of a physiological individuals has been developed and applied in the phi- losophy of biology to understand symbiosis, an understanding of which is key to theorising about the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to multi- cellularity. The paper begins by asking what such symbiotic individuals can help to reveal about a possible transition in the evolution of cognition. Such a transition marks the movement from cooperating individual biological cognizers to a function- ally integrated cognizing unit. Somewhere along (...)
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  18. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing (...)
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  19. How Mindreading Might Mislead Cognitive Science.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):195-219.
    This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...)
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  20. Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):747-767.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, (...)
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  21. Attributing Awareness to Others: The Attention Schema Theory and Its Relationship to Behavioural Prediction.M. S. A. Graziano - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):17-37.
    The attention schema theory provides a single coherent framework for understanding three seemingly unrelated phenomena. The first is our ability to control our own attention through predictive modelling. The second is a fundamental part of social cognition, or theory of mind — our ability to reconstruct the attention of others, and to use that model of attention to help make behavioural predictions about others. The third is our claim to have a subjective consciousness -- not merely information inside us, but (...)
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  22. A Neuroscientific Perspective on the Nature of Altered Self-Other Relationships in Schizophrenia.S. J. H. Ebisch & V. Gallese - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):220-240.
    By empirically investigating the neural correlates of the basic experience one makes of oneself as bodily self and of its alterations, new light can be shed on the relationship between self-disturbances and social deficits in schizophrenia. We review recent neuroscientific evidence showing how a pre-reflective, experiential understanding of others can be accomplished, so that others are conceived as bodily selves by means of neural reuse of our own sensorimotor and visceromotor resources, and how a clear distinction between self and other (...)
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  23. Pathologies of Intersubjectivity in Autism and Schizophrenia.T. Fuchs - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):191-214.
    Most mental disorders include more or less profound disturbances of intersubjectivity, that means, a restricted capacity to respond to the social environment in a flexible way and to reach a shared understanding through adequate interaction with others. Current concepts of intersubjectivity are mainly based on a mentalistic approach, assuming that the hidden mental states of others may only be inferred from their external bodily behaviour through 'mentalizing' or 'mindreading'. On this basis, disorders of intersubjectivity for example in autism or schizophrenia (...)
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  24. How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    Teresa believes in God. Maggie’s wife believes that the Earth is flat, and also that Maggie should be home from work by now. Anouk—a cat—believes it is dinner time. This dissertation is about what believing is: it concerns what, exactly, ordinary people are attributing to Teresa, Maggie’s wife, and Anouk when affirming that they are believers. Part I distinguishes the attitudes of belief that people attribute to each other (and other animals) in ordinary life from the cognitive states of belief (...)
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  25. Constructing a Social Subject: Autism and Human Sociality in the 1980s.Gregory Hollin - 2014 - History of the Human Sciences 27 (4):98-115.
    This article examines three key aetiological theories of autism, which emerged within cognitive psychology in the latter half of the 1980s. Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of ‘forms of possible knowledge’, and in particular his concept of savoir or depth knowledge, two key claims are made. First, it is argued that a particular production of autism became available to questions of truth and falsity following a radical reconstruction of ‘the social’ in which human sociality was taken both to exclusively concern interpersonal (...)
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The Nature of Folk Psychology
  1. I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Here I explore a new line of evidence for belief-credence dualism, the thesis that beliefs and credences are distinct and equally fundamental types of mental states. Despite considerable recent disagreement over this thesis, little attention has been paid in philosophy to differences in how our mindreading systems represent the beliefs and credences of others. Fascinatingly, the systems we rely on to accurately and efficiently track others’ mental states appear to function like belief-credence dualists: Credence is tracked like an emotional state, (...)
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  2. Belief in Character Studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.
    In Go Set a Watchman, Harper Lee reveals that American man of integrity Atticus Finch harbors deep-seated racist beliefs. Bob Ewell, Finch's nemesis in To Kill a Mockingbird, harbors the same beliefs. But the two men live out their shared racist beliefs in dramatically different fashions. This article argues that extant dispositionalist accounts of belief lack the tools to accommodate Finch and Ewell's divergent styles of believing. It then draws on literary and philosophical character studies to construct the required tools.
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  3. Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists.T. Parent - manuscript
    Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction. An eliminativist version of the view can seem self-refuting, but this charge is neutralized. Yet a different kind of “self-effacing” emerges: Mental fictionalism appears to be a mere “parasite” on a future science of cognition, without contributing anything substantial. (...)
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  4. Implicit Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Implicit Cognition. Routledge.
    Positing implicit social cognitive processes is common in the social cognition literature. We see it in discussions of theories of mentalizing, empathy, and infants' social-cognitive capacities. However, there is little effort to articulate what counts as implicit social cognition in general, so theorizing about implicit social cognition is extremely disparate across each of these sub-domains. In this paper, I argue that Michael Brownstein’s account of implicit cognition promises to be a fruitful, unifying account of implicit cognition in general, and it (...)
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  5. G as Bridge Model.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):1067-1078.
    Psychometric g—a statistical factor capturing intercorrelations between scores on different IQ tests—is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. Psychometric g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and it idealizes away from those varieties of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of (...)
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  6. Modeling the Theory-Form: Beyond the Elements of Observational Postulation.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Contemporary Pragmatism 18 (2):154-186.
    We formalize a theory of the subject by sketching a pragmatic functional hierarchy of sapient cognition. Our expanded framework attempts to articulate a normative understanding of discursive cognition by demarcating its functional propriety within a naturalist rejoinder, seeing in the functional development of cognition from pre-discursive to discursive abilities an increase and refinement in representational competence found in non-intentional systems. We therein explain how sapient cognitive systems not only engage in patterns of material and formal inference to map intensional relations (...)
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  7. Eliminative Materialism and the Distinction Between Common Sense and Science.Nada Gligorov - 2007 - Dissertation,
    It is one of the premises of eliminative materialism that commonsense psychology constitutes a theory. There is agreement that mental states can be construed as posited entities for the explanation and prediction of behavior. Disputes arise when it comes to the range of the commonsense theory of mental states. In chapter one, I review major arguments concerning the span and nature of folk psychology. In chapter two, relying on arguments by Quine and Sellars, I argue that the precise scope of (...)
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  8. Too Many Cooks: Bayesian Inference for Coordinating Multi‐Agent Collaboration.Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes & Max Kleiman-Weiner - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (2):414-432.
    Collaboration requires agents to coordinate their behavior on the fly, sometimes cooperating to solve a single task together and other times dividing it up into sub‐tasks to work on in parallel. Underlying the human ability to collaborate is theory‐of‐mind (ToM), the ability to infer the hidden mental states that drive others to act. Here, we develop Bayesian Delegation, a decentralized multi‐agent learning mechanism with these abilities. Bayesian Delegation enables agents to rapidly infer the hidden intentions of others by inverse planning. (...)
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  9. Traits, Beliefs and Dispositions in a Pluralistic Folk Psychology.Harmen Ghijsen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5395-5413.
    According to pluralistic folk psychology we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which PFP’s methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation can interact; and (...)
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  10. Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Present State of Connectionism.Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Theoria: Beograd 1 (64):173-196.
    Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul (...)
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  11. Knowledge and the Brain: Why the Knowledge-Centric Theory of Mind Program Needs Neuroscience.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    The knowledge-centric Theory of Mind research program suggested by Phillips et al. stands to gain significant value by embracing a neurocognitive approach that takes full advantage of techniques like fMRI and EEG. This neurocognitive approach has already begun providing important insights into the mechanisms of knowledge attribution, insights which support the claim that it is more basic than belief attribution.
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  12. How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.
    Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...)
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  13. Is Science Eliminating Ordinary Talk?Louis Caruana - 1999 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 4:25-39.
    After elucidating the nature of ordinary linguistic behaviour and its ontological implications, the paper critically examines some trends in the philosophy of mind that use the expression folk-psychology. The main argument shows that, when eliminativists hold that everyday discourse dealing with describing and predicting each other’s behaviour is an empirical theory, they are forcing their object of study into an exclusively mechanistic mould, and thus seriously distorting it. The meaning of everyday utter¬ances is not to be sought towards the physical (...)
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  14. Introduction to Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches.Kristin Andrews, Shannon Spaulding & Evan Westra - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1685-1700.
    This introduction to the topical collection, Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches reviews the origins and basic theoretical tenets of the framework of pluralistic folk psychology. It places special emphasis on pluralism about the variety folk psychological strategies that underlie behavioral prediction and explanation beyond belief-desire attribution, and on the diverse range of social goals that folk psychological reasoning supports beyond prediction and explanation. Pluralism is not presented as a single theory or model of social cognition, but rather as a big-tent research (...)
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  15. Spillover Effects When Taking Turns in Dyadic Coping: How Lingering Negative Affect and Perceived Partner Responsiveness Shape Subsequent Support Provision.Lisanne S. Pauw, Suzanne Hoogeveen, Christina J. Breitenstein, Fabienne Meier, Valentina Rauch-Anderegg, Mona Neysari, Mike Martin, Guy Bodenmann & Anne Milek - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    When experiencing personal distress, people usually expect their romantic partner to be supportive. However, when put in a situation to provide support, people may at times be struggling with issues of their own. This interdependent nature of dyadic coping interactions as well as potential spillover effects is mirrored in the state-of-the-art research method to behaviorally assess couple’s dyadic coping processes. This paradigm typically includes two videotaped 8-min dyadic coping conversations in which partners swap roles as sharer and support provider. Little (...)
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  16. What Early Sapiens Cognition Can Teach Us: Untangling Cultural Influences on Human Cognition Across Time.Andrea Bender - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Evidence of cultural influences on cognition is accumulating, but untangling these cultural influences from one another or from non-cultural influences has remained a challenging task. As between-group differences are neither a sufficient nor a necessary indicator of cultural impact, cross-cultural comparisons in isolation are unable to furnish any cogent conclusions. This shortfall can be compensated by taking a diachronic perspective that focuses on the role of culture for the emergence and evolution of our cognitive abilities. Three strategies for reconstructing early (...)
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  17. Representation and Misrepresentation of Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.
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  18. Why Literalism is Still the Best Game in Town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and Schwitzgebel.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):687-693.
    In Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates (Oxford UP, 2018), I argue that psychological predicates used to ascribe cognitive capacities to many nonhuman biological species should be interpreted literally with the same reference for humans and nonhumans alike. In this Mind & Language book symposium, I respond to comments and criticisms by Zoe Drayson, Edouard Machery, and Eric Schwitzgebel, and conclude that the Literalist position is still the best interpretation of these uses.
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  19. Getting to Know You: Accuracy and Error in Judgments of Character.Evan Westra - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):583-600.
    Character judgments play an important role in our everyday lives. However, decades of empirical research on trait attribution suggest that the cognitive processes that generate these judgments are prone to a number of biases and cognitive distortions. This gives rise to a skeptical worry about the epistemic foundations of everyday characterological beliefs that has deeply disturbing and alienating consequences. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical worry is misplaced: under the appropriate informational conditions, our everyday character-trait judgments are in (...)
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  20. The Cultural Evolution of Mind-Modelling.Richard Moore - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1751-1776.
    I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of (...)
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  21. Beyond the Human Standard in the Cognitive Domain: A Reply to Rodriguez' “Cognition Beyond the Human Domain”.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1204-1208.
    In "Cognition Beyond the Human Domain", Angel Garcia Rodriguez provides critical commentary on Pieces of Mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates (Oxford UP, 2018). In this reply, I argue that his alternative "No-Core" semantic proposal is not an alternative to the Literalist view I defend, but rather one way of elaborating that position.
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  22. When is Mindreading Accurate? A Commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Evan Westra - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):868-882.
    In How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, Shannon Spaulding develops a novel account of social cognition with pessimistic implications for mindreading accuracy: according to Spaulding, mistakes in mentalizing are much more common than traditional theories of mindreading commonly assume. In this commentary, I push against Spaulding’s pessimism from two directions. First, I argue that a number of the heuristic mindreading strategies that Spaulding views as especially error prone might be quite reliable in practice. Second, I argue that current (...)
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  23. Interpretivism without judgement-dependence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):611-615.
    In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By (...)
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  24. '이상한 루프입니다'에 관한 리뷰 (I am a Strange Loop) Douglas Hofstadter (2000).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 지구상의 지옥에 오신 것을 환영합니다 : 아기, 기후 변화, 비트 코인, 카르텔, 중국, 민주주의, 다양성, 역학, 평등, 해커, 인권, 이슬람, 자유주의, 번영, 웹, 혼돈, 기아, 질병, 폭력, 인공 지능, 전쟁. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 122-141.
    호프스타터 목사에 의해 근본주의 자연주의 교회의 최신 설교. 그의 훨씬 더 유명한 (또는 그 끊임없는 철학적 오류로 악명 높은) 작업 고델, 에셔, 바흐처럼, 그것은 피상적 인 타당성을 가지고 있지만, 하나는 철학적 인 것들과 실제 과학적 문제를 혼합 만연 한 사이언티즘것을 이해한다면 (즉, 유일한 진짜 문제는 우리가 재생해야하는 언어 게임이다) 다음 거의 모든 관심. 나는 진화 심리학과 비트겐슈타인의 작품에 기반한 분석을위한 프레임 워크를 제공합니다 (이후 내 최근 글에서 업데이트). 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 (...)
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  25. Self-deception, intentions and the folk-psychological explanation of action (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako - 2020 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 19 (1):91-117.
    In the paper, I examine the conditions that are necessary for the correct characterization of the phenomenon of self-deception. Deflationists believe that the phenomenon of self-deception can be characterized as a kind of motivationally biased belief-forming process. They face the selectivity problem according to which the presence of a desire for something to be the case is not enough to produce a self-deceptive belief. Intentionalists argue that the solution to the selectivity problem consists in invoking the notion of intention. According (...)
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