Dualism

Edited by Andreas Elpidorou (University of Louisville)
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  1. Review of Lilli Alanen, Descartes’s Concept of Mind. [REVIEW]Sean Crawford - 2004 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 8.
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  2. Soul-Switching and the Immateriality of Human Nature: On an Argument Reported by Razi.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1067-1082.
    This article deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that attempted to undermine the immaterialist position about human nature. After some introductory remarks and explanation of the conceptual background, the article analyses the structure of the argument, with special attention to the idea of soul-switching.’ Some comparisons are made between the argument reported by Razi and a number of arguments from modern and contemporary eras of philosophy. One section is devoted to the critique of the argument and its (...)
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  3. Methodological Dualism Considered as a Heuristic Paradigm for Clinical Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - forthcoming - BJPsych Advances.
    Debates on dualism continue to plague psychiatry. I suggest that these debates are based on false dichotomies. According to metaphysical physicalism, reality is ultimately physical. Although this view excludes the idea of entities distinct from physical reality, it does not compel us to favour neural over psychological interventions. According to methodological dualism, both physical and mental interventions on the world can be deemed effective, and both perspectives can therefore be thought to be equally ‘real’.
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  4. The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind and metaethics to argue that the reasoning employed in an important argument for panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in metaethics: panmoralism. Next, I raise a number of problems for panmoralism and thereby build a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument for panpsychism. Finally, I contrast panmoralism with a position recently defended by Einar Duenger Bohn and argue that the two suffer (...)
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  5. Eliminative Materialism and the Distinction Between Common Sense and Science.Nada Gligorov - 2007 - Dissertation,
    It is one of the premises of eliminative materialism that commonsense psychology constitutes a theory. There is agreement that mental states can be construed as posited entities for the explanation and prediction of behavior. Disputes arise when it comes to the range of the commonsense theory of mental states. In chapter one, I review major arguments concerning the span and nature of folk psychology. In chapter two, relying on arguments by Quine and Sellars, I argue that the precise scope of (...)
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  6. Living in a Tokenized (Think: Cryptic) Reality.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
    Zero and one (modern) are yin and yang (ancient), circumference and diameter (literally and figuratively) of an always-conserved (omnipresent) circular-linear relationship. Explaining everything in Nature.
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  7. Are We Bodies or Souls? [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey, Joseph Han & Alcan Sng - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (4):546-549.
  8. Abstraction: How to Understand It.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
  9. Euclid's Error: The Mathematics Behind Foucault, Deleuze, and Nietzsche.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
    We have to go all the way back to Euclid, and, actually, before, to figure out the basis for representation, and therefore, interpretation. Which is, pure and simple, the conservation of a circle. As articulated by Foucault, Deleuze, and Nietzsche. 'Pi' (in mathematics) is the background state for everything (a.k.a. 'mind').Providing the explanation for (and the current popularity, and, thus, the 'genius' behind) NFT (non fungible tokens). 'Reality' has, finally, caught up with the 'truth.'.
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  10. How Nature ‘Tokenizes’ Reality.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
    Pi in mathematics is mind in Nature, explaining the tokenization of 'reality.'.
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  11. Duality.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
  12. The History of 'Ideas'.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
    We have to begin with the pyramid (pi-diameter-circumference). In order to understand an 'idea.' And, the history of ideas.
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  13. Avicenna’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Arguments for Immateriality of the Soul From the Viewpoint of Physicalism.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2020 - Angelicum 97 (3):367-390.
    I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his (...)
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  14. The Importance of 'Unitization'.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - In https://medium.com/the-circular-theory/.
    Conservation of a circle is the basis for unification (and, also, then, 'unitization'). Explaining and unifying physics, philosophy, and psychology. All disciplines.
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  15. The Epistemic Role of Imagination in Descartes's First Meditation.Lynda Gaudemard - manuscript
    While imagination was a major concern for Descartes throughout his work, Cartesian scholars have paid little attention to this faculty, especially regarding to the Meditations of First Philosophy. This article highlights the epistemic role of imagination in the First Meditation. I argue that the way Descartes’s conception of imagination is elaborated in the First Meditation helps question our interpretation of his dualism, and enables us to formulate the hypothesis that imagination belongs to the essence of the mind. It results that (...)
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  16. Deep Learning and Artificial Intelligence: X, XX, XXX.Ilexa Yardley - 2017 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
  17. The Literal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Intelligent Design Center.
  18. Conservation of a Circle Explains (the Human) Mind.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  19. The Mind-Body Problem(s) in Descartes’ “Meditations” and Husserl’s “Crisis” (Part2).Andrii Leonov - 2020 - Filosofska Dumka 5:117-128.
    The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). (...)
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  20. Near-Death Experiences: To the Edge of the Universe.J. M. Fischer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):166-191.
    Most discussions of near-death experiences (NDEs) in both the academic and popular literature contend that they establish ('prove') supernaturalism (about NDEs): they show that the mind is not the brain (and can continue after the brain stops functioning), and they bring us into contact with non-physical realms. I believe that the evidence provided by NDEs for supernaturalism is not persuasive, but I offer an alternative, naturalistic interpretation of these phenomena. On this interpretation, NDEs are 'real' in both senses of the (...)
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  21. Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism.Lynda Gaudemard - 2021 - Springer.
    This monograph presents an interpretation of Descartes's dualism, which differs from the standard reading called 'classical separatist dualism' claiming that the mind can exist without the body. It argues that, contrary to what it is commonly claimed, Descartes’s texts suggest an emergent creationist substance dualism, according to which the mind is a nonphysical substance (created and maintained by God), which cannot begin to think without a well-disposed body. According to this interpretation, God’s laws of nature endow each human body with (...)
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  22. Perspectivalism, A-Theorism, and Their Interpretation of QM.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Abstract We motivate and develop an A-theory of time and probe its implied interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will emerge that, as a first take, the time of relativity is a B-series and the time of quantum mechanics is an A-series. There is philosophical motivation for the idea that mutual quantum measurement happens when and only when the systems’ A-series become one mutual A-series. This accounts almost trivially for many quantum phenomena, including that the electrons of a Bell pair do (...)
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  23. How Mindreading Might Mislead Cognitive Science.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):195-219.
    This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...)
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  24. The Story of the Ghost in the Machine.Adam Toon - forthcoming - In Sonia Sedivy (ed.), Art, Representation and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York, NY, USA:
  25. Non-Locality in the AB-Time Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Non-locality is one of the great mysteries of quantum mechanics (qm). There is a new realist interpretation of qm on the table whose notion of time incorporates both of McTaggart's A-series and B-series. In this philosophically motivated interpretation there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 'now' of one system is the 'now' of another system, until measurement. But this reproduces the idea that the spins of a Bell pair of electrons do not become definite 'until' measurement. (...)
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  26. Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?J. F. Storm - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):174-189.
    Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...)
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  27. Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism.K. Williford - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):190-200.
    I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain genuine realists about phenomenal experience.
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  28. Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130.
    Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
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  29. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...)
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  30. First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
    Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.
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  31. Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness.J. Dewhurst & K. Dolega - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):54-61.
    Chalmers (2018) raises three challenges for Michael Graziano's attention schema theory. Our aim in this paper is to bolster Graziano's attention schema theory with some tools and insights from the predictive processing framework, in order to respond to the challenges raised by Chalmers and more generally strengthen the theory. We will first introduce the attention schema theory and the three challenges raised by Chalmers, before outlining our application of predictive processing to the theory and how it can resolve these challenges, (...)
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  32. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.
    The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.
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  33. Two Caveats to the Meta-Problem Challenge.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):74-81.
    I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we (...)
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  34. How Colour Qualia Became a Problem.Z. Adams & J. Browning - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus (...)
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  35. Soft-Wired Illusionism vs. the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.A. Balmer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):26-37.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. This is framed as a means of uniting illusionists and realists toward a common goal, but this supposes that the only viable form of illusionism is what I call 'hard-wired' illusionism, under which phenomenal judgments are a direct product of natural selection. I argue (...)
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  36. Editorial Introduction: More Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):8-13.
  37. Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 2nd Edition.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co..
    In this introductory work, Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 2nd edition, Gennaro updates and expands the work to reflect current topics and discussions. The dialogue provides a clear and compelling overview of the mind-body problem suitable for both introductory students and those who have some background in the philosophy of mind. Topics include: Immortality, Materialism, Descartes' "Divisibility Argument" for substance dualism, The "Argument from Introspection" for substance dualism, The main objections to dualism, The interaction between mind (...)
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  38. Intentionality Contra Physicalism.Dallas Willard & Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):497-515.
    We argue for the mind’s independence from the body. We do so by making several moves. First, we analyze two popular kinds of reasons which have swayed many to adopt the independence of the mind from the body. Second, we advance an argument from the ontology of intentionality against the identity thesis, according to which the mind is identical to the brain. We try to show how intentionality is not reducible to or identical to the physical. Lastly, we argue that, (...)
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  39. Review of Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Adam Taylor - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2018).
    The familiar narrative about the early days of analytic philosophy tells us of its triumph over the needless metaphysical excesses of its immediate forerunners, the idealists. In one form or another, idealism was the paramount philosophical view of the 19th century. Nowadays, however, the bulwarks of idealism are largely abandoned. Few defend the view, and fewer still are willing to take the time to consider its claims seriously. Materialism and dualism dominate the philosophical landscape.
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  40. On Perception and Ontology in the Context of Subjectivity and Modern Physics.Piotr Witas -
    I argue that our direct experience and some physical facts do not go well with an understanding of perception as a mechanism producing a representation of a ''truly'' outer world. Instead, it is much more coherent to treat what is traditionally considered an image in this context as a closed structure equipped in its own ontology, replacing the ''truly'' outer one from the point of view of an agent possessing it. In such a framework, the notion of existence is taken (...)
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  41. La influencia epistemológica del modelo cartesiano de la mente en arqueología cognitiva.Alfredo Robles Zamora - 2019 - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología 14 (14).
    The aim of this work is to expose the Cartesian Model of the mind in Cognitive Archaeology and point out how it relates to the questions behind this branch of archaeology. Based on this, some of the premises assumed by the Cartesian Model and how they influence the formulation to the problem of epistemological relativism in the branch are explained. According to this problem, since there is no way to evaluate hypotheses in this research area, the investigations on cognition, based (...)
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  42. Leibniz on the Divine Preformation of Souls and Bodies.Christopher P. Noble - 2019 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (2):327-342.
  43. Circumnavigating the Causal Pairing Problem with Hylomorphism and the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.Matthew Owen - forthcoming - Synthese (Suppl 11):2829-2851.
    The causal pairing problem allegedly renders nonphysical minds causally impotent. This article demonstrates how a dualist view I call neo-Thomistic hylomorphism can circumnavigate the causal pairing problem. After explicating the problem and hylomorphism, I provide an account of causal pairing that appeals to a foundational tenet of hylomorphism. Subsequently, I suggest that a prominent view of consciousness in theoretical neuroscience—the integrated information theory—can learn from hylomorphism and likewise account for causal pairing.
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  44. Underestimating the Physical.G. Strawson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about (...)
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  45. A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Bradford Saad - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):205-216.
    Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I favour an interactionist dualist version of realizationism on which experiences are non-physical states that non-redundantly cause problem judgments. This view is subject to the challenges of specifying laws that would enable experiences to cause problem judgments and of explaining why (...)
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  46. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):8-18.
  47. Emergentism and Sadra’s Psychology; a Common Physicalistic Challenge.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2019 - Asian Philosophy 29 (3):221-230.
    This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...)
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  48. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Eric Yang - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):221-225.
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  49. What Is It Like To Become a Bat? Heterogeneities in an Age of Extinction.Stephanie Rhea Erev - 2018 - Environmental Humanities 1 (10):129-149.
    In his celebrated 1974 essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” Thomas Nagel stages a human-bat encounter to illustrate and support his claim that “subjective experience” is irreducible to “objective fact”: because Nagel cannot experience the world as a bat does, he will never know what it is like to be one. In Nagel’s account, heterogeneity is figured negatively—as a failure or lack of resemblance—and functions to constrain his knowledge of bats. Today, as white-nose syndrome threatens bat populations (...)
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  50. Conceivability and the Silence of Physics.G. Strawson - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):167-192.
    According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to (...)
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