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  1. Robustness and Modularity.Trey Boone - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Functional robustness refers to a system’s ability to maintain a function in the face of perturbations to the causal structures that support performance of that function. Modularity, a crucial element of standard methods of causal inference and difference-making accounts of causation, refers to the independent manipulability of causal relationships within a system. Functional robustness appears to be at odds with modularity. If a function is maintained despite manipulation of some causal structure that supports that function, then the relationship between that (...)
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  2. The Universal System Architecture of Nature.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
    The universal system architecture of Nature can be summarized as: one zero, one one. This is because zero is, technically (and literally), circumference, and one is, technically (and literally), diameter. This means the algorithm that produces Nature (what humans label 'reality') is: if zero, then one (meaning, if one, then zero). Explaining the tokenzation of space (any matrix) (any lattice) (all vortices and edges) (if circumference, then diameter). Meaning, technically, you cannot use 'words' in any language (including the language of (...)
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  3. The Ups and Downs of Mechanism Realism: Functions, Levels, and Crosscutting Hierarchies.Joe Dewhurst & Alistair M. C. Isaac - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Mechanism realists assert the existence of mechanisms as objective structures in the world, but their exact metaphysical commitments are unclear. We introduce Local Hierarchy Realism as a substantive and plausible form of mechanism realism. The limits of LHR reveal a deep tension between two aspects of mechanists’ explanatory strategy. Functional decomposition identifies locally relevant entities and activities, while these same entities and activities are also embedded in a nested hierarchy of levels. In principle, a functional decomposition may identify entities engaging (...)
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  4. Rise of the Swamp Creatures: Reflections on a Mechanistic Approach to Content.Jonny Lee - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    Recent developments in the literature suggest cognitive representation can be conceived of as a kind of mechanism that meets the functional profile set out by the S-representation account. However, this approach is threatened by worries that the S-representation account cannot tell a satisfactory story about content determination at the subpersonal level. One solution is to complement the S-representation account with a traditional etiological theory of content determination. This paper argues such a move is unwarranted and threatens the broader project of (...)
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  5. Underlying Delusion: Predictive Processing, Looping Effects, and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction.Matteo Colombo & Regina E. Fabry - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-27.
    What is the relationship between the concepts of the predictive processing theory of brain functioning and the everyday concepts with which people conduct and explain their mental lives? To answer this question, we focus on predictive processing explanations of mental disorder that appeal to false inference. After distinguishing two concepts of false inference, we survey four ways of understanding the relationship between explanations of mental phenomena at the personal and sub-personal level. We then argue that if predictive processing accurately accounts (...)
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  6. Are Basic Actors Brainbound Agents? Narrowing Down Solutions to the Problem of Probabilistic Content for Predictive Perceivers.George Britten-Neish - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):435-459.
    Clark (2018) worries that predictive processing accounts of perception introduce a puzzling disconnect between the content of personal-level perceptual states and their underlying subpersonal representations. According to PP, in perception, the brain encodes information about the environment in conditional probability density distributions over causes of sensory input. But it seems perceptual experience only presents us with one way the world is at a time. If perception is at bottom probabilistic, shouldn’t this aspect of subpersonally represented content show up in consciousness? (...)
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  7. Introduction to Philosophy of Science.Carlos Mariscal - forthcoming - In Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience.
    This chapter will be a brief survey of the concepts from general philosophy of science for those interested in cognitive science. It covers several major topics in the philosophy of science: scientific explanation and underdetermination, reductionism and levels of nature, and scientific realism. We will discuss the goals of science, the methods of science, and the most plausible interpretations of science. To demonstrate the importance of these topics, the chapter includes cases in which confusion over these issues has led scientists (...)
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  8. The Magical Universe.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  9. The Importance of 'Unitization'.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - In https://medium.com/the-circular-theory/.
    Conservation of a circle is the basis for unification (and, also, then, 'unitization'). Explaining and unifying physics, philosophy, and psychology. All disciplines.
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  10. Logic as Marr's Computational Level: Four Case Studies.Giosuè Baggio, Michiel van Lambalgen & Peter Hagoort - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):287-298.
    We sketch four applications of Marr's levels‐of‐analysis methodology to the relations between logic and experimental data in the cognitive neuroscience of language and reasoning. The first part of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of computational level theories based on logic. We show that a Bayesian treatment of the suppression task in reasoning with conditionals is ruled out by EEG data, supporting instead an analysis based on defeasible logic. Further, we describe how results from an EEG study on temporal prepositions (...)
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  11. Grounding Cognition: Heterarchical Control Mechanisms in Biology.William Bechtel & Leonardo Bich - 2021 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376 (1820).
    We advance an account that grounds cognition, specifically decision-making, in an activity all organisms as autonomous systems must perform to keep themselves viable—controlling their production mechanisms. Production mechanisms, as we characterize them, perform activities such as procuring resources from their environment, putting these resources to use to construct and repair the organism's body and moving through the environment. Given the variable nature of the environment and the continual degradation of the organism, these production mechanisms must be regulated by control mechanisms (...)
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  12. Editors’ Review and Introduction: Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science: From Molecules to Culture.Matteo Colombo & Markus Knauff - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1224-1240.
    Cognitive science began as a multidisciplinary endeavor to understand how the mind works. Since the beginning, cognitive scientists have been asking questions about the right methodologies and levels of explanation to pursue this goal, and make cognitive science a coherent science of the mind. Key questions include: Is there a privileged level of explanation in cognitive science? How do different levels of explanation fit together, or relate to one another? How should explanations at one level inform or constrain explanations at (...)
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  13. Constitutive Relevance in Interlevel Experiments.Maria Serban & Sune Holm - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):697-725.
    One reason for the popularity of Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance is that it seems to make good sense of the experimental practices and constitutive reasoning in the life sciences. Two recent papers propose a theoretical alternative to in light of several important conceptual objections. Their alternative approach, the no de-coupling account, conceives of constitution as a dependence relation that once postulated provides the best explanation of the impossibility of breaking the common cause coupling of a macro-level mechanism (...)
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  14. Diachronic Causal Constitutive Relations.Bert Leuridan & Thomas Lodewyckx - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-31.
    Mechanistic approaches are very common in the causal interpretation of biological and neuroscientific experimental work in today’s philosophy of science. In the mechanistic literature a strict distinction is often made between causal relations and constitutive relations, where the latter cannot be causal. One of the typical reasons for this strict distinction is that constitutive relations are supposedly synchronic whereas most if not all causal relations are diachronic. This strict distinction gives rise to a number of problems, however. Our end goal (...)
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  15. Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - forthcoming - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dolega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What are Mental Representations? New York, État de New York, États-Unis:
    Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive (...)
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  16. Interlevel Causation and External Causes.Marco Totolo - 2016 - Philosophy Pathways 203 (1).
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  17. Essay Review: Reduction in Physiology: Heat and LifeHeat and Life. MendelsohnEverett . Pp. Xiv + 208. 36s.David M. Knight - 1966 - History of Science 5 (1):134-140.
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  18. Creativity as the Self-Realization of Man's Potential — the Supreme Value of Man: Marxian and Confucian.Tsung-I. Dow - 1978 - Dialectics and Humanism 5 (4):33-41.
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  19. Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap'.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-173.
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson, ; Levine,, ; McGinn ; Sturgeon, ; Chalmers,. Some of these writers claim that the existence of such a gap would warrant a belief in some form of ontological dualism, whereas others argue (...)
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  20. Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive Explanation.Raphael van Riel - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):185-221.
  21. Symposium: Are Physical, Biological and Psychological Categories Irreducible?J. S. Haldane, D'Arcy W. Thompson, P. Chalmers Mitchell & L. T. Hobhouse - 1918 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 1 (1):11-74.
  22. XVIII.—Symposium: Are Physical, Biological and Psychological Categories Irreducible?J. S. Haldane, D'Arcy W. Thompson, P. Chalmers Mitchell & L. T. Hobhouse - 1918 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18 (1):419-478.
  23. “You Never Fail to Surprise Me”: The Hallmark of the Other: Experimental Study and Simulations of Perceptual Crossing.Charles Lenay, John Stewart, Marieke Rohde & Amal Ali Amar - 2011 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 12 (3):373-396.
    Classically, the question of recognizing another subject is posed unilaterally, in terms of the observed behaviour of the other entity. Here, we propose an alternative, based on the emergent patterns of activity resulting from the interaction of both partners. We employ a minimalist device which forces the subjects to externalize their perceptual activity as trajectories which can be observed and recorded; the results show that subjects do identify the situation of perceptual crossing with their partner. The interpretation of the results (...)
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  24. Mechanisms, Determination and the Metaphysics of Neuroscience.Patrice Soom - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (3):655-664.
  25. Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):83-105.
  26. Reduction Without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability.Colin Klein - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):39-53.
    Unlike the overall framework of Ernest Nagel's work on reduction, his theory of intertheoretic connection still has life in it. It handles aptly cases where reduction requires complex representation of a target domain. Abandoning his formulation as too liberal was a mistake. Arguments that it is too liberal at best touch only Nagel's deductivist theory of explanation, not his condition of connectability. Taking this condition seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one which requires us to index explanatory power (...)
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  27. Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory.Carl F. Craver - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S83-S97.
    The dominant neuroscientific theory of spatial memory is, like many theories in neuroscience, a multilevel description of a mechanism. The theory links the activities of molecules, cells, brain regions, and whole organisms into an integrated sketch of an explanation for the ability of organisms to navigate novel environments. Here I develop a taxonomy of interlevel experimental strategies for integrating the levels in such multilevel mechanisms. These experimental strategies include activation strategies, interference strategies, and additive strategies. These strategies are mutually reinforcing, (...)
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  28. CHAPTER 4. Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the “Gap”.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 93-120.
  29. F. H. Bradley's Ethics of Self-Realization.Melvin Joseph Brandon - 1972 - Dissertation, Saint Louis University
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  30. Physicalism and Psychology.Ronald Patrick Endicott - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    My thesis is a study in the ontology of psychology, and in particular the status of the entities it is willing to countenance vis-a-vis the physical sciences. The overriding theme which guides the present work is that psychology is an autonomous discipline, autonomous not only in the sense that it utilizes its own distinctive concepts and classification schemes, but in the much stronger sense that it has its own distinct and irreducible ontology which sets it apart from the physical sciences. (...)
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  31. Neural Mechanisms: On the Structure, Function, and Development of Theories in Neurobiology.Carl Frederick Craver - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Reference to mechanisms is virtually ubiquitous in science and its philosophy. Yet, the concept of a mechanism remains largely unanalyzed; So too for its possible applications in thinking about scientific explanation, experimental practice, and theory structure. This dissertation investigates these issues in the context of contemporary neurobiology. ;The theories of neurobiology are hierarchically organized descriptions of mechanisms that explain functions. Mechanisms are the coordinated activities of entities by virtue of which that function is performed. Since the activities composing mechanisms are (...)
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  32. Dilemma Reduction.Phd Daniel Callahan & Md Steven Ralston - 2012 - Lahey Clinic Medical Ethics Journal 19 (1):6-7.
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  33. A Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of Reduction in the Behavioral Sciences.Peter Robinson - 1969 - Dissertation, Boston University Graduate School
  34. On Vowel Reduction in Aramaic.Stephen A. Kaufman - 1984 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 104 (1):87-95.
  35. A Variation on "Reduction Within Reduction": "Interior Extraneity".Armando Rigobello - 1991 - Analecta Husserliana 35:259.
  36. The Conceptual Carvery: A Token of the Type “Clear Explanation”?Peter S. Fosl - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 28:86-86.
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  37. Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims (...)
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  38. No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience.Markus I. Eronen - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...)
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  39. From Backward Reduction to Configurational Analysis.Petri Mäenpää - forthcoming - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
  40. Spiritual Experiences and Integral Realization.Arabinda Basu - forthcoming - Journal of Dharma.
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  41. Meditation: A Discriminating Realization.John Britto Chethimattam - 1977 - Journal of Dharma 2:164-172.
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  42. On the Importance of Being Emergent.Peter Cariani - 2010 - Constructivist Foundations 5 (2).
  43. The Ontology of Psychology: Questioning Foundations in the Philosophy of Mind.Linda A. W. Brakel - 2013 - Routledge.
    In this volume, Brakel raises questions about conventions in the study of mind in three disciplines—psychoanalysis, philosophy of mind, and experimental philosophy. She illuminates new understandings of the mind through interdisciplinary challenges to views long-accepted. Here she proposes a view of psychoanalysis as a treatment that owes its successes largely to its biological nature—biological in its capacity to best approximate the extinction of problems arising owing to aversive conditioning. She also discusses whether or not "the mental" can have any real (...)
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  44. Methodology and Reduction in the Behavioural Neurosciences: Object Exploration as a Case Study.A. Chemero & C. Heyser - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 68--90.
  45. Explanatory Pluralism and the Coevolution of Theories in Science.Robert N. McCauley - 1996 - In The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell. pp. 17--47.
  46. Reduction.Paul Teller - 1995 - In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 679--80.
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  47. Task-Realization Models in Contextual Graphs.Patrick Brézillon - 2005 - In B. Kokinov A. Dey (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer. pp. 55--68.
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  48. Minisymposia-IV Substructuring, Dimension Reduction and Applications-Parallel Algorithms for Balanced Truncation Model Reduction of Sparse Systems.Jose M. Badia, Peter Benner, Rafael Mayo & Enrique S. Quintana-Orti - 2006 - In O. Stock & M. Schaerf (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Verlag. pp. 267-275.
  49. Reduction: Varieties Of.Graham Oddie - 2001 - In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. pp. 12.
  50. Reduction.Robert C. Richardson - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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