Think of the Children! Epistemic Justification and Cognitively Unsophisticated Subjects

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2017)
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I undermine the argument that ‘high’ epistemic standards are false because children and other cognitively unsophisticated subjects possess justification while lacking certain logical and epistemic concepts. I argue, instead, that the standards we often use to attribute logical and epistemic concepts to ordinary, cognitively sophisticated adults can easily be seen to cover many unsophisticated subjects; therefore, the alleged lack of certain concepts is no basis for rejecting ‘high’ epistemic standards. Whether or not such standards are correct has to be argued on other grounds.



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Gregory Stoutenburg
York College Of Pennsylvania

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