Gabriel Leuenberger
University of Groningen
Given functionally equivalent minds, how does the expected quantity of their conscious experience differ across different substrates and how could we calculate this? We argue that a realistic digital brain emulation would be orders of magnitude less conscious than a real biological brain. On the other hand, a mind running on neuromorphic hardware or a quantum computer could in principle be more conscious than than a biological brain.
Keywords consciousness  brain emulation  substrate  brain simulation  artificial intelligence  ethics  occam's razor  universal prior  algorithmic probability  Kolmogorov complexity
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Hyperset Models of Self, Will and Reflective Consciousness.Ben Goertzel - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):19-53.

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