Aquinas: Metaphysics

Thomas Aquinas embraces a controversial claim about the way in which parts of a substance depend on the substance’s substantial form. On his metaphysics, a ‘substantial form’ is not merely a relation among already existing things, in virtue of which (for example) the arrangement or configuration of those things would count as a substance. The substantial form is rather responsible for the identity or nature of the parts of the substance such a form constitutes. Aquinas’ controversial claim can be roughly (...) put as the view that things are members of their kind in virtue of their substantial form. To put it simply, Aquinas’ claim results in the implication that, every time the xs come to compose a y, those xs have to undergo a change in kind membership. -/- This has been called the “homonymy principle,” and it follows from Aquinas’ view of substantial forms, and specifically from the position that substantial forms inform prime matter, rather than substance-parts. The aim of this paper will be to defend that the Thomistic claim that substantial forms account for the determinate actuality of every part of a substance is plausible and coherent. After defending the Thomistic account, I propose that approaching problems of material composition as a Thomist has a significant, oft-overlooked advantage of involving a thorough-going naturalistic methodology that resolves such problems by appeal to empirical considerations. (shrink)

This synopsis contains the Greek text of Aristotle, Metaphysics XII (in the edition of Silvia Fazzo, since this edition corresponds best to the translation template of the Anonyma), the translation of the Translatio Anonyma, the commentary of Albertus Magnus (including all digressions), further the translation improved by Moerbeke and the commentary of Thomas Aquinas (the sources used are listed in the document). -/- The synopsis is intended to facilitate the study and comparison of the two commentaries, since all the material (...) is visible side by side (it is best to use a wide screen, for the printout is suitable A3 format, landscape). -/- Marked in red are loosely placed comments and questions by me. All questions are real, who can answer, is welcome. For me, the material is a starting point for the study of the reception of Metaphysics XII (Lambda) in the Middle Ages, with special attention to the conditions under which they were written, which are only partly explicit, partly taken for granted. It concerns in particular the view of the text as a theological thesis of Aristotle, the understanding of οὐσία as substance, the presupposition that philosophy must be systematic and assertive and other questions. The influence of the Liber de Causis and some of the writings of Dionysius Areopagita must also be taken into account, of course. -/- I hope it can be useful to someone who is also interested in the metaphysics commentaries of Albert and Thomas. Whoever wants the bare synopsis without my comments can write to me, I will send the source text (LaTeX), from which these can be easily removed. -/- ******************* -/- Diese Synopsis enthält den griechischen Text von Aristoteles, Metaphysik XII (in der Ausgabe von Silvia Fazzo, da diese Ausgabe am besten der Textvorlage der Anonyma entspricht), die Übersetzung der Translatio Anonyma, den Kommentar des Albertus Magnus dazu (inklusiv allen Digressionen), sowie die von Moerbeke verbesserte Übersetzung und den Kommentar des Thomas von Aquin dazu (die benutzten Quellen sind im Dokument aufgeführt). -/- Die Synopsis soll das Studium und den Vergleich der beiden Kommentare erleichtern, da das ganze Material nebeneinander sichbar ist (am besten verwendet man einen breiten Bildschirm, für den Ausdruck eignet sich A3-Format, quer). -/- Rot markiert sind locker gesetzte Anmerkungen und Fragen von mir. Alle Fragen sind echt, wer antworten kann, ist herzlich willkommen. Für mich ist das Material Ausgangspunkt für das Studium der Rezeption von Metaphysik XII (Lambda) im Mittelalter, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf die Voraussetzungen, unter denen sie verfasst worden sind, die nur teils ausdrücklich sind, teils als selbstverständlich angesehen werden. Es betrifft im Besonderen die Auffassung des Textes als theologische Äusserung des Aristoteles, das Verständnis von οὐσία als Substanz, die Voraussetzung, dass Philosophie systematisch und behauptend zu sein habe. Der Einfluss des Liber de Causis und einiger Schriften von Dionysius Areopagita sind natürlich auch in Rechnung zu stellen. -/- Ich hoffe, dass es jemandem, der sich ebenfalls für die Metaphysik-Kommentare von Albert und Thomas interessiert, nützlich sein kann. Wer die blosse Synopse ohne meine Bemerkungen wünscht, kann mich anschreiben, ich werde den Quelltext (LaTeX) senden, woraus diese leicht entfernt werden können. (shrink)

This paper tries to understand existence as identified with Aquinas' esse in a right way. The author distinguishes among facticity and existence, because facticity it a mere negative understanding of existence as the negation of nothing. But existence is not only a negative thing, but a positive one, therefore it is not still described by this negative definition. Existence includes facticity but is not only facticity. Existence is the actuality of essence and that description does not diminish Aquinas' understanding of (...) esse but puts it in its true dimension. (shrink)

This article focuses on some topics in Jeffrey Brower’s recent and excellent book, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects. Part of Brower’s goal for the book is to reconstruct Aquinas’s views. I offer some reflections on Brower’s use of this metaphor of reconstruction, before considering four topics in some detail. These are: 1. Brower’s discussion of the relation between Aristotle’s Ten Categories and the not-obviously-connected four-fold division of being into substance, form, prime matter, and accidental (...) unity. 2. Brower’s interpretation of prime matter as “non-individual stuff.” 3. Brower’s account of numerical sameness without identity along with some discussion of how this is supposed to be useful for solving a particular puzzle about accidental change. 4. I’ll close with some reflections on Brower’s somewhat novel solution to a longstanding problem with Aquinas’s metaphysics of the afterlife. (shrink)

The Hegelian and the Thomistic accounts of self-knowledge are solidly Aristotelian in their origins and motivations. In their conclusions and consequences, however, the two accounts exhibit significant differences. Hegel argues that genuine self-knowledge is necessarily social and historical, while Aquinas says nothing about history or society in his account of self-knowledge. The aim of this paper is not to decide the issue concerning historicity in favor of either Hegel or Aquinas. The aim here is rather to address a prior question: (...) what are the systematic and philosophical reasons for the difference between the two thinkers? In order to articulate this difference between the two, we might begin by considering an underlying similarity: their common Aristotelian background. (shrink)

The different meanings of the word "to be" have interested philosophers at least since Aristotle. In my paper, I would like to draw attention to the following question: in what way "to be", when predicating actual existence of an individual, is connected with time and how it refers to the individual and its real change. I want to do this by presenting Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of the Aristotelian analysis of the different means of the word "to be" referring to Peter (...) Geach, who discussed this doctrine in relation to the interpretation of "existence" by Russell and Quine. My aim is to ask whether this medieval doctrine may contribute to the clarification of the relation between unity and time with regard to the question of endurantism and perdurantism. (shrink)

This work includes contributions by grice, pears, strawson, hampshire, williams, buchdahl, gardiner, murdoch, and warnock. the general consensus of opinion seems to be that metaphysics is characterized by being conceptual revision. these philosophers also agree that there is no real future for such metaphysical enquiries. (staff).

IN ‘Thomistic First Principles and Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language’ Professor Peter Dwyer SJ has put forward some suggestions, both learned and exciting, for increasing friendly commerce between admirers of Saint Thomas and admirers of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Recognising that there is considerable philosophical diversity within each set of admirers and that some fine philosophers already belong to both sets, Dwyer concludes: ‘Thomistic first principles complement and correct the philosophy of Wittgenstein by drawing attention to the fact that language has an objective (...) criterion of meaning which is, in the last analysis, independent of what we might say about reality’. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that both defence and criticism of the claim that humans act ‘under the guise of the good’ neglects the metaphysical roots of the theory. I begin with an overview of the theory and its modern commentators, with critics noting the apparent possibility of acting against the good, and supporters claiming that such actions are instances of error. These debates reduce the ‘guise of the good’ to a claim about intention and moral action, and in so (...) doing have become divorced from the theory's roots in classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle and Aquinas’ ‘guise of the good’ is primarily a metaphysical claim resting on the equivalence between actuality and goodness, from which conclusions about moral action are derived. I show the reasoning behind their theory and how it forms the basis for the claims about intention and action at the centre of the modern debate. Finally, I argue that the absence of its original foundation is apparent in recent attacks on the ‘guise of the good’. It is unsurprising that modern action theory and ethics have not always been able to comfortably accommodate the ‘guise of the good’; they are only telling half of the story. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that both defence and criticism of the claim that humans act ‘under the guise of the good’ neglects the metaphysical roots of the theory. I begin with an overview of the theory and its modern commentators, with critics noting the apparent possibility of acting against the good, and supporters claiming that such actions are instances of error. These debates reduce the ‘guise of the good’ to a claim about intention and moral action, and in so (...) doing have become divorced from the theory's roots in classical and medieval philosophy. Aristotle and Aquinas’ ‘guise of the good’ is primarily a metaphysical claim resting on the equivalence between actuality and goodness, from which conclusions about moral action are derived. I show the reasoning behind their theory and how it forms the basis for the claims about intention and action at the centre of the modern debate. Finally, I argue that the absence of its original foundation is apparent in recent attacks on the ‘guise of the good’. It is unsurprising that modern action theory and ethics have not always been able to comfortably accommodate the ‘guise of the good’; they are only telling half of the story. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role of non-humans in Aquinas’ account of moral learning. I intend to show that the entire created order can play an important role in demonstrating to us the life of virtue, and argue that non-human exemplars offer important advantages to the moral learner. I begin by addressing apparent problems with this approach, founded on the observation that human virtue, for Aquinas, is unique to humans. I resolve these by showing that Aquinas’ approach to exemplars (...) is fundamentally analogical, meaning that exemplars point beyond themselves and need not necessarily live the good life to which they direct learners. I show that this means that Aquinas can use non-humans as moral exemplars and offer examples of him doing just that. Finally, I offer an assessment of the benefits of this approach. Among other things, it offers ethicists new ways to focus on particular virtues and provides a plausible way to include non-humans in the moral realm. (shrink)