This paper discusses the views of three medieval thinkers—Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus—about a specific aspect of the problem of evil, which can be dubbed ‘the Lucifer problem’. What was the object of the first evil choice? What could entice a perfectly rational agent placed in ideal circumstances into doing evil? Those thinkers agreed that Lucifer wanted to be happier, but while Anselm thought that that was something Lucifer could achieve by his natural powers, Aquinas held that it (...) was not naturally possible for Lucifer to be happier, even though it was something he could obtain supernaturally. By contrast, Scotus posited that what Lucifer wanted was beyond what was logically possible, i.e. to be as happy as God (or to be God’s equal). An interesting consequence of Scotus’s hypothesis is that God could have done nothing to make Lucifer’s evil choice less likely. (shrink)

Scotus claims that the extramental world is divided into ten distinct kinds of essences, no one of which can be reduced to another one. Although by the end of the thirteenth century this claim was not new, Scotus's way of articulating it into a comprehensive metaphysical doctrine resulted into a ground-breaking contribution to what became known as 'late medieval realism'. This paper shows how Scotus's view of the categories as ten kinds of irreducible essences should be seen as a development (...) and correction of his predecessors' (including Thomas Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's) views. The main elements of Scotus's doctrine are his application of the real distinction to the categories, his view of inherence as a categorial item separated from accidents, and his distinction between absolute and non-absolute accidents. Finally, although Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being seems to pose a challenge to his claim that categories are irreducible to each other and do not have anything in common, this paper shows how Scotus's doctrine of univocity and his realist conception of the categories can be reconciled as two theories that describe the world from different points of view. (shrink)

Students of later medieval semantics are familiar with the controversy that developed at the end of the thirteenth century over the signification of names. The debate focused on the signification of common nouns such as and : Do they signify an extramental thing or a mental representation of an extramental thing? 1 Duns Scotus is commonly recognized as having played an important role in this debate. 2 In his Ordinatio, he alludes to a magnaaltercatio among his contemporaries concerning signification. 3 (...) What is more, he gives, in his two commentaries on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, a detailed and fair analysis of the two contrasting positions on this issue. 4. (shrink)

Even though Scotus did not develop his account in direct opposition to Aquinas, a contrast between these two thinkers helps us to focus on some distinctive features of their respective approaches and on some characteristic moves they made to answer the question, “What is it to think?” Scotus agreed with Aquinas that, barring divine intervention, an intelligible species must be received in the intellect prior to the production of an occurrent thought about a thing’s essence. Unlike Aquinas, however, Scotus argued (...) that occurrent thoughts are qualities and not actions. This allowed him to reject the view held by Aquinas that the presence of the intelligible species in the intellect explains a thought’s intentionality. Rather, Scotus claimed that a thought’s intentionality is explained by a relation grounded in that thought and directed at its object. (shrink)

This study of the interpretations of Aristotle's "Categories" in the thirteenth century provides an introduction to some main themes of medieval philosophical ...

Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in the mind — have been recently interpreted in different ways. In this paper, I argue that Scotus’s apparently contradictory statements on objective being can be made sense only if they are read against the background of his theory of essence. Specifically, I claim that a key point of Scotus’s position is that objects of thoughts are in the mind but have mind-independent identity (...) (they are in the mind but not of the mind). I defend my interpretation by focusing on a usually neglected passage from Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics where Scotus provides an unusually explicit (if short) account of what he takes ‘to be objectively in the intellect’ to mean. (shrink)

How should we understand intuitive cognition? Duns Scotus held that we have intuitive cognition only when objects cause our knowledge without any causal intermediary; if an intelligible species caused our knowledge, it would be abstractive cognition. Compared to abstractive cognition, intuitive cognition is the paradigmatic case of knowledge; by contrast, abstractive cognition is only a "second best.".

The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually recognized as a high point in the history of medieval epistemology. Still, there is much obscurity surrounding that debate, including the specific nature of the disagreement between those two thinkers. In this paper, I argue that the point at issue is the relationship between sense and intellect. Henry of Ghent, who posits a close tie between sense and intellect, holds that the senses are the only (...) natural source of both content and certainty for the intellect. By contrast, Duns Scotus holds that, in our natural state, the senses are the source of content but not of certainty for the intellect, which can achieve knowledge of the truth of first principles true by virtue of the meaning of their terms independently of the sensory input it receives. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Duns Scotus’s treatment of accidents existing without substances in the Eucharist to shed light on how he thinks Aristotle’s metaphysics should be modified to make room for miracles. In my reconstruction, Duns Scotus makes two changes to Aristotle’s metaphysics. First, he distinguishes a given thing’s natural inclinations from the manifestations of those inclinations. Second, he argues that it is up to God’s free decisions whether a thing’s aptitudes manifest or do not manifest themselves in any (...) given situation. In this way, Duns Scotus tries to find a point of equilibrium between the necessary causal order he attributes to Aristotle and his followers on the one hand, and God’s freedom to break the natural order at any moment on the other hand. (shrink)

L'A. sottolinea come la posizione di Scoto sugli universali, sebbene mal compresa e incomprensibile, è davvero un tentativo interessante di dire cosa sia possibile e necessario circa la struttura della realtà senza far confusione fra la realtà stessa e il nostro modo di conoscerla. Non è possibile dire che cosa gli oggetti siano nel mondo e se siano individui o universali sulla base di una semantica o una considerazione epistemologica. Non è possibile formulare la struttura del mondo sulla base dei (...) nostri concetti o delle parole che si si usano per descriverlo. L'A. è conscio del fatto che questa posizione che rileva all'interno della filosofia scotista è inedita rispetto alla sua linea interpretativa, che si allineava con quanti intendevano leggere la filosofia del Doctor subtilis sugli universali nell'ambito di una linea realista, non tenendo conto della palese reticenza del filosofo in merito alla questione degli universali. I nodi testuali esaminati sono quelli delle Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, della Lectura, dell'Ordinatio e del Quodlibet. (shrink)

The existence of everlasting punishment has sometimes been thought to be incompatible with God’s goodness and omnipotence. John Duns Scotus focused on the key issue concerning everlasting punishment, i.e., the impossibility for the damned to repent of their evil deeds and so to obtain forgiveness. Scotus’s claimwas that such an impossibility is not logical but nomological, i.e., it depends on the rules God established to govern the world, specifically on what I call ‘the rule of the permanence of the last (...) volition.’ Scotus does not try to defend God’s decision to implement the rule of the permanence of the last volition. I suggest, however, that that decision can be taken as an indication of God’s preference for a world where this life is given unique value as the only test rational creatures have to prove themselves as moral agents. (shrink)

Duns Scotus’ authorship of the commentary on Aristotle’s Topics transmitted in ms. Vatican, Ottoboni lat. 318 is demonstrated by no less than twelve references to his commentaries on the Isagoge and the Categories. In addition, new information is provided about the relative chronology of Scotus’ philosophical commentaries and the existence of a lost commentary on the Prior Analytics.

La prima parte del saggio è apparsa in «Documenti e Studi» 3, 1 271-304 . L'esame analitico condotto su ciascuna delle sette questioni egidiane permette all'A. di valutare «le dimensioni e le modalità dell'impiego delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino compiuto da Egidio Romano» . Di ciascuna questione viene quindi presentata una scheda ragionata articolata in tre parti: 1) collocazione della questione ; 2) analisi delle sezioni ; 3) raffronto complessivo tra la questione studiata e l'articolo parallelo del commento al II (...) libro Sententiarum di Egidio, seguito da una valutazione generale del rapporto tra la questione di Egidio e la trattazione svolta da Tommaso. (shrink)

La prima parte del saggio è apparsa in «Documenti e Studi» 3, 1 271-304. L'esame analitico condotto su ciascuna delle sette questioni egidiane permette all'A. di valutare «le dimensioni e le modalità dell'impiego delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino compiuto da Egidio Romano». Di ciascuna questione viene quindi presentata una scheda ragionata articolata in tre parti: 1) collocazione della questione ; 2) analisi delle sezioni ; 3) raffronto complessivo tra la questione studiata e l'articolo parallelo del commento al II libro Sententiarum (...) di Egidio, seguito da una valutazione generale del rapporto tra la questione di Egidio e la trattazione svolta da Tommaso. (shrink)

Lo studio, la cui seconda parte sarà pubblicata nel secondo fascicolo di DSTradF 3, si può dividere in tre sezioni principali. Nella prima, dopo aver accennato alla questione storiografica sulla paternità tommasiana o egidiana della dottrina della differenza reale fra essere ed essenza, l'A. esamina datazione e struttura delle Quaestiones de esse et essentia egidiane, ed in particolare delle prime sette questioni di quest'opera, le Questiones de primo principio, sul tema della creazione, confrontandole poi con i Theoremata de esse et (...) essentia e con il commento di Egidio al II libro delle Sententiae. L'esame della dottrina egidiana della creazione è condotto sia per chiarire come Egidio abbia recepito il corpus degli scritti di Tommaso, sia per trarre nuova luce a proposito della dottrina della distinzione reale di essere ed essenza, la cui trattazione era intesa dal maestro agostiniano come continuazione di quella della creazione. Nella seconda parte l'A. esamina l'impiego egidiano degli scritti dell'Aquinate sulla creazione, mentre la parte finale del saggio verte sulle critiche mosse da Enrico di Gand alla dottrina della creazione elaborata da Egidio. (shrink)

Can the Proslogion argument for God’s existence be parodied to demonstrate the existence of the worst evil? This is what Duns Scotus contends in one of his works, where he presents such a parody as evidence for the argument’s unsoundness. Elsewhere, however, Scotus defends a “touched-up” version (coloratio) of Anselm’s argument. In my reconstruction, Scotus’s touched-up argument includes three stages: first, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought is a possible object of thought; second, a demonstration (...) that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to exist and so can exist; third, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists. Contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, I argue that Scotus’s argument does not make any illegitimate shift from logical to real possibility. I also contend that one of the most characteristic aspects of Scotus’s touched-up argument is that the comparison between existing in the intellect and existing in reality (arguably the weakest point in standard reconstructions of Anselm’s argument) plays no role in it, and that accordingly Scotus’s argument is immune from his own parody of Anselm’s argument. (shrink)

L'A. propone una nuova indagine sull'essenzialismo di Scoto attraverso una lettura analitica della questione 7 delle Questiones sul settimo libro della Metafisica. Nello stesso luogo Scoto critica la dottrina di Tommaso sull'essenza. In tal modo, l'A. evidenzia profonde differenziazioni fra ciò che è comunemente etichettato essenzialismo aristotelico. Nel caso dei due filosofi, infatti, pur partendo entrambi dall'interpretazione del pensiero aristotelico e da una comune assunzione della dottrina avicenniana dell'indifferenza dell'essenza, si approda ad opposte teorie.

Da lungo tempo è stato riconosciuto il carattere scotista dell'Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum di Antonio Andrea, a tal punto che essa figura tra le opere di Scoto nelle edizioni del Wadding e di Vivés. Anche ora che la paternità di Antonio Andrea per quest'opera è stata comunemente riconosciuta, accade spesso che si faccia ricorso all'Expositio al fine di illuminare questo o quel punto oscuro del pensiero di Scoto. Tuttavia, una volta analizzata, quest'opera mostra di essere un adattamento puntuale del commento (...) alla Metafisica di Tommaso dal punto di vista delle teorie di Scoto. Attraverso l'introduzione sistematica nelle formulazioni di Tommaso delle nuove dottrine scotiste dell'univocità dell'ente e della natura communis, Antonio realizzò il progetto di fornire ai primi discepoli di Scoto un manuale della scienza dell'ente come scientia transcendens. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus is commonly recognized as one of the most original thinkers of medieval philosophy. His influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians is enormous and extends well beyond the limits of the Middle Ages. His thought, however, might be intimidating for the non-initiated, because of the sheer number of topics he touched on and the difficulty of his style. The eleven essays collected here, especially written for this volume by some of the leading scholars in the field, take the (...) reader through various topics, including Duns Scotus's intellectual environment, his argument for the existence of God, and his conceptions of modality, order, causality, freedom, and human nature. This volume provides a reliable point of entrance to the thought of Duns Scotus while giving a snapshot of some of the best research that is now being done on this difficult but intellectually rewarding thinker. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus authored two works on Aristotle's metaphysics, the Questions on the Metaphysics and the Remarks on the Metaphysics. The Questions were copied several times and were soon regarded as one of Scotus's major works. A close study of Scotus's views on the nature, method, and limits of metaphysics in the Questions provides an access key to an otherwise intractable work. Scotus had a particularly lofty conception of metaphysics as the discipline that both considers anything whatsoever with regard to (...) its most general features and inquires into the deeper structure of reality. Scotus was acutely aware of some severe cognitive limitations that actually mar our current practice of metaphysics. Scotus developed an original conception of how it is possible to overcome the current cognitive limitations and grasp the deeper structure of reality by the exercise of purely intellectual powers. (shrink)

Between the thirteenth and fourteenth century, a remarkable number of thinkers developed an interest in explaining a cognitive state's property of being about something, as many recent studies have shown.1 Several of those later medieval accounts shared a common strategy. According to this common strategy, intentionality was explained in causal terms. Thus, it was contended that cognitive states are about what causes them, and that it is precisely because a certain thing causes a certain cognitive state that such a cognitive (...) state is about that thing. For example, I see something white because my act of seeing is caused by something white. Similarly, my act of thinking is about horses because horses cause it. I .. (shrink)

L'A., analizzando la fortuna delle Quaestiones super Metaphysicam di Antonio, discepolo di Scoto, ne segnala il carattere di revisione, ovvero di semplificazione e di riordino, dell'opera del maestro, realizzata con lo scopo di rendere agevole ai discepoli la consultazione dell'opera. Di fatto le Quaestiones presentano, oltre alle correzioni formali, aggiunte, modifiche e soppressioni rispetto all'opera di Scoto, apportate secondo una prospettiva aristotelica che influenzerà la formazione del pensiero metafisico della scuola scotista. Due appendici concludono il saggio: l'elenco dei mss. noti (...) della Metafisica aristotelica, e la classificazione delle quaestiones di Andrea in rapporto alle originali scotiste. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a recent book, Thomas Ward advances an original interpretation of Duns Scotus’s hylomorphism, which stresses the ability of the parts of certain kinds of composites to exist independently from each other and from the composite to which they belong. Ward argues that the notion of essential order plays a key role in accounting for the unity of those parts in a composite. In another book, Richard Cross gives a comprehensive treatment of Duns Scotus’s theory of cognition, which proposes an (...) interesting but controversial interpretation of Duns Scotus as introducing a distinction between object and content and defending the view that the contents of intellectual cognitive acts are determined only by their internal structure. (shrink)

Giorgio Pini - Duns Scotus on God - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.3 497-498 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Giorgio Pini Fordham University Richard Cross. Duns Scotus on God. Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005. Pp. xi + 289. Paper, $34.95. In this volume, Richard Cross gives us an excellent treatment of Duns Scotus's teaching on God, admirable for both its comprehensiveness and (...) philosophical rigor. Scotus's positions on God's existence and nature, and on the Trinity, are reconstructed and evaluated with close attention to their argumentative soundness. Cross's method is particularly well-suited to his subject. As he notices, Scotus is, among theologians, "the least likely to appeal to mystery, and most likely to try to solve a.. (shrink)

Lo studio si pone due domande sulla dottrina dell'essenzialismo, desunta dalla posizione di Avicenna sull'essenza : 1) come fu possibile per gli autori del Due e Trecento interpretare la dottrina aristotelica dell'essenza come dottrina dell'indifferenza dell'essenza all'individualità e all'universalità; 2) come poterono autori che sostenevano dottrine diverse fra loro appellarsi tutti alla risposta di Avicenna. In questo studio è presa in esame la posizione di Tommaso, soprattutto in quanto nell'evoluzione del suo pensiero non dette alla dottrina dell'indifferenza dell'essenza la medesima (...) interpretazione. La prima parte dello studio è centrata sulla dottrina dell'essenza in Avicenna, elaborata sulla scia della distinzione di Alessandro di Afrodisia tra universale e ciò cui l'universale pertiene. Nella seconda si considera la posizione di Tommaso, prima nel De ente et essentia, poi nel Quodlibet VIII, q. 1 delle Quaestiones de quodlibet, infine nei commenti al De anima e alla Metafisica, e nella Summa contra Gentiles. (shrink)

Walter of Mortagne taught at Reims and Laon, where he become bishop and died in 1174. He is the author of two theological treatises and ten letters. Tarlazzi’s book is a careful study of his realism concerning universals. As the author notes, his views must be reconstructed from indirect evidence. We know from John of Salisbury that he was the main proponent of an original position according to which universals are real items in the world but are identical with individuals. (...) Unfortunately, no work on universals has come down to us that can be attributed to William. Since the late nineteenth century, however, scholars have been able to link Walter’s views as described by John of... (shrink)