While the logical reconstruction of empirical theories is, in principle, no longer a matter of dispute, the possibility and, furthermore, the procedure of constructing ab initio such theories are hardly debated upon, although this might be conducive to the advancement, above all, of sciences of a pre-paradigmatic status. Eight steps are here proposed for the constructive development of an explanatory empirical theory in a strictly scientific sense, the development starting with a construction of the theory's set of partial potential models (...) ${\rm M}_{{\rm pp}}$ and ending up in a characterization of its range of intended applications I. The set of partial potential models is gained by way of genetic reduction of present-day practical, i. e. pre-theoretical, notions, which denote observable facts to be explained, to some possible notion of an elementary historical practice. This elementary practical notion, which must be conceived as a general notion of a formerly given elementary social practice, has afterwards to be developed into some general notion for all the phenomena to be presently explained, by way of reconstructing the historical emergence of the present field of research. The elementary practical notion also forms the basis for the generation of the explaining so-called t-theoretical terms of the theory. Their development, however, presupposes a 'political' decision of the scientist to work in favour of the perfection of certain practically relevant capacities, which decision also determines the domain of discourse for the set of partial potential models of the theory and links its explaining terms to the terms denoting the facts to be explained. A set Iₒ of successful applications of the as yet not completed theory and respective special laws, making up the success of such applications, render possible the full axiomatization of the theory as well as the characterization of the range of its intended applications. (shrink)

While the logical reconstruction of empirical theories is, in principle, no longer a matter of dispute, the possibility and, furthermore, the procedure of constructingab initio such theories are hardly debated upon, although this might be conductive to the advancement, above all, of sciences of a pre-paradigmatic status. Eight steps are here proposed for the constructive development of an explanatory empirical theory in a strictly scientific sense, the development starting with a construction of the theory's set of partial potential models Mpp (...) and ending up in a characterization of its range of intended applications I. The set of partial potential models is gained by way of genetic reduction of present-day practical, i. e. pre-theoretical, notions, which denote observable facts to be explained, to some possible notion of an elementary historical practice. This elementary practical notion, which must be conceived as a general notion of a formerly given elementary social practice, has afterwards to be developed into some general notion for all the phenomena to be presently explained, by way of reconstructing the historical emergence of the present field of research. The elementary practical notion also forms the basis for the generation of theexplaining so-called t-theoretical terms of the theory. Their development, however, presupposes a ‘political’ decision of the scientist to work in favour of the perfection of certain practically relevant capacities, which decision also determines the domain of discourse for the set of partial potential models of the theory and links its explaining terms to the terms denoting the facts to be explained. A set Io of successful applications of the as yet not completed theory and respective special laws, making up the success of such applications, render possible the full axiomatization of the theory as well as the characterization of the range of its intended applications. (shrink)

In this paper an attempt is made at developing the notion of a real and complete empirical explanation as excluding all forms of potential or incomplete explanations. This explanation is, however, no longer conceived as the proper aim of empirical science, for it can certainly be gleaned from recent epistemological publications that no comprehensive notion of a real and complete scientific explanation is likely to be constructed from within empirical science. Contrary to common understanding the empirical explanation, deductive-nomological as well (...) as statistical explanation, is considered here only as motive of scientific activities, i.e., as common aim of a transcending cooperation of scientific and non-scientific social practice. Following from this the proper aim of empirical science now consists in the development of practically relevant explanatory theories.This redetermination of the aim of scientific activities of empirical science also means criticism of the unification of deductive-nomological and statistical explanations, as it has been proposed by Wolfgang Stegmüller in his pragmatisch-epistemische Wende. For both forms of empirical explanation must be referred to fundamentally different kinds of practical relevance, the former playing a more important role in the advancement of social practice. Stegmüller's development of a comprehensive probabilistic notion of empirical explanation, as tied up to pragmatic knowledge-situations, in a way already transcends a scientifically immanent determination of it, but he seems to have stopped halfway on the road to practically relevant empirical explanations. Several insufficiencies with his probabilistic notion of empirical explanation are shown up in this paper as a consequence of his abiding by pragmatic, and not penetrating to practical, knowledge-situations. The final result of it, however, consists in a clarification and a modification of the concept of deductive-nomological explanation, originally developed by Hempel and Oppenheim. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes (as I named it) are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

In this article the outlines are sketched of an empirical science of literature as close as possible to the model of the natural sciences. This raises the question of what the standards of an empirical science in the strictest sense should generally be. Practical relevance of its results soon turns up as the fundamental condition for an explanatory empirical science, if the ideology of nearing an empirical truth is no longer accepted and a mere pragmatic justification rejected as its insufficient (...) substitute. As a consequence the logical priority of scientific explanation over scientific description is considered irrefutable. The so-called "sciences of understanding" - among them a "science of literature" - are confronted with a special difficulty, if they want to become explanatory empirical sciences. Their practical problems to be solved are related to linguistically or semiotically coded facts. To empirically describe these problematic facts causes this difficulty, which the author tries to overcome with recourse to ideas from Wittgenstein. And the practical relevance, which may be achieved with the help of nomological explanations, here doesn't consist in predictions for better practical production of means, direct or indirect, for survival, but in the provision of rational understanding for better practical teaching or criticism. This practical relevance is shown in the explanation of valuing acts of readers of The Golden Bowl by Henry James. The meaning of a literary text is no longer taken as a possible object of scientific empirical explanation, nor its rational justification as a scientific goal that might be practically relevant. (shrink)

In this article the outlines are sketched of an empirical science of literature as close as possible to the model of the natural sciences. This raises the question of what the standards of an empirical science in the strictest sense should generally be. Practical relevance of its results soon turns up as the fundamental condition for an explanatory empirical science, if the ideology of nearing an empirical truth is no longer accepted and a mere pragmatic justification rejected as its insufficient (...) substitute. As a consequence the logical priority of scientific explanation over scientific description is considered irrefutable. The so-called "sciences of understanding" - among them a "science of literature" - are confronted with a special difficulty, if they want to become explanatory empirical sciences. Their practical problems to be solved are related to linguistically or semiotically coded facts. To empirically describe these problematic facts causes this difficulty, which the author tries to overcome with recourse to ideas from Wittgenstein. And the practical relevance, which may be achieved with the help of nomological explanations, here doesn't consist in predictions for better practical production of means, direct or indirect, for survival, but in the provision of rational understanding for better practical teaching or criticism. This practical relevance is shown in the explanation of valuing acts of readers of The Golden Bowl by Henry James. The meaning of a literary text is no longer taken as a possible object of scientific empirical explanation, nor its rational justification as a scientific goal that might be practically relevant. (shrink)

Ziel des Buches war der Entwurf einer praktisch relevanten empirischen Literaturwissenschaft, welche sich absetzt sowohl von hermeneutischen wie von phanomenologischen Vorgehensweisen. Zunachst wird allgemein eine wissenschaftstheoretische Grundlegung empirischer Wissenschaften im strengen Sinn von Erklarungswissenschaften entwickelt. Als gemeinsame Basis fur die Konstruktion von empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Erklarungstheorien wird die Relevanz bei der vordringlichen Losung praktischer Probleme angesehen. Im Falle der Literaturwissenschaft ist ein solches vorrangig zu losendes Problem die misslingende Begrundung unterschiedlicher Auffassungen von Lesern eines Publikums uber auktoriale Mitteilungen. Ergebnis ist ein Paradigma, (...) das nicht mehr den literarischen Text und seine individuelle Verarbeitung durch den einzelnen Leser beschreibt und zu erklaren versucht, sondern die wertende kommunikative Handlung von Lesern gegenuber anderen Lesern bezuglich von ihnen ausgewahlter Teile einer auktorialen Botschaft.". (shrink)

Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.

Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.

Husserls »Logische Untersuchungen« sind eines der folgenreichsten Werke der neueren Philosophiegeschichte. Mit dem ersten Erscheinen in den Jahren 1900 und 1901 (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle/Saale) nimmt jene Schule ihren Anfang, deren Name im Untertitel des zweiten Bandes zum ersten Mal sinnfällig wird: die Phänomenologie. Husserl sah damals in diesem Werk »Versuche zur Neubegründung der reinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie«, die den Grund zu einem größeren Gedankengebäude zu legen imstande waren. Sie wollten freilich kein bloßes Programm sein, sondern »Fundamentalarbeit an den unmittelbar (...) erschauten und ergriffenen Sachen« darstellen. Die weitere Arbeit an der Ausprägung der phänomenologischen Philosophie führte schon nach wenigen Jahren zu neuen Problemen, zu vertieften Erkenntnissen und zu schärferen Formulierungen. Ihnen trägt die zweite, zum Teil tiefgreifend umgearbeitete Auflage Rechnung, deren Text seither in unveränderter Form immer wieder nachgedruckt wurde. (shrink)

Le 27 avril 1938, Edmund HUSSERL, l'initiateur et principal representant du courant phenomenologique dans la philosophie contemporaine, mourut a Fribourg en Brisgau, age de pres de quatre-vingts ans. Depuis la parution de ses Logische Untersuchungen en 190~ 1901, le monde philosophique international avait suivi, avec UD interet toujours croissant, les exposes successifs et de plus en plus approfondis, que le maUre fribourgeois publiait sur les prin~ cipes de sa methode, dite pMnomenologique, sur les applications concretes de celle-ci aux problemes (...) philosophiques les plus divers, ainsi que sur la phenomenologie comme systeme philo­ sophique autonome et pour ainsi dire "autarchique". Ces publi­ cations, relativement peu nombreuses, mais fort remarquees des leur parution, furent etudiees avec le plus grand soin par les representants les plus autorises des differents courants de la pensee contemporaine. Les critiques, il va sans dire, ne manquerent point. On attira l'attention sur le caractere plutöt programmatique de ces etudes, sur la terminologie fort neuve, quelque peu arbitraire, parfois meme deroutante, dont se servait l'auteur, sur son pen­ chant prononce pour des distinctions subtiles et pour des defini­ tions minutieuses a l'exces, sur la difficulte de son style et les complications parfois inutiles de son expose, enfin et surtout -­ au moins depuis 1913 - sur le caractere audacieux de sa theorie de la reduction, presentee par lui avec une insistance toute par­ ticuliere comme le fondement dernier et indispensable de toute phenomenologie presente ou future. (shrink)

an der Universität Göttingen gehaltenen Vcwlesung über Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis,l ist annähernd voll­ ständig erhalten; die Blätter des V cwlesungsmanuskripts zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins liegen verstreut in den Konvoluten F I 6 und 2 F I 8 des Husserl-Archivs zu Löwen. Allerdings fußt der Erste Teil des Erstdrucks, dessen Bezeichnung als Die Vorlesungen über das innere Zeit­ bewußtsein aus dem Jahre 1905 gleichwohl auch in vcwliegender Neuausgabe beibehalten wurde, nur zum Teil noch, und auch (...) in diesem Teil mit be­ trächtlichen Abweichungen, auf dem Text des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts des Jahres I905; und umgekehrt hat nur ein Teil des Textes des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs-Manuskripts - mit den erwähnten Abwand­ lungen - Eingang in den Ersten Teil des Erstdrucks gefunden. Wo der Text dieses Ersten Teils des Erstdrucks dem des ursprünglichen Vcwlesungs­ manuskripts entspricht, wurde er er mit diesem verglichen, und ollensicht­ liche Irrtümer im Erstdruck wurden berichtigt; in den Textkritischen Anmer­ kungen ist dann mit dem Vermerk nach dem Ms. verbessert die Text­ fassung des Erstdrucks wiedergegeben. Ferner wurde in den Textkritischen Anmerkungen vcwliegender Neuausgabe überall der ursprüngliche und voll­ ständige· Text des Vorlesungsmanuskripts von I905 wiedergegeben, auf dessen Zusammenhang die entsprechenden Teile des Erstdrucks zurückgehen, wo dieser von ienem abweicht. Einige zum V cwlesungsmanuskript gehörige Blätter, deren Text sich iedoch nicht zusammenhängend dem übrigen einfügt, wurden im vcwliegenden Band unter B (S. 135-382) mit abgedruckt. Die 1 Vgl. oben die "Einleitung des Herausgebers", S. XIV-XVII. (shrink)

5 sehr merkwürdiger Tatsachen zutage gefördert, die vordem verborgen waren, und wirklich psychologische Tatsachen, wenn auch die Physiologen manche große Gruppen von ihnen ihrer eigenen Wissenschaft mit zurechnen. Mag die Einstimmigkeit 5 in der theoretischen Interpretation dieser Tatsachen auch sehr weit zurückstehen hinter derjenigen der exakten naturwissen­ schaftlichen Disziplinen, so ist sie in gewisser Hinsicht doch wieder eine vollkommene, nämlich was den methodischen Stil der gesuchten Theorien anlangt. Jedenfalls ist man in den inter- 10 nationalen Forscherkreisen der neuen Psychologie der (...) festen Überzeugung, einer bis vor kurzem ungebrochenen Überzeugung, daß nun endlich die allein wahre und echte Psychologie in den Gang gebracht sei, als eine strenge Wissenschaft, auf deren Wegen die Gesamtheit aller psychologischen Probleme, aller 15 zur individuellen und Kulturgeistigkeit gehörigen, liegen müssen. Es bedürfe nur, wie in jeder auf elementaren Aufbau und auf die Erklärung aus elementaren Gesetzen bedachten Erfahrungs­ wissenschaft, geduldiger Zurückhaltung und eines ganz vor­ sichtigen Emporschreitens ; man dürfe nur nicht voreilig nach 20 Problemen greifen, die noch nicht zu wissenschaftlicher Be­ arbeitung reif, für die noch nicht die Tatsachenunterlage bereit­ gestellt und die nötigen Erfahrungsbegriffe geschaffen sind. Einen nicht geringen Zuwachs an innerer Sicherheit hat die neue Psychologie durch die gelingende Schöpfung einer Psycho- 25 technik erhalten. Nun schien diese Psychologie wirklich der exakten Physik gleichzustehen. Sie war nun sogar so weit, um ihre psychologische Erkenntnis, ganz so wie physikalische und chemische, technisch nutzbar zu machen. (shrink)

In recent years, virtue theories have enjoyed a renaissance of interest among general and medical ethicists. This book offers a virtue-based ethic for medicine, the health professions, and health care. Beginning with a historical account of the concept of virtue, the authors construct a theory of the place of the virtues in medical practice. Their theory is grounded in the nature and ends of medicine as a special kind of human activity. The concepts of virtue, the virtues, and the virtuous (...) physician are examined along with the place of the virtues of trust, compassion, prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and effacement of self-interest in medicine. The authors discuss the relationship between and among principles, rules, virtues, and the philosophy of medicine. They also address the difference virtue-based ethics makes in confronting such practical problems as care of the poor, research with human subjects, and the conduct of the healing relationship. This book woith the author's previous volumes, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice and For the Patient's Good, are part of their continuing project of developing a coherent moral philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

Die Lebenswelt als personale Welt der Praxis und Welt der endlichen Erkenntnisinteressen. 7. Die Welt als Erwerb.

In this companion volume to their 1981 work, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, Pellegrino and Thomasma examine the principle of beneficence and its role in the practice of medicine. Their analysis, which is grounded in a thorough-going philosophy of medicine, addresses a wide array of practical and ethical concerns that are a part of health care decision-making today. Among these issues are the withdrawing and withholding of nutrition and hydration, competency assessment, the requirements for valid surrogate decision-making, quality-of-life determinations, (...) the allocation of scarce health care resources, medical gatekeeping, and for-profit medicine. The authors argue for the restoration of beneficence to its place as the fundamental principle of medical ethics. They maintain that to be guided by beneficence a physician must perform a right and good healing action which is consonant with the individual patient 's values. In order to act in the patient 's best interests, or the patient 's good, the physician and patient must discern what that good is. This knowledge is gained only through a process of dialogue between patient and/or family and physician which respects and honors the patient 's autonomous self-understanding and choice in the matter of treatment options. This emphasis on a dialogical discernment of the patient 's good rejects the assumption long held in medicine that what is considered to be the medical good is necessarily the good for this patient. In viewing autonomy as a necessary condition of beneficence, the authors move beyond a trend in the medical ethics literature which identifies beneficence with paternalism. In their analysis of beneficence, the authors reject the current emphasis on rights- and duty-based ethical systems in favor of a virtue-based theory which is grounded in the physician- patient relationship. This book's provocative contributions to medical ethics will be of great interest not only to physicians and other health professionals, but also to ethicists, students, patients, families, and all others concerned with the relationship of professional to patient and patient to professional in health care today. (shrink)

It is an orthodoxy of modern political thought that violence is morally incompatible with politics, with the important exception of the permissible violence carried out by the state. The “commonsense argument” for permissible political violence denies this by extending the principles of defensive ethics to the context of state-subject interaction. This article has two aims: First, I critically investigate the commonsense argument and its limits. I argue that the scope of permissions it licenses is significantly more limited than its proponents (...) allow. Second, I develop an alternative (and supplementary) framework for thinking about permissible political violence. I argue that under certain circumstances, subjects may violently protest their treatment, where protest is understood as an expression of rejection of those circumstances. On my view, protest, including violent protest, is permissible when it is the fitting response to those circumstances. This alternative framework accounts for an important class of cases of intuitively permissible political violence, including cases in which such violence does not serve strategic political ends or is even counterproductive towards those ends. (shrink)

Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian approach, (...) Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler. (shrink)

The moral authority for professional ethics in medicine customarily rests in some source external to medicine, i.e., a pre-existing philosophical system of ethics or some form of social construction, like consensus or dialogue. Rather, internal morality is grounded in the phenomena of medicine, i.e., in the nature of the clinical encounter between physician and patient. From this, a philosophy of medicine is derived which gives moral force to the duties, virtues and obligations of physicians qua physicians. Similarly, an ethic specific (...) to the other healing professions, law, teaching or ministry, can be derived from the specific ends to telos of each of these professions, which like medicine, are focused on a special type of human relationship. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker seeks to offer a version of ideal rule consequentialism that is immune from standard criticisms. I will attempt to challenge Hooker’s ideal rule-consequentialist theory by arguing that there are philosophical problems at the ultimate foundation of his maximizing consequentialist and pluralist approach toward well-being and other basic goods. I find that no amount of revision is likely to insulate his approach from standard criticisms. I suggest that any maximizing rule-consequentialist approach toward well-being, (...) taken in a rich and pluralist sense, is likely to fall prey to standard criticisms. In later work, Hooker drops ideal rule consequentialism in favor of an incremental rule-consequentialist approach. That piecemeal approach is also challenged in this paper. RÉSUMÉ: Avec Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker cherche à offrir une version du conséquentialisme de la règle qui serait à l’abri des critiques habituelles. Nous tentons de la mettre en question en soutenant que le principe fondateur de son approche, qui non seulement maximise le conséquentialisme, mais est aussi pluraliste envers le bien-être et les autres nécessités, repose sur des problèmes philosophiques. Il semble qu’aucune adaptation ne puisse protéger cette approche des critiques habituelles. Je suggère que toute approche qui maximise le conséquentialisme de la règle envers le bien-être, interprété dans un sens riche et pluraliste, sera probablement susceptible de tomber sous les critiques habituelles. Nous mettons aussi en question l’approche différentielle qu’adopte Hooker dans ses travaux ultérieurs après avoir délaissé le conséquentialisme de la règle. (shrink)

An important philosophical issue in the study of addiction is what difference the fact that a person is addicted makes to attributions of autonomy (and responsibility) to their drug-oriented behavior. In spite of accumulating evidence suggesting the role of emotional dysregulation in understanding addiction, it has received surprisingly little attention in the debate about this issue. I claim that, as a result, an important aspect of the autonomy impairment of many addicted individuals has been largely overlooked. A widely shared assumption (...) in the philosophical literature is that for addiction to impair a person’s autonomy it has to make them (in some sense) take drugs against their will. So-called “willing addicts” are therefore usually seen as exempted from the autonomy impairment believed to characterize “unwilling addicts”, the latter being those who ‘truly want’ to stop using drugs but find their attempts repeatedly derailed by failures of self-control. In this article, I argue that the association between addiction and emotional dysregulation shows why this assumption is false. Emotional dysregulation is not only consistent with the possibility that many addicts take drugs ‘willingly’, it supports the hypothesis that they use drugs because they truly want to. The article proposes an explanation for why emotional dysregulation should nevertheless be seen as an aspect of their loss of control and an important reason why they have impaired autonomy. I end by exploring some implications of this account for addict’s decision-making capacity when they are prescribed the drugs to which they are addicted. -/- . (shrink)

Edmund Abegg constructs a coherent path that leads from abstract psychological and moral theory to ideal political and economic scenarios and then to their real-world applications. This book establishes a framework that clarifies important public policy issues.

What produces emotions? Why do we have emotions? How do we have emotions? Why do emotional states feel like something? This book considers these questions, going beyond examining brain mechanisms of emotion, by proposing a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion.

Virtue is the most perdurable concept in the history of ethics, which is understandable given the ineradicability of the moral agent in the events of the moral life. Historically, virtue enjoyed normative force as long as the philosophical anthropology and the metaphysics of the good that grounded virtue were viable. That grounding has eroded in both general and medical ethics. If virtue is to be restored to a normative status, its philosophical underpinnings must be reconstructed. Such reconstruction seems unlikely in (...) general ethics, where the possibility of agreement on the good for humans is remote. However, it is a realistic possibility in the professional ethics of the health professions where agreement on the telos of the healing relationship is more likely to arise. Nevertheless, virtue-based ethics must be related conceptually and normatively to other ethical theories in a comprehensive moral philosophy of the health professions. (shrink)

[ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».

At the center of medical morality is the healing relationship. It is defined by three phenomena: the fact of illness, the act of profession, and the act of medicine. The first puts the patient in a vulnerable and dependent position; it results in an unequal relationship. The second implies a promise to help. The third involves those actions that will lead to a medically competent healing decision. But it must also be good for the patient in the fullest possible sense. (...) The physician cannot fully heal without giving the patient an understanding of alternatives such that he or she can freely arrive—together with the physician—at a decision in keeping with his or her personal morality and values. In today's pluralistic society, universal agreement on moral issues between physicians and patients is no longer possible. Nevertheless, a reconstruction of professional ethics based on a new appreciation of what makes for a true healing relationship between patient and physician is both possible and necessary. (shrink)

I argue that the moral right to privacy is the moral right to consent to access by others to one’s personal information. Although this thesis is relatively simple and already implicit in considerations about privacy, it has, nevertheless, been overlooked by philosophers. In the paper, I present and defend my account of the moral right to privacy, respond to possible objections to it, and attempt to show its advantages over two recent accounts: one by Steve Matthews and the other by (...) Adam Moore. I also offer reasons to think that my account can be assimilated into a broad range of fundamental ethical approaches (i.e., a variety of consequentialist,deontological, and natural law approaches). Given the number and variety of such approaches, however, I can only attempt to make a prima facie case for the adaptability of the proposed account. (shrink)

Husserl (1859-1938) hatte sich in seinem Werk "Formale und transzendentale Logik" das Ziel gesetzt, den inneren Sinn, die Gliederung und Zusammengehörigkeit all dessen nachzuweisen, was bislang an logischen Problemen behandelt worden war, und die Notwendigkeit einer phänomenologischen Durchleuchtung der gesamten logischen Problematik darzutun. Ein Hauptstück der analytisch-deskriptiven Untersuchungen, die einer solchen phänomenologischen Begründung der Logik dienen, ist "Erfahrung und Urteil". Das Buch entstand in Zusammenarbeit mit Schülern und Mitarbeitern.