Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Analysis 23 (6):121-123 (1963)
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Abstract

Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.

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10.1093/analys/23.6.121

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Citations of this work

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.
Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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