Abstract

Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist-universalizing-utilitarian approach, Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler.