We agree with Rachlin's argument that altruism is best understood as a case of self-control, and that a behavioral analysis is appropriate. However, the appeal to teleological behaviorism and the value of behavioral patterns may be unnecessary. Instead, we argue that altruism can generally be explained with traditional behavioral principles such as negative reinforcement, conditioned reinforcement, and rule-governed behavior.

Experimental psychologists in the learning tradition stress the importance of three of the authors' four key variables of experimental design. We review research investigating the roles played by these variables in studies of choice from our laboratory. Supporting the authors' claims, these studies show that the effects of these variables are not fixed and should not be taken for granted.

Game-theoretic rationality is not generally observed in human behavior. One important reason is that subjects do not perceive the tasks in the same way as the experimenters do. Moreover, the rich history of cooperation that participants bring into the laboratory affects the decisions they make.

We present evidence supporting the target article's assertion that while the presentation of base-rate information in a natural frequency format can be helpful in enhancing sensitivity to base rates, method of presentation is not a panacea. Indeed, we review studies demonstrating that when subjects directly experience base rates as natural frequencies in a trial-by-trial setting, they evince large base-rate neglect.

We applaud Domjan et al. for providing an elegant account of Pavlovian feed-forward mechanisms in social behavior that eschews the pitfall of purposivism. However, they seem to imply that they have provided a complete account without provision for operant conditioning. We argue that operant conditioning plays a central role in social behavior, giving examples from fish and infant behavior.

Grandparental altruism may be partially understood in the same way as other instances of altruism. Acts of altruism often occur in a context in which the actor has a broader sense of cause and effect than is evident in more typical behavioral interactions where cause and effect appear relatively transparent. Many believe that good deeds will ultimately produce good results.

Future economic game research should include: (1) within-culture comparisons between individuals exposed and not exposed to market integration; (2) use of a game (such as the “Sharing Game”) that enables subjects to maximize their earnings while also maximizing those of the other participant; and (3) assessment of performance in a repeated-trials format that might encourage sensitivity to the games' economic contingencies.

The target authors make a strong case for parallels between human and nonhuman metacognition. The case may be bolstered by an appeal to the literatures on commitment and self-control and to that on observing behavior.

Behavioral research suggests that rule-governed behavior should be less sensitive to environmental changes and thus more resistant to extinction (disconfirmation) than contingency-governed behavior. The opposite is implied in Davey's discussion of ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to fear development. The generality of the behavioral findings and their apparent inconsistency with the present article should be further explored with more sensitive research paradigms.

Heyman's target article makes a strong case for a behavioral approach to addiction, yet some important assumptions require justification, and promising behavioral alternatives to the author's melioration approach should be considered. In particular, the behavioral economic approach to addiction appears well developed and comprehensive. How does the melioration approach complement or improve on a behavioral economic account?

There may be evolutionary as well as economic reasons why organisms generally act impulsively. I discuss this possibility and suggest some follow-up experiments that may clarify the exciting empirical and theoretical contributions made by the experiments discussed in the target article.

Nevin & Grace identify a difference between the predictions of delay reduction theory and the contingency-ratio account underlying behavioral momentum approaches to choice. This is shown not to be a true difference. The role of the overall context of reinforcement must be carefully incorporated by any theory of choice.

If Tool Theory is buttressed by fundamental concepts of conditioned reinforcement and extinction, a dependence on Drug Theory may not be necessary. (Published Online April 5 2006).

Subjects have a rich history of decision making which would be expected to affect reasoning in new tasks. For example, averaging, a strategy that is effectively used in many decisions, may help explain the conjunction fallacy. Before resorting to accounts based on phylogeny, more parsimonious accounts in terms of ontogeny should be explored.

There are good reasons why social psychologists have emphasized the negative side of human reasoning. They are simply following humans' tendency to pay particular attention to unusual occurrences. Attempts to refocus attention onto a wider range of behavior should include the influence of learning on both normative and non-normative behavior.

Mood and optimism have been demonstrated to influence risk-taking decisions; however, the literature on mood, optimism, and decision-making is mixed and conducted primarily with western samples. This study sought to address this gap in the literature by examining the impact of mood and dispositional optimism on risk-taking and whether these associations differed between undergraduate students from the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Both samples completed a dispositional optimism questionnaire and an autobiographical mood induction task. They were then (...) tasked with choosing to complete the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices reasoning task on easy, medium, or hard difficulty for hypothetical money. Selecting harder difficulties was interpreted as more risk-taking due to a higher chance of failure. More positive mood and higher dispositional optimism were associated with decreased risk-taking, i.e., selecting easier puzzle difficulties, in the American sample but increased risk-taking decisions, i.e., selecting harder difficulties, in the Chinese sample. These findings suggest that the effect of mood and optimism on decision-making may differ by nationality and/or culture. (shrink)