Husserl: Works, Misc

In the “Vienna lecture”, the whole of the world’s history is at one moment depicted through the allegory of a wavy sea without borders. In The Idea of Phenomenology, the philosopherstoryteller is caught up in a heavy sea, but at the end, they finally manage to “drop the anchor on the shore of phenomenology”. With the break into the “mainland of absolute givenness” through phenomenological reduction, allegorical representation should lose its philosophical justification. However, metaphors which evoke allegories continue to proliferate (...) even in the most rigorous phenomenological descriptions. Despite its inherent metaphoricity, so vivid that at the crucial points of Husserl’s analyses often reappears a mythical clash of land and sea, the phenomenological interpretation of the world seems nonetheless essentially non-allegorical. (shrink)

Teilband 1. Verstand und Gegenstand : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1909-1927) -- Teilband 2. Gefühl und Wert : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896-1925) -- Teilband 3. Wille und Handlung : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1902-1934) -- Teilband 4. Textkritischer Anhang.

In this paper I discuss some significant aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology which could not be adequately known without studying the manuscripts, unpublished during his lifetime and then published gradually since 1950 by Husserl Archives in Leuven founded by Father van Breda in 1939. The aspects I discuss here are listed under 6 subjects: Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the constituting corporeal subjectivity, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the conditions of possibility of representifications, concept of I-consciousness, conception of transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity, the (...) development of Husserl’s conception of phenomenological philosophy, and Husserl’s metaphysics. This paper is drawn from, and an extension of, a lecture given at the Catholic University of Louvain in the occasion of 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Husserl Archives. (shrink)

Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar, was darunter zu verstehen ist. Wie Schuhmann (1984 ) herausgearbeitet hat, tritt dieser Begriff in der Philosophiegeschichte auf, noch lange bevor Edmund Husserl sich ihn zu Eigen machte, um sein eigenes philosophisches Projekt zu beschreiben. Auch hinderte Husserls Versuch, diesen Begriff für die Beschreibung seines eigenen einmaligen Projekts zu beanspruchen, seine Zeitgenossen (z.B. Pfänder, Reinach, Stein) keineswegs daran, denselben Begriff ebenfalls zur Beschreibung ihrer jeweiligen Projekte und (...) Methoden zu verwenden. Es versteht sich also, dass Husserl selbst beträchtlichen Aufwand betrieb, um zu definieren, was der Begriff ‚Phänomenologie‘ in seinen Augen zu bedeuten hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Publikation des ersten Buches seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie im Jahre 1913 charakterisiert Husserl Phänomenologie als eine neue Wissenschaft, die sich von jeder anderen, bereits geschichtlich verankerten Wissenschaft wie Physik, Psychologie oder Kulturwissenschaft unterscheidet (Hua III/1, 1). Diese Darstellung von Phänomenologie lässt auf Anhieb eine wichtige Abweichung von seiner einstigen Gleichsetzung von Phänomenologie und deskriptiver Psychologie in den Logischen Untersuchungen (1901) erkennen. In der breiteren philosophischen Landschaft wären angesichts Husserls positiver Bestimmung dessen, was diese phänomenologische Wissenschaft ist, möglicherweise auch heute noch viele genauso irritiert wie einige der damaligen Teilnehmer des VI. Kongresses für experimentelle Psychologie, denen Husserl 1914 erklärte: „Analog wie die reine Geometrie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Raumes bzw. Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Raumgestalten ist, ist die reine Phänomenologie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Bewusstseins, Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Bewusstseinsgestalten (mit ihren ‚immanenten Korrelaten‘)“ (Schumann 1914, 144-5). Was heute wie damals für ein Verständnis dieser Darstellung von Phänomenologie der Klärung bedarf, ist Husserls Beschreibung der Phänomenologie als einer Wesenslehre, d.h. einer reinen oder eidetischen Wissenschaft, ebenso wie seine Aussage, deren Untersuchungsgegenstand sei das von ihm sogenannte reine Bewusstsein. Nur indem man die beiden Bedeutungen von ‚rein‘ erhellt, die hiermit angesprochen sind, wird auch deutlich, inwiefern Husserl behaupten kann, Phänomenologie unterscheide sich von anderen Wissenschaften: sowohl von empirischen wie Physik oder experimenteller Psychologie als auch von anderen eidetischen Wissenschaften wie Geometrie und deskriptiver Psychologie. Diese Erläuterung zeigt nicht nur, inwiefern Phänomenologie von all diesen Disziplinen verschieden ist, sondern auch, inwiefern sie mit ihnen zusammenhängt – und damit ist gerade die Idee der Phänomenologie begründet. (shrink)

Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian meaning of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo-Kantian background.

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Article en hommage à Jacques English dans lequel je propose une réflexion générale sur le thème des objets intentionnels en examinant un aspect de la solution proposée par Husserl dans son manuscrit de 1894 sur les objets intentionnels qui concerne le statut ontologique des objets de pensée et leur temporalité. J’aborde cette question par le biais de l’individuation des contenus intentionnels et leur temporalité dans les manuscrits de Bernau publiés dans le volume XXXIII des Husserliana . Je m’intéresse en particulier (...) au sens que prend le principium individuationis dans la cinquième partie de ces manuscrits de Husserl qui s'intitule «De la phénoménologie de l’individuation : la temporalité des objets d’expérience, des objets imaginaires et des objets idéaux». (shrink)

The following pages contain a partial edition of Husserl’s manuscript A I 35, pages 1a-28b. The first few pages are dated on May 1927 and are included mostly for completeness’ sake. The bulk of the manuscript convolute, however, is from 1912. Four pages of the convolute, 31a-34b, have been published as Beilage XII (210, 2–216, 2) in Hua XXXII. The manuscript was excluded from the text selection of Husserliana XXI3 based on its much later date of composition. A I 35/24a (...) is mentioned in Husserliana XXII (p. xxi, n. 4) as confirmation for Zermelo’s 1902 “oral report” to Husserl of his own independent discovery of the paradox. The text presented here for the first time has already been the target of at least three extensive commentaries, while still unpublished, by Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock. These present a good survey in english of the central issues on the text and contain many translated quotations. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

This text is the ‘first draft” (erster Entwurf) of Edmund Husserl’s article for the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. The text had four versions (A, B, C, D) and it received its final version after many months of work. This ‘first draft’ has a cognitive value as it reflects Husserl’s spontaneous intuitions about understanding of phenomenology and a phenomenological method in the vein of transcendental philosophy, which he has created, developed, improved and on and on modified.

The following text, which is now published for the first time, comes from Husserl’s manuscript A III 1 and was probably written in 1914. The text belongs to a bundle of pages which Husserl wrote down during the presentation and examination of the “Staatsexamensarbeit” of his student Jean Hering. The work “Die Lehre vom Apriori bei Lotze” was done by Hering in the summer semester 1914 in order to receive a degree that would qualify him as a secondary school teacher. (...) Although this “Staatsexamensarbeit” was never published, Hering used parts of it for his article which appeared in the Jahrbuch, “Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Edmund Husserl zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet”. Husserl characterized pages 5 to 8 of the manuscript A III 1 as his “own reflections” on Hering’s work. These pages are published as “Text Nr. 5” in Husserliana XLI. What follows here are pages 9 to 16 of this manuscript, which Husserl called “free excerpts”. (shrink)

Husserl’s legacy of research manuscripts has been revered as a resource containing the deepest insights of his later work and criticized because such manuscripts present work in progress rather than completed “results.” I suggest that these materials are far more than fragments calling for careful interpretation; instead, they belong to a different genre and should be taken up in an attitude of research directed toward working out unsolved problems rather than in an attitude focused on interpreting pregiven texts. After sketching (...) some elements of the research practice this entails, I review some of the ways in which Husserl’s research results have been appropriated and emphasize the need for further phenomenological investigation in the spirit of the “rigorous science” Husserl envisioned. (shrink)

This work, a significant achievement by itself, completes J. N. Mohanty’s comprehensive two-volume study of Edmund Husserl’s body of writings. With the publication of this second volume, Mohanty has produced an immensely detailed and profound analysis of Husserl’s philosophy. At nearly one thousand pages for both volumes, the scale of this achievement cannot be overstated. As Robert Sokolowski notes in his review of the first volume (Husserl Studies 25, p. 256), Mohanty’s work offers an immeasurably helpful manual for those who (...) seek to work their way through parts or the whole of Husserl’s corpus. Where the first volume, ThePhilosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development, ranges from his early years at Halle to the publication of Ideen I and the conclusion of his teaching career at Göttingen, this second volume begins with Husserl’s “Inaugural Lecture” at Freiburg and works its way through his lectures, research manuscripts, and published writings to the Krisis texts produced in. (shrink)

The Idea of Philosophy and its Historical Origin is the first chapter on Edmund Husserl’s First Philosophy . First Philosophy, vol. I, is the edited and completed text of the course which Husserl gave under that title at the University of Freiburgim-Breisgau . The manuscript, written in Husserl’s shorthand, was typed by his assistant Ludwig Landgrebe. The article is an introduction to phenomenology as first philosophy and makes reference to the critical reflection of the historical interpretation of first philosophy and (...) to the „necessity“ of first philosophy. Husserl postulates a return to the first philosophy, he shows how first philosophy is the theorizing of being as being and how philosophy/phenomenology is both metaphysical and perennial. (shrink)

A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.

A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.

This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl’s first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be gained from this non-exhaustive collection of reviews is that the Philosophy of Arithmetic had a much more widespread reception than hitherto assumed: in the present collection alone there already are fourteen, all published between 1891 and 1895. Three of the reviews appeared in mathematical (...) journals (Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik, and Zeitschrift für mathema- tischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht), three were published in English journals (The Philosophical Review, The Monist, Mind), two were written by other members of the School of Brentano (Franz Hillebrand and Alois Höfler). Some of the reviews and notices appear to be very superficial, consisting merely of para- phrases (often without references) and lists of topics taken from the table of con- tents, presenting barely acceptable summaries. Others, among which Höfler might be the most significant, engage much more deeply with the topics and problems that Husserl addresses, analyzing his approach in the context of the mathematics of his time and the School of Brentano. (shrink)

Il soggetto empirico indagato dagli psicologi trattiene forti legami con il soggetto puro indagato dai fenomenologi. Ne deriva il paradosso di una differenza che è insieme identità. L’analisi fenomenologica allora potrebbe assumere presupposti naturalistici, esito che Husserl ha decisamente escluso, affermando invece la necessità dell’epoché, della ricerca eidetica e il primato della coscienza intenzionale. Le ricerche che vertono sulla coscienza vedono oggi consumarsi un contrasto tra i sostenitori dell’embodiment, secondo cui le neuroscienze sono in grado di spiegare a sufficienza i (...) fenomeni psichici, e i fenomenologi, i quali, basandosi sul concetto husserliano di hyle, configurano una soggettività sensoriale, ovvero una coscienza legata strettamente all’esperienza sensibile. La ricerca di scientificità nel primo caso giunge attraverso le scienze della complessità alla matematizzazione della psiche, mentre nel secondo caso i fenomenologi si appoggiano ai progressi delle neuroscienze. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auch die noch erhaltenen Teile seiner beiden ersten Freiburger Einleitungen in die Philosophie von 1916 und 1918 enthält, bietet eine sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Hinführung zur transzendentalphänomenologischen Philosophie auf dem Weg über die Ontologie und die Erkenntnistheorie. Im Ausgang von der Darstellung des Anstoßes durch die Sophisitk entwickelt Husserl ausführlich Platons Entdeckung des Apriori als den für die Folgezeit maßgeblichen Schritt zu einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie und (...) verfolgt in kritischen Analysen deren neuzeitliche Entwicklung seit Descartes über die rationalistischen und empiristischen Systeme bis hin zu Kant. -/- In den systematisch orientierten Abschnitten der Vorlesung stellt Husserl zunächst die grundlegenden Disziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie dar: die Erkenntnistheorie, die formale Wissenschaftslehre und die Ontologie, die sich in formale Ontologie, die materialen Ontologien und die von Aristoteles begründete Ontologie der realen Welt differenziert. Die praktische Philosophie behandelt Husserl in einer detaillierten Skizze der apriorischen Wertlehre und der in dieser fundierten apriorischen Ethik; diese beiden Prinzipienwissenschaften bilden für ihn die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik. Diese aus der Göttinger Zeit stammende, unter dem Einfluss Brentanos stehende Konzeption von Ethik erfährt in der Vorlesung von 1919/20 bzw. in den wenig später in diese eingefügten kritischen Reflexionen gewichtige Korrekturen. Diese Korrekturen sowie die detailierte Analyse und Entfaltung des von Platon und Aristoteles grundgelegten, durch den Siegeszug der ateleologischen Naturwissenschaft verdrängten Gedankens einer teleologischen Welterklärung deuten vor auf Husserls späte Ethik und seine metaphysische Weltdeutung. (shrink)

In 1913, in a draft for a new Preface for the second edition of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl reveals to his readers that "The source of all my studies and the first source of my epistemological difficul­ties lies in my first works on the philosophy of arithmetic and mathematics in general", i.e. his Habilitationsschrift and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: "I carefully studied the consciousness constituting the amount, first the collec­tive consciousness (consciousness of quantity, of multiplicity) in its simplest and (...) higher levels (consciousness of sums, sums of sums etc.). I immediately separated proper (intuitive) and symbolic consciousness, in the characteriza­tion of the former I hit the radical difference of categorial consciousness [...] and sensuous consciousness of unity." Later on, in the Third Investigation, Husserl makes some very specific claims, that are of considerable importance to assess the development of his early works and their relation to his later phenomenology: "This first work of mine (an elaboration of my Habilitationsschrift, [...], 1887) should be compared with all assertions of the present work on compounds, moments of unity, complexes, wholes and objects of higher order. I am sorry that in many recent treatments of the doctrine of "Gestalt-qualities", this work has mostly been ignored, though quite a lot of the thought-content of later treatments by Cornelius, Meinong etc., of questions of analysis, apprehension of plurality and complexion is already to be found, differently expressed, in my Philosophy of Arithmetic. I think it would still be of use today to consult this work on the phenomenological and ontological issues in question, especially since it is the first work that attached importance to acts and objects of higher order and investigated them thoroughly." Hence, at the time of the Ideas, Husserl retrospectively considers his first works4 as being still relevant for phenomenological issues. Not only does Husserl advance a very interesting priority claim with respect to Von Ehrenfels’ development of the notion of Gestalt and Meinong’s development of Gegenstandstheorie, but also a strong affirmation of continuity and coherence of his position from 1887 all the way up to 1913, encompassing the alleged “revolution” in his position from psychologism to anti-psycho­logism in the 1890s. Indeed, according to much of the recent secondary literature, in 1894, right in the middle of the ten “incubation” years between the Philosophy of Arithmetic and the Logical Investigations, Frege’s destruc­tive review would have converted Husserl to antipsychologism practically overnight. This gives us two conflicting interpretations: on the one hand, Husserl himself in 1913 still seems to approve of the Philosophy of Arithmetic and even considers it to contain valuable phenomenological material, on the other, it is routinely dismissed by much of the secondary literature as hope­lessly psychologistic. So which one is it: do we have a phenomenological arithmetic or a psychologistic arithmetic in Husserl’s first book? On balance, I think that Husserl in his Philosophy of Arithmetic developed a position that does not fall prey to the exaggerated and poorly aimed critiques of Frege, while at the same time, as a descriptive psychology of the genesis and constitution of number, it can certainly be considered as providing phenome­nologically meaningful analyses, though of course not made from within an explicitly transcendental phenomenological framework. (shrink)

The concept of a Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl has been given various interpretations, due to its shifting role in his works. Many authors have been misled by this term, placing it in the context of Husserl’s early period in Halle, while writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic, as a friend and colleague of Georg Cantor.Yet at the time, Husserl distanced himself explicitly from Cantor’s definition and rather took Bernhard Riemann as example, having studied and lectured extensively on Riemann’s theories of space. Husserl’s (...) Mannigfaltigkeitslehre would then not be a Cantorian set-theory, but come rather closer to topology. Then, in the Prolegomena, Husserl introduces the idea of a pure Mannigfaltigkeitslehre as a meta-theoretical enterprise which studies the relations among theories, e.g. how to derive or found one upon another. When Husserl announces that in fact the best example of such a pure theory of manifolds is what is actually practiced in mathematics, this sounds slightly misleading. The pure theory of theories cannot simply be the mathematics underlying topology, but should rather be considered as a mathesis universalis. Indeed, while this might not have been fully clear yet in 1900/1901, Husserl will explicitly tie together the notions of pure theory of manifolds and mathesis universalis. The mathesis universalis in this sense is formal, a priori and analytic, as theory of theory in general. It is an analysis of the highest categories of meaning and their correlative categories of objects. In my paper I try to understand the development of the notion of Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl’s thought from its mathematical beginnings to its later central philosophical role, taking into account the mathematical background and context of Husserl’s own development. (shrink)

The article introduces and discusses an unpublished manuscript by Edmund Husserl, conserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven with signature K I 26, pp. 73a–73b. The article is followed by the text of the manuscript in German and in an English translation. The manuscript, titled “The Transition through the Impossible” ( Der Durchgang durch das Unmögliche ), was part of the material Husserl used for his 1901 Doppelvortrag in Göttingen. In the manuscript, the impossible is characterized as the “sphere of objectlessness” ( (...) Sphäre der Gegenstandslosigkeit ) and Husserl addresses the question whether and when it is warranted to perform a transition through the impossible to obtain valid results for the sphere of objectivity. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910--1911. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10743-010-9073-7 Authors Colin J. Hahn, Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881, USA Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848 Journal Volume Volume 26 Journal Issue Volume 26, Number 3.

This volume is chiefly composed of revised versions of essays presented and discussed at the research symposium of the same title held in Delray Beach, Florida, on May 7-9, 1993. The symposium was conducted under the sponsorship of the William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar Chair in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. Several essays have been added, including the Husserl ineditum and its translation. The intention of the project was to attract even (...) wider appreciation for this posthumous work by Husserl, especially since it has now been first translated into English by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. In manuscript form, the Ideas II was known to Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty before Sein und Zeit and Phenomenologie de la perception, as well to Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe, of course, who worked on it as Husserl' s assistants. It was published in 1952 as Volume IV of the Husserliana series, and critical studies of that volume were written by Paul Ricoeur and Alfred Schutz. Now that there is an English translation, it is increasingly being taught in the United States along with the Ideas I. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl, Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937). Rochus Sowa (ed) (Series Husserliana, vol. XXXIX) Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10743-010-9072-8 Authors Roberto J. Walton, CEF (ANCBA), Av. Alvear 1711, 3º, C1014AAE Buenos Aires, Argentina Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848 Journal Volume Volume 26 Journal Issue Volume 26, Number 3.

The question that arises in this article is whether we can find elements of phenomenology in Bernard Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology.With help of other Lonergan scholars, I have discovered that modern thinking plays an important role in the theology and philosophy ofthis Jesuit author. Moreover, the terminology of modern philosophy coexists with the terminology of classical and especially Tomisticthought. This article is interested in the elements that Lonergan takes from the modern philosophy and emphasizes the centrality ofHusserlian phenomenology among the other (...) modern authors used by Lonergan. Following the research of the Jesuit thinker, I speakabout two parallel realities coexisting in his Trinitarian theology. Lonergan tries to realize their synthesis, but at the same time healso recognizes their distinctiveness. The most relevant result of this coexistence is obtained through the replacement of the metaphysical differentiation between the level of substance and the level of the three Persons, so that, instead of having the elements of classical theology, Lonergan predicates at the same time that God subsists as well as the Trinitarian Persons subsist. Through this assertion he emphasizes the identity between God’s existence and the existence of the three divine Persons, and eliminates the classical differentiation that might be closer to the danger of subordinating the three Persons to the one God. (shrink)

The article comments upon Husserl’s attempts to outline, in a brief text dated 1922/23, the concept of Quasi-Konstitution. With its help, Husserl wishes to address the way objects are and can be constituted in the realm of pure phantasy. In discussing the various strata of their constitution, he reaches several problematic issues, concerning concordance, individuality, inter-subjectivity or reality. However, the chief aspect that governs Husserl’s reflections is the questionable relation between phantasy and the manifold senses of “possibility”.

In Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, experience is the result of some intentional processes that stand on the platform of hyletic givenness. These processes are globally called “constitution” and are articulated in lower and higher levels according to their grade of complication. This paper focuses on the lowest level of constitution, i.e. time consciousness, as resulted from Husserl’s 1817–18 manuscripts and written in the Bernau mountain resort. It argues for the existence of a so-called originary stream of time consciousness, which has a (...) specific role in the order of constitution, and it states that its constitutional-intentional status is highly instable. (shrink)

Die Lebenswelt als personale Welt der Praxis und Welt der endlichen Erkenntnisinteressen. 7. Die Welt als Erwerb.

This volume contains an English translation of Edmund Husserl’s first major work, the Philosophie der Arithmetik, (Husserl 1891). As a translation of Husserliana XII (Husserl 1970), it also includes the first chapter of Husserl’s Habilitationsschrift (Über den Begriff der Zahl) (Husserl 1887) and various supplementary texts written between 1887 and 1901. This translation is the crowning achievement of Dallas Willard’s monumental research into Husserl’s early philosophy (Husserl 1984) and should be seen as a companion to volume V of the Husserliana: (...) Collected Works series (Husserl 1994b), which already contained selected translations from Hua XII. As Willard re- marks on the inner cover of the volume, it is “a window on a period of rich and illuminating philosophical activity”, to which I wholeheartedly agree. Willard’s two volumes of translations open this window on the beginnings of Husserl’s philosophy for the English-speaking world. This earliest period of Husserl’s philosophy has often been unjustly ignored and Willard provides the English reader with an excellent starting point. Husserl’s first steps into phenomenology and the philosophy of logic and mathematics contain many promising seeds that will flower later on, in the Logische Untersuchungen and beyond. (shrink)

Bob Sandmeyer - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-11 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 338-339 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Bob Sandmeyer University of Kentucky Edmund Husserl. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–11. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Edmund Husserl Collected Works, Volume 12. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. Pp. xi + 179. Cloth, $119.00. Husserl's seminal (...) lectures on the phenomenological reduction and transcendental theory of empathy have finally been translated into English. Known by the title of the course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology presents some of Husserl's most important innovations in the theory of the phenomenological.. (shrink)

The objective of the article is a comparison of three texts by Edmund Husserl: Ideen I, its revision in Hua XXXIV and Epilogue of Ideen III. There are internal and external connections between these three texts which – also as a justification of this comparison – will be examined in this article. The comparison should give answers to several questions: Why did Husserl decide to do this revision? What changes did he make? Should we regard these changes as important interventions (...) into certain phenomenological topics? What are the results of this comparison for the phenomenological method? By means of these texts several chosen phenomenological themes – such as the problematic of consciousness, intentionality, natural and phenomenological attitudes, method etc. – can be presented, as well as a new view of them 16 or 17 years later. The last text introduces also Husserl’s résumé of the idea of philosophy. (shrink)

This essay aims, first of all, at underlining the peculiar idea of perception that emerges from Husserl’s Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. In analysing the constitution of the Thing and the external perception, Husserl describes an activity which is, at the same time, legal and dependent from the data of reality. In so doing, he manages to avoid both the scepticism, which is ingrained in the idea of perception as simple and spontaneous opening to facts, and the idealism that, on (...) the contrary, cuts off its essential connection with the external reality. Husserl’s interpretation of Tactility confirms his ability to avoid the accusation of relapsing into a kind of realist or idealist metaphysical dialectics. In these lessons he analyses Touch not as a simple and immediate contact with things or self-perception without any residue, but as stratified, complex and not linear perception, which represents a moment of the constitution of one’s own body. (shrink)