This article addresses intraorganizational pressures for organizational transformation toward more responsible business practices by exploring the role of internal activists. Building on the interactive framing perspective, I ask how internal activists develop a framing of their company’s responsibilities as they attempt to transform its business practices from the inside out. I explore this question in the context of a Danish pharmaceutical company’s responsibilities regarding the rising diabetes problem. Grounded in an inductive, interpretive analysis, I show how internal activists developed a (...) framing of the company’s responsibility over time and eventually instigated new ways of thinking about and doing business in their organization. I theorize the constitutive processes that strengthened frame alignment and allowed the internal activists to shape business practices. My study contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication by explaining how intraorganizational processes of meaning making may constitute more responsible business practices and by explicating the distinct role of internal activists as agents of organizational transformation. (shrink)

I discuss an influential argument put forward by Hatherley in theJournal of Medical Ethics. Drawing on influential philosophical accounts of interpersonal trust, Hatherley claims that medical artificial intelligence is capable of being reliable, but not trustworthy. Furthermore, Hatherley argues that trust generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. For instance, when a patient trusts a clinician, it generates certain moral obligations on behalf of the clinician for her to do what she is entrusted to do. I make three objections (...) to Hatherley’s claims: (1) At least one philosophical account of interagent trust implies that medical AI is capable of being trustworthy. (2) Even if this account should ultimately be rejected, it does not matter much because what we care mostly about is that medical AI is reliable. (3) It is false that trust in itself generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. (shrink)

Verzeihen bedeutet Verzicht. Als ein zeitlicher Verzicht auf Tilgung von Schuld entzieht sich das Verzeihen dem Macht- und Möglichkeitsbereich normativ regulierbarer Handlungen und bildet die Grundlage für eine Ethik der Urteilsenthaltung. Verena Rauen weist in ihrer Studie das Verzeihen als Quellpunkt der ethischen Zeit aus. Das Verzeihen interveniert in den Schuldzusammenhang der kontinuierlichen Zeit der Geschichte und ermöglicht ethische, d.h. neue und nicht durch vorherige Schuld bestimmte Handlungen. Eine solche zeitliche Unterbrechung der Kausalverkettung der Schuld kann sich nur durch (...) einen Verzicht auf das moralische Urteil ereignen, der einen Wiederanfang in der Beziehung mit dem Anderen stets von neuem ermöglicht. So eröffnet das Verzeihen den ethischen Zeitraum des Zusammenlebens angesichts der nicht wiedergutzumachenden Schuld der Vergangenheit und der Ungewissheit der Zukunft - es bildet den konstitutiven Ursprung der Ethik. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) often outperforms human doctors in terms of decisional speed. For some diseases, the expected benefit of a fast but less accurate decision exceeds the benefit of a slow but more accurate one. In such cases, we argue, it is often justified to rely on a medical AI to maximise decision speed – even if the AI is less accurate than human doctors.

In this paper, we argue that there is at least a pro tanto reason to favor the control account of the right to privacy over the access account of the right to privacy. This conclusion is of interest due to its relevance for contemporary discussions related to surveillance policies. We discuss several ways in which the two accounts of the right to privacy can be improved significantly by making minor adjustments to their respective definitions. We then test the improved versions (...) of the two accounts on a test case, to see which account best explains the violation that occurs in the case. The test turns out in favor of the control account. (shrink)

Smart Cities consist of a multitude of interconnected devices and services to, among others, enhance efficiency, comfort, and safety. To achieve these aims, smart cities rely on an interplay of measures including the deployment of interventions targeted to foster certain human behaviors, such as saving energy, or collecting and exchanging sensor and user data. Both aspects have ethical implications, e.g., when it comes to intervention design or the handling of privacy-related data such as personal information, user preferences or geolocations. Resulting (...) concerns must be taken seriously, as they reduce user acceptance and can even lead to the abolition of otherwise promising Smart City projects. Established guidelines for ethical research and practice from the psychological sciences provide a useful framework for the kinds of ethical issues raised when designing human-centered interventions or dealing with user-generated data. This article thus reviews relevant psychological guidelines and discusses their applicability to the Smart City context. A special focus is on the guidelines’ implications and resulting challenges for certain Smart City applications. Additionally, potential gaps in current guidelines and the limits of applicability are reflected upon. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend what I call the ‘Inference Principle’. This principle holds that if an agent obtains some information legitimately, then the agent can make any inference she wants based on the information, without violating anyone’s right to privacy. This principle is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it constitutes a novel answer to the timely question of whether the widespread use of ‘data analytics’ to infer personal information about individuals is morally permissible. Second, it contradicts what (...) seems to be a common view of inferences’ ability to violate privacy rights. Third, it offers an account of the theoretically underdeveloped issue of what duties are engendered by the moral right to privacy with regard to inferred information. (shrink)

Diese Publikation untersucht eine altspanische Handschrift von Aristoteles' De animalibus unter Anwendung philologischer, traduktologischer und sprachhistorischer Methoden. Zudem wird eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Würdigung vorgenommen. Auszüge aus der Handschrift werden erstmals ediert, mit dem arabischen und lateinischen Text verglichen und kommentiert. Als Ergebnis weist die Untersuchung nach, dass zwei Übersetzer, wahrscheinlich in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts, gleichzeitig aus dem Arabischen und dem Lateinischen ins Kastilische übersetzten- eine bislang noch unbelegte Arbeitstechnik.

Ecopolitics is a study of environmental awareness--or non-awareness--in contemporary French theory. Arguing that it is now impossible not to think in an ecological way, Verena Andermatt Conley traces the roots of today's concern for the environment back to the intellectual climate of the late '50s and '60s. Major thinkers of 1968, the author argues, changed the way we think the world; this owes much to an ecological awareness that remains at the heart of issues concerning cultural theory in general. (...) The book points to critiques of ecology in the work of Luc Ferry and Jean Baudrillard before turning to more complicated ecological awareness primarily in French thought. The author considers key texts by influential figures such as Michael Serres, Paul Virilio, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Michel de Certeau, Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray. (shrink)

This article presents three brief case studies of the way Romans talked about and expressed contempt. It examines aspects of discourses about contempt that are characteristic both of Roman literature and of modern concepts. The focus is on the relationship of hierarchy, recognition, and (active and passive) contempt in the Latin vocabulary and in two literary motifs taken from invective and historiography, two genres in which expressions of contempt are particularly frequent and prominent.

In accordance with societal norms and values, consumers readily indicate their positive attitudes toward sustainability. However, they hardly take sustainability into account when engaging in exchange relationships with companies. To shed light on this paradox, this paper investigates whether defense mechanisms and the more specific concept of neutralization techniques can explain the discrepancy between societal norms and actual behavior. A multi-method qualitative research design provides rich insights into consumers’ underlying cognitive processes and how they make sense of their attitude–behavior divergences. (...) Drawing on the Ways Model of account-taking, which is advanced to a Cycle Model, the findings illustrate how neutralization strategies are used to legitimize inconsistencies between norm-conforming attitudes and actual behavior. Furthermore, the paper discusses how the repetitive reinforcement of neutralizing patterns and feedback loops between individuals and society are linked to the rise of anomic consumer behavior. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an indirect argument for the Access Theory of privacy. First, I develop a new version of the rival Control Theory that is immune to all the classic objections against it. Second, I show that this new version of the Control Theory collapses into the Access Theory. I call the new version the ‘Negative Control Account’. Roughly speaking, the classic Control Theory holds that you have privacy if, and only if, you can control whether other people (...) know personal information about you. Critics of the Control Theory often give counterexamples, where privacy is either not diminished even though the claimant has lost control, or where privacy is diminished even though the claimant is in control. I argue that none of these alleged counterexamples work against the Negative Control Account. However, this is not a victory for the control theorist, because the Negative Control Account collapses into the Access Theory. The paper thus adds to the recent trend in the literature of favoring the Access Theory over the Control Theory. (shrink)

The question of diversity, both with regard to the demographic profile of philosophers as well as the content of philosophical inquiry, has received much attention in recent years. One figure that has gone relatively unnoticed is that of the foreigner. To the extent that philosophers have taken the foreigner as their object of inquiry, they have focused largely on challenges nonnative speakers of English face in a profession conducted predominantly in English. Yet an understanding of the foreigner in terms of (...) the nonnative speaker does not exhaust the conceptual space of the foreigner. This article provides a more nuanced conceptual apparatus that allows for a more precise identification and discussion of other ways in which one can be a foreigner in philosophy. I develop a taxonomy of different conceptions of the foreigner, namely the linguistic, material, cultural, and epistemic foreigner; I discuss the different and specific challenges they face; and I show how foreigners enrich philosophical practice. (shrink)

The significance of the complicated numbering of the propositions in the Tractatus has occasioned much speculation. Wittgenstein's own explanation has, following Stenius, been generally regarded as misleading. But an examination of the Prototractatus reveals that the numbering system was for Wittgenstein principally an aid in the composition of his work. It allowed him to mark out certain propositions which required further work or supplementation, without disturbing the basic structure of the treatise. But the reworking of the Prototractatus to form the (...) Tractatus considerably changed the original order in which the ideas were connected, and thus made it more difficult to understand the Tractatus. Several specific examples make it clear that it is essential to look back at the context of the Prototractatus in order to achieve a correct interpretation of many of the propositions in the Tractatus. (shrink)

In this paper, I spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that captures the intuitive view that a subject enters the mental state of agnosticism via an act or event called suspension. I will argue that agnosticism is a complex mental state, and that the formation of an attitude is the relevant act or event by which a subject commits to indecision regarding some matter. I will suggest a ‘two-component analysis’ that addresses two aspects that jointly account for the settled (...) state of agnosticism: the subject’s de facto indecision and the subject’s commitment to her indecision. Unlike meta-cognitivist or sui generis accounts, I do not take the agnostic’s commitment to indecision as constitutive for her indecision but rather as an evaluation or qualification of the indecision that she already exhibits. Agnosticism, thus, is a settled form of indecision that marks the end of inquiry. (shrink)

The paper addresses the nature of seemings in light of their role in inquiry. Seemings are mental states or events with propositional content that have a specific phenomenology often referred to as “felt truth”. In epistemology, seemings are mainly discussed as possible (non-inferential) justifications for belief. Yet, epistemology has recently taken a zetetic turn, that is, a turn toward the study of inquiry. I will argue that the role of seemings in epistemology should be re-assessed from the perspective of inquiry (...) and deliberation. Seemings may fall short of justifying beliefs, but there is an important role for seemings in the zetetic realm, which may also explain why seemings lack direct justificatory force for beliefs. Seemings, so I will suggest, can provide normative reasons for performing certain zetetic tasks, but they cannot provide normative reasons for making up one’s mind about the inquired question. In this sense, the zetetic role of seemings can be described as guiding rational inquiry. I will suggest that a modified version of the so-called Taking Evidence View about the nature of seemings is best fitted to accommodate their zetetic role. Yet, contra existing versions of the Taking Evidence View, my modified account acknowledges that seemings are genuine experiences (of one’s evidential standing during inquiry) that are accompanied by the characteristic phenomenology of what is called a “feeling of truth”. By doing so, my modified version of the Taking Evidence View incorporates the (as I take it) most important feature of the rival Experience View of seemings. (shrink)

Eine marktparadigmatische Wettbewerbsorientierung – symptomatisch die Exzellenzinitiative – hat die deutsche Hochschullandschaft radikal verändert und das Legitimationserfordernis gegenüber der Bürgerschaft verschärft. Hier setzt das Buch an und liefert eine dezidiert normative Fundierung für die legitime Gestaltung von Politik in der Demokratie im Hinblick auf die praktische Fruchtbarmachung für die deutsche Hochschulpolitik. Die Autorin bedient sich der legitimatorischen Ansätze von John Rawls im Sinne einer allgemeinen rationalen Zustimmungsfähigkeit und von John Dewey im Rahmen einer praktizierten sozialen Kooperation. Dewey wird weniger als (...) Gegenspieler zu Rawls, sondern als eine – pragmatistische – Komplettierung der Rawls‘schen Legitimationstheorie hinsichtlich der sozialen Praxis verstanden. Die abstrakten, politik-philosophischen Erörterungen werden dann im Hinblick auf ihre praktischen Implikationen für die Hochschulpolitik konkretisiert. Ein kooperatives, vertrauensvolles Zusammenwirken von gestärkter wissenschaftlicher und politischer Verantwortung sieht die Autorin als Weg hin zu einer lebendigen zivilgesellschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit und illustriert dies am Beispiel Wissenschaftsregionen. Die Arbeit verdeutlicht eine der bedeutenden Stärken der politischen Philosophie: theoretische Entwürfe für praktische Legitimationsaufgaben fruchtbar zu machen. (shrink)

Arts education in schools frequently experiences the pressure of being validated by demonstrating quantitative impact on academic outcomes. The quantitative evidence to date has been characterized by the application of largely correlational designs and frequently applies a narrow focus on instrumental outcomes such as academically relevant competencies. The present review aims to summarize quantitative evidence from quasi-experimental and experimental studies with pre-test post-test designs on the effects of school-based arts education on a broader range of competency outcomes, including intra- and (...) interindividual competencies. A systematic literature search was conducted to identify relevant evaluation studies. Twenty-four articles reporting on 26 evaluation studies were eligible for inclusion, and their results were reviewed in terms of art domains and outcome categories. Whilst there is some evidence of beneficial effects on some competencies, for example of music education on arithmetic abilities, speech segmentation and processing speed, the evidence across arts domains and for different outcomes is limited due to small sample sizes, small number of studies, and a large range of effect sizes. The review highlights that sufficiently powered experimental studies with pre-test post-test designs evaluating arts education are sparse and that the “gold standard” of experimental research comes at the expense of a number of other study characteristics such as sample size, intervention and follow-up length. By summarizing the limitations of the current experimental research, the application of experimental designs is critically assessed and a combination with qualitative methods in mixed-method designs and choice of relevant outcomes discussed. (shrink)

Tacitus understands himself as a historiographer who writes against forgetting. This essay examines how Tacitus conceives of forgetting and how he depicts processes of forgetting. (1) First I will introduce forgetting as an important research theme in modern memory studies. Research on forgetting can help us to understand transformations in the collective memory of modern and ancient social groups. (2) In Tacitus’ works about Roman imperial history forgetting stands out as a crucial topic. (3) When analysing processes of forgetting in (...) the Annals, the Histories and the Agricola, we can distinguish different forms of forgetting (such as ‘automatic forgetting’ and ‘directed forgetting’) as well as certain methods that Tacitus depicts as supporting or impeding forgetting. I will focus on ‘removing’ as an ambivalent method of forgetting, and on ‘writing’, which is central to Tacitus’ concept of the historiographer. This analysis of Tacitus’ works reveals that his ideas on forgetting are highly relevant to the twenty-first century. Tacitus’ age, like our own, was one of dramatic societal change, in which social frames are transformed, while the objects of collective memory are questioned and reevaluated. (shrink)

This paper is about the efforts the norwegian psychologist Jan Smedslund made in analyzing and checking philosophically his theory called ‘Psycho-logic’. I am going to reconstruct and discuss the debates between Smedslund and several critics, which have been going on since about 1978, mainly in the “Scandinavian Journal of Psychology”. A result will be that the kind of modal logics Smedslund uses — a type with realistic semantics and epistemology — is not the proper one for the analysis of ‘Psycho-logic’.

In diesem Artikel wird anhand von zwei Fallbeispielen von Eifersucht in konsensuell nicht-monogamen Beziehungsgefügen dargelegt, inwiefern Emotionen neoliberal-patriarchalen (Selbst-)Regierungstechnologien inhärent sind. Emotionen werden dabei aus einer postkolonialen, queerfeministischen Affektperspektive betrachtet, da sie hierbei sowohl als den gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, in denen sie entstehen, inhärent, als auch diese Verhältnisse (re-)produzierend gedacht werden. Emotionen dienen in dieser Sichtweise und in diesem Artikel als Erkenntnismoment und als Analysetool, die ambivalent wirken, da sie sowohl den Status Quo affirmieren als diesen auch unterminieren können. Mithilfe dieser (...) Emotionsperspektive werden zwei Fallbeispiele analysiert, in denen Eifersucht in konsensuell nicht-monogamen Beziehungskonstellationen auftritt. Der Fokus dabei liegt einerseits auf dem individuellen Umgang der beteiligten Personen mit Eifersucht und andererseits auf den normativen, vor allem diskursiven, Rahmenbedingungen, die das Entstehen des Gefühls innerhalb dieser Lebenszusammenhänge mitbedingen. Die Daten zu den Fallbeispielen stammen aus narrativen Interviews, die innerhalb meines Dissertationsprojekts „Beyond the Nuclear Family“ (i. E., Universität Wien, 2022) mithilfe der Grounded Theory Methodologie nach Kathy Charmaz (2006: 10) ausgewertet wurden. Ziel des Artikels ist es aufzuzeigen, inwiefern Eifersucht nicht nur als eine ‚negative‘, unangenehme Emotion betrachtet werden kann, sondern auch als ein Wahrnehmungsmodus, der etwas über die sozialen Machtverhältnisse, in welche die Emotion eingebettet ist, aussagen kann. Konsensuell nicht-monogam lebenden Beziehungs- und Familienkonstellationen soll es damit vereinfacht werden, sich normativen Zuschreibungen und Diskursen rund um ihre Gefühlswelt und Lebensweise entgegenzusetzen. (shrink)

Die hier versammelten Beiträge analysieren Typen und Funktionen der Ambiguität an Beispielen aus der mittelalterlichen bis zur zeitgenössischen Kunst.

Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that compatibilist free will and free belief (...) are equally misguided because freedom is a concept that only applies to an agent’s actions and not to her mental attitudes. Compatibilist strategies that seek to define control by reason-responsiveness merely weaken the conditions for freedom such that arbitrary forms of control can be defined. I will demonstrate that these methods also commit to freedom of fear, freedom of hope and freedom of anger. However, I accept the compatibilist challenge to account for the addict’s and the paranoid’s unfreedom. I will sketch a unified approach to compatibilist free agency that does justice to these phenomena without the help of free will or free belief. (shrink)

The book is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself – in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution. Though the ratio legis argument is (...) widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications. (shrink)

This paper concerns the double standard debate in the ethics of AI literature. This debate essentially revolves around the question of whether we should subject AI systems to different normative standards than humans. So far, the debate has centered around the desideratum of transparency. That is, the debate has focused on whether AI systems must be more transparent than humans in their decision-making processes in order for it to be morally permissible to use such systems. Some have argued that the (...) same standards of transparency should be applied across the board, for AI systems and humans alike. Others have argued that we should hold AI systems to higher standards than humans in terms of transparency. In this paper, we first point out that there are structurally similar double standard debates to be had about other desiderata besides transparency, such as predictive accuracy. Second, we argue that when we focus on predictive accuracy, there are at least two reasons for holding AI systems to a lower standard than humans. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that doxastic compatibilists are making a strong case for genuine doxastic freedom when modelled on compatibilist free will. Unfortunately, their arguments from analogy can be used for the introduction of rather odd forms of freedom that concern our emotions, e.g. “freedom of fear” and “freedom of anger”. The author argues that this problem of overgeneralisation also concerns free will compatibilists who originally provided the weak conditions that are used by doxastic compatibilists. She (...) points out the possibilities and costs of avoiding these consequences and concludes that the standard compatibilist picture is not tenable. (shrink)

Tracing the History of a Super‐Category: The ‘Empirical’ in German Agricultural Improvement and Science around 1800. In accordance with some historians of philosophy, this paper claims that Kant′s critical philosophy can be seen as a watershed between the largely negative and ascriptive term ‘empiric’ applied during the early modern period and the more self‐referential term ‘empiricist’ of the modern period. I will examine the usage and polemical function of the ‘empirical’ label in German agricultural improvement, and will point out its (...) largely negative connotation with respect to agricultural knowledge before 1810. I will then go on to demonstrate how the most prominent founding figure of modern agricultural science in Germany, Albrecht Daniel Thaer (1752–1828), used the conceptual watershed moment as a means to his own academic and polemical ends. Whereas Thaer's opponents, cameralist authors such as Johann Beckmann (1739–1811) and Friedrich Benedict Weber (1774–1848), remained on one side of the watershed, Thaer's reasoning embraced both connotations of the ‘empirical’, and did so in significant ways. My conclusion is that the conceptual transition of the term reflects societal conflicts and social change on a broader level. Thus, the general historiographical claim of this paper is that conceptual histories are a useful and prolific tool of historical research. (shrink)

The volume enquires into the relationship between philosophy and aesthetics in Late Antiquity. Is the sensuous beauty of art a medium for the highest thinkable truth?