- The Strange Case of Dr. DeVille, or Determinism and Rationality.Steven M. Duncan - manuscriptdetails
- Online Radicalization and Voluntary Belief.Rebecca Keller - manuscriptdetails
- "The Vanishing Goal": A New Interpretation of Voluntarism.Victor Mota - manuscriptdetails
- Doxastic Involuntarism devastates Subjectivist Justificationism.Ray Scott Percival - manuscriptdetails
- Welfarist Pluralism: A Theory of the Foundations of a Pluralist Account of Reasons for Belief [Chapter 1 of A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons (Under Contract with OUP).Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
- Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding.J. Spencer Atkins - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.details
- Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford University Press.details
- A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
- Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
- Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.details
- A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.details
- The Pragmatic Hypothesis Testing Theory of Self-Deception and the Belief/Acceptance Distinction.Kevin Lynch - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (1):29-53.details
- The Puzzle of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47:e13245.details
- The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.details
- Ética da Crença.Eros Carvalho - 2022 - In Rogel Esteves de Oliveira, Kátia Martins Etcheverry, Thiege Vieira Rodrigues & Carlos Augusto Sartori (eds.), Compêndio de Epistemologia. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi. pp. 467-493.details
- Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
- Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
- On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
- The Paradox of Epistemic Obligation Avoided.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - The Reasoner 16:49-50.details
- Two Concepts of Belief Strength: Epistemic Confidence and Identity Centrality.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:1-4.details
- The Tinkering Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- On the role of knowers and corresponding epistemic role oughts.Cheryl Abbate - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.details
- Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.details
- There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.details
- Impossible intentions.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):319-332.details
- Doxastic Deontology and Cognitive Competence.Gábor Forrai - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):687-714.details
- Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
- The Ethics of Religious Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Religious Studies Archives 1 (4):1-10.details
- Quantificational Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (11):585-613.details
- The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2021 - In The Fragmented Mind. New York, NY, USA: pp. 350-375.details
- In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
- Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
- Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
- Как верить преданно и твердо? (How to Believe Faithfully and Firmly?).Pavel Butakov - 2020 - Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics 4 (4):167-184.details
- Believing as We Ought and the Democratic Route to Knowledge.Matthew Chrisman - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 47-70.details
- A fé como “salto qualitativo” e as três possibilidades existenciais fundamentais em Kierkegaard: o esforço de conquista de si mesmo, a harmonização com a generalidade do bem e do mal e a espiritualidade individual e a autenticidade existencial.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Guairacá - Revista de Filosofia 36 (1):192-218.details
- Responsibility for Doxastic Strength Grounds Responsibility for Belief.Benoit Gaultier - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 71-85.details
- If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
- Obsessive–compulsive akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.details
- Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy.Daniel Kuby - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3271-3299.details
- Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
- Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 1-20.details
- The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.details
- Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-330.details
- Agency, Akrasia, and the Normative Environment.Gregory Antill - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):321-338.details
- Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-331.details
- Почему эвиденциалисты должны верить обещаниям (Why Evidentialists Must Believe in Promises).Pavel Butakov - 2019 - Phiosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3 (3):172-200.details
- Sobre el etnocentrismo y la paradoja de la convicción.Claudio Cormick - 2019 - Factótum. Revista de Filosofía 20 (21):1-12.details
- ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
- Promising as Doxastic Entrustment.Jorah Dannenberg - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):425-447.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|