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Jakob Mainz [13]Jakob Thrane Mainz [11]
  1. The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making.Lauritz Munch, Jakob Mainz & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (1):1-11.
    Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to (...)
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  2. Too Much Info: Data Surveillance and Reasons to Favor the Control Account of the Right to Privacy.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (2):287-302.
    In this paper, we argue that there is at least a pro tanto reason to favor the control account of the right to privacy over the access account of the right to privacy. This conclusion is of interest due to its relevance for contemporary discussions related to surveillance policies. We discuss several ways in which the two accounts of the right to privacy can be improved significantly by making minor adjustments to their respective definitions. We then test the improved versions (...)
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  3. To Believe or not to Believe - That is not the (Only) Question: the Hybrid View of Privacy.Lauritz Munch & Jakob Mainz - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):245-261.
    In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...)
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  4. Inferences and the Right to Privacy.Jakob Mainz - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
    In this paper, I defend what I call the ‘Inference Principle’. This principle holds that if an agent obtains some information legitimately, then the agent can make any inference she wants based on the information, without violating anyone’s right to privacy. This principle is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it constitutes a novel answer to the timely question of whether the widespread use of ‘data analytics’ to infer personal information about individuals is morally permissible. Second, it contradicts what (...)
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  5. Why algorithmic speed can be more important than algorithmic accuracy.Jakob Mainz, Lauritz Munch, Jens Christian Bjerring & Sissel Godtfredsen - 2023 - Clinical Ethics 18 (2):161-164.
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) often outperforms human doctors in terms of decisional speed. For some diseases, the expected benefit of a fast but less accurate decision exceeds the benefit of a slow but more accurate one. In such cases, we argue, it is often justified to rely on a medical AI to maximise decision speed – even if the AI is less accurate than human doctors.
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  6. An Indirect Argument for the Access Theory of Privacy.Jakob Mainz - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (3):309-328.
    In this paper, I offer an indirect argument for the Access Theory of privacy. First, I develop a new version of the rival Control Theory that is immune to all the classic objections against it. Second, I show that this new version of the Control Theory collapses into the Access Theory. I call the new version the ‘Negative Control Account’. Roughly speaking, the classic Control Theory holds that you have privacy if, and only if, you can control whether other people (...)
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  7. But anyone can mix their labor: a reply to Cheneval.Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2021 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 24 (2):276-285.
  8. Algorithmic decision-making: the right to explanation and the significance of stakes.Lauritz Munch, Jens Christian Bjerring & Jakob Mainz - forthcoming - Big Data and Society.
    The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a detailed investigation of what we will call (...)
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  9. Privacy Rights, and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - 2021 - Res Publica 28 (2):391-400.
    Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative (...)
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  10.  20
    To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question: The Hybrid View of Privacy.Lauritz Munch & Jakob Mainz - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):245-261.
    In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...)
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  11. The Patient preference predictor and the objection from higher-order preferences.Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (3):221-222.
    Recently, Jardas _et al_ have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas _et al_. I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as powerful as the ones discussed by Jardas _et al._.
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  12. The Privacy Dependency Thesis and Self-Defense.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act can undermine other people’s ability to effectively conceal information about themselves. One case in point involves genetic information: if I share ‘my’ genetic information with others, I thereby also reveal genetic information about my biological relatives. Such dependencies are well-known in the privacy literature and are often referred to as ‘privacy dependencies’. Some take the existence of privacy dependencies to generate a moral duty to sometimes avoid sharing information about oneself. (...)
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  13. The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-19.
    Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. (...)
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  14. Two Reasons for Subjecting Medical AI Systems to Lower Standards than Humans.Jakob Mainz, Jens Christian Bjerring & Lauritz Munch - 2023 - Acm Proceedings of Fairness, Accountability, and Transaparency (Facct) 2023 1 (1):44-49.
    This paper concerns the double standard debate in the ethics of AI literature. This debate essentially revolves around the question of whether we should subject AI systems to different normative standards than humans. So far, the debate has centered around the desideratum of transparency. That is, the debate has focused on whether AI systems must be more transparent than humans in their decision-making processes in order for it to be morally permissible to use such systems. Some have argued that the (...)
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  15. Are Markets in Personal Information Morally Impermissible?Jakob Mainz - 2021 - Journal of Information Ethics 31 (2).
    In this paper, I shall discuss what I call the Argument From Exploitation. This argument has as its conclusion that for-profit markets in personal information are morally impermissible. The main premise given for this conclusion is that markets in personal information involve exploitation of vulnerable people, and appertaining inequalities. I try to show that at least one of the premises of this argument is false. I then entertain an objection to my argument that holds that adding the option for vulnerable (...)
     
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  16.  92
    If You Polluted, You’re Included: The All-Affected Principle and Carbon Tax Referendums.David Matias Paaske & Jakob Thrane Mainz - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
    In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referendums. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot are ceteris (...)
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  17. Artificial Intelligence and the Secret Ballot.Jakob Mainz, Jorn Sonderholm & Rasmus Uhrenfeldt - forthcoming - AI and Society.
    In this paper, we argue that because of the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the secret ballot is now much less effective at protecting voters from voting related instances of social ostracism and social punishment. If one has access to vast amounts of data about specific electors, then it is possible, at least with respect to a significant subset of electors, to infer with high levels of accuracy how they voted in a past election. Since the accuracy levels of Artificial Intelligence (...)
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  18. Big Data Analytics and How to Buy an Election.Jakob Mainz, Rasmus Uhrenfeldt & Jorn Sonderholm - 2021 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (2):119-139.
    In this article, we show how it is possible to lawfully buy an election. The method we describe for buying an election is novel. The key things that make it possible to buy an election are the existence of public voter registration lists where one can see whether a given elector has voted in a particular election, and the existence of Big Data Analytics that with a high degree of accuracy can predict what a given elector will vote in an (...)
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  19. Why some defenders of positive duties serve a bad theoretical cocktail.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Jørn Sønderholm - 2021 - Journal of Global Ethics 17 (3):323-339.
    In the literature on global justice, there has been a lengthy debate about what the world’s rich owe to the world’s poor. Some have argued that rich individuals have positive duties of beneficence to help the poor, while others have argued that rich individuals only have negative duties not to harm them. A common objection to the former view is that once it is accepted that positive duties exist, fulfilling these duties will be overdemanding since rich individuals can almost always (...)
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  20. I Know What You Will Do Next Summer: Informational Privacy and the Ethics of Data Analytics.Jakob Mainz - 2021 - Dissertation, Aalborg University
  21.  15
    Just Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society, written by Lisa Herzog.Jakob Mainz - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (2):257-260.
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  22. Why Busing Voters to the Polling Station is Paying People to Vote.Jørn Sønderholm & Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2023 - Law and Philosophy 42 (5):437-459.
    In this paper, we argue that the widespread practice in the United States of busing voters to the polling station on Election Day is an instance of paying people to vote. We defend a definition of what it means to pay people to vote, and on this definition, busing voters to the polling station is an instance of paying people to vote. Paying people to vote is illegal according to United States federal election law. However, the United States courts have (...)
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