Traditional approaches to the semantics of questions analyze questions indirectly, via the notion of an answer. In recent work on inquisitive semantics, a different perspective is taken: the meaning of a question is equated with its resolution conditions, just like the meaning of a statement is traditionally equated with its truth-conditions. In this paper I argue that this proposal improves on previous approaches, combining the formal elegance and explanatory power of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s partition theory with the greater (...) generality afforded by answer-set theories. (shrink)

Because Dasein, as conceived by Heidegger, is inherently temporal, the "who" of Dasein can never be defined simply in terms of a present identity but must have the character of what Derrida calls "différance." Dasein 's authenticity, then, must be an embracing of this, its character as différance. This means that the "self" is "neither a substance nor a subject " but a resolution. The anticipatory resoluteness of authenticity, however, is a unique kind of resolve: it is the resolve (...) to be open to transformation. For that reason, Dasein 's proper self-appropriation—authenticity—is found precisely in its inherent inappropriability. Because Dasein is always being-in-the-world, the openness of its own "who" is equally an openness of being's "what." Dasein 's authenticity is nothing other than the enactment of the question of the meaning of being. (shrink)

Questions of both a theoretical and methodological nature are raised concerning Harcum's interesting paper on the resolution of the free will issue. The theoretical questions deal with the meaning of "free" as the supposed capricious disregard of environmental circumstances, the theoretical perspective from which agency is construed, the sort of causation that is involved, the choice of a predication model rather than a mediation model, and the role of opposition in framing alternatives. Methodological questions raised center on the role (...) of the experimental instruction, manipulation of the independent variable, and the reliance on randomness or error variance in the validation of free will conceptions. It is concluded that Harcum's findings are consistent with human agency, but that his theoretical account requires some rethinking. (shrink)

This article challenges dominant explanations in the comparative political economy literature on the origins and purposes of social protection. Far from being a tool of working-class mobilization, social protection in southern Spain was strategically employed by a left party to politically demobilize its supposedly “natural” constituencies. This peculiar outcome is the result of a setting that is common in welfare states outside of northern Europe: the context of a divided left, in which parties and unions are seeking to mobilize different (...) constituencies and in which left parties are themselves divided between moderate and far-left groups. The result in Spain was that social policy became a weapon in parties' efforts to undermine their political competition. This suggests the need to rethink the received wisdom about what the welfare state does to build working-class power in the context of a divided left. (shrink)

The question of Theodicy demands a reasonable justification of the nature, structures and goals of evil and suffering in the world. The paper attempts to explain the reasons for its presence in our lives and seeks to unveil its principles. If God is all knowing, almighty and also merciful, we must face the problem of the presence of evil and suffering in this world. The main goal of the paper is to show the way the New Testament deals with (...) this question, and further to show to what extent it has influenced the life of Christians from the point of view of teleology. (shrink)

The foundational hypothesis to this study is that congregations which have a healthy perception and a greater understanding of conflict will develop more effective responses to conflict that will translate into more effective conflict resolution and reconciliation. The process and sustainability of the development of a missional church, the context of the study, is pregnant with potential conflict. Untamed conflict has the propensity to retard, jeopardise or even destroy the development of a missional church. When conflict arises, it must (...) be understood and dealt with theologically. The inherent problem is that conflict appears to be neither understood nor appreciated sociologically and theologically. This knowledge and praxis vacuum has the potential for conflict to translate into inappropriate or ineffective responses that do not always make for effective resolution and reconciliation. The research focuses mainly on an empirical study based on the four practical theological questions of Osmer (2008). Participants for this study were randomly selected from specific sectors of Methodist congregations in the wider Pretoria area. The research explores congregants’ perceptions, understanding and views of conflict; their responses to conflict; and some felt and observed outcomes of conflict. The presupposition is that the development of the local missional church would be more effective and efficient when the management and process of conflict resolution and reconciliation are well led and well managed. This study confirmed that conflict, despite its normalcy and necessity, carries a negative undertone and is mostly avoided in congregations. This is compounded by the evidence that there is little, if any, theological or scriptural understanding of conflict. There is also no indication that churches intentionally and purposefully educate their members to appreciate and understand conflict. In so doing, churches are harming their innate calling as the glory and manifestation of God’s divine grace through faith communities for the transformation of all peoples. Yet, the church understands the dangers of unhealthy conflict, and on occasion even expects conflict to arise, although deeming it inappropriate. Practical theological discernment is sought as to why this may be so and remedial action is proposed to address the problem of conflict within congregations. (shrink)

How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about (...) the rationality of emotions —namely, that a rational change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence. (shrink)

The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin’s framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their evidence, prior beliefs, and epistemic standards may still differ in the explicit doxastic attitudes that they adopt. This can happen because two such subjects may be sensitive to different questions. Thus, differing intellectual interests can (...) yield failures of uniqueness. This is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon. (shrink)

Over the years, metaethicists have witnessed the rise of a cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections. In doing so, I hope to call into question some prevailing assumptions about the linguistic phenomena that a metaethical theory should be expected to capture.

What is it to read Wittgenstein resolutely? In this essay, I make a suggestion about how to answer that question. I backtrack in time to a debate about Philosophical Investigations between O. K. Bouwsma and Gilbert Ryle. I selectively reconstruct that debate, highlighting features of it that I take to be interesting in their own right and in relation to debates about PI, but also interesting in analogy with debates about resolute and standard readings of Tractatus logico-philosophicus. As will (...) be clear, my sympathies are with Bouwsma against Ryle, and with resolute readers against standard readers. But I do not vindicate Bouwsma; I will, in fact, be critical, carefully or guardedly critical of him.Nor do I vindicate resolute reading of TLP. I suggest a way of seeing resolute reading that makes clearer what it is and how it contrasts with standard reading, and, in so doing, that makes clearer what some of the difficulties of the debate between the readings really are, whether about TLP or about PI. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to critically assess the philosophical importance of phenomenology as a method for studying the normativity of meaning and its transcendental conditions. Using the pioneering work of Steven Crowell as a springboard, phenomenologists from all over the world examine the promise of phenomenology for illuminating long-standing problems in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, action theory, the philosophy of religion, and moral psychology. The essays are unique in that they engage with the phenomenological tradition not as (...) a collection of authorities to whom we must defer, or a set of historical artifacts we must preserve, but rather as a community of interlocutors with views that bear on important issues in contemporary philosophy. -/- The book is divided into three thematic sections, each examining different clusters of issues aimed at moving the phenomenological project forward. The first section explores the connection between normativity and meaning, and asks us to rethink the relation between the factual realm and the categories of validity in terms of which things can show up as what they are. The second section examines the nature of the self that is capable of experiencing meaning. It includes essays on intentionality, agency, consciousness, naturalism, and moral normativity. The third section addresses questions of philosophical methodology, examining if and why phenomenology should have priority in the analysis of meaning. Finally, the book concludes with an afterword written by Steven Crowell. -/- Normativity, Meaning, and the Promise of Phenomenology will be a key resource for students and scholars interested in the phenomenological tradition, the transcendental tradition from Kant to Davidson, and existentialism. Additionally, its forward-looking focus yields crucial insights into pressing philosophical problems that will appeal to scholars working across all areas of the discipline. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic (...) or analytic process will control the response. The parallel-competitive model assumes that each system operates in parallel to deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict that then needs to be resolved. Finally, the default-interventionist model involves the cueing of default responses by the heuristic system that may or may not be altered by subsequent intervention of the analytic system. A second, independent issue also emerges from this discussion. The superior performance of higher-ability participants on reasoning tasks may be due to the fact that they engage in more analytic reasoning ( quantity hypothesis ) or alternatively to the fact that the analytic reasoning they apply is more effective ( quality hypothesis ). (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need (...) for justification altogether or by reframing justification in either ostensive or coherentist fashion, showing that each fails to account for our sense that basic equality is objectively true. In response, I outline a Hegelian approach that treats the commitment to basic equality as a social fact that constrains philosophical reasoning in contemporary liberal democracies. By itself that might suggest complacent conservatism or cultural relativism, but I argue that practices and institutions that reflect and foster a commitment to basic equality have a distinct value in permitting reciprocal recognition and thereby enabling us to make a distinct class of normative claims on one another. This Hegelian resolution of the problem is dialectically superior to its rivals and therefore warrants further development. (shrink)

This article seeks to examine the debilitating issue of ethnicity and conflict which is so prevalent in Africa with particular focus on Cameroon. Many situations of ethnicity and conflict have disrupted the unity of many communities in Africa. As Jesus equally lived in an agonistic society of stratification and class differences wherein the question of neighbourliness was a matter of endless discussion, Luke 10:29–37 is approached from an African perspective to verify what ethnicity and conflict meant to Jesus’ listeners (...) in their 1st-century Mediterranean context and what it meant to Africans in their own context. The article contends that the continued resurgence of disputes over religious differences, a sense of belonging and cultural prejudice, inter alia are some of the consequential factors that breed ethnic conflicts in Cameroon. This article argues that to overcome these impediments, capacity prevention and conflict resolution should be strengthened through dialogue, mediation and arbitration with particular attention on the African values of love and compassion. Jesus’ method of conflict resolution was to show love and compassion, even to the enemy; thus He commissioned all to do the same, ‘Go and do likewise’ (Lk 10:37). The article concludes that if dialogue is considered and implemented, sustainable ethnic conflict resolution will be enhanced in Africa and the Cameroonian society. Contribution: This article highlights the relationship between ethnicity and conflict in Africa. Reading Luke 10:29–37 through the lenses of the African values of love and compassion, the article proposes that ethnic conflict can be overcome through dialogue, mediation and arbitration. The article thus contributes to the possible resolution of ethnic conflict in Africa and especially in Cameroonian society. (shrink)

Given the current climate of political division and global conflict it is not surprising that there has been an increasing interest in how we ought to respond to perceived wrongdoing, both personal and political. In this volume, top scholars from around the world contribute all new original essays on the ethics of forgiveness, revenge, and punishment. -/- This book draws on both historical and contemporary debates in order to answer important questions about the nature of forgiveness, the power of apology, (...) the relationship between punishment and revenge, the path to reconciliation, the morality of blame, and the role of forgiveness in political conflict. -/- Chapter 16 is available open access . (shrink)

In Heidegger's 1921 lectures, he presents an extensive interpretation of Book Ten of Augustine's Confessions . The present paper elaborates parallels between that interpretation of Augustine's Confessions and Heidegger's interpretation of existence in Being and Time , with special reference to the themes of self-possession and resoluteness as respective anchors of the two interpretations. The study also highlights ways the two interpretations diverge, i.e., the aspects of the interpretation of the Confessions ' themes of the good and desirable, the joyful (...) and endearing, the delectatio that Augustine deems the end of our care that do not find their way into the existential analysis. By way of conclusion, questions are raised about the significance and plausibility of Heidegger's prima facie omissions of these themes from his existential analysis. (shrink)

This paper has arisen from my interest in questions ofsubjectivity of primary concern to contemporaryfeminist jurisprudence. Rather than side with anyparticular view represented in the debates surroundingthese questions, I have used Foucault's concept ofepisteme to explore the tradition of feministlegal thought. By focusing upon seventeenth-centurywomen's writings in which the earliest statementslinking law to women's oppression are to be found, thepaper argues that knowledge claims about law'sassociation with women's oppression are predicated notupon the positing of a sovereign feministconsciousness, but upon the (...) specific positivities ofknowledge which existed at the time. Theunderstanding of the birth of the feminist legaldiscourse in terms of the specific conditions of itspossibility, although historically contextualised,raises questions about the hitherto seeminglyunassailable adherence to subjectivist epistemologywhich the current feminist engagement with lawmaintains. (shrink)

How questions are understudied in philosophy and linguistics. They can be answered in very different ways, some of which are poorly understood. Jaworski identifies several types: ‘manner’, ‘method, means or mechanism’, ‘cognitive resolution’, and develops a logic designed to enable us to distinguish among them. Some key questions remain open, however, in particular, whether these distinctions derive from an ambiguity in how, from differences in the logical structure of the question or from contextual underspecification. Arguing from two classes (...) of responses, adverbs and by gerunds, I give the answer that the logical structure of the question is indeed relevant: loosely, manners are adjuncts but methods are arguments. (shrink)

This article explores the links between the philosophies of Georges Canguilhem and Gilbert Simondon. It highlights their shared emphasis on the difficult character of human life, framing this difficulty in terms of an existential encounter with problems and their resolutions. It shows how the notion of ‘problem’ which grounds both of their thinking presupposes a neo-vitalist conception of life as purposive behaviour, extended to forms of collective, technical and symbolic activity. The consequences of this conception for Canguilhem's and Simondon's engagement (...) with questions of pedagogy, and the role of philosophical education in particular, are then examined. The article concludes by considering the ambiguous place of anxiety in their work and its significance for thinking about the conditions of knowledge and action. Following Canguilhem and Simondon, I argue for the importance of helping the human organism develop relatively autonomous interior and exterior milieus to cope with life's fundamental difficulty. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the question whether there is anything left of the Tractatus criticisms of Frege and Russell, if the principles on which those criticisms are apparently based are “thrown away.” I consider two examples of Tractarian arguments that criticize Russell, both of which may appear to rest on the context principle. I discuss only briefly Wittgenstein’s argument against Russell on the theory of types, but I look in detail at his criticism of Russell on generality. I (...) show how that criticism can be understood independently of any supposed Tractarian principles. I also consider the importance of ideas in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics for the development of Wittgenstein’s thought, including the distinction between saying and showing. (shrink)

A major challenge for any grammar-driven text understanding system is the resolution of fragments. Basic examples include bare NP answers (1a), where the bare NP John is resolved as the assertion John saw Mary, and sluicing (1b), where the wh-phrase who is interpreted as the question Which student saw John.

In non-ideal theory, the political philosopher seeks to identify an injustice, synthesize social scientific work to diagnose its underlying causes, and propose morally permissible and potentially efficacious remedies. This paper explores the role in non-ideal theory of the identification of a plausible agent of change who might bring about the proposed remedies. I argue that the question of the agent of change is connected with the other core tasks of diagnosing injustice and proposing practical remedies. In this connection, I (...) criticize two linked postures that nonideal theorists sometimes adopt: a technocratic mode of neutral policy recommendation, whereby philosophers say what “we” must do to address some problem, without attending to the way agency enters the problem and its possible resolution; and the tendency to treat non-ideal theory as primarily consisting int eh enumeration of duties we are failing to fulfill, and specification of who is under what additional duties in light of this shortfall. My argument is that these tendencies fail to register in a coherent way the practical character of political philosophy. (shrink)

When faced with an ambiguous pronoun, comprehenders use both multimodal cues and linguistic cues to identify the antecedent. While research has shown that gestures facilitate language comprehension, improve reference tracking, and influence the interpretation of ambiguous pronouns, literature on reference resolution suggests that a wide set of linguistic constraints influences the successful resolution of ambiguous pronouns and that linguistic cues are more powerful than some multimodal cues. To address the outstanding question of the importance of gesture as (...) a cue in reference resolution relative to cues in the speech signal, we have previously investigated the comprehension of contrastive gestures that indexed abstract referents – in this case expressions of personal preference – and found that such gestures did facilitate the resolution of ambiguous statements of preference. In this study, we extend this work to investigate whether the effect of gesture on resolution is diminished when the gesture indexes a statement that is less likely to be interpreted as the correct referent. Participants watched videos in which a speaker contrasted two ideas that were either neutral or moral acceptable). A gesture to the left or right side co-occurred with speech expressing each position. In gesture-disambiguating trials, an ambiguous phrase was accompanied by a gesture to one side or the other. In gesture non-disambiguating trials, no third gesture occurred with the ambiguous phrase. Participants were more likely to choose the idea accompanied by gesture as the stimulus speaker’s preference. We found no effect of scenario type. Regardless of whether the linguistic cue expressed a view that was morally charged or neutral, observers used gesture to understand the speaker’s opinion. This finding contributes to our understanding of the strength and range of cues, both linguistic and multimodal, that listeners use to resolve ambiguous references. (shrink)

I show that resolution-oriented discourse has a distinctive normative structure, partially subject to theoretical explication.Those with a keen commitment to the idea of working out differences of opinion dialogically may fail to grasp what such a commitment entails. In the heat of discursive conflict, discerning our obligations is often difficult. These difficulties yield a general lack of clarity concerning the norms in question. Yet theory can inform reason-giving practice by clarifying the normative structures underlying such discourse. A logic (...) of disputation must be anchored in the relevant features of concrete discursive contexts, even as it abstracts from their particularities. Different types of challenge present claimants with different options for redeeming the claim challenged, and defending moves, too, open up and close off various options for the challenger. I show that the structure of the normative "field" at any point in the dialectic can be characterized with surprising precision. (shrink)

Clinicians, operating within complex systems, make mistakes, as people do in every human endeavor, and when they do, patients are sometimes harmed. One important question is how we as clinicians can find resolution in the wake of an error. The published literature has divided errors into those caused by “systems” and by “individuals.” But whereas both “systems” and “individual” approaches are important in understanding the cause of an error, neither alone can fully lead to resolution once an (...) error has occurred. Instead, both are necessary to understand, resolve, and prevent errors. (shrink)

In 2018, three journalists accused one of the Members of the Russian Parliament of harassment at workplace. Many influential persons of the Russian elite engaged themselves in the public discussion of the conflict. We studied that high-profiled discussion using a hybrid method merging human- and logic-oriented approaches in argumentation studies. The method develops ideas of the new dialectics, the argumentation logic and the logical-cognitive approach to argumentation, on which is based the algorithm for determining of dispute resolution by aggregating (...) formal and informal tools of analysis. We have reconstructed the discussion as two disputes about questions A and B. A: Did the MP violate the code of conduct by making statements or actions against the journalists? B: Are actions like the behavior of the MP harassment? The opinions of the discussion participants were grouped into the four points of view: A1 – the MP did not violate the code of conduct, A2 – the MP violated the code of conduct, B3 – the actions are not harassment, B4 – the actions are harassment. We mapped arguments in support or against each of them using OVA software, evaluated the arguments with the help of the critical questions, a tool proposed in the new dialectics, and determined the ultimate A + B resolution by applying of the algorithm that combines elements of gradual and labelling semantics from the argumentation logic and the classification of disputes from the dialectical approaches. The resolution was a subset of four arguments that ensured the victory of A1+B4. However, the substantial incompatibility of those arguments highlighted a deep disagreement, an unresolvable difference of opinion, between the parties about the permissibility of courtship. The deep disagreement, a bonus result yielded by the application of the hybrid method, excluded the interpretation of the determined resolution as convincing for the parties, but pointed out a way to smooth the difference of opinions by elaborating of legal, social and moral aspects of the problem of harassment at workplace. (shrink)

Recent evidence suggests that performance on reasoning tasks may reflect the operation of a number of distinct cognitive mechanisms and processes. This paper explores the implications of this view of the mind for the descriptive and normative assessment of reasoning. I suggest that descriptive questions such as “Are we equipped to reason using rule X?” and normative questions such as “Are we rational?” are obsolete—they do not possess a fine enough grain of architectural resolution to accurately characterize the mind. (...) I explore how this general lesson can apply to specific experimental interpretations, and suggest that 'rationality' must be evaluated along a number of importantly distinct dimensions. (shrink)

In this concise text, Roy Bhaskar sets out to diagnose, explain and resolve the "problems of philosophy". _Plato Etc._ reviews all the main areas of the subject: the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science; the philosophy of logic and language; the philosophies of space, time and causality; the philosophy of the social and life sciences and of dialectic; ethics, politics and aesthetics; and the history and sociology of philosophy. Among the issues discussed are the problems of induction and universals, (...) the question of relativism, Heidegger’s "scandal of philosophy", the nature of moral truth and the conundrum of free will and determinism. The last two chapters consist of a synoptic account of the development of Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to poststructuralism. _Plato Etc._ seeks to revindicate the philosophical project, and to demonstrate that the author’s "dialectical critical realism" has the categorical power to remedy the problem fields of philosophy. The book serves both as a critical introduction to philosophy and as an invaluable resource for the scholar. (shrink)

This conversation analytic paper investigates how speakers self-position or are other-positioned as members of a certain social group through other-initiated repair. Findings illustrate the complexity of linguistic membership categories by demonstrating that they continually shift depending on local interactional goals and documenting how shifts are accomplished. The different levels and types of linguistic and cultural knowledge that are invoked in instances of repair on specific lexical items demonstrate the complexity of linguistic membership categorization, and this indicates a need to problematize (...) the use of a priori and overly-vague labels like ‘non-native speaker’. Findings contribute to our understanding of the functions of other-initiated repair and the mechanisms of co-constructing membership and thus social identity in interaction. They also raise questions about the relationship between amounts and types of knowledge and further our understanding of the construction of expert/novice categories via knowledge displays and negotiation. (shrink)

International dispute resolution in general and international arbitration, in particular, is highly affected by the emergence and fast development of innovation-driven technologies. On the one hand, such technologies are cost and time-effective. To name a few, they allow online filing of a case, collecting of e-evidence and remote hearings, among others. On the other hand, they also may lead to some challenges that need to be addressed. The primary concerns comprise e-arbitration agreements and e-awards, as well as cybersecurity and (...) data protection. Therefore, this begs the question of whether such new technologies will significantly impact the dispute resolution landscape and thus become a game-changer therein. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the emergence of new technologies provides an opportunity to establish a long-lasting new standard for international arbitration. (shrink)

This chapter explores how our understanding of Molyneux’s question, and of the possibility of an experimental resolution to it, should be affected by recognizing the complexity that is involved in reidentifying shapes and other spatial properties across differing sensory manifestations of them. I will argue that while philosophers today usually treat the question as concerning ‘the relations between perceptions of shape in different sensory modalities’ (Campbell 1995, 301), in fact this is only part of the question’s (...) real interest, and that the answer to the question also turns on how shape is perceived within each of sight and touch individually. (shrink)

In 1976, the Genetics Society of America published a document entitled “Resolution of Genetics, Race, and Intelligence.” This document laid out the Society’s position in the IQ controversy, particularly that on scientific and ethical questions involving the genetics of intellectual differences between human populations. Since the GSA was the largest scientific society of geneticists in the world, many expected the document to be of central importance in settling the controversy. Unfortunately, the Resolution had surprisingly little influence on the (...) discussion. In 1979, William Provine analyzed the possible factors that decreased the impact of the Resolution, among them scientists’ limited understanding of the relationship between science and ethics. Through the analysis of unpublished versions of the Resolution and exchanges between GSA members, I will suggest that the limited impact of the statement likely depended on a shift in the aims of the GSA due to the controversies that surrounded the preparation of the document. Indeed, the demands of the membership made it progressively more impartial in both scientific and political terms, decreasing its potential significance for a wider audience. Notably, the troubled history of the Resolution raises the question of what can make effective or ineffective the communication between scientists and the public—a question with resonance in past and present discussions on topics of social importance. (shrink)

When considering the question, “Is it just for a [genetic] screening program to give people all the information they want?” it is first necessary to understand how the information is being presente...

The Preface Paradox is often discussed for its implications for rational belief. Much less discussed is a variant of the Preface Paradox for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible closure-friendly resolution to the Preface Paradox for Knowledge is to say that in any given context, we do not know much. I call this view “Socraticism”. I argue that Socraticism is the most plausible view on two accounts—(1) this view is compatible with the claim that most (...) of our knowledge ascriptions are true, and (2) provided that (1) is true, the costs of accepting Socraticism are much less than the costs of accepting any other resolution to the Paradox. I argue for (1) in Section 2 by developing a question-sensitive contextualist model for knowledge that shows how Socraticism is compatible with the claim that most of our knowledge ascriptions are true. I also argue how this contextualist model can achieve this result where other contextualist models fail. I then consider other closure-friendly solutions to the paradox in Section 3 and show how accepting those solutions forces us to give up a number of plausible epistemic principles. (shrink)

Among the many fundamental problems Wittgenstein discussed, two are especially relevant for evolutionary theory. The first one is the problem of negation and its relation to the intentionality of thought. Its resolution answers the question of how thought can anticipate reality though what is thought may not exist, and explains how empirical propositions are distinguishable from mathematical, logical, and conceptual (or what are traditionally called metaphysical) propositions. The second is the problem of the grounds of sensory experience. Wittgenstein’s (...) resolution of this problem is revolutionary since he showed that first-person, present-tense expressions (these are sentences by which we express what goes on in our mind) have no grounds at all, clarifying why we should abandon (all variants of) representative idealism. In combination with the resolution of the first problem, it enables us to develop new explanations about how during the course of development and evolution the mind evolves and evolved. (shrink)

To the philosopher, the logician, and the linguist, questions have a special fascination. The two main views of language, that it describes the world, and that it expresses thought, are not directly applicable to questions. Ques tions are not assertions. A question may be apt, sharp, to the point, impor tant, or it may be inappropriate, ambiguous, awkward, irrelevant or irreverent. But it cannot be true or false. It does not have a truth value not just because an utterance (...) like Was the letter long? does not indicate which letter is being talked about. The indicative The letter was not long has the same indeter minacy. In actual context the anaphoric definite article will be resolved both for a question and for an indicative sentence. Contextual resolutions are easily found for most cross-references. A question cannot be either true or it does not describe a state of affairs. Neither does it express false, because thought, because it is an expression of suspended thought, of lack of judge ment. To dress it in other philosophical styles, a question is not a judgment, it is not a proposition, it is not an assertion. A philosopher may try to paraphrase a question as an indicative sentence, for instance as a statement of ignorance, or as a statement of the desire to know. Hintikka, Wachowicz and Lang explore this territory. Or he may interpret it as a meta statement intimating the direction in which the flow of the discourse is going. (shrink)

Concealed questions are determiner phrases that are naturally paraphrased as embedded questions (e.g., John knows the capital of Italy ≈ John knows what the capital of Italy is). This paper offers a novel account of the interpretation of concealed questions, which assumes that an entity-denoting expression α may be type-shifted into an expression ?z.P(α), where P is a contextually determined property, and z ranges over a contextually determined domain of individual concepts. Different resolutions of P and the domain of z (...) yield a wide range of concealed question interpretations, some of which were not noted previously. On the other hand, principled constraints on the resolution process prevent overgeneration. (shrink)

This paper focuses on children’s interpretation of sentences containing negation and a quantifier (e.g., The detective didn’t find some guys). Recent studies suggest that, although children are capable of accessing inverse scope interpretations of such sentences, they resort to surface scope to a larger extent than adults. To account for children’s behavioral pattern, we propose a new factor at play in Truth Value Judgment tasks: the Question–Answer Requirement (QAR). According to the QAR, children (and adults) must interpret the target (...) sentence that they evaluate as an answer to a question that is made salient by the discourse. (shrink)