Sweeping denials of the story's capacity to accurately reflect the past are ever catalyzing equally misleading global affirmations. The impositionalists, such as theorist Hayden White, view historical narratives as imposing a falsifying narrative structure on the past, and conclude that narratives cannot be true. Plot-reifiers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr, and Frederick Olafson, posit that the past is already narratively structured; historical plots are reified in order for there to be something in the world to which narrative structures can (...) correspond in being true. The antireferentialists such as JeanFrançois Lyotard and Roland Barthes deny that narrative histories even claim truth. Escaping this trilemma of theoretical interpretation involves accepting the idea that construction of a history does not entail its falsification. Historical narrative need to be allowed to function both figurally, in the sense of generating new discursive figures, and at the same time literally, in the sense of asking to be understood literally. Narratives need to be understood on their own terms, and not treated as an approximation to some foreign ideal. (shrink)

Existing solutions to the epistemic regress problem, and the theories of justification built upon them, are inadequate, for they fail to diagnose the root source of the problem. The problem is rooted in our attachment to a pernicious dogma of modern epistemology: the idea that a judgement must be supported by some kind of reason or evidence to be justified. The epistemic analogue of the doctrine of original sin, this idea renders every judgement in need of redemption – guilty until (...) shown to be innocent – distorting our understanding of reason at a very deep level, and preventing us from conceptualizing a satisfactory solution to the problem. If we opt for a more context–sensitive mechanism for assigning default epistemic status, however, we get a more plausible picture of justification, an epistemology more in tune with epistemic practice, and an elegant solution to the regress problem. (shrink)

I show that resolution-oriented discourse has a distinctive normative structure, partially subject to theoretical explication.Those with a keen commitment to the idea of working out differences of opinion dialogically may fail to grasp what such a commitment entails. In the heat of discursive conflict, discerning our obligations is often difficult. These difficulties yield a general lack of clarity concerning the norms in question. Yet theory can inform reason-giving practice by clarifying the normative structures underlying such discourse. A logic of disputation (...) must be anchored in the relevant features of concrete discursive contexts, even as it abstracts from their particularities. Different types of challenge present claimants with different options for redeeming the claim challenged, and defending moves, too, open up and close off various options for the challenger. I show that the structure of the normative "field" at any point in the dialectic can be characterized with surprising precision. (shrink)