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Formal Epistemology

Assistant editor: Mackenzie Marcotte (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscript
    This essay gives an account of epistemic deference for agents with imprecise credences. I look at the two main imprecise deference principles in the literature, known as Identity Reflection and Pointwise Reflection (Moss, 2021). I show that Pointwise Reflection is strictly weaker than Identity Reflection, and argue that, if you are certain you will update by conditionalisation, you should defer to your future self according to Identity Reflection. Then I give a more general justification for Pointwise and Identity Reflection from (...)
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  2. Rational updating at the crossroads.Silvia Milano & Andrés Perea - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):190-211.
    In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed (...)
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  3. Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.
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  4. Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.
    Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of (...)
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  5. A Qualitative Approach to Conceptual Spaces: Prototypes as Qualitative Atoms.Javier Belastegui - 2022 - Erkenntnis (Online):1-36.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a qualitative approach to the theory of conceptual spaces, in contrast to the usual metric framework. This requires qualitative notions of similarity, simple concepts, prototypes and conceptual categorisation. For this purpose, I will introduce three mathematical models for conceptual spaces. The first one is topological and has been proposed by Mormann. The other two are new and are based on atomistic orders and similarity relations. I will discuss how each of them deals (...)
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  6. The Ambiguity Dilemma for Imprecise Bayesians.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    How should we make decisions when we do not know the relevant physical probabilities? In these ambiguous situations, we cannot use our knowledge to determine expected utilities or payoffs. The traditional Bayesian answer is that we should create a probability distribution using some mix of subjective intuition and objective constraints. Imprecise Bayesians argue that this approach is inadequate for modelling ambiguity. Instead, they represent doxastic states using credal sets. Generally, insofar as we are more uncertain about the physical probability of (...)
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  7. Underdetermination of Imprecise Probabilities.Joshua Thong - 2022 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In a fair finite lottery with n tickets, the probability assigned to each ticket winning is 1/n and no other answer. That is, 1/n is unique. Now, consider a fair lottery over the natural numbers. What probability is assigned to each ticket winning in this lottery? Well, this probability value must be smaller than 1/n for all natural numbers n. If probabilities are real-valued, then there is only one answer: 0, as 0 is the only real and non-negative value that (...)
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  8. Primitive Conditional Probabilities, Subset Relations and Comparative Regularity.Joshua Thong - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. (...)
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  9. Virtuously Circular. Theoretical Virtues in Reflective Equilibrium.Andreas Freivogel - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Bern
  10. On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - unknown - Cambridge University Press | Under Contract.
    Epistemologists commonly distinguish between our outright doxastic states and our graded doxastic states. The outright doxastic states include believing that p, thinking that p, having the opinion that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. In contrast, our graded doxastic states include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps certain degreed phenomenal states. But in addition to these commonly cited outright states we also have *conviction*, i.e. the state of being convinced (simpliciter) that something is (...)
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  11. Landscapes and Bandits: A Unified Model of Functional and Demographic Diversity.Alice C. W. Huang - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Two types of formal models - landscape search tasks and two-armed bandit models - are often used to study the effects that various social factors have on epistemic performance. I argue that they can be understood within a single framework. In this unified framework, I develop a model that may be used to understand the effects of functional and demographic diversity and their interaction. Using the unified model, I find that the benefit of demographic diversity is most pronounced in a (...)
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  12. Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    The Preface Paradox is often discussed for its implications for rational belief. Much less discussed is a variant of the Preface Paradox for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible closure-friendly resolution to the Preface Paradox for Knowledge is to say that in any given context, we do not know much. I call this view “Socraticism”. I argue that Socraticism is the most plausible view on two accounts—(1) this view is compatible with the claim that most of (...)
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  13. The Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Formal Epistemology: Conditionals.Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam & Karolina Krzyżanowska - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 211-236.
  14. Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - forthcoming - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning:1-37.
    Calibration inductive logics are based on accepting estimates of relative frequencies, which are used to generate imprecise probabilities. In turn, these imprecise probabilities are intended to guide beliefs and decisions — a process called “calibration”. Two prominent examples are Henry E. Kyburg's system of Evidential Probability and Jon Williamson's version of Objective Bayesianism. There are many unexplored questions about these logics. How well do they perform in the short-run? Under what circumstances do they do better or worse? What is their (...)
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  15. Learning from experience and conditionalization.Peter Brössel - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2797-2823.
    Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provided new formal accounts of conditionalization that are more in line with how (...)
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  16. Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.
    This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence: roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost‐free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision: the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise, i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that (...)
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  17. Modelling Belief Dynamics.Manuel Bremer - manuscript
    The following considerations concern modelling Belief Dynamics (BD) not just in the sense of a formalization, but rather in the sense of building a computational model and implementing the corresponding data structures and algorithms of recomputing beliefs. The purpose of such a project is to illustrate some ideas about belief changes in a Web of Beliefs (WoB) to explore and deepen one's understanding of belief changes by trying to implement or improve corresponding algorithms.
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  18. Reasoning Simplifying Attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):722-735.
    Several philosophers maintain that outright belief exists because it plays a reasoning simplifying role (Holton 2008; Ross and Schroeder 2014; Staffel 2019; Weisberg 2020). This claim has been recently contested, on the grounds that credences also can simplify reasoning (Dinges 2021). This paper takes a step back and asks: what features of an attitude explain its alleged ability to simplify reasoning? The paper contrasts two explanations, one in terms of dispositions and the other in terms of representation, arguing in favour (...)
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  19. Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1.Andrew del Rio - 2022 - Analysis 83 (1):31-39.
    On one view of the traditional doxastic attitudes, belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0 and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1. In ‘Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief’ (2013) Jane Friedman argues, against this view, that there are cases where a credence of 0 is required but where suspension is permitted. If this were so, belief, disbelief and suspension could not be identified or reduced to the aforementioned credences. I argue that Friedman relies on two (...)
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  20. A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...)
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  21. The Myside Bias in Argument Evaluation: A Bayesian Model.Edoardo Baccini & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 44:1512-1518.
    The "myside bias'' in evaluating arguments is an empirically well-confirmed phenomenon that consists of overweighting arguments that endorse one's beliefs or attack alternative beliefs while underweighting arguments that attack one's beliefs or defend alternative beliefs. This paper makes two contributions: First, it proposes a probabilistic model that adequately captures three salient features of myside bias in argument evaluation. Second, it provides a Bayesian justification of this model, thus showing that myside bias has a rational Bayesian explanation under certain conditions.
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  22. Conjunctive Explanations: A Coherentist Appraisal.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - In Conjunctive Explanations. The Nature, Epistemology, and Psychology of Explanatory Multiplicity. J. Schupbach and D. Glass (eds.), New York: Routledge. pp. 111-134.
    A conjunction of two hypotheses may provide a better explanation than either one of them individually, even if each already provides a good explanation on its own. An appropriate measure of explanatory power should reflect this, but none of the measures discussed in the literature do so because they only consider how much an explanatory hypothesis reduces our surprise at the evidence – which is problematic. This chapter introduces and defends a class of coherentist measures of explanatory power, and shows (...)
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  23. Confirmation, Coherence and the Strength of Arguments.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:1473-1479.
    Alongside science and law, argumentation is also of central importance in everyday life. But what characterizes a good argument? This question has occupied philosophers and psychologists for centuries. The theory of Bayesian argumentation is particularly suitable for clarifying it, because it allows us to take into account in a natural way the role of uncertainty, which is central to much argumentation. Moreover, it offers the possibility of measuring the strength of an argument in probabilistic terms. One way to do this, (...)
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  24. Coherence of Information: What It Is and Why It Matters.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:3617-3623.
    Coherence considerations play an important role in science and in everyday reasoning. However, it is unclear what exactly is meant by coherence of information and why we prefer more coherent information over less coherent information. To answer these questions, we first explore how to explicate the dazzling notion of ``coherence'' and how to measure the coherence of an information set. To do so, we critique prima facie plausible proposals that incorporate normative principles such as ``Agreement'' or ``Dependence'' and then argue (...)
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  25. Editors with multiple retractions, but who serve on journal editorial boards: Case studies.Jaime A. Teixeira da Silva & Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2023 - Epistēmēs Metron Logos 9:1-8.
    In a recent opinion paper, it was argued that individuals with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct should not serve as editors, including as editors-in-chief, on the editorial boards of scholarly or academic journals. As a first step towards appreciating how such a policy could be applied in practice, the presence of 30 individuals listed on the Retraction Watch Leaderboard on editorial boards was screened. Six cases are highlighted to gain an appreciation of the potential reputational risks that (...)
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  26. Sociology.Lee Yunho - 2023 - Eml.
    Traditional focuses of sociology include social stratification, social class, social mobility, religion, secularization, law, sexuality, gender, and deviance. Recent studies have added socio-technical aspects of the digital divide as a new focus.
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  27. Norm Conflicts and Epistemic Modals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & John Cantwell - 2023 - Cognitive Psychology 145 (101591):1-30.
    Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...)
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  28. Edenic Orgulity.Gordon Belot - manuscript
    The orgulity objection of Belot (2013) is recast in the form of a decision problem.
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  29. Infinite Opinion Sets and Relative Accuracy.Ilho Park & Jaemin Jung - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):285-313.
    We can have credences in an infinite number of propositions—that is, our opinion set can be infinite. Accuracy-first epistemologists have devoted themselves to evaluating credal states with the help of the concept of ‘accuracy’. Unfortunately, under several innocuous assumptions, infinite opinion sets yield several undesirable results, some of which are even fatal, to accuracy-first epistemology. Moreover, accuracy-first epistemologists cannot circumvent these difficulties in any standard way. In this regard, we will suggest a non-standard approach, called a relativistic approach, to accuracy-first (...)
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  30. Good guesses as accuracy-specificity tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2025-2050.
    Guessing is a familiar activity, one we engage in when we are uncertain of the answer to a question under discussion. It is also an activity that lends itself to normative evaluation: some guesses are better than others. The question that interests me here is what makes for a good guess. In recent work, Dorst and Mandelkern have argued that good guesses are distinguished from bad ones by how well they optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and specificity. Here I argue (...)
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  31. Mystical Rationality.Isaac Wilhelm - 2022 - In Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt (eds.), Avatar: The Last Airbender and Philosophy: Wisdom From Aang to Zuko. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 88–97.
    In this chapter, we explore some ways in which reasoning based on mysticism can be rational, focusing on the episode “The Fortuneteller,” in which Aang, Katara, and Sokka save a village from a volcanic eruption. Throughout this episode, Sokka advocates a purely empirical approach to reasoning. The villagers, however, believe that no source of knowledge is more reliable than Aunt Wu, the local fortuneteller. At several points in the episode, Sokka claims that the villagers’ reliance on Aunt Wu is irrational. (...)
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  32. Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design.Jürgen Landes - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (2):215-231.
    This article connects recent work in formal epistemology to work in economics and computer science. Analysing the Dutch Book Arguments, Epistemic Utility Theory and Objective Bayesian Epistemology we discover that formal epistemologists employ the same argument structure as economists and computer scientists. Since similar approaches often have similar problems and have shared solutions, opportunities for cross-fertilisation abound.
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  33. Actual value in decision theory.Andrew Bacon - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):617-629.
    Decision theory is founded on the principle that we ought to take the action that has the maximum expected value from among actions we are in a position to take. But prior to the notion of expected value is the notion of the actual value of that action: roughly, a measure of the good outcomes you would in fact procure if you were to take it. Surprisingly many decision theories operate without an analysis of actual value. I offer a definition (...)
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  34. Unspecific Evidence and Normative Theories of Decision.Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Episteme:1-23.
    The nature of evidence is a problem for epistemology, but I argue that this problem intersects with normative decision theory in a way that I think is underappreciated. Among some decision theorists, there is a presumption that one can always ignore the nature of evidence while theorizing about principles of rational choice. In slogan form: decision theory only cares about the credences agents actually have, not the credences they should have. I argue against this presumption. In particular, I argue that (...)
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  35. Uma Abordagem Bayesiana ao Paradoxo do Prefácio.Samuel Cibils - 2018 - Intuitio 11 (1):p.65-76.
    Is logic a normative science for reasoning? Do its principles play any role in the rationality of our beliefs? Being logically consistent is supposed to be a principle for the theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, it seems that logical consistency imposes a constraint on rational belief. However, the preface paradox puts this principle to the test, since the ‘state of preface’ would be a rational state. We will present an analysis according to a Bayesian model of degrees of belief in order to (...)
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  36. Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.
    The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first program in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which (...)
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  37. Iterated Knowledge.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    You omega know p when you possess every iteration of knowledge of p. This book argues that omega knowledge plays a central role in philosophy. In particular, the book argues that omega knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. Although omega knowledge plays this important role, existing theories of omega knowledge are unsatisfying. One theory, KK, identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This theory struggles to accommodate cases of inexact knowledge. The other main theory is skeptical, claiming that (...)
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  38. Consequences of Calibration.Robert Williams & Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:14.
    Drawing on a passage from Ramsey's Truth and Probability, we formulate a simple, plausible constraint on evaluating the accuracy of credences: the Calibration Test. We show that any additive, continuous accuracy measure that passes the Calibration Test will be strictly proper. Strictly proper accuracy measures are known to support the touchstone results of accuracy-first epistemology, for example vindications of probabilism and conditionalization. We show that our use of Calibration is an improvement on previous such appeals by showing how it answers (...)
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  39. Natural Theology and Divine Freedom.Philipp Kremers - forthcoming - Sophia:1-16.
    Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the (...)
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  40. Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion.Dennis Whitcomb & Jared Millson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-23.
    A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...)
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  41. Degrees of incoherence, Dutch bookability & guidance value.Jason Konek - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):395-428.
    Why is it good to be less, rather than more incoherent? Julia Staffel, in her excellent book “Unsettled Thoughts,” answers this question by showing that if your credences are incoherent, then there is some way of nudging them toward coherence that is guaranteed to make them more accurate and reduce the extent to which they are Dutch-bookable. This seems to show that such a nudge toward coherence makes them better fit to play their key epistemic and practical roles: representing the (...)
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  42. Formal epistemology.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum.
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  43. Il paradosso della conoscibilità.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Padua: Padova University Press.
    Il paradosso della conoscibilità è un semplice argomento che partendo da premesse piuttosto modeste giunge alla sorprendente conclusione che vi sono verità inconoscibili; verità che è impossibile sapere non già per limiti fisici o cognitivi, ma nemmeno in linea di principio. L’argomento sembra dimostrare l’esistenza di limiti necessari ed ineludibili del sapere umano. Tale conclusione è apparentemente in grado di confutare un gran numero di teorie filosofiche quali per esempio l’idealismo trascendentale Kantiano, il pragmatismo di Peirce e James, e varie (...)
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  44. Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.
    There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some (...)
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  45. Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscript
    In response to two trenchant objections, radical subjective Bayesianism has been widely rejected. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I argue that what is at stake in the subjectivism/anti-subjectivism debate is not, as is commonly thought, which norms of rationality are true, but rather, the conception of rationality that we adopt: there is an alternative approach to the widespread telic approach to rationality, which I (...)
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  46. The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
    Awareness growth—coming to entertain propositions of which one was previously unaware—is a crucial aspect of epistemic thriving. And yet, it is widely believed that orthodox Bayesianism cannot accommodate this phenomenon, since that would require employing supposedly defective catch-all propositions. Orthodox Bayesianism, it is concluded, must be amended. In this paper, I show that this argument fails, and that, on the contrary, the orthodox version of Bayesianism is particularly well-suited to accommodate awareness growth. For it entails what I call the refinement (...)
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  47. Der Boden der Erkenntnistheorie. Reflexionen, Kritik und eine logische Re-Konzeption der Erkenntnisbeziehung.Rudolf Lindpointner - manuscript
    Was für eine Art von Beziehung ist die Erkenntnisbeziehung? Ihre geläufige Konzeption im Sinne einer linearen Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung bildet so etwas wie den Boden, bzw. das logische Rückgrat der Erkenntnistheorie. Von ihr leiten sich weitestgehend die Annahmen, Vorstellungen und Begriffe her, in denen wir über Erkenntnis (als Tätigkeit und als Produkt) kommunizieren. Und insofern ist sie auf informelle oder explizite Weise auch ein Kernelement unserer Auffassung von Wissenschaft. Die Bezeichnung als 'logisches Rückgrat' der Erkenntnistheorie verweist dabei zugleich auf ihren heuristisch-funktionalen Zusammenhang (...)
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  48. States of ignorance and ignorance of states: Examining the Quantum Principal Principle.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90 (C):160-167.
    Earman (2018) has recently argued that the Principal Principle, a principle of rationality connecting objective chance and credence, is a theorem of quantum probability theory. This paper critiques Earman's argument, while also offering a positive proposal for how to understand the status of the Principal Principle in quantum probability theory.
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  49. The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here. In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality---call it the `Typical Principle'---which links rational belief to facts about what is typical. As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face. And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts of the Principal Principle: so ultimately, the Typical Principle (...)
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  50. A formal epistemology reader.Horacio Arló-Costa (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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