This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.

Formal Epistemology

Assistant editor: Mackenzie Marcotte (University of Western Ontario)
Related categories

2844 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 2844
Material to categorize
  1. Il paradosso della conoscibilità.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Padua: Padova University Press.
    Il paradosso della conoscibilità è un semplice argomento che partendo da premesse piuttosto modeste giunge alla sorprendente conclusione che vi sono verità inconoscibili; verità che è impossibile sapere non già per limiti fisici o cognitivi, ma nemmeno in linea di principio. L’argomento sembra dimostrare l’esistenza di limiti necessari ed ineludibili del sapere umano. Tale conclusione è apparentemente in grado di confutare un gran numero di teorie filosofiche quali per esempio l’idealismo trascendentale Kantiano, il pragmatismo di Peirce e James, e varie (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Why Aren't I Part of a Whale?David Builes & Caspar Hare - forthcoming - Analysis.
    We start by presenting three different views that jointly imply that all people have a large number of conscious beings in their immediate vicinity, and that the number greatly varies from person to person. We then present and assess an argument to the conclusion that how confident people should be in these views should sensitively depend on how massive they happen to be. According to the argument, sometimes irreducibly de se observations can be powerful evidence for or against believing in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Suspending Belief in Credal Accounts.Andrew del Rio - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1.Andrew del Rio - forthcoming - Analysis.
    On one view of the traditional doxastic attitudes, belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0 and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1. In ‘Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief’ (2013) Jane Friedman argues, against this view, that there are cases where a credence of 0 is required but where suspension is permitted. If this were so, belief, disbelief and suspension could not be identified or reduced to the aforementioned credences. I argue that Friedman relies on two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Good Guesses as Accuracy-Specificity Tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Guessing is a familiar activity, one we engage in when we are uncertain of the answer to a question under discussion. It is also an activity that lends itself to normative evaluation: some guesses are better than others. The question that interests me here is what makes for a good guess. In recent work, Dorst and Mandelkern have argued that good guesses are distinguished from bad ones by how well they optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and specificity. Here, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscript
    In response to two trenchant objections, radical subjective Bayesianism has been widely rejected. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I argue that what is at stake in the subjectivism/anti-subjectivism debate is not, as is commonly thought, which norms of rationality are true, but rather, the conception of rationality that we adopt: there is an alternative approach to the widespread telic approach to rationality, which I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - manuscript
    Awareness growth—coming to entertain propositions of which one was previously unaware—is a crucial aspect of epistemic thriving. And yet, it is widely believed that orthodox Bayesianism cannot accommodate this phenomenon, since that would require employing supposedly defective catch-all propositions. Orthodox Bayesianism, it is concluded, must be amended. In this paper, I show that this argument fails, and that, on the contrary, the orthodox version of Bayesianism is particularly well-suited to accommodate awareness growth. For it entails what I call the refinement (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Der Boden der Erkenntnistheorie. Reflexionen, Kritik und eine logische Re-Konzeption der Erkenntnisbeziehung.Rudolf Lindpointner - manuscript
    Was für eine Art von Beziehung ist die Erkenntnisbeziehung? Ihre geläufige Konzeption im Sinne einer linearen Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung bildet so etwas wie den Boden, bzw. das logische Rückgrat der Erkenntnistheorie. Von ihr leiten sich weitestgehend die Annahmen, Vorstellungen und Begriffe her, in denen wir über Erkenntnis (als Tätigkeit und als Produkt) kommunizieren. Und insofern ist sie auf informelle oder explizite Weise auch ein Kernelement unserer Auffassung von Wissenschaft. Die Bezeichnung als 'logisches Rückgrat' der Erkenntnistheorie verweist dabei zugleich auf ihren heuristisch-funktionalen Zusammenhang (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here. In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality---call it the `Typical Principle'---which links rational belief to facts about what is typical. As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face. And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts of the Principal Principle: so ultimately, the Typical Principle (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. A formal epistemology reader.Horacio Arló-Costa (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Accuracy and probabilism in infinite domains.Michael Nielsen - forthcoming - Mind.
    The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first program in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic.Corey Dethier - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2285-2301.
    The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Getting Accurate About Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind:1-28.
    There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favor, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?Matheus de Lima Rui - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):135-152.
    It is certainly well accepted that formal models play a key role in scientific job. Its use goes from natural sciences like physics and even to social sciences like economics and politics. Using mathematics allows the researcher to consider more complicated scenarios involving several variables. Some models are developed to make predictions, others to describe a phenomena, or just to improve the explanation of events in the world. But what has all this to do with philosophy? The aim of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Credal Imprecision and the Value of Evidence.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence: roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision: the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise, i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In A. K. Flowerree & Baron Reed (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
    Bayesians standardly claim that there is rational pressure for agents’ credences to cohere across time because they face bad (epistemic or practical) consequences if they fail to diachronically cohere. But as David Christensen has pointed out, groups of individual agents also face bad consequences if they fail to interpersonally cohere, and there is no general rational pressure for one agent's credences to cohere with another’s. So it seems that standard Bayesian arguments may prove too much. Here, we agree with Christensen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Graded Ratifiability.David James Barnett - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (2):57-88.
    An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19. A Qualitative Approach to Conceptual Spaces: Prototypes as Qualitative Atoms.Javier Belastegui - 2022 - Erkenntnis (Online):1-36.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a qualitative approach to the theory of conceptual spaces, in contrast to the usual metric framework. This requires qualitative notions of similarity, simple concepts, prototypes and conceptual categorisation. For this purpose, I will introduce three mathematical models for conceptual spaces. The first one is topological and has been proposed by Mormann. The other two are new and are based on atomistic orders and similarity relations. I will discuss how each of them deals (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. What of multi- and interdisciplinarity? A (personal) case study.Luis M. Augusto - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (2):1-3.
    An analysis of--yet another--case of academic failure in multi- and interdisciplinarity. An editorial of the Journal of Knowledge Structures & Systems.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - forthcoming - Mind.
    Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Degrees of Incoherence, Dutch Bookability & Guidance Value.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-34.
    Why is it good to be less, rather than more incoherent? Julia Staffel, in her excellent book "Unsettled Thoughts," answers this question by showing that if your credences are incoherent, then there is some way of nudging them toward coherence that is guaranteed to make them more accurate and reduce the extent to which they are Dutch-bookable. This seems to show that such a nudge toward coherence makes them better fit to play their key epistemic and practical roles: representing the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Actual Value in Decision Theory.Andrew Bacon - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Decision theory is founded on the principle that we ought to take the action that has the maximum expected value from among actions we are in a position to take. But prior to the notion of expected value is the notion of the actual value of that action: roughly, a measure of the good outcomes you would in fact procure if you were to take it. Surprisingly many decision theories operate without an analysis of actual value. I offer a definition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Diachronic trends in the topic distributions of formal epistemology abstracts.David Kinney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-34.
    Formal epistemology is a growing field of philosophical research. It is also evolving, with the subject matter of formal epistemology papers changing considerably over the past two decades. To quantify the ways in which formal epistemology is changing, I generate a stochastic block topic model of the abstracts of papers classified by PhilPapers.org as pertaining to formal epistemology. This model identifies fourteen salient topics of formal epistemology abstracts at a first level of abstraction, and four topics at a second level (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.
    Extreme Permissivism is the view that a body of evidence could rationally permit both the attitude of belief and disbelief towards a proposition. This paper puts forward a new argument against Extreme Permissivism, which improves on a similar style of argument due to Roger White (2005, 2014). White’s argument is built around the principle that the support relation between evidence and a hypothesis is objective: so that if evidence E makes it rational for an agent to believe a hypothesis H, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge.Brett Topey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Hilary Greaves and David Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy and so is a rational requirement, but their argument presupposes a particular picture of the bridge between rationality and accuracy: the Best-Plan-to-Follow picture. And theorists such as Miriam Schoenfield and Robert Steel argue that it's possible to motivate an alternative picture—the Best-Plan-to-Make picture—that does not vindicate conditionalization. I show that these theorists are mistaken: it turns out that, if an update procedure maximizes expected accuracy on the Best-Plan-to-Follow picture, it's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. JTB-Epistemology and the Gettier problem in the framework of topological epistemic logic.Thomas Mormann -
    Abstract. Traditional epistemology of knowledge and belief can be succinctly characterized as JTB-epistemology, i.e., it is characterized by the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. Since Gettier’s trail-blazing paper of 1963 this account has become under heavy attack. The aim of is paper is to study the Gettier problem and related issues in the framework of topological epistemic logic. It is shown that in the framework of topological epistemic logic Gettier situations necessarily occur for most topological models of knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Prison Break? In Defense of Correlationism.Emanuel Rutten - manuscript
    A core presumption of object oriented ontology and other speculative realisms is that there is a world independent of the mind that can be successfully inquired and should take center stage in our reflections again. A profound case for this realist presumption is found in Meillassoux’s After Finitude. He aims to secure our access to reality as it is in itself by refuting correlationism according to which we cannot escape reality as it is thought by us. He presents three arguments: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. A Primer on Bartlett's CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON.Steven James Bartlett - 2021 - Willamette Univesity Faculty Research Website.
    This is a primer on Steven James Bartlett's book CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING. ●●●●● -/- Some books are long and complex. The Critique of Impure Reason is such a book. It is long enough and complex enough so that it may be a service to some readers to offer a primer to introduce and partially summarize the book’s objectives and method. Here, the author of Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning provides such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Risco: modal ou probablístico?Gustavo Oliva de Oliveira - 2021 - In Valentinne Serpa, Vinícius Felipe Posselt, Bruna Diedrich & Darlan Lorenzetti (eds.), XXI SEMANA ACADÊMICA DO PPG EM FILOSOFIA DA PUCRS VOLUME II – FILOSOFIA MEDIEVAL / FEMINISMO / FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA. Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil: pp. 125-140.
    The traditional conception of risk is probabilistic, according to which the degree of risk of an event is determined by the probability of its occurence. Recently this view was challenged by Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016), who suggested a modal theory of risk, centered in the idea that the riskiness of events depends on the modal distance between the actual world and worlds where the event obtains. What is attractive about this theory, according to Pritchard, is that it explains our judgement (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matt Hewson - 2021 - Noûs.
    This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multi-premise closed belief set, and not a (merely) single-premise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief-sensitive; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief-insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the belief-sensitive over belief-insensitive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization.Sophie Horowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):303-319.
    I argue that three arguments for conditionalization -- the Diachronic Dutch Book, the expected-accuracy maximization argument from Greaves and Wallace, and the accuracy-dominance argument from Briggs and Pettigrew -- can all be improved by narrowing their focus. I suggest alternative, targeted arguments which better identify the flaw involved in non-conditionalizing updates.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Do sistema de conhecimento de Descartes: o “eu” como “coisa em si” e a “consciência da consciência”.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2015 - Revista Húmus 5 (13):2-31.
    Se o sentido e a finalidade da razão como instrumento de conhecimento converge para a possibilidade de discernimento envolvendo o verdadeiro e o falso, o que se impõe ao seu exercício não é senão um método que consiste na aplicação de determinados preceitos destinados tanto ao entendimento como à vontade, cuja contradição caracteriza o fundamento metafísico do erro, segundo Descartes que, conforme assinala o referido artigo, recorre a uma dúvida que, na investigação dos fundamentos absolutos, encerra uma radicalidade que tende (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Popper e a objetividade do conhecimento científico: a ciência provisória e a verdade temporária.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2011 - Cognitio-Estudos: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia - Philosophy Eletronic Journal 8 (1):17-28.
    Se a leitura da epistemologia clássica e a perspectiva dos adeptos do “empirismo lógico” assinalam que a ciência demanda a exclusão de tudo aquilo que não se impõe ao horizonte que envolve a dedutibilidade analítica e a verificabilidade, Karl Popper defende que mais do que saber quando e em que condição uma teoria dialoga com a verdade a relevância não acena senão para a demarcação entre ciência e não ciência, particularmente no tocante às fronteiras que abrangem a ciência que carrega (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: the metaphysical dualism the principle of multiple-unit.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2014 - Revista Filosofia Capital 9 (2): 85-98.
    Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafí­sica da vontade e o pensamento (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-27.
    The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. El poscolonialismo o el colonialismo de los ‘pos.José Ramón Fabelo Corzo - 2002 - Revista Internacional Marx Ahora 13 (13):130-141.
    Se realiza una valoración crítica de algunas de las propuestas teóricas fundamentales del poscolonialismo, particularmente del Grupo Latinoamericano de Estudios Subalternos, nacido en los Estados Unidos en la década de 1990. Se muestra algunos de sus méritos, pero, sobre todo, sus limitaciones teórico-prácticas. -/- .
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. World Domination in Decision Theory and Formal Epistemology.Stephen Yablo - manuscript
  40. Connaissance formelle.Cedric Paternotte - 2018 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Local explanations via necessity and sufficiency: unifying theory and practice.David Watson, Limor Gultchin, Taly Ankur & Luciano Floridi - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32:185-218.
    Necessity and sufficiency are the building blocks of all successful explanations. Yet despite their importance, these notions have been conceptually underdeveloped and inconsistently applied in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), a fast-growing research area that is so far lacking in firm theoretical foundations. Building on work in logic, probability, and causality, we establish the central role of necessity and sufficiency in XAI, unifying seemingly disparate methods in a single formal framework. We provide a sound and complete algorithm for computing explanatory factors (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. BACON E A INDUÇÃO POR SUBTRAÇÃO COMO NOVO MÉTODO INDUTIVO NA FUNDAÇÃO DO EMPIRISMO MODERNO.Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa - 2020 - Revista Filosofia Capital 15 (22):21-35.
    Defendendo a união entre a razão e a experiência como a possibilidade de instauração do desenvolvimento científico, Bacon se contrapõe à indução aristotélica enquanto procedimento que implica a enumeração de casos particulares tendo em vista o objetivo de encontrar o geral existente em todos e em cada um deles em um processo que se detém na soma de fatos, limitando-se à comunicação, na medida em que não tem capacidade de empreender a descoberta do conhecimento. Dessa forma, sobrepondo-se ao acúmulo de (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Da ciência das quatro causas à ciência conjectural: Demonstração, invenção e descoberta entre Aristóteles, Bacon, Kant e Popper.Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa - 2021 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: PZP - Politikón Zôon Publicações.
    O referido trabalho de pesquisa se detém no desenvolvimento do pensamento científico através de uma construção teórico-conceitual baseada em Aristóteles, Bacon, Kant e Popper, convergindo para uma investigação que assinala desde a fundação da ciência em um processo que traz como perspectiva a ciência da substância (ou ciência das quatro causas) de Aristóteles, mostrando a contribuição de Bacon para a instauração da ciência moderna por intermédio da concepção de um novo método indutivo e da união entre ciência e técnica com (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.
    Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one’s total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This paper focuses on an often misunderstood and underexplored response to this (and similar) puzzles, the so-called conflicting-ideals view. Drawing on work from defeasible logic, I propose understanding this view as a move away from the default metaepistemological position according to which rationality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Accuracy and Educated Guesses.Sophie Horowitz - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  46. Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.
    The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  47. Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence.Mario J. Rizzo - 1999 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 9 (4):497-510.
    Nous proposons dans cet article un développement de l’idée proposée par F.A. Hayek selon laquelle l’ordre du droit coutumier est un ordre d’action, une coordination des plans individuels dans un système d’échange régi par ce droit. Cette conception s’oppose à l’idée suivant laquelle l’ordre légal doit être avant tout fondé sur la cohérence logique des concepts et doctrines de ce droit. Un exemple important de cette approche est celui de la structure de maximisation des richesses de William Landes et Richard (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Disagreement. Edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield. (Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. 291. Price $35.00.).Jeffrey Glick - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):422-425.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Modellings for Belief Change: Base Contraction, Multiple Contraction, and Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function.Hans Rott - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
1 — 50 / 2844